Revelation

on calculating Apocalypse, awakening the Avatar, and related.

You can get a quick summary of this book on p 135 or 326. If you are not up to speed on evolutionary psychology, you should first read one of the numerous recent texts with this term in the title. One of the best is "The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology" 2nd ed by Buss. Until about 15 years ago, ´explanations´ of behavior have not really been explanations of mental processes at all, but rather vague and largely useless descriptions of what (...) people did and what they said, with no insight into why. We might say that people gather to commemorate an event, praise god, receive his (or her or their) blessings, etc., but none of this describes the relevant mental processes, so we might say they are explanations in much the same way that it explains why an apple drops to the ground if we say its because we released it, and it's heavy-there is no mechanism and no explanatory or predictive power. This book continues the elucidation of the genetic basis of human behavior which has been almost universally ignored and denied by academia, religion, politics and the public (see Pinker´s excellent book ``The Blank Slatè`). His statement (p3) that it is meaningless to ask if religion is genetic is mistaken as the percentage of variation of any behavior due to genes and environment can be studied, just as they are for all other behaviors (see e.g., Pinker). The title should be Preliminary Attempts to Explain Some Aspects of Primitive Religion, since he does not treat higher consciousness at all (e.g., satori, enlightenment etc.) which are by far the most interesting phenomena and the only part of religion of personal interest to intelligent, educated people in the 21st century. Reading this entire book, you would never guess such things exist. Likewise, for the immense field of drugs and religion. It lacks a framework for rationality and does not mention the dual systems of thought view which is now so productive. For this I suggest my own recent papers. Nevertheless, the book has much of interest, and in spite of being dated is still worth reading. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says `The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well be true. I am in my 70´s and have read many books by spiritual teachers and on spirituality, and this is one of the greatest. Certainly, it is by far the fullest and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I have (...) ever seen. Even if you have no interest at all in the most fascinating of all human psychological processes, it is an amazing document that reveals a great deal about religion, yoga, and human psychology and probes the depths and limits of human possibilities. I describe it in some detail and compare his teaching with that of the Contemporary Indian mystic Osho. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. -/- There is a strong (...) tendency among adherents of different faith traditions to invoke asymmetric explanations of the religious value or salvific status of the home religion vis-à-vis all others. Attributions of good/bad religious luck and exclusivist dismissal of the significance of religious disagreement are the central phenomena that the book studies. -/- Part I lays out a taxonomy of kinds of religious luck, a taxonomy that draws upon but extends work on moral and epistemic luck. It asks: What is going on when persons, theologies, or purported revelations ascribe various kinds of religiously-relevant traits to insiders and outsiders of a faith tradition in sharply asymmetric fashion? “I am saved but you are lost”; “My religion is holy but yours is idolatrous”; “My faith tradition is true, and valued by God, but yours is false and valueless.” Part II further develops the theory introduced in Part I, pushing forward both the descriptive/explanatory and normative sides of what the author terms his inductive risk account. Firstly, the concept of inductive risk is shown to contribute to the needed field of comparative fundamentalism by suggesting new psychological markers of fundamentalist orientation. The second side of what is termed an inductive risk account is concerned with the epistemology of religious belief, but more especially with an account of the limits of reasonable religious disagreement. Problems of inductively risky modes of belief-formation problematize claims to religion-specific knowledge. But the inductive risk account does not aim to set religion apart, or to challenge the reasonableness of religious belief tout court. Rather the burden of the argument is to challenge the reasonableness of attitudes of religious exclusivism, and to demotivate the “polemical apologetics” that exclusivists practice and hope to normalize. -/- Lexington Books Pages: 290 978-1-4985-5017-8 • Hardback • December 2018 • $95.00 • (£65.00) 978-1-4985-5018-5 • eBook • December 2018 • $90.00 • (£60.00) ISBN 978-1-4985-5018-5 (pbk: alk. paper) (coming 2020) [Download the 30% personal use Discount Order Form I uploaded for hardcover or e-book, and please ask your library to purchase a copy for their collection.]. (shrink)

This micro-summary and extended overview for the Special Divine Action Project discusses the connection between divine action and religious experience.

marginal notes on Jung, Sartre, Valéry, Tolkien, Borges, and more; with woven-in autobiography.

In this very brief piece I suggest the possibility of regarding the Bible as both revealed and fallible, by outlining a theory of revelation that sees it as conditioned by the limitations of those who receive it.

Theology Without Walls is a project that seeks to understand the nature of divine reality through an exploration of all the world's religious traditions, without confining itself to any one in particular. In this essay, I discuss why theology has traditionally been done within the boundaries of specific traditions and suggest that, in our time, we are called to a new, more comprehensive, approach to theology.

In this paper, I examine various philosophical approaches to religious experience and natural theology and look at some ways in which the former might be relevant for the latter. I argue that by thinking more about oft-overlooked or -underemphasized understandings of a) what might constitute religious experience and b) what functions natural theology might serve, we can begin to develop a more nuanced approach to natural theological appeals to religious experience — one that makes use of materially mediated religious experience (...) to develop a natural theology more sensitive to the varieties of experience of lived religion “on the ground”. (shrink)

This essay addresses arguments regarding the “place” or “non-place” in which ideas originate and whether they are wholly transcendental, wholly contingent, or a combination of transcendental and contingent. Far from a resuscitation or recitation of Medieval scholastic disputations, the essay seeks to situate these untimely concerns in the context of spent discursive and ideological systems that support capitalist exploitation of the knowledge commons, exploitation only made possible because of a decisive and historically determined reduction of knowledge to fully contingent status (...) as spectral commodity. (shrink)

Obstacles to Divine Revelation examines the notion that there are obstacles to God giving revelation, if God exists. Rolfe King argues that exploring these significantly refines ideas of evidence for God, including the claim that God must operate within a logically necessary structure of revelation. Examining obstacles to divine revelation clarifies this structure and paves the way to evaluating its significance.

One not infrequently hears rumors that the robust practice of natural theology reeks of epistemic pride. Paul Moser’s is a paradigm of such contempt. In this paper we defend the robust practice of natural theology from the charge of epistemic pride. In taking an essentially Thomistic approach, we argue that the evidence of natural theology should be understood as a species of God’s general self-revelation. Thus, an honest assessment of that evidence need not be prideful, but can be an act (...) of epistemic humility, receiving what God has offered, answering God’s call. Lastly, we provide criticisms of Moser’s alternative approach, advancing a variety of philosophical and theological problems against his conception of personifying evidence. (shrink)

The grand and sweeping claims of many relativists might seem to amount to the argument that everything is relative--except the thesis of relativism. In this book, Steven Hales defends relativism, but in a more circumscribed form that applies specifically to philosophical propositions. His claim is that philosophical propositions are relatively true--true in some perspectives and false in others. Hales defends this argument first by examining rational intuition as the method by which philosophers come to have the beliefs they do. Analytic (...) rationalism, he claims, has a foundational reliance on rational intuition as a method of acquiring basic beliefs. He then argues that there are other methods that people use to gain beliefs about philosophical topics that are strikingly analogous to rational intuition and examines two of these: Christian revelation and the ritual use of hallucinogens. Hales argues that rational intuition is not epistemically superior to either of these alternative methods. There are only three possible outcomes: we have no philosophical knowledge ; there are no philosophical propositions ; or there are knowable philosophical propositions, but our knowledge of them is relative to doxastic perspective. Hales defends relativism against the charge that it is self-refuting and answers a variety of objections to this account of relativism. Finally, he examines the most sweeping objection to relativism: that philosophical propositions are not merely relatively true, because there are no philosophical propositions--all propositions are ultimately empirical, as the naturalists contend. Hales's somewhat disturbing conclusion--that intuition-driven philosophy does produce knowledge, but not absolute knowledge--is sure to inspire debate among philosophers. (shrink)

In their recent paper, Brandon Rickabaugh and Derek McAllister object to Paul Moser’s rejection of natural theology on the grounds that Moser is committed to a principle, Seek, which commits Moser to another principle, Access. Access in turn can be rationally motivated for at least some nonbelievers only by the arguments of natural theology. So Moser is in fact committed to the epistemic usefulness of natural theology. In this paper, we show that Seek by itself does not commit one to (...) Access, and that even if Moser is committed to Access, he is not thereby committed to the epistemic usefulness of natural theology for all nonbelievers. While we find this argument offered by Rickabaugh and McAllister lacking, we do not deny their conclusion that natural theology is epistemically useful to all nonbelievers. (shrink)

To what extent are the answers to theological questions knowable? And if the relevant answers are knowable, which sorts of inquirers are in a position to know them? In this chapter we shall not answer these questions directly but instead supply a range of tools that may help us make progress here. The tools consist of plausible structural constraints on knowledge. After articulating them, we shall go on to indicate some ways in which they interact with theological scepticism. In some (...) cases the structural constraints bear directly on whether one can know answers to theological questions. But the structural considerations are related to theological scepticism in other interesting ways as well; for instance we will also be using them to explore the significance of scepticism, by addressing questions such as ‘To what extent does it matter whether or not we can know the answer to theological questions?’. (shrink)

John Smith (1618-1652), long known for the elegance of his prose and the breadth of his erudition, has been underappreciated as a philosophical theologian. This book redresses this by showing how the spiritual senses became an essential tool for responding to early modern developments in philosophy, science, and religion for Smith. Through a close reading of the Select Discourses (1660) it is shown how Smith’s theories of theological knowledge, method, and prophecy as well as his prescriptive account of Christian piety (...) rely on his spiritual aesthetics. Smith offers a coherent system with intellectual intuition informing natural theology and revelation supplemented by spiritual perception via the imagination too. The central uniting feature of Smith’s philosophical theology is thus ‘spiritual sensation’ broadly construed. The book closes with proposals for research on Smith’s influence on the accounts of the spiritual senses developed by significant later figures including Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) and John Wesley (1703-1791). (shrink)

In this article I offer an extended, critical review of the analytic theology project. In the first part of the article, I investigate the origins and rise of analytic theology. I also offer some initial insights into the nature of analytic theology, based on some of what its chief proponents understand analytic theology to be. In the second part of the article, I summarize and evaluate some of the major contributions that already have been made within analytic theology. In the (...) third and final section of the article, I evaluate the analytic theology project as a whole, testing its compatibility with certain methods and movements within the Christian theological tradition. Based on this discussion, I then begin to narrate the advantages of construing analytic theology more narrowly, as a dogmatic project committed to articulating and defending Christian doctrine in rational pursuit of genuine theological knowledge and truth. My final claim is that analytic theologians should continue to engage in bold, speculative inquiry into the nature of the divine as well as related divine matters, and thus remain committed to developing and defending theology as a dogmatic and speculative enterprise. By doing so, analytic theologians will help fortify and elevate the contemporary theological enterprise as a whole. (shrink)

In this article, I take my own position within an ongoing debate about what place (if any) Christian theology should have within the secular university. Against both “secularists” and “sectarians,” I argue that we can and should locate the study (teaching and learning) of theology squarely within the secular university, once we cease to demand that all academic study within the secular university be framed by a narrowly defined and overly constrictive “secular perspective.” Freed from the controlling dogma of the (...) “secular perspective,” theology in the secular university can proceed unhindered in its quest for knowledge, following the classical method of “faith seeking understanding,” while still remaining remarkably inclusive of, and respectful toward, those who do not share specific theological commitments. (shrink)

This short essay was written in the context of a theological symposium on revelation. In focusing on the Indian religious traditions I have tried to avoid the persisting nineteenth century categories of theisms and revelations, and instead have discussed multi-optional and multilayered positions as contrasted with the ages-old preoccupation with singular, unique meanings. In today’s shifting attitudes towards overarching meanings it appears that both the adherents of monoscriptural systems and of the endless variety of options tend to express inadequacy in (...) the long run. (shrink)

Christianity, Islam, and Judaism all claim that God has given humans a revelation. Divine revelation may be either of God, or by God of propositional truth. Traditionally Christianity has claimed that the Christian revelation has involved both of these. God revealed himself in his acts in history; for example in the miracles by which he preserved the people of ancient Israel, and above all by becoming incarnate as Jesus Christ, who was crucified and rose from the dead. And God also (...) revealed to us propositional truths by the teaching of Jesus and his church. Some modern theologians have denied that Christianity involves any propositional revelation, but there can be little doubt that from the second century until the eighteenth century, Christians and non-Christians were virtually unanimous in supposing that it claimed to have such a revelation, and so it is worthwhile investigating its traditional claim. This article is concerned with the Christian claim to have a propositional revelation. The first section describes the process by which Christians of past centuries have come to believe that certain propositions have been revealed. The second assesses alternative philosophical accounts of what constitutes a belief that such-and-such propositions have been revealed, being a ‘justified’ belief. (shrink)

Jesus said to Peter, “Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven,” This looks like a noetic miracle which happened in (or to) Peter. Must all Christians have a comparable miracle in themselves, or does the Bible enable us to apprehend, in some “natural” way, the revelations made to prophets and apostles long ago?I suggest that we need not have a single answer to this question, and that the “mix” of revelation and (...) reason, natural and supernatural noetic elements, may be different in various believers. (shrink)

Christianity and other religions claim that their books and creeds contain truths revealed by God. How can we know whether they do? Revelation investigates the claim of the Christian religion to have such revealed truths; and so considers which parts of the Bible are to be regarded as literal history, and which as metaphorical truth. This entirely rewritten second edition contains a long new chapter examining whether traditional Christian claims about personal morality can be regarded as revealed truths.

Another spiritual adventure from a modern master. Adi Da is certainly one of the most powerful enlightened beings of modern times and his spritual autobiography ``The Knee of Listening`` (1978 originally, but revised and enlarged continually-see my review) is probably the most detailed and fascinating personal account there is of the process of enlightenment. He is a very smart and a good writer with a substantial output. However when speaking he is far less interesting as can be seen here or (...) in any of the videotapes available from the Adi da web page. This book is mostly transcribed from his talks to the small group of devotees with whom he lives on a small island in Fiji. It will mostly be valuable only to those who have followed him for many years and know his jargon and style and who practice his meditation or sit in his presence. Others will find it very tough going if not downright boring as he tries to convey the ineffable state of enlightenment). -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ 662p (2016). (shrink)

Flipping convention on its head, Eric Dietrich argues that science uncovers awe-inspiring, enduring mysteries, while religion, regarded as the source for such mysteries, is a biological phenomenon. Just like spoken language, Dietrich shows that religion is an evolutionary adaptation. Science is the source of perplexing yet beautiful mysteries, however natural the search for answers may be to human existence. _Excellent Beauty_ undoes our misconception of scientific inquiry as an executioner of beauty, making the case that science has won the battle (...) with religion so thoroughly it can now explain why religion persists. The book also draws deep lessons for human flourishing from the very existence of scientific mysteries. It is these latter wonderful, completely _public_ truths that constitute some strangeness in the proportion, revealing a universe worthy of awe and wonder. (shrink)

My paper addresses what a religion is. I comment briefly on the "substantive versus functionalist" debate, and I provide reasons to reject both of them. While I offer short summary arguments against the functionalist approach, I develop two detailed arguments against the substantive one. The former moves from the evidence that religious beliefs change over time. The latter moves from internal disagreements about the meaning of the core beliefs of a faith. These two arguments show that it is impossible to (...) reduce the belief system of any historical faith to a set of propositions which all the adherents to a tradition assent to. Although my arguments are conceptual, I include also empirical materials in support of my view. I then conclude by presenting a pluralist account of religions from an internalist standpoint. (shrink)

In this theological dialogue two characters, the skeptical Simon and the man of faith, Joseph, engage in a wide-ranging conversation touching on the meaning of morality, God, revelation, the Bible, and the viability of faith in a world full of evils.

ABSTRACT: This article aims to study Sufism (taṣawwuf) and inspiration (ilhâm), which is the main means of the mystical knowledge, in the thought of Ibn Taymiyya who is known generally as an exponent of a tradition grounded on the understanding of Salaf. He is considered by majority to be a rigid opponent of Sufism because of his unconventional interpretations of Sufi terminology. Also, since Ibn Taymiyya constantly offers the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, and the opinions of Salaf as the base of religious (...) knowledge, the idea that he does not lean toward inspirational and rational knowledge and he does not give a place for them in his epistemology came out and has grown in the course of time. As a result of our research, however, we realize Ibn Taymiyya admits the epistemological value of inspiration along with Sufism conditionally. While he divides Sufism into Early and Later periods, he examines inspiration in the context of knowledge (bâb al-ʿilm) which is considered to be a subcategory of supernatural events. Ibn Taymiyya, who believes that inspirational knowledge must be tested by means of the Qur’ān, Sunna, and the opinions of Salaf, without rejecting its reality, assesses the subject matter in detail through his own criteria. Therefore, this article, in which the subject is elaborated critically and descriptively, focuses on the approach of Ibn Taymiyya to Sufism and inspiration that is the basic element of Sufi knowledge. -/- SUMMARY: Ibn Taymiyya, who is one of the most influential, productive, and controversial Muslim scholars in history of Islam, exerted sincerely to find out the best and the most reliable way of acquiring religious knowledge. Through his fruitful works, his enormous knowledge of the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, Kalām, and Islamic and Greek philosophy can be witnessed. His works where his epistemological, theological, and philosophical statements are found dispersedly, are dealing with many issues such as revelation, the human intellect, inspiration (ilhām), Sufism, Aristotelian logic, the doctrines of Shia sect, methods of commentary of the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, creation of the world, the divine names and attributes, jihad, and juridical ones. Of all issues about which Ibn Taymiyya provided his opinions, Sufism obviously has been one of the most problematic ones. -/- Since Ibn Taymiyya criticizes Ibn al-ʿArabī who is considered to be the Greatest Master in Sufism, he has been acknowledged to be a virulent opponent of Sufism and its complements like knowledge of inspiration- unveiling which is bestowed to the heart of believers by God. It is correct to say that Ibn Taymiyya has objections to the conceptions of unification (ittihād), incarnation (ḥulūl), oneness of the existence (waḥdat al-wujūd), the fixed entities (aʿyān al-thābita), and the seal of the friends of God (khatam al-awliyā’) all of which are encountered abundantly in the studies of Ibn al-ʿArabī and Sufism. In addition to these conceptions, Ibn Taymiyya refutes kinds of unification including general unification and particular or specific unification. -/- Through detailed investigations of the works of Ibn Taymiyya it is possible to realize that Ibn Taymiyya elaborates Sufism under the categories of Early Sufism and Later Sufism. The Later Sufism, which is mostly heretical, is also elaborated with the distinction of philosophical and practical aspects. Furthermore, it is realized that along with criticisms of the practical aspects, his objections intensify on the philosophical Sufism, which may be called pantheistic, monistic, and metaphysical Sufism, imported noticeably from non-Islamic sources like Greek philosophy, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism. While Ibn Taymiyya persistently defends that the validity of Sufism depends on obedience to the Qur’ān and ḥadīth only, he interprets in his own way the conceptions of the friendship of God and inspiration (ilhām). According to Ibn Taymiyya, those, who are counted among the Early Sufism methodologically, even if not historically, like ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, Sahl Ibn al-Tusterī, and Maʿrūf al-Karkhī follow the Qur’ān and ḥadīth precisely. -/- As for inspiration itself as a way of acquisition of knowledge, it is worth noting that in Ibn Taymiyya’s teaching inspiration or unveiling (kashf) is not argued concerning its reality. It is neither a sort of active communication nor is it a superstition. On the contrary, Ibn Taymiyya suggests that inspiration is a kind of supernatural events (khawāriq), which can be seen as an effect (ta’thīr) or knowledge (ʿilm). In this respect, inspiration is examined under the category of knowledge. He believes that when God has lifted the cover from the heart of believers, the heart will be under the control of God. As a result of this divine control, the servants can find out the correct, valid, and permissible way to follow. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya, who classifies inspirational knowledge as divine (raḥmānī) and devilish (shayṭānī), emphasizes importance of religious and spiritual training for purification of the heart. -/- When the validity or acceptability of inspirational knowledge is in question, Ibn Taymiyya offers a test in the light of the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, and the opinions of the Salaf. According to him, the soundness of inspirational knowledge can be verified as long as it is weighed on the scale of these sources of Islamic sources. The reason for offering a test to verify the accuracy of inspirational knowledge received by a person is based on his idea that receiving inspirational knowledge is not an indication of being one of the friends of God at all. According to Ibn Taymiyya, it is very possible to perform or receive inspirational knowledge as a supernatural event not only for the friends of God but also for polytheists, disbelievers, people of the Book, and people of the innovation. He, as is said above, does not argue the validity of inspiration concerning its epistemological reality and value. What is more, he would rather give precedence to inspirational knowledge over weak ḥadīth reports, weak argumentations, and weak analogies. Therefore, it can be said that if we had to constitute an epistemological hierarchy of Ibn Taymiyya, it would be something like that the revelation, the human intellect, and inspiration, respectively. Finally, it may be propounded that even if there are several conditions to accept inspirational knowledge, it is a reality in Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology. (shrink)

A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says `The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well be true. I am in my 70´s and have read many books by spiritual teachers and on spirituality, and this is one of the greatest ones. Certainly it is by far the fullest and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I (...) have ever seen. Even if you have no interest at all in the most fascinating of all human psychological processes, it is an amazing document that reveals a great deal about religion, yoga, and human psychology and probes the depths and limits of human possibilities. I describe it in some detail and compare his teaching with that of the Indian mystic Osho. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

L’article édite la Collatio super Sacram Scripturam in generali d’Armand de Belvézer , contenue dans le ms. Paris, BnF lat 2584. Il propose de la considérer comme la reportation d’une partie de l’inceptio d’un bachelier sentenciaire, conforme à ce que prescriront les Statuts de l’Université de Bologne en 1366. Cette lecture conduit à réviser la biographie d’Armand de Belvézer et à préciser, grâce à une étude codicologique approfondie, l’origine du manuscrit, copié entre 1333-1342 pour le successeur d’Armand comme maître du (...) Sacré Palais, Arnaud de St-Michel. Par son contenu, la Collatio est à verser au dossier des théories du savoir théologique entre 1303 et 1325 etfait état d’un pré-thomisme serein, teinté d’influences aristotéliciennes et néo-platoniciennes. Elle associe Écriture sainte et théologie dans un même éloge, parfaitement cohérent mais desservi par un texte corrompu et difficile. (shrink)

A philosophy of language that incorporates the manifestation of divinity shed liberally upon the psyche of humanity without violence or chaos as in that which is common to the powers and sovereignties of human beings is critical to the understanding of Holy Writ. The discourse presented here is primarily intended to foster a better general understanding of the divine directive given to Moses by Yahweh to build the wilderness sanctuary in order to objectify his majestic presence among them and draw (...) their attention periodically to his Shekinah glory. It is the author’s deep desire to encourage ministers of religion, students and teachers of theology, linguistics, philology, and grammar, to develop an approach to biblical studies that take into account the biblical languages that were the sheaths for the sword of the word. A cursory reading of this script should generate active interest in these languages. (shrink)

Analytic theology is often seen as an outgrowth of analytic philosophy of religion. It isn’t fully clear, however, whether it differs from analytic philosophy of religion in some important way. Is analytic theology really just a sub-field of analytic philosophy of religion, or can it be distinguished from the latter in virtue of fundamental differences at the level of subject matter or metholodology? These are pressing questions for the burgeoning field of analytic theology. The aim of this article, then, will (...) be to map out several forms that analytic theology might (and in some cases actually does) take before examining the extent to which each can be thought to be distinct from analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The paper considers René Descartes’ assertion that believing that God exists because the Bible says so, and believing that what the Bible says is true because God says it, involves circular reasoning. It argues that there is no circularity involved in holding these beliefs, and maintains that the appearance of circularity results from an equivocation. It considers a line of argument that would defend the rationality of holding these beliefs, but does not try to prove its soundness.

The essay is divided into three parts. In the first part, I try to get clear about what we might mean in calling a text authoritative. In the second part, I draw distinctions between different things that we might mean by saying that a text is truthful. My goal in both of these parts is to arrive at some general conclusions about texts, rather than specific conclusions about the Bible. Consequently, I try to refrain from making assumptions about (e.g.) biblical (...) interpretation or about the truth of particular biblical texts. Indeed, for much of the discussion, the Bible is not even directly in view. In the third part I draw out some of the implications of the discussions in the first two parts for the question of how textual authority and textual truth are connected to one another. I also comment on the significance of these conclusions for discussions about the relation between biblical authority and biblical inerrancy. (shrink)

Dans ce travail, je me propose d'examiner, en réfléchissant sur l'apophatisme, les modalités par lesquelles la philosophie entre ou peut entrer en dialogue avec la théologie. L'ouverture vers la pensée théologique est fondée sur le fait que l'apophatisme philosophique peut être compris comme une étape préparatoire à l'apophatisme théologique: le dernier niveau auquel le philosophe peut arriver dans sa méditation peut correspondre à la première étape de la pensée apophatique à un niveau theologique.

Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational and unscientific. If you ask a philosopher, however, you'll likely get two answers: most religious belief is rational in some respects and irrational in other respects. In this essay I explain why they think religious belief is rational. In a sequel essay I explain why they think the very same beliefs are irrational.

This paper is part of a symposium on Linda Zagzebski's EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY (OUP, 2012). It focuses on Zagzebski's argument that the transmission of information through a chain of testimony weakens its evidential value. This argument is shown to rest on an overly simplistic model of testimonial transmission that does not apply to religious traditions. The real problem with modeling religious traditions just as transmitters of information is that this assumes a conception of religious knowledge that is too "insular" with respect (...) to other things the believer knows, as well as aspects of religious faith that go beyond the mere acceptance of doctrines. (shrink)