M&E;, Misc

*Principia Logico-Metaphysica* (a developing, online manuscript) contains a foundational logical theory for metaphysics, mathematics, and the sciences. It contains a canonical development of Abstract Object Theory [AOT], a metaphysical theory (inspired by ideas of Ernst Mally, formalized by Zalta) that differentiates between ordinary and abstract objects. -/- This article reports on recent work in which AOT has been successfully represented and partly automated in the proof assistant system Isabelle/HOL. Initial experiments within this framework reveal a crucial but overlooked fact: a (...) deeply-rooted and known paradox is reintroduced in AOT when the logic of complex terms is simply adjoined to AOT's specially-formulated comprehension principle for relations. This result constitutes a new and important paradox, given how much expressive and analytic power is contributed by having the two kinds of complex terms in the system. Its discovery is the highlight of our joint project and provides strong evidence for a new kind of scientific practice in philosophy, namely, *computational metaphysics*. -/- Our results were made technically possible by a suitable adaptation of Benzm\"uller's metalogical approach to universal reasoning by semantically embedding theories in classical higher-order logic. This approach enables the fruitful reuse of state-of-the-art higher-order proof assistants, such as Isabelle/HOL, for mechanizing and experimentally exploring challenging logics and theories such as AOT. Our results also provide a fresh perspective on the question of whether relational type theory or functional type theory better serves as a foundation for logic and metaphysics. (shrink)

In discussions regarding models of cognition, the very mention of “computationalism” often incites reactions against the insufficiency of the Turing machine model, its abstractness, determinism, the lack of naturalist foundations, triviality and the absence of clarity. None of those objections, however, concerns models based on natural computation or computing nature, where the model of computation is broader than symbol manipulation or conventional models of computation. Computing nature consists of physical structures that form layered computational architecture, with computation processes ranging from (...) quantum to chemical, biological/cognitive and social-level computation. It is argued that, on the lower levels of information processing in the brain, finite automata or Turing machines may still be adequate models, while, on the higher levels of whole-brain information processing, natural computing models are necessary. A layered computational architecture of the mind based on the intrinsic computing of physical systems avoids objections against early versions of computationalism in the form of abstract symbols manipulation. (shrink)

John Keller presents a set of new essays on ontology, time, freedom, God, and philosophical method. Our understanding of these subjects has been greatly advanced, since the 1970s, by the work of Peter van Inwagen. The contributions, from some of the most prominent living philosophers, engage with van Inwagen's work and offer new insights in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of philosophy. Van Inwagen himself gives selective responses. In metaphysics, the volume will particularly interest philosophers working on free (...) will, relational vs constituent ontologies, and time travel; in philosophy of religion, notable topics include the ontological argument, the compatibility of theism and evolution, the problem of evil, and the doctrine of atonements. And there are three papers on the hot topic of philosophical success, with responses from van Inwagen. (shrink)

Leeremos la hermenéutica nihilista de G. Vattimo como continuación del pensar de Wittgenstein en su argumento sobre el significado de "seguir una regla". Para ello definimos como "metafísicas" las posturas epistemológicas que otorgan a una instancia independiente de la acción de los sujetos la autoridad sobre la corrección de sus prácticas comunicativas, y como postmetafísicas aquellas que consideran tal instancia como dependiente de la acción de los participantes en las prácticas. Wittgenstein demuestra en su tratamiento de las reglas que la (...) determinación de la corrección de acuerdos a éstas no puede sino depender de la historia y voluntad de los sujetos que participan en su mantenimiento. Esta visión postmetafísica, aunque historiza las reglas, puede abocar al inmovilismo que resulta de la imposibilidad para la filosofia de legitimar una crítica o juicio propios, debido a la carencia de un apoyo metafísico para ello. En este punto el nihilismo vattimiano resalta la posibilidad, compartiendo el diagnóstico wittgensteiniano, de hacer precisamente de los elementos antimetafísicos de éste la propuesta que cabe hacer hacia otros ámbitos de la cultura, a menudo aún demasiado metafísicos. (shrink)

Price’s :157–176, 1991; 44:187–203, 1993 ; 2007, 2017) agency theory of causation has takes itself to provide a use-theory of our causal discourse. The theory’s aim is to describe the rules implicit to our linguistic behaviour when we describe things in causal terms. According to this theory, the rules governing our use of the concept of causation are based on our perspective as agents and our associated experiences of manipulating events. I argue that the observed relation between agency and our (...) concept of causation cannot exhaustively describe the conditions under which we enter into causal discourse. In particular, I demonstrate that the agency theory faces familiar problems with accounting for causal ascriptions to token cases. (shrink)

There is an important disagreement in contemporary epistemology over the possibility of non-epistemic reasons for belief. Many epistemologists argue that non-epistemic reasons cannot be good or normative reasons for holding beliefs: non-epistemic reasons might be good reasons for a subject to bring herself to hold a belief, the argument goes, but they do not offer any normative support for the belief itself. Non-epistemic reasons, as they say, are just the wrong kind of reason for belief. Other epistemologists, however, argue that (...) there can be cases where non-epistemic reasons directly offer normative support for the beliefs a subject holds. -/- My aim in this paper is to remove an apparent obstacle for the view that there can be non-epistemic normative reasons for belief, by showing that the existence of non-epistemic reasons for belief does not conflict with epistemic standards for the assessment of inference. More specifically, I aim to show that the following principles are compatible: -/- Epistemic Norm of Inference (ENI): Necessarily, for all subjects, S, and inferences, I: I is a good inference for S only if S can gain a (doxastically) epistemically justified belief in I’s conclusion on the basis of I’s premises. -/- Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief (NERB): Possibly, for some subject, S, reason, R, and belief, B: R is a good (i.e., normative) reason for S to hold B, and R is not an epistemic reason for B. -/- Guidance: For all subjects S, potential reasons R, and beliefs/actions φ: In order for R to count as a normative reason for S to φ, it must be possible for S to take R into account as relevant to the determination of whether S ought to φ. -/- One might naturally think that these principles conflict, for if there are non-epistemic reasons for belief, then they must guide deliberation, and in guiding deliberation, they would violate epistemic standards. The aim of this paper is to show that no such conflict need arise. -/- Section 2 of the paper proceeds to set out the concept of an inference, and to sketch an epistemic framework for the assessment of inferences and arguments. Section 3 sets out the distinction between normative and motivating reasons, and briefly defends the view that there can be non-epistemic reasons for beliefs. Section 4 shows that non-epistemic reasons for belief are compatible with epistemic standards for inference, because any time a reason R is a good non-epistemic reason for a subject S to hold a belief B, there is an epistemically good inference available to S which takes R as a premise and which concludes with the meta-belief that S ought to hold B. So the paper employs a level-connecting principle between normative reasons for φ-ing and epistemic reasons for believing that one ought to φ. The paper ends with clarifications of that level-connecting principle, and responses to three objections. (shrink)

This article relates the philosophical discussion on naturalistic religious practice to Tim Crane’s The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View, in which he claims that atheists can derive no genuine solace from religion. I argue that Crane’s claim is a little too strong. There is a sense in which atheists can derive solace from religion and that fact is worth acknowledging (whether or not this counts as ‘genuine’ solace).

The article formulates and substantiates the philosophical epistemological principle, which generalizes the principle of complementarity of Bohr to all phenomena of reality. The general complementarity principle is formulated as follows: the rational side of reality and its cognition and its associated irrational side of reality and its cognition are complementary to each other. The general principle of complementarity allows one to search for phenomena of duality in various fields, grouping them according to rational and irrational signs.

It is widely recognized that accurately identifying and classifying com- petitors is a challenge for many companies and entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, it is a paramount activity which provide valuable insights that affect a wide range of strategic decisions. One of the main challenges in competitor identification lies in the complex nature of the competitive relationships that arise in business envi- ronments. These have been extensively investigate over the years, which lead to a plethora of competition theories and frameworks. Still, the concept (...) of competition remains conceptually complex, as none of these approaches properly formalized their assumptions. In this paper, we address this issue by means of an ontologi- cal analysis on the notion of competition in general, and of business competition, in particular, leveraging theories from various fields, including Marketing, Strate- gic Management, Ecology, Psychology and Cognitive Sciences. Our analysis, the first of its kind in the literature, is grounded on the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) and allows us to formally characterize why competition arises, as well as to distinguish between three types of business competitive relationships, namely market-level, firm-level and potential competition. (shrink)

The proof of first thesis of Gorgias is an indirect deductive argument constructed by the multiple use of the _modus tollens_ pattern. Those of its premises which are assumed without proofs are misleadingly similar to some logical or analytical truths. If they actually were such truths, some contradictions would have to appear in the proof. In the times of Gorgias the proof could be regarded as correct; the possibility of showing and clearly describing its defects emerged only after formal logic (...) had been invented. Gorgias could announce his thesis seriously – as a thesis of extreme metaphysical nihilism – without being embarrassed. If the proof is a sophistry, then it is a masterpiece among sophistries, the most outstanding achievement of the sophists in this domain. (shrink)

Definitions, uses, and understanding of technology have varied tremendously since Jacob Bigelow’s Elements of Technology in 1829. In addition to providing a frame of reference for understanding technology, the purpose of this study was to define or describe it conceptually. A determination of dimensions comprising technology was made by critiquing historical and contemporary examples of definition by Bigelow and Volti. An analytic-synthetic method was employed to deconstruct both definitions spanning two centuries to derive aspects of technology. Definitions relying on an (...) anthropocentric “how humans use technology” viewpoint failed to account for different perspectives that were found when an ethological perspective inquiring “how technology is used” served as a framework. Findings support qualification of insulin as technology according to the following comprehensive definition: something inherently intelligent enough to either function, be used to function, or be interpreted as having a function that intelligent beings—human or otherwise—can appreciate, something devised, designed, or discovered serving particular purposes from a secular standpoint without humankind creating it, or a significant beneficiary of rationally derived knowledge that is “used for” a purpose without itself necessarily being translated into something material that “does” autonomously, or dependently when used. (shrink)

This paper argues for an overlooked dimension in the metaphysical microstructure of knowledge. The connection between knowledge and truth is even deeper than generally acknowledged. Knowledge, I argue, supervenes not only on a specific (namely modal) relation between the proposition p’s truth and an agent’s belief that p, but also on specific relations between the proposition’s truthmaker and the belief’s justification-maker. S knows that p only if the states of affairs referred to by S’s reasons for believing that p are (...) identical with, causally related to, or grounded in the states of affairs that make p true. (shrink)

In representing an interdisciplinary perspective on shame, this edited collection as a whole ultimately reflects shame as a richly layered experience by focusing as a whole on the following three themes: 1) questions about theory and method in the science and study of shame, 2) how the context of culture and politics, broadly construed, affect our understanding of what shame is and who we are in the face of shame, and 3) normative considerations regarding shame and its importance to understanding (...) ourselves as individuals and in relation to our communities. More specifically, this edited collection aims to weave together the various threads on shame within the academic discourse into an intricate and deep understanding of what shame is and its implications on our lives. It does so by collecting and organizing the essays contained within in order to inspire in the reader possible answers to the following questions: 1) how ought the science of shame identify its object of study, 2) how ought the science of shame be pursued, 3) what methods are appropriate for a rigorous scientific study of shame, 4) does a method of study determine or influence a theory of shame or vice versa, 5) how do culture and politics affect the value and import of shame, 6) what is the relationship between culture and politics in the construction of shamed identities, and 7) how is shame related to a normative understanding of ourselves as individual persons, which includes an understanding of ourselves as moral and epistemic agents within a community. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that an understanding of what shame is through an understanding of its rationality and intentionality can provide a single framework that may be able to unify the research on shame, perhaps even across disciplines. To do so, I begin by explaining what a criterion for the ontological rationality of shame is, and I explain its relation to an understanding of what makes shame the kind of emotion that it is. In doing so, I demonstrate how (...) the rationality of shame, including the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame, is intimately intertwined with shame’s intentionality. Next, I consider some of the research on shame from the disciplines of philosophy and psychology in order to isolate the genus from the differentia of shame, and, with the inclusion of research from the discipline of sociology, I derive the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame. I follow this discussion by introducing an understanding of shame as a superordinate inference rule, which amounts to a non-standard account of shame, in order to fulfill the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame. I conclude by explaining how what I suggest as the core of shame—the superordinate inference rule of shame—fulfills the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame, by constituting the ontological rationality of shame, and I highlight the benefit of my account over alternative accounts of shame in regard to the rationality of our experiences of shame. I thereby argue in virtue of an inference to the best explanation for my proposal to fulfill the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame and to provide a single unifying framework for an understanding of what shame is. (shrink)

Part I, Fundamentals -/- Chapter 1, The Problem of Intentionality -/- Chapter 2, Original Intentionality -/- Chapter 3, The Intentionality of Emotions -/- Chapter 4, The Rationality of Emotions -/- Chapter 5, How Emotions Mean -/- Chapter 6, How Emotions Know -/- Part II, The Science of Emotion -/- Chapter 7, Meta-Semantic Realism about the Science of Emotion -/- Chapter 8, Semantic Dualism about Emotion.

Recently we proposed “quantum language" (or,“the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics"), which was not only characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of quantum mechanics but also the linguistic turn of Descartes=Kant epistemology. Namely, quantum language is the scientific final goal of dualistic idealism. It has a great power to describe classical systems as well as quantum systems. Thus, we believe that quantum language is the language in which science is written. The purpose of this preprint is to examine (...) and assert our belief (i.e.,“proposition in quantum language" ⇔“scientific proposition). We believe that it's one of main themes of scientific philosophy to make such language. (shrink)

Aesthetics versus Art History? Ernst Cassirer as Mediator in an ongoing Controversy on the Relevance of Art for Life. Against the background of Ernst Cassirer’s cultural philosophy, art studies are to be classified as cultural studies. Central to this is Cassirer’s philosophy as the basis for answering a question that has been posed by the methods of formal aesthetics and iconology since the 19th century but is still unanswered today, namely the question of the relevance of the arts for life. (...) In this way, aesthetics/Kunstwissenschaft and art history gain a new meaning as cultural studies beyond their achievements in the humanities and in epistemology. (shrink)

While regarding Gregory M. Browne as mainly on target in his Rand-inspired treatment of reference and necessity, as well as in his rejection of the analyticsynthetic dichotomy, Long argues, first, that Browne is mistaken in rejecting some other vital distinctions, such as the a priori / a posteriori distinction; second, that Browne is nevertheless implicitly committed, under different terminology, to these very distinctions that he purportedly rejects; and third, that Browne's treatment of kinds and definitions leads him to misdescribe and (...) misprescribe ordinary language use, and also to embrace unnecessary semantic incommensurability. (shrink)

The widespread assumption among academic philosophers that no truth can be simultaneously necessary and factual, founded on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, was challenged from outside the profession by Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff in the 1960s, and from within the profession by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam in the 1970s. Gregory M. Browne's book Necessary Factual Truth represents a long-overdue attempt to synthesize the Rand-Peikoff and Kripke-Putnam approaches into an integrated theory. While Browne's project is partially successful, it gives up one (...) of the chief attractions of these approaches: the ability to preserve continuity of reference across radical theoretical change. (shrink)

In a typical classroom interaction, the teacher asks questions, students answer, and the teacher—knowing the answer—evaluates the responses. This structure might cultivate a view of knowledge as objective, uncontested, and immutable. In response to criticisms of such models, teachers increasingly encourage students’ self-expression, communicating the validity of multiple solutions and perspectives. Stressing that there is "no one right answer,” might be important in countering absolutist and encouraging relativist understandings of knowledge. Cultivating more qualified and critical perspectives that seek to use (...) criteria to judge an answer's quality and identify better answers from among a set of "right answers" may be more difficult to achieve, and might explain the prevalence of multiplist and paucity of evaluativist positions among youth. We suggest that teacher training that emphasizes pedagogy apart from subject-matter learning might contribute to practices that encourage individual expression without providing the domain-specific tools or values of evaluating knowledge claims. (shrink)

Much of the research on teachers’ personal epistemology concerns their learning. Surprisingly little research has looked at how personal epistemologies are related to teachers’ teaching and other aspects of their interactions with students. In this chapter we investigate teachers’ personal epistemologies and the extent to which they predict autonomy-supporting behaviors. Such behaviors have been found to predict positive educational outcomes. 600 students in 21 grade 7 and 8 classrooms were administered surveys regarding two aspects of autonomy support: the extent to (...) which their teachers tried to take their perspective and provided them with rationales for prosocial behavior. At the same time, their teachers’ personal epistemologies were assessed. Students of teachers scored as having advanced personal epistemologies reported that their teachers were more likely to take their perspective. We conclude that teacher education in personal epistemology and autonomy supportive practices should have positive effects both for the teachers and their students. (shrink)

According to the ?story model? a juror constructs an implicit mental model of a story telling what happened as the basis for the verdict choice. But the explicit justification of a verdict choice could take the form of a story (knowledge telling) or the form of a relational (knowledge-transforming) argument structure that brings together diverse, non-chronologically related pieces of evidence. The study investigates whether people tend towards knowledge telling or knowledge transforming, and whether use of these argument structure types are (...) related to skilled argument and epistemic understanding. A sample of people on jury duty chose and justified verdicts in two abridged cases. Participants tended to display the same argument structure and argument skill across cases. Those using knowledge-transforming structures were more successful at the juror argument skills task and had a higher level of epistemic understanding. The discussion suggests that jurors approach their task with an epistemic orientation towards knowledge telling or knowledge transforming. (shrink)

We asked jurors awaiting trial assignment to listen to a recorded synopsis of an authentic criminal trial and to make a choice among 4 verdict possibilities. Each participant juror then deliberated with another juror whose verdict choice differed, as a microcosm of a full jury's deliberation. Analysis of the transcripts of these deliberations revealed both characteristics general to the sample and characteristics for which variation appeared across participants. Findings were interpreted in terms of a model of juror reasoning as entailing (...) theory-evidence coordination. More frequently than challenging the other's statements, we found, a juror agreed with and added to or elaborated them. Epistemological stance --- whether knowledge was regarded as absolute and certain or subject to interpretation --- predicted several characteristics of discourse. Absolutists were less likely to make reference to the verdict criteria in their discourse. Those who did so, as well as those who made frequent reference to the evidence, were more likely to persuade their discourse partners. (shrink)

POSTURES ET PRATIQUES DE L'HOMME Libéralisme, philosophie non-standard et pensée japonaise Jordanco SEKULOVSKI Nous, les sans-philosophie ASIE Japon -/- La philosophie véhicule des distinctions dualistes dont la conflictualité affaiblit gravement notre sentiment de solidarité humaine ; affronter la philosophie sur son propre terrain mène à une impasse, toute objection à son règne métaphysique devant, pour être reçue, se formuler dans les termes mêmes de la métaphysique... Il s'agit donc de changer de terrain, ou de chemin... L'auteur s'appuie sur le kâta (...) japonais qui forme la base des techniques de soi et façonne la pensée et les pratiques sociétales : une alternative crédible à la pensée-monde occidentale aujourd'hui dans l'impasse. -/- - format : 135 x 215 cm ISBN : 978-2-343-00792-2 • septembre 2013 • 222 pages EAN13 : 9782343007922 EAN PDF : 9782336322865. (shrink)

The paper provides a review of the collection of scientific works «Williamson on Modality» and contains a brief summary of the main ideas of the articles published in the book.

In this paper, I present a categorial theory of meaning which asserts that the meaning of a sentence is the function from the actualization of some potentiality or the potentiality of some actuality to the truth of the sentence. I argue that it builds on the virtues of David Lewis’s Possible World Semantics but advances beyond problems that Lewis’s theory faces with its distinctly Aristotelian turn toward actuality and potentiality.

Contemporary naturalism is changing and scientific reductionism is under challenge from those who advocate a more comprehensive outlook. This special issue of Telos, based on the first Telos Australia Symposium held at Swinburne University in Melbourne in February 2014, introduces some of the key questions in the current debates. It also poses the question of whether more satisfactory political and social thought can be produced if scientific reductionism is replaced by a richer and more hermeneutical naturalism, one that takes more (...) account of philosophical anthropology, actual co-involvements of human beings and their environments, and the potential of more naturalistically grounded approaches to culture. (shrink)

The viability of metaphysics as a field of knowledge has been challenged time and again. But in spite of the continuing tendency to dismiss metaphysics, there has been considerable progress in this field in the 20th- and 21st- centuries. One of the newest − though, in a sense, also oldest − frontiers of metaphysics is the grounding project. In this paper I raise a methodological challenge to the new grounding project and propose a constructive solution. Both the challenge and its (...) solution apply to metaphysics in general, but grounding theory puts the challenge in an especially sharp focus. The solution consists of a new methodology, holistic grounding or holistic metaphysics. This methodology is modeled after a recent epistemic methodology, foundational holism, that enables us to pursue the foundational project of epistemology without being hampered by the problems associated with foundationalism. (shrink)

Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability By LeibowitzUri D. and SinclairNeilOxford University Press, 2016. x + 258 pp. £45.00.

Nietzsche regarded nihilism as an outgrowth of the natural sciences which, he worried, were bringing about “an essentially mechanistic [and hence meaningless] world.” Nihilism in this sense refers to the doctrine that there are no values, or that everything we might value is worthless. In the last issue of Modern Horizons, I offered this conditional explanation of the relation of science and nihilism: that a scientific worldview is nihilistic insofar as it rules out the existence of anything that cannot in (...) principle be precisely picked out or identified.i What kinds of entities would a scientific worldview eliminate on the basis of such an assumption? The list is long and various, but it includes those intentional (mentalii) entities of our consciousness that underwrite the existence of persons, and more basically of thought itself – e.g., belief, value, agency, truth, and meaning. I argued in that previous paper that intentional concepts are ultimately inscrutable, and yet impossible coherently to deny. I claimed that we could no more doubt the existence of values than we could doubt reality itself – and when I spoke of values I had in mind the (suspicion-engendering) concept of the good, and was even toying with the related idea of the Logos (an even more suspect concept). There are a several attractive reasons why the idea of the good, or the Logos, might be regarded with suspicion, and why either might reasonably be discarded as a pseudo concept. Leaving the latter concern until later, we might worry that insisting on the possibility of an overarching good supports the idea of a total worldview, or that we are gradually progressing towards a single correct vision of things. A progressivist, totalising vision would seem to foreclose on outlooks, values, and persons that deviate from its most likely trajectory, and may stymie or interfere with incommensurate forms of otherness,iii awkward disturbances, and idiosyncrasies threatening its more well-established precincts – perhaps whatever stands out as strange, rare, and indissolubly individual. The idea of an emerging universal standard of values thus might amount to a source of oppression, e.g., if it provides a warrant to transform a currently limited universally prescriptive set of global practices and institutes into an ever more elaborate totalising hierarchy. In the discussion below, I will say why the good, conceived as the Logos, suggests a more salutary trajectory for individuals, and erodes support for either a totalitarian vision or a dissolving nihilistic outlook on the world. (shrink)

Anaphoric deflationism is a prosententialist account of the use of “true.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of “true” (especially in Brandom’s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that “true” (...) is not understood as a predicate and that truth is not a property. Primitivism, defended by Frege, Moore, and Davidson, is associated with two ideas: (1) that truth is a primitive and central trait of our conceptual system and (2) that truth, as such, cannot be defined. This second claim can be called “negative primitivism,” and it especially points out the facts about the “indefinability” of truth generally advocated by primitivists. In what follows, a connection is established between the deflationist’s rejection of the predicate and of the property and facts (and primitivist ideas) about the indefinability of truth. This connection establishes a common framework to lend further explanatory power to both options. According to the resulting view, this indefinability can explain the appeal and soundness of a deflationist dismissal of predicates and properties dealing with truth. (shrink)

Mary Douglas introduced the grid-group map as a tool of anthropological analysis. Several studies have been applying this approach to study social phenomena, but very few concerning the scientific community. This article aims to bridge the current gap, building sociological ideal-types in the scientific community based on grid-group analysis. First, we illustrate the main features of Douglas’s grid-group analysis, up to and including the latest studies developed in the social sciences. Then, we apply Douglas’s approach to a sample of scientists, (...) reporting scholars’ stances in the grid-group plane. Finally, we put forward a new elaboration of grid-group analysis and propose ideas for further research. (shrink)

Largely a response to Lee Basham’s essay “Malevolent Global Conspiracy.” After presenting an update on the status of conspiracy theories surrounding the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, I agree with Basham that falsification and paranoia are not effective ways to criticize conspiratorial thinking. However, I am not convinced with the case Basham presents against worries that conspiracy theories often falter by overestimating the ability of large, public institutions to be secretly and effectively controlled. His appeal to the historical record can be (...) read as suggesting that malevolent global action can be effectively carried out in full public view, obviating recourse to conspiracy. (shrink)

The starting point of Tarde's sociology are individuals. That does not make it a methodological individualism. Instead, it is a sociology of infinitesimal difference which finds in individuals an adequate reference for addressing social life, and that ends up by turning problematic both the notion of individual and society. Imitation is here an elemental form of social relation, but it is not the only one: opposition and invention are elemental social relations as well. Social life, in what it has of (...) proliferating and chaotic, is made up of these relations, differential relations that can however be organized, or better yet integrated, both logically and teleologically (without being totalized by this organization). By relying on pluralistic ontological and epistemological positions which privilege difference over identity, time over space, the infinite over the finite, this sociology shows itself as off-centered regarding formerly and today’s holisms and individualisms. Re-reading it as an infinitesimal sociology of flows and ensembles can open a way to go beyond the oppositions between individual and society, and between micro and macro approaches. (shrink)

According to Kemp Smith, Descartes believed that animals were devoid of feelings and sensations. This is the so-called ‘monstrous thesis,’ which I explore here in light of two Cartesian approaches to animals. Firstly, I examine their original treatment in function of Descartes’ early metaphysical approach, i.e., all natural phenomena are to be elucidated in terms of mental scrutiny. As pain would only exist in the understanding, and animals have neither understanding nor souls, Descartes held that they did not suffer. Secondly, (...) I look at the Cartesian late naturalism; specifically, at how animals are subsequently regarded as machines that may suffer. Lastly, I conclude that the ‘monstrous thesis’ is not Cartesian because animals are machines with feelings and sensations. However, Descartes’ surprising indulgence towards humans who kill and eat animals supposes that empathy for beings who may suffer is not necessary. This may raise doubts as to another ‘monstrous thesis. (shrink)

Something amazing happened to me: in my book 2010, I have written about smolin’s book 2002 ‘Three roads to Quantum Gravity’. In 2017, smolin wrote the third edition of this book with revision and adding’ some material. Apparently nothing surprisingly… However, when I saw a commentary on his book 2017, I realized that these ‘revision and adding’ material introduces UNBELIEVABLE similarities between smolin’s new ideas (2017) and my ideas (2002-2008…including 2016a)! The problem is that these new ideas a completely NEW (...) comparing with all his ideas from the previous editions. The question arises immediately: ‘Why smolin introduced these ESSENTIAL ideas (which represent a NEW FRAMEWORK OF THINKING very similar to my EDWs perspective) 15 years later than the first edition?’ He named this new framework ‘relationalism’ (apparently the same name used by carlo rovelli in the past 1995) but who also came with a new relationalism very closed to my EDWs perspective in the same YEAR 2017! What is the probability lee smolin to introduce so many similar ideas to my ideas in 2017? The probability is ZERO! (shrink)

Guy Le Gaufey’s critical reading of Lacan’s formulae of sexuation has traced the historical course of the invention of Lacan’s object. Lacan’s objet a is not the specular object corresponding to his early concentration on the Imaginary, nor the unary trait from his transition to the Symbolic, but "an object without a concept ” or an object in the Real. It is to make sense of this new object that Lacan draws on Immanuel Kant’s four nothings and, in particular, his (...) nihil negativum or negative nothing, which is a nothing without a concept. The relevance of this to the formulae of sexuation and “not-all” is that Lacan’s interpretation of this negative nothing will allow for an object free from a concept, a concept which would relate it to a whole, a class or an “all”. This paper will examine Lacan’s use of Kant’s nothings and attempt to raise some questions about Le Gaufey’s reading. (shrink)

This book surveys the major theological writings of Hans Urs von Balthasar from the perspective of the relationship between finite and infinite freedom. The first part examines Balthasar's early treatment of the question in the context of the analogy of being. The second part concentrates on his more mature work, the Theological Dramatics, with its understanding of the relationship between finite and infinite freedom in terms of a 'dramatic encounter' in which, controversially, human freedom is thought to actively participate in (...) an ever-greater exchange of love in God. But this book is more than a survey. Observing the persistence of the 'analogy of proportionality' within the Dramatics leads the author in the third part to a critique of Balthasar's thought. It is argued that the continuation of the earlier perspective explains Balthasar's emphasis on the freedom of the individual to the neglect of social structures and their transformation. While the 'historical' as such is not neglected, as some claim it is, the focus is on the history of the individual and his or her relationship with God. It is therefore contended that Balthasar's theology of the Trinity is more concerned with 'interpersonal' relationships than truly 'social' ones and that this is what inhibits a fruitful dialogue with social theologies. (shrink)

© Mind Association 2017No two scholars have done more in the past half a century to bring contemporary European thought into dialogue with Anglo-American philosophy than Charles Taylor and the late Hubert Dreyfus. For years they planned to write a book together, defending their shared commitment to realism, and in 2015 the project came to fruition in this accessible, but also rich and stimulating volume.As philosophers know all too well, there are about as many realisms as there are realists. Two (...) things make Dreyfus and Taylor’s position distinctive. The first is that it is firmly grounded in a phenomenological critique of a cluster of deeply rooted assumptions that have defined mainstream philosophy since the seventeenth century. The second is that their realism aspires to be, as they put it, ‘robust’ yet pluralistic: it is robust—which is to say, not merely deflationary—because it insists... (shrink)

This is an anthology of experimental papers relevant to philosophical inquiry across many areas of philosophy.