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Central Bank Independence

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Monetary Economics

Part of the book series: The New Palgrave Economics Collection ((NPHE))

Abstract

Central bank independence refers to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or governmental influence in the conduct of policy.

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Bibliography

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Authors
  1. Carl E. Walsh
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

    Steven N. Durlauf

  2. Cornell University, USA

    Lawrence E. Blume

Copyright information

© 2010 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Walsh, C.E. (2010). Central Bank Independence. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Monetary Economics. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280854_3

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