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Summary

Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) was a German-American philosopher mainly working in logic and philosophy of science. He began his philosophical career as a neo-Kantian, and later became a leading figure of the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. Since that time, he considered it as one of the main tasks of philosophy to “overcome metaphysics” – not simply as an internal philosophical issue, but also as a contribution of philosophy to the project of enlightenment and the fight against politically and morally pernicious ideologies. After his emigration to the United States (1935) he became one of the best-known representatives of philosophy of science and analytic philosophy. According to Carnap, the task of philosophy was to construct linguistic and ontological frameworks that could be used in the ongoing progress of scientific knowledge. In the last decades of his life he dedicated a great part of his work in the elaboration of inductive logic. 

Key works Two classical works of Carnap are Carnap 1928 (translated into English as Carnap 1969) and Carnap 1937. Two excellent collections of papers on all aspects of Carnap's philosophy are  Creath & Friedman 2007 and Richardson & Uebel 2007. The Schilpp volume Schilpp 1963 dedicated to Carnap is still worth reading. Klein & Awodey 2004 and  Friedman 2002 offer useful information on the European context of Carnap's philosophy.
Introductions Many introductory works on specific Carnapian themes may be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. There are surprisingly few introductory works that deal with Carnap's philosophy in general. An internet source is Murzi 2001, for a book-length general introduction into Carnap's philosophy see Mormann 2000
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  1. Review: La Relevancia de Carnap: Estudio Del Libro El Programa de Carnap. Ramón Cirera, Andoni Ibarra y Thomas Mormann. [REVIEW]Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock - 2006 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 10 (2):209-235.
    In this critical study of the valuable collection of essays edited by Cirera, Ibarra and Mormann, the present author not only critically assesses the different renderings of Carnap’s writings propounded by the different authors therein represented, but also sketches his own interpretation and subjects to criticism some of the presumed consequences of the demise of logical empiricism.
  2. The Continental Origins of Verificationism: Natorp, Husserl and Carnap on the Object as Infinitely Determinable X.Abraham D. Stone - 2005 - Angelaki 10 (1):129-143.
  3. Explication.Moritz Cordes & Geo Siegwart - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This encyclopedia article provides a procedural account of explication outlining each step that is part of the overall explicative effort (2). It is prefaced by a summary of the historical development of the method (1). The latter part of the article includes a rough structural theory of explication (3) and a detailed presentation of an examplary explication taken from the history of philosophy and the foundations of mathematics (4).
  4. Logical Positivism and Carnap's Confirmability on the Meaningfulness of Religious Language.Alberto Oya - 2018 - Espíritu 67 (155):243-249.
    Due to their acceptance of the verifiability principle, the only way left for logical positivists to argue for the meaningfulness of religious language was to accept some sort of emotivistic conception of it or to reduce it to the description of religious attitude. The verifiability principle, however, suffers from some severe limitations that make it inadequate as a criterion for cognitive meaning. To resolve these problems, logical positivists gave up the requirement of conclusive verifiability and defended a sort of ‘liberalization’ (...)
  5. Concepts Morphologiques Et Concepts Propres : Le Problème de l'Axiomatisation de l'Expérience Chez Husserl Et Carnap.Jean-Baptiste Fournier - 2018 - Philosophie 138 (3):46.
  6. Working From Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    During the past few decades, a radical shift has occurred in how philosophers conceive of the relation between science and philosophy. A great number of analytic philosophers have adopted what is commonly called a ‘naturalistic’ approach, arguing that their inquiries ought to be in some sense continuous with science. Where early analytic philosophers often relied on a sharp distinction between science and philosophy—the former an empirical discipline concerned with fact, the latter an a priori discipline concerned with meaning—philosophers today largely (...)
  7. Setting Sail: The Development and Reception of Quine’s Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18 (19):1-24.
    Contemporary analytic philosophy is dominated by metaphilosophical naturalism, the view that philosophy ought to be continuous with science. This naturalistic turn is for a significant part due to the work of W. V. Quine. Yet, the development and the reception of Quine’s naturalism have never been systematically studied. In this paper, I examine Quine’s evolving naturalism as well as the reception of his views. Scrutinizing a large set of unpublished notes, correspondence, drafts, papers, and lectures as well as published responses (...)
  8. Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry. [REVIEW]Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1-9.
  9. Sign and Object : Quine’s Forgotten Book Project.Sander Verhaegh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    W. V. Quine’s first philosophical monograph, Word and Object, is widely recognized as one of the most influential books of twentieth century philosophy. Notes, letters, and draft manuscripts at the Quine Archives, however, reveal that Quine was already working on a philosophical book in the early 1940s; a project entitled Sign and Object. In this paper, I examine these and other unpublished documents and show that Sign and Object sheds new light on the evolution of Quine’s ideas. Where “Two Dogmas (...)
  10. CARNAP's IDEAL OF EXPLICATION AND NATURALISM, EDITED BY PIERRE WAGNER. [REVIEW]Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2).
  11. With Carnap, Beyond Carnap: Metaphysics, Science, and the Realism/Instrumentalism Controversy.Parrini Paolo - 1994 - Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories, Universitätsverlag Konstanz Und Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh Und Konstanz:255--277.
  12. In Carnap’s Defense: A Survey on the Concept of a Linguistic Framework in Carnap’s Philosophy.Parzhad Torfehnezhad - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1):03-30.
    The main task in this paper is to detail and investigate Carnap’s conception of a “linguistic framework”. On this basis, we will see whether Carnap’s dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction, are to be construed as absolute/fundamental dichotomies or merely as relative dichotomies. I argue for a novel interpretation of Carnap’s conception of a LF and, on that basis, will show that, according to Carnap, all the dichotomies to be discussed are relative dichotomies; they depend on conventional decisions concerning the (...)
  13. The Logical and the Analytic.Richard Creath - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):79-96.
    This paper considers various objections to Carnap’s logical syntax definition of ’logical expression’, including those by Saunders Mac Lane and W. V. O. Quine. While the specific objections of these two authors can be answered, if necessary by a slight modification of Carnap’s definition, there are other objections that I do not see how to meet. I also consider the proposal by Denis Bonnay for avoiding the objections to Carnap’s definition. In light of the unresolved problems with Carnap’s definition, I (...)
  14. A Forgotten Strand of Reception History: Understanding Pure Semantics.Peter Olen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):121-141.
    I explore a strand of reception history that follows Rudolf Carnap’s shift from a purely syntactical analysis of constructed languages to his conception of pure semantics. My exploration focuses on Gustav Bergmann’s and Everett Hall’s interpretation of pure semantics, their understanding of what constitutes a ’formal’ investigation of language, and their arguments concerning the relationship between expressions and their extra-linguistic referents. I argue that Bergmann and Hall strongly misread Carnap’s semantic project and, subsequently, their misunderstanding is passed down through colleagues (...)
  15. Carnap on Logic and Rationality.Georg Schiemer - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):1-14.
  16. Stephan Blatti and Sandra Lapointe, Eds., Ontology After Carnap. Reviewed By.Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2016 - Philosophy in Review 36 (6):244-246.
  17. Analytic Philosophy, Continental Literature?Marc Champagne - 2015 - Philosophy Now 109:21-23.
  18. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.Richard C. Jeffrey & Paul Arthur Schilpp - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (4):534.
  19. A Letter of Rudolf Carnap to Jonas Cohn From 26 September 1925.Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock - 2016 - In Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 321-322.
  20. The Old Husserl and the Young Carnap.Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock - 2016 - In Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (ed.), Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 261-286.
  21. Der Logische Aufbau Als Plagiat: Oder: Eine Einführung in Husserls System der Konstitution.Verena Mayer - 2016 - In Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (ed.), Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 175-260.
  22. Carnap Rudolf. Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1947, Viii + 210 Pp. [REVIEW]Paul Bernays - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):237-241.
  23. II—Carnap on Logic and Language.W. Mays - 1962 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62 (1):21-38.
  24. Introduction to Semantics. Rudolf Carnap.Keith R. Symon - 1943 - Isis 34 (3):229-229.
  25. How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):645-668.
    In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not (...)
  26. Wissenschaftslogik: The Role of Logic in the Philosophy of Science.Michael Friedman - 2008 - Synthese 164 (3):385-400.
    Carl Hempel introduced what he called "Craig's theorem" into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the "problem of theoretical terms." Beginning with Hempel's use of 'Craig's theorem," I shall bring out some of the key differences between Hempel's treatment of the "problem of theoretical terms" and Carnap's in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap's mature philosophy. Carnap's treatment, in particular, is fundamentally antimetaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather (...)
  27. A New Analysis of Quasianalysis.Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):181-226.
    We investigate the conditions under which quasianalysis, i.e., Carnap's method of abstraction in his Aufbau, yields adequate results. In particular, we state both necessary and sufficient conditions for the so-called faithfulness and fullness of quasianalysis, and analyze adequacy as the conjunction of faithfulness and fullness. It is shown that there is no method of (re-)constructing properties from similarity that delivers adequate results in all possible cases, if the same set of individuals is presupposed for properties and for similarity, and if (...)
  28. Russell's Influence On Carnap's Aufbau.Christopher Pincock - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):1-37.
    This paper concerns the debate on the nature of Rudolf Carnap's project in his 1928 book "The Logical Structure of the World or Aufbau". Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson have initiated much of this debate. They claim that the "Aufbau" is best understood as a work that is firmly grounded in neo-Kantian philosophy. They have made these claims in opposition to Quine and Goodman's "received view" of the "Aufbau". The received view sees the "Aufbau" as an attempt to carry out (...)
  29. The Cambridge Companion to Carnap.Michael Friedman & Richard Creath (eds.) - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Rudolf Carnap is increasingly regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. He was one of the leading figures of the logical empiricist movement associated with the Vienna Circle and a central figure in the analytic tradition more generally. He made major contributions to philosophy of science and philosophy of logic, and, perhaps most importantly, to our understanding of the nature of philosophy as a discipline. In this volume a team of contributors explores the major themes (...)
  30. Recenzja Z: Rudolf Carnap, 2011, Logiczna Struktura Świata, Tłum. Paweł Kawalec, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Ss. Cxxv + 417.Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa 50 (200).
  31. The Linguistic Doctrine and Conventionality: The Main Argument in ”Carnap and Logical Truth”.Richard Creath - 2003 - In Gary L. Hardcastle & Alan W. Richardson (eds.), Logical Empiricism in North America. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. pp. 234--256.
  32. From Epistemology to the Logic of Science: Carnap’s Philosophy of Empirical Knowledge in the 1930s.Alan W. Richardson - 1996 - In Ronald Giere & Alan W. Richardson (eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. pp. 309--332.
  33. Tolerating Semantics: Carnap’s Philosophical Point of View.Alan W. Richardson - 2004 - In Steven Awodey & Carsten Klein (eds.), Carnap Brought Home: The View From Jena. The Open Court: Chicago. pp. 63--78.
  34. Carnap’s Views on Conceptual Systems Versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy.Peter F. Strawson - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Open Court: La Salle. pp. 503--518.
  35. Introduction: Carnap’s Revolution in Philosophy.Michael Friedman - 2007 - In Friedman, Michael & Richard Creath (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp. 1--18.
  36. Replies to Creath, Ebbs, and Lavers. [REVIEW]Greg Frost-Arnold - 2016 - Metascience 25 (1):43-49.
  37. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. [REVIEW]Paul Arthur Schilpp - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (17):503-515.
  38. Carnap’s Paradox and Easy Ontology.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10):470-501.
  39. Carnap's Conventionalism : Logic, Science, and Tolerance.Noah Friedman-Biglin - unknown
    In broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for (...)
  40. An Apology of Carnap.Felipe G. A. Moreira - 2014 - Manuscrito 37 (2):269-289.
    This paper is focused on dismissive metaontological views about ontology. The paper's first section deals with radical dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Carnap's. The second section approaches moderate dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Hirsch's. My first claim is stated in section three: that there are significant differences between the mentioned authors. However, current literature on metaontology, not only does not emphasize such differences, but also insinuates that they do not exist. The authors I have in mind (...)
  41. Rudolf Carnap.Bernd Buldt - unknown
  42. Psa 1970 in Memory of Rudolf Carnap : Proceedings of the 1970 Biennial Meeting, Philosophy of Science Association.Roger C. Buck, Rudolf Carnap, R. S. Cohen & Philosophy of Science Association - 1971
  43. Conventionalism in Carnap's Early Philosophy.Edmund Runggaldier - 1977
  44. Carnap and Theory of Knowledge.Dr M. Dashtbozorgi - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 21.
    Every philosopher who is to deal with the epistemology and go to discuss human beliefs should answer the question; how can be our beliefs justified? . That is, in the system of our beliefs, which of our beliefs can be taken as true and reasonable and the base of other beliefs?The present article is merely to introduce Rudolf Carnap's point of view.Carnap turned the philosophy into the study of formal languages, i.e. symbolic logic. Carnap believed that he had connected the (...)
  45. Carnap's Explication of 'Analytic' and 'Meaning-Of'.Richard Porter Butrick - 1966 - Dissertation, Columbia University
  46. Abstract Entities in the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.Richard Penner Wiebe - 1964 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
  47. Rudolph Carnap, Meaning and Necessity. [REVIEW]John A. Oesterle - 1949 - The Thomist 12:106.
  48. In the Philosophical Vein: Carnap's Views on Ontology.Marc Aubrey Kelly - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Rudolf Carnap's essay "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" is traditionally interpreted as an expression of either the analytic/synthetic distinction or verificationism. However, Carnap's fundamental aim---the repudiation of both nominalism and Platonism---cannot be accommodated by either interpretation. I interpret ESO as a renunciation of first-philosophical metaphysics, understood as an inquiry into what there is that transcends empirical science and constrains what sorts of entities a legitimate science can countenance. Carnap saw such constraints as metaphysical prejudices dressed up as ontological insights, and wrote (...)
  49. CARNAP, Meaning and Necessity. [REVIEW]Anthony Quinton - 1959 - Hibbert Journal 58:200.
  50. Acceptance of Hypotheses in Carnap.Zygmunt Hajduk - 1976 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 24 (3):36.
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