Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals
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David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
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Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
Aness Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287 - 313 (2011)
| Abstract |
Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context-sensitive 'all cases', in the spirit of David Lewis's contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, necessary conditions on knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
John Hawthorne (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
View all 18 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Knowledge and Implicatures. Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.
Nina Emery (2015). The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
Karen S. Lewis (2015). Elusive Counterfactuals. Noûs 50 (1):n/a-n/a.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2013). Basic Knowledge and Contextualist “E = K”. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):282-292.
Bernhard Salow (2016). Lewis on Iterated Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1571-1590.
View all 7 citations / Add more citations
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