Plotinus

The paper follows the development of the concept of transcendence ‹e)pe/keina› from the time when it first entered philosophy in Plato’s The Republic up to Plotinus, who thought it through in all its essential dimensions. In common with some thinkers before him, Plotinus thought of the concept of transcendence in the light of the absolute one Plato analyzed in the first hypothesis of Parmenides. The paper also shows how Plotinus understood transcendence with regard to Being and to thinking. The paper (...) aims to show how Plotinus, by his criticism of the onto-theo-logical structure of philosophical thought, already announced the criticism of traditional philosophy for which Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein became known in the 20th century. (shrink)

Within the Plotinian corpus the topic of audacity provides a key for explaining the hypostatic constitution of what proceeds from the One and advances towards the formation of the sensitive world. This essay will try to settle some questions about the role of audacity within the corpus of Plotinus. Doing so will allow us to argue for the following position. Even if the generation of a being separate and distinct from the One includes the notion of otherness and therefore of (...) multiplicity, this action—a product of the Intellect’s daring—does not imply dispersion but only the constitution of a living being able to develop by its own strength the richness already contained in its germinal potency. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 117 - 148 The paper examines the problem of self-knowledge from the perspectives of Plotinus and the Indian Advaita school. Analyzing the subject-object relation, I show that according to both Plotinus and Advaita thinkers, full self-knowledge demands complete absence of otherness. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is divided into subject-object relation then one will know oneself as contemplated but not as contemplating and no real self-knowledge obtains in this case. Śaṅkara, who constitutes an (...) important representative of Advaita thought, points out that the self cannot know itself as an object because what is called an object to be known becomes established when it is separated from the self, the subject. I argue that at the level of the One, similar to the state of _ātman_ consciousness in Advaita framework, the soul experiences itself in expansive non-dual consciousness. Lastly, I examine the role of non-duality as the foundation of knowledge. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 2 Seiten: 231-234.

Plotinus on the Soul is a study of Plotinus' psychology, which is arguably the most sophisticated Platonist theory of the soul in antiquity. Plotinus offers a Platonist response to Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of the soul that is at the same time an innovative interpretation of Plato's Timaeus. He considers the notion of the soul to be crucial for explaining the rational order of the world. To this end, he discusses not only different types of individual soul but also an (...) entity that he was the first to introduce into philosophy: the so-called hypostasis Soul. This is the first study to provide a detailed explanation of this entity, but it also discusses the other types of soul, with an emphasis on the human soul, and explains Plotinus' original views on rational thought and its relation to experience. (shrink)

Recently, there has been a growing interest in ancient views on consciousness and particularly in their influence on medieval and early modern philosophers. Here I suggest a new interpretation of Plotinus’s account of consciousness which, if correct, may help us to reconsider his role in the history of the notion of the inner sense. I argue that, while explaining how our divided soul can be a unitary subject of the states and activities of its parts, Plotinus develops an original account (...) of consciousness that appeals to an inner sense. In contrast to ‘the outer senses’, which perceive sensible things out there in the world, this sense, for him, perceives the activities of the parts of our soul, thus enabling us to be conscious of them as a single subject. I suggest that Plotinus devises his account of this psychic power in the light of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s interpretation of the Aristotelian ‘common sense’. Since in Alexander the ‘common sense’ enables us to be conscious as a single subject of sensat.. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 159 - 176 The purpose of this paper is the analysis of the Plotinian and Iamblichean reading of the Aristotelian theory of abstraction, and its relationship with the status of mathematical entities, as they were conceived within a Platonic model, according to which mathematical objects are ontological autonomous and separate.

Originally published in 1940, this book by famous Plotinus scholar Arthur Hilary Armstrong assesses how the philosopher's hierarchy of reality fits into the wider universal order, and how the historical and philosophical tradition gave rise to Plotinus' own philosophies. Armstrong also supplies a bibliography broken down by topic for those who wish to pursue any aspect of the text in greater depth. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Plotinus, Neoplatonism and in the pagan roots (...) of Christian philosophy. (shrink)

Plotinus, Self and the World addresses the question of the individual subject in its relationship with the world, the 'all'. It traces the self through its experience of memory and forgetfulness, looks at whether the idea of the subconscious exists in Plotinus, and notes the probable impact of Plotinus' thought on the development of the autobiography, in the form of Augustine's Confessions. Augustine historicises the Plotinian individual self. The book reinterprets the idea of to oikeion in Plotinus and places great (...) emphasis on the importance of the idea of 'having', and the ability to possess is itself linked to being: thus we are close to the idea of personal authenticity. Lastly the book examines Plotinus' view of images and art, and notes his respect for the beauty of the human face. His positive view of the physical world is stressed. (shrink)

This article analyzes the status of passive potentiality of prime matter and sensible objects in Plotinus' Enneads . In particular, it will focus on Enneads II 5 [25] and confront it with other treatises, specifically Enneads III 6 [26]; II 6 [17]; VI 2 [43] and VI 3 [44]. It aims at offering a new interpretation of treatise 25 and at proposing a reconstruction of Plotinus' notion of change in the sensible realm that illustrates both his critique of Aristotle's notion (...) of substantial change and his acceptance of Aristotle's view of qualitative change. (shrink)

The point of view put forth in the following pages differs greatly from the common perspective according to which the treatises 30 to 33 constitute a single work, a Großschrift, and this single work, Plotinus essential response to the ...

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Plotinus describes sensible objects as conglomerations of qualities and matter. However, none of these ingredients seems capable of accounting for the structure underlying the formation of each sensible object so as to constitute an identifiable and discrete entity. This is the effect of the logos, the organizing formative principle inherent in each object, which determines how its qualitative constituents are brought together to form a coherent unity. How the logos operates differs in various kinds of entities, such as living organisms, (...) artefacts and inanimate objects; however, some basic characteristics render its contribution to reality both coherent and rationally accessible. It further indicates how the various constituents of the sensible universe combine so as to form a unified cosmos. (shrink)

This paper studies Sentence 16 of Porphyry's Pathways to the Intelligible. It is argued that it should be understood against the background of Plotinus' discussions of the similes of the waxen block and the aviary from Plato's Theaetetus. The first part of the paper concentrates on Plotinus' reception of these similes. In the second part of the paper Plotinus' discussions of the two similes are used to shed light on Sentence 16, in particular on the term προχείρισις. Furthermore it is (...) argued that Porphyry does not reject Plotinus' claim that, pace Aristotle, intellection does not require imaging. (shrink)

There is a question to be answered if one is to grasp the function of suicide in the Plotinian universe and its connection to the subject matters of soul, incarnation, murder and killing living beings. How far does the body exist as a degenerative trait? Could the purpose of embodying a soul purify it and to what extent does the particular use of it by an individual soul point towards its ability to uncover hidden potentiality or simply makes it an (...) instrument of self-destruction and self-alienation? Our view of Plotinus’ philosophy and its significance depends upon how we chose to solve this puzzle. Although Plotinus ultimately changed his attitude on suicide in Ennead 1.4.46 as compared to Ennead 1.9.16, the concept appears under three basic guises in his philosophy. One is the more traditional notion that we have today, whether given a choice to remain or to leave the body, the soul should remain? Beyond that, Plotinus enriches our view of suicide with two further notions: One is the idea of soul’s incarnation as an involuntary suicide, committed in the rush to attain matter. Finally there is the notion of suicide in the form of murder or killing a living being or plant. Killing another living being would be like attempting suicide: killing a part of the one unified, single soul to which we also partake. The difference between Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, of which Damascius was one, is that the latter won’t allow for the absolute detachment of the soul from the body, while the body is still alive. It thus becomes impossible for the soul of the prospective wise man, to venture completely into the positive nothingness of the Ineffable, because the soul is always bound to the body, and that results in its inability to escort its own self, so as to say, into that which is total nothingness and alien to the soul. (shrink)

Two treatises on memory which have come down to us from antiquity are Aristotle’s “On memory and recollection” and Plotinus’ “On perception and memory” ; the latter also wrote at length about memory in his “Problems connected with the soul”. In both authors memory is treated as a ‘modest’ faculty: both authors assume the existence of a persistent subject to whom memory belongs; and basic cognitive capacities are assumed on which memory depends. In particular, both theories use phantasia to explain (...) memory. Aristotle takes representations to be changes in concrete living things which arise from actual perception. To be connected to the original perception the representation has to be taken as a copy of the original experience ‑ this is the way Aristotle defines memory at the end of his investigation. Plotinus does not define memory: he is concerned with the question of what remembers. This is of course the soul, which goes through different stages of incarnation and disincarnation. Since the disembodied soul can remember, so he does not have Aristotle’s resources for explaining the continued presence of representations as changes in the concrete thing. Instead, he thinks that when acquiring a memory we acquire a capacity in respect of the object of the memory, namely to make it present at a later time. (shrink)

Determinism is the view that any event is determined by previous events and the laws of nature. My claim is that Plotinus's, Leibniz's and Berkeley's rejection of determinism is structurally similar. Indeed, while determinism holds that phenomenal changes (ontologically) depend only on the way the laws of Nature apply to the previous conditions of the states of the world, the three philosophers all argues for the claim that the laws of Nature are not independent on the mind (the Hypostasis of (...) Soul or the Divine Mind). That is to say: laws of nature are not mechanisms producing the succeeding of one event to the others, namely are not properties of a non mental substance. Rather, they are regularities (ontologically dependent on the mind, since) established by a Mind. Plotinus, Leibniz and Berkeley hold a two steps argument: a) laws of nature aren't properties of a material substance accounting for phenomenal changes, since undifferentiated matter doesn't exist; b) even if regularities in phenomenal changes could be refer to properties of a substance, these regularities couldn't be construed as non mental mechanisms, because any transition from, say, event A to event B, lacks causal power. (shrink)

In Plotinus the myths are scattered throughout the Enneads‟ treatises. In contrast with Porphyry, Plotinus prefers to make allusions and fragmentary quotations of the myths rather than an exegesis of a comprehensive extract of a poem. Only one of Porphyry‟s works, dedicated to the allegorical exegesis of Homer, has come down to us in its integrity: The cave of the Nymphs in the Odyssey. In this work, which is studied here, Porphyry follows a complete extract of Homer in order to (...) find a hidden meaning beneath the letter of the text. Through an analysis of a small sample of the plotinian mythical kaleidoscope and then of Porphyry‟s above-mentioned work, this article intends to show the main characteristics of the mythical exegesis of the epical tradition in both authors.myth, exegesis, image, genealogy, allegory. (shrink)

The subject of the paper, Plotinus’ theory of the One, is situated on the intersection of a systematic investigation and a text analysis and interpretation belonging to the area of the history of philosophy. The motif to work on this issue was the absence of a systema- tic analysis of the specificity of Plotinus’ philosophical theory and its unique mode of expression. The aim of the study is the presentation, analysis and critical evaluation of the forms of expression, fundamental statements (...) and consequences of Plotinus’ concept of the One. The structure of the text resulted from discussing the general character of Plotinus’ language , the explanation of terms „One“ and „hypostasis“ to and presentation and criticism of its own statements and philosophical consequences of the theory of the One. (shrink)

In the Classical world, the language of cosmology was a means for framing philosophical concerns. Among these were issues of time, motion, and soul; concepts of the limited and the unlimited; and the nature and basis of number. This is no less true of Indian thought-Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, and Ājivika-where the prestige of the cosmological idiom for organizing philosophical and theological thought cannot be overstated. This essay focuses on the structural similarities in the thought of Plotinus and Buddhist cosmological/philosophical speculation. (...) It builds on research concerning the Buddha-field (buddhakṣetra), which identified two discrete numerologies central to this speculation: the thousands of worlds (sāhasralokadhātu) comprising the field of a single Buddha (buddhakṣetra), characteristic of the Hinayana, and the innumerable or incalculable (asaṃkhyeya) Buddha-fields filling the ten regions of space, characteristic of the Mahāyāna. The Enneads of Plotinus serve as a lens through which to view in a fresh way a broad range of difficult issues associated with Buddhist cosmology in three general areas. First, it asks whether Plotinus' understanding of Intellect and his treatment of infinite and essential number afford an understanding of the innumerables and thousands central to the concept of the Buddhā-field. This analysis involves a consideration of the Hindu creator god, Brahma, as 'demiurge.' Second, it suggests analogies between the One, Intellect, and Soul of Plotinus and the three Buddhist Realms-the Formless Realm, the Realm of Form, and the Realm of Desire. Finally, it explores the possibility that an understanding of the Enneads can provide a model for relating the cosmologies of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. (shrink)

The subject of the paper is Plotinus’ theory of the One. The motif to work on the issue was the need of a systematic treatment of this problem, still missing in the writings of Slovak historians of philosophy. The intention of the paper is the presentation, analysis and critical interpretation of the remarkable origins of Plotinus’ theory. The paper deals further with the question of the sources of Plotinus’ theory of the One in Plato. The introductory general theoretical reflections on (...) the origins of Plotinus’ theory is followed by a detailed text analysis of the books 6 and 7 of Plato’s Republic and by the analysis of the first and second hypotheses of the second part of the dialogue Parmenides. (shrink)