Determinism

The traditional problem of free will and determinism is ostensibly about settling the relationship between free will and determinism. According to the standard narrative, this problem boils down to settling whether free will stands in a compatibility or incompatibility relation with determinism. Similarly, there is traditional debate over whether a compatibility or an incompatibility relationship holds between free will and indeterminism. Since indeterminism is simply the negation of determinism, anyone who holds that human free will is incompatible with both determinism (...) and indeterminism seems to be committed to free-will impossibilism, i.e. the view that free will is metaphysically impossible. We might summarize this constructive dilemma argument as follows: -/- The Standard Dilemma Argument 1. Necessarily, either determinism or its negation, i.e. indeterminism, is true. 2. Necessarily, determinism is incompatible with free will. 3. Necessarily, indeterminism is incompatible with free will. 4. Therefore, free will is metaphysically impossible; impossibilism is true. -/- In this essay, I argue that the term “incompatible” used in this argument is ambiguous. Since there are two fundamentally different ways to disamabiguate the term “incompatible”, there are at least four substantively different ways to disambiguate the Standard Dilemma Argument. Because these four arguments are typically conflated, the philosophically interesting differences between these four instances of the Standard Dilemma Argument are generally ignored. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom is a well-known defender of hard incompatibilism. Roughly, hard incompatibilism is the conjunction of two incompatibilist views about free will: (1) d-incompatibilism, the view that deterministic evolution of the natural world (as described by the doctrine of determinism) makes it impossible for humans to exercise free will , and (2) i-incompatibilism, the view that indeterministic evolution of the natural world makes it impossible for humans to exercise free will. Pereboom’s argument for d-incompatibilism is a manipulation argument called The (...) Four-case Argument. Becaause it is generally assumed that The Four-case Argument is a free-standing argument for d-incompatibilism, this argument is typically discussed in isolation from Pereboom’s defense of i-incompatibilism. However, when we look at Pereboom’s overall case for hard incompatibilism, a tension between his argument for d-incompatibilism and his defense of i-incompatibilism. Upon review, it seems that there is no viable way for Pereboom to shore up his defense of hard incompatibilism, for there seems to be an in principle tension between d-incompatibilism and i-incompatibilism. In short, it seems that d-incompatibilism can only be motivated by an explicit appeal to a libertarianism-friendly account of free will, but to accept a libertarian-friendly account of free will is to reject i-incompatibilism; as such, even though d-incompatibilism and i-incompatibilism do not technically assert logically inconsistent claims, belief in hard incompatibilism cannot be epistemically justified. If this is right, hard incompatibilism not a tenable position. This paper has five main sections. It begins (s2) with a review of Pereboom’s Four-case Argument. I then (s3) set the stage for a new abductive variant of the Four-case Argument, what I call an (in)dependent-variable abductive argument. I do this by identifying the values of variables which may be used to test Pereboom’s hypothesis that the Four-case Argument shows that the best explanation for the lack of human free will in deterministic worlds is that deterministic causation (qua being deterministic) undermines free will. Next (s4), I use the identified (in)dependent variables to show that Pereboom’s claim that deterministic causation (qua being deterministic) poses a threat to human freedom is in tension with his commitment (qua being a hard incompatibilist) to the claim that it is impossible for a normal human to act freely when indeterminism is true. Given the nature of this tension, I conclude that it is a necessary feature of any argument for hard incompatibilism. Finally, I discuss and reject (s5) two candidate replies to my critique of hard incompatibilism, ultimately concluding that neither provides reason to think that hard incompatibilism is a viable position on free will. (shrink)

This dissertation makes two general arguments. First, I argue that we can reasonably address and decide between deterministic and anti-deterministic accounts of human behavior via standards of empirical, logical and moral consistency. Second, I argue that we must address this philosophical question about human behavior because our answer has profound implications for a range of applications. I demonstrate why it is important, both practically and theoretically, to make a studied, objective choice between deterministic and anti-deterministic theories.

I take it for granted that free will is a central philosophical notion. Still, throughout Western history certain philosophers have put forth arguments which claim that no person has, or could have, free will. These arguments may be grouped into three different types. First, there are metalogical arguments which argue that since all propositions are either true or false, and since propositions do not change their truth-values, no person ever has free will. Second, there are divination arguments which claim that (...) there exists some divine being, perhaps God, with complete knowledge of all future events. Thus, no person ever has free will. Third, there are determinism arguments which suggest the truth of a general causal determinism which governs each object and event in the entire universe. Given this, it is supposed, no person ever has free will. I call these the inevitability arguments. ;In this dissertation I show that all of these arguments are unsound. I do this by showing, first, that each argument type is of the same general form which I call the basic structure. So, the arguments stand or fall together. The basic structure includes, beyond the information given above, another premise which claims that the past, or the set of God's beliefs, or the conjunction of the laws of nature is fixed and, in some sense, beyond our control. It is this premise, necessary to the validity of any inevitability argument, which I claim to be false. I show that there is some sense in which, say, the past is fixed but that this sense is unimportant to attributions of free will. Moreover, the sense of fixedness which is important to freedom is not undermined by the inevitability arguments. (shrink)

In the book, I provide an account of what it is for an agent to have an ability. According to the Success View, abilities are all about success across possible situations. In developing and applying the view, the book elucidates the relation between abilities on the one hand and possibility, counterfactuals, and dispositions on the other; it sheds light on the distinction between general and specific abilities; it offers an understanding of degrees of abilities; it explains which role intentions and (...) performances play for the having of an ability, how abilities relate to success and failure, and gives an outlook at how the view might be applied to the free will debate and time travel. (shrink)

Avec Kazimierz Twardowski, Stanisław Leśniewski et Alfred Tarski, le logicien et philosophe polonais Jan Łukasiewicz est l’un des membres les plus importants de l’École de Lvov-Varsovie.Célèbre pour ses ouvrages consacrés à Aristote, notamment sur le principe de non-contradiction et sur la syllogistique, il a également publié des articles majeurs sur la logique propositionnelle, la logique modale, l’intuitionnisme et les logiques multivalentes, dont il fut l’un des fondateurs. Enfin, il a contribué à faire reconnaître l’importance des travaux en logique de l’école (...) mégarico-stoïcienne, trop longtemps éclipsés par ceux d’Aristote sur la syllogistique.Mais Łukasiewicz ne fut pas seulement un logicien et un historien brillant, il s’engagea aussi dans les polémiques philosophiques de son temps. Il défendit ainsi la méthode logique en philosophie. Proche sur ce point des membres du Cercle de Vienne, il ne rejetait pas pour autant les questions métaphysiques, commecelle du déterminisme qui l’occupa toute sa vie. Les treize articles de ce recueil, fruit d’un travail collectif de traduction, ont pour ambition de montrer le caractère protéiforme de l’œuvre de Łukasiewicz, préoccupé autant par la précision logique que par le problème de la liberté humaine. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Kristin Mickelson argues that Alfred Mele’s Zygote Argument, a popular argument for the claim that the truth of determinism would preclude free action or moral responsibility, is not valid. This sort of objection is meant to generalize to various manipulation arguments. According to Mickelson, the only way to make such arguments valid is to supplement them with an argument that is an inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I argue that there are two other (...) ways in which the proponent of such manipulation arguments can modify their argument, neither of which requires an inference to the best explanation. I then briefly consider and respond to a worry with one of these proposed solutions. (shrink)

Throughout philosophical history, there has been a recurring argument to the effect that determinism, naturalism, or both are self-referentially incoherent. By accepting determinism or naturalism, one allegedly acquires a reason to reject determinism or naturalism. _The Epistemological Skyhook_ brings together, for the first time, the principal expressions of this argument, focusing primarily on the last 150 years. This book addresses the versions of this argument as presented by Arthur Lovejoy, A.E. Taylor, Kurt Gödel, C.S. Lewis, Norman Malcolm, Karl Popper, J.R. (...) Lucas, William Hasker, Thomas Nagel, Alvin Plantinga, and others, along with the objections presented by their many detractors. It concludes by presenting a new version of the argument that synthesizes the best aspects of the others while also rendering the argument immune to some of the most significant objections made to it. (shrink)

The problem of determinism arises in all the major areas of philosophy. The first part of this book, first published in 1991, is a critical and historical exposition of the problem and the most important ideas and arguments which have arisen over the many years of debate. The second part considers the various forms of determinism and the implications that they engender.

Determinism/indeterminism, permanence /change, global/local — these have been the occasion for disputes that have persisted for ages. Combined in every conceivable fashion, these three pairs have given rise to theories of reality which, though incompatible, nevertheless possess some degree of adequacy. Accounting for the properties of the inorganic world, on invariably confronts several opposing attitudes, each of which questions the pertinence of the continuous/discontinuous pair, which underlies any discussion of the three pairs noted above. Thinkers of Antiquity sought to deal (...) with this question, and the Eleatic school was dedecated to demonstrating that it would forever imprison us: appearances are discontinous, but reality is continous. Thus, the question remains central to debates in chemistry and physics, despite the remarkable attempt by the atomists to defer the problem by changing the level of description to include a macroscopic /microscopic pair destined to avert the paradox.... (shrink)

This set reissues a number of classic titles on free will and determinism. They approach the topic from a range of differing viewpoints, and in so doing, provide an excellent overview and in-depth analysis of this fundamental philosophical problem.

A unique anthology featuring contributions to the dispute over free will from Aristotle to the twenty-first century, Derk Pereboom's volume presents the most thoughtful positions taken in this crucial debate and discusses their consequences for free will's traditional corollary, moral responsibility. The Second Edition retains the organizational structure that made its predecessor the leading anthology of its kind, while adding major new selections by such philosophers as Spinoza, Reid, John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Galen Strawson, and Timothy O'Connor. _Hackett Readings (...) in Philosophy_ is a versatile series of compact anthologies, each devoted to a topic of traditional interest. Selections include classical, modern, and contemporary writings chosen for their elegance of exposition and success at stimulating thought and discussion. (shrink)

The problems with grace and free will have prompted long-standing theological conflicts, chiefly revolving around certain disagreements over the nature of divine causality in respect to the free will's of creatures and His foreknowledge of free acts. Eleonore Stump offers a new interpretation of divine action on the will that holds God only acts by way of formal causality and that human cooperation with grace is only by way of "quiescence." I argue that this account lacks coherence in certain important (...) respects, especially in how human beings freely decide upon conversion - a process impossible on this model. I also argue that any model of divine causality cannot escape the dichotomy of holding a Molinist or a Banezian model of efficacious grace. In response, I offer a new interpretation of classical Thomist models of grace that preserves human freedom and divine sovereignty in grace. (shrink)