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Epistemology > Epistemological Theories > Pragmatic Encroachment

Pragmatic Encroachment

Edited by Brian Kim (Oklahoma State University)
About this topic
Summary

The motto of pragmatic encroachment is "the practical encroaches on the epistemic".  This pragmatic approach is exemplified by those who argue that there are practical conditions on knowing.  However, proponents of pragmatic encroachment differ in terms of their explanations of how the pragmatic encroaches on knowledge.  For example, it has been proposed that there are practical conditions on believing, on evidence and evidential support, and most prominently, on having knowledge-level justification.  Arguments for this pragmatic view of knowledge have primarily been grounded in the ordinary use of ‘knows’ as well as the epistemic norms governing action and deliberation.  These pragmatic views have been used to address issues related to skepticism, knowledge closure principles, and the value of knowledge.
Key works The recent discussion of pragmatic encroachment began with Fantl & McGrath 2002 and were then followed by extended discussions in Hawthorne 2003, Stanley 2005, DeRose 2009, Fantl & McGrath 2009, and Weatherson 2012.  Arguments for and against pragmatic accounts of knowledge that focus on knowledge ascriptions are found in DeRose 2004, DeRose 2005, Schaffer 2006, Pinillos 2011, Sripada & Stanley 2012, Buckwalter & Schaffer 2015, and Kim 2016.  Arguments for and against the pragmatic account that focus on the epistemic norms of action are found in Hawthorne & Stanley 2008, Brown 2008, Reed 2010, Fantl & Mcgrath 2012, Brown 2013, and Brown 2013.  Discussions of practical conditions on believing are found in Weatherson 2005, Armendt 2010, and Ross & Schroeder 2014.  Historical predecessors to the contemporary discussion are found in the debate about the ethics of belief (James 1896, Clifford 1877) and the value-ladenness of science (Rudner 1953, Levi 1960).
Introductions Fantl & McGrath 2009, Kim 2017
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1 — 50 / 215
  1. added 2019-03-15
    The Rational Impermissibility of Accepting Racial Generalizations.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...)
  2. added 2019-03-06
    How to Argue for Pragmatic Encroachment.Blake Roeber - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Purists think that changes in our practical interests can’t affect what we know unless those changes are truth-relevant with respect to the propositions in question. Impurists disagree. They think changes in our practical interests can affect what we know even if those changes aren’t truth-relevant with respect to the propositions in question. I argue that impurists are right, but for the wrong reasons, since they haven’t appreciated the best argument for their own view. Together with “Minimalism and the Limits of (...)
  3. added 2019-01-08
    Pragmatic Encroachment and the Challenge From Epistemic Injustice.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    The article consists in an argument that pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge face difficulty in accounting for paradigmatic cases of discriminatory epistemic injustice as such. This challenge is a fairly unusual one that proceeds from moral judgments to an epistemological conclusion. The basic idea is, roughly, that in some cases, a knowing subject is wronged by being regarded as lacking knowledge due to social identity prejudices. But pragmatic encroachers appear to be committed to the view that the subject does not (...)
  4. added 2019-01-04
    Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
    You shouldn’t have done it. But you did. Against your better judgment you scrolled to the end of an article concerning the state of race relations in America and you are now reading the comments. Amongst the slurs, the get-rich-quick schemes, and the threats of physical violence, there is one comment that catches your eye. Spencer argues that although it might be “unpopular” or “politically incorrect” to say this, the evidence supports believing that the black diner in his section will (...)
  5. added 2018-12-19
    Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath. [REVIEW]Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):703-721.
  6. added 2018-12-12
    How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can (...)
  7. added 2018-10-22
    Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s justification for that claim is less than fully conclusive. According to the purist, knowledge does not depend on practical factors. Fallibilism and purism are widely assumed to be compatible; in fact, the combination of these views has been called the ‘ho-hum,’ obvious, traditional view of knowledge. But I will argue that fallibilism and (...)
  8. added 2018-09-06
    Interests, Evidence and Games.Brian Weatherson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):329-344.
    Pragmatic encroachment theories have a problem with evidence. On the one hand, the arguments that knowledge is interest-relative look like they will generalise to show that evidence too is interest-relative. On the other hand, our best story of how interests affect knowledge presupposes an interest-invariant notion of evidence. -/- The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of evidence that is interest-relative, but which allows that ‘best story’ to go through with minimal changes. The core idea is that (...)
  9. added 2018-09-01
    A Note on Knowledge-First Decision Theory and Practical Adequacy.Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
  10. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Closure.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
  11. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment on Scientific Knowledge?Mikkel Gerken - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    Pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge may be characterized as views according to which practical factors may partly determine the truth-value of ascriptions that S knows that p – even though these factors do not partly determine S’s belief that p or p itself. The pros and cons of variations of pragmatic encroachment are widely discussed in epistemology. But despite a long pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, few efforts have been devoted to relate this particular view to issues in (...)
  12. added 2018-09-01
    Deliberation and Pragmatic Belief.Brad Armendt - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? The idea that beliefs are sometimes stake-sensitive (Armendt 2008, 2013) is further explored here, with a focus on whether beliefs may be stake-sensitive and rational. In contexts of extended deliberation about what to do, beliefs and assessments of options interact. In some deliberations, a belief about what you will do may rationally (...)
  13. added 2018-09-01
    Skepticism and Evolution.N. Ángel Pinillos - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    I develop a cognitive account of how humans make skeptical judgments (of the form “X does not know p”). In my view, these judgments are produced by a special purpose metacognitive "skeptical" mechanism which monitors our reasoning for hasty or overly risky assumptions. I argue that this mechanism is modular and shaped by natural selection. The explanation for why the mechanism is adaptive essentially relies on an internalized principle connecting knowledge and action, a principle central to pragmatic encroachment theories. I (...)
  14. added 2018-09-01
    An Externalist Decision Theory for a Pragmatic Epistemology.Brian Kim - 2019 - In Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    In recent years, some epistemologists have argued that practical factors can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. While proponents of this pragmatic thesis have proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, it is striking that they have failed to address Gettier cases. As a result, the proposed analyses of knowledge are either lacking explanatory power or susceptible to counterexamples. Gettier cases are also worth reflecting on because they raise foundational questions for the pragmatist. Underlying these challenges is (...)
  15. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Practical Reasons.Anne Baril - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
  16. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Having Reasons.Stewart Cohen - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
  17. added 2018-09-01
    Great Expectations: Belief and the Case for Pragmatic Encroachment.Dorit Ganson - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
  18. added 2018-06-11
    Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay (...)
  19. added 2018-06-09
    Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.
    In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we feel (...)
  20. added 2018-06-05
    Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Evaluation By David K. Henderson and John Greco. [REVIEW]Michael Hannon - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):173-177.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] is the point of epistemic evaluation? Why do we appraise others as knowers, understanders and so forth? Epistemology has traditionally focused on analysing the conditions under which one has knowledge, leaving aside for the most part questions about the roles played by epistemic evaluation in our lives more broadly. This fact is borne out by the so-called Gettier (...)
  21. added 2018-04-04
    Judgment and Agency. [REVIEW]Matthew McGrath - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):399-404.
  22. added 2018-04-04
    Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
  23. added 2018-04-04
    Two Purposes of Knowledge Attribution and the Contextualism Debate.Matthew McGrath - unknown
    In this chapter, we follow Edward Craig?s advice: ask what the concept of knowledge does for us and use our findings as clues about its application conditions. What a concept does for us is a matter of what we can do with it, and what we do with concepts is deploy them in thought and language. So, we will examine the purposes we have in attributing knowledge. This chapter examines two such purposes, agent evaluation and informant-suggestion, and brings the results (...)
  24. added 2018-03-05
    How Much is at Stake for the Pragmatic Encroacher.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    “Pragmatic encroachers” about knowledge generally advocate two ideas: (1) you can rationally act on what you know; (2) knowledge is harder to achieve when more is at stake. Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne have recently argued that these two ideas may not fit together so well. I extend their argument by working out what “high stakes” would have to mean for the two ideas to line up, using decision theory.
  25. added 2018-02-17
    The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 2014 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    For this 1897 publication, the American philosopher William James brought together ten essays, some of which were originally talks given to Ivy League societies. Accessible to a broader audience, these non-technical essays illustrate the author's pragmatic approach to belief and morality, arguing for faith and action in spite of uncertainty. James thought his audiences suffered 'paralysis of their native capacity for faith' while awaiting scientific grounds for belief. His response consisted in an attitude of 'radical empiricism', which deals practically rather (...)
  26. added 2018-02-17
    Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.
    Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of 'knowledge'-ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI.
  27. added 2018-02-17
    Stanley on the Knowledge-Relation.Steffen Borge - 2008 - SATS 9 (1):109-124.
    The latest newcomer on the epistemology scene is Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), which is the view that even though the semantics of the verb “know” is invariant, the answer to the question of whether someone knows something is sensitive to factors about that person. Factors about the context of the purported knower are relevant to whether he knows some proposition p or not. In this paper I present Jason Stanley's version of SSI, a theory Stanley calls Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI). The core (...)
  28. added 2018-01-05
    Credal Pragmatism.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    According to doxastic pragmatism, certain perceived practical factors, such as high stakes and urgency, have systematic effects on normal subjects’ outright beliefs. Endorsement of doxastic pragmatism can be found in Weatherson (2005), Bach (2005, 2008, 2010), Ganson (2008) and Nagel (2008, 2010). Upholders of doxastic pragmatism have so far endorsed a particular version of this view, which we may call threshold pragmatism. This view holds that the sensitivity of belief to the relevant practical factors is due to a corresponding sensitivity (...)
  29. added 2017-12-23
    Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer Verlag.
    Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that most women employees at the (...)
  30. added 2017-12-04
    The Epistemic Consequences of Forced Choice.Mark Schroeder - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (3):365-374.
    In “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge,” I used a variety of cases, including cases of forced choice, to illustrate my explanation of how and why some pragmatic factors, but not others, can affect whether an agent knows. In his recent contribution, Andy Mueller argues that cases of forced choice actually pose a dilemma for my account. In this paper I reply.
  31. added 2017-10-23
    Reply to Blackson.Brian James Weatherson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:73-75.
    Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles (...)
  32. added 2017-10-17
    Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía.
    According to the fallibilist, it is possible for us to know things when our evidence doesn't entail that our beliefs are correct. Even if there is some chance that we're mistaken about p, we might still know that p is true. Fallibilists will tell you that an important virtue of their view is that infallibilism leads to skepticism. In this paper, we'll see that fallibilist impurism has considerable skeptical consequences of its own. We've missed this because we've focused our attention (...)
  33. added 2017-09-28
    Anti-Intellectualism, Egocentrism and Bank Case Intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2841-2857.
    Salience-sensitivity is a form of anti-intellectualism that says the following: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on which error-possibilities are salient to the believer. I will investigate whether salience-sensitivity can be motivated by appeal to bank case intuitions. I will suggest that so-called third-person bank cases threaten to sever the connection between bank case intuitions and salience-sensitivity. I will go on to argue that salience-sensitivists can overcome this worry if they appeal to egocentric bias, a general tendency to (...)
  34. added 2017-09-18
    The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.
    Does knowledge depend in any interesting way on our practical interests? This is the central question in the pragmatic encroachment debate. Pragmatists defend the affirmative answer to this question while purists defend the negative answer. The literature contains two kinds of arguments for pragmatism: principle-based arguments and case-based arguments. Principle-based arguments derive pragmatism from principles that connect knowledge to practical interests. Case-based arguments rely on intuitions about cases that differ with respect to practical interests. I argue that there are insurmountable (...)
  35. added 2017-09-18
    Introduction to On Folk Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This is the Introduction to "On Folk Epistemology. How we think and talk about knowledge" -/- In addition to a brief introduction to the main themes of the book, it contains a chapter-by-chapter overview.
  36. added 2017-09-18
    An Epistemological Corrective to Doctrines of Assurance.Jonathan Rutledge - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):163--177.
    Many Christian traditions affirm a doctrine of assurance. According to this doctrine, those who are saved have assurance of their own salvation; that is, the doctrine of assurance tells us that the elect can know their status as elect. In this paper, I explore two developments of the doctrine of assurance by theologians (i.e. John Calvin & Kenneth Keathley) and argue that they fail to accommodate the fallibilistic nature of human knowing. I then develop a fallibilistic doctrine of assurance, which (...)
  37. added 2017-09-18
    Aaron Rizzieri: Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice. Palgrave 2013.Smith Martin - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):221--224.
  38. added 2017-09-18
    On Folk Epistemology. How We Think and Talk About Knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. -/- A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained (...)
  39. added 2017-09-18
    Pragmatic or Pascalian Encroachment?Andy Mueller - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):235-241.
    I argue against Schroeder's explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In section 1, I introduce pragmatic encroachment and point out that an explanation of it should avoid Pascalian considerations. In section 2, summarize the key aspects of Schroeder's explanation of pragmatic encroachment. In section 3, I argue that Schroeder's explanation faces a dilemma: it either allows for an objectionable form of Pascalian encroachment or it fails to be a fully general explanation of pragmatic encroachment.
  40. added 2017-09-18
    Conhecimento, Contexto e Infiltração Pragmática.T. V. Rodrigues - 2013 - Intuitio (Nº 2):05-18.
    Resumo: Neste texto, introduzo algumas questões importantes que fazem parte do debate sobre infiltração pragmática. Além de apresentar e problematizar as principais alegações oferecidas pelos proponentes da infiltração pragmática eu irei contrasta-la com algumas teses mais tradicionais, como a Tese Tradicional sobre o Conhecimento e o Contextualismo Epistêmico. Por fim, apresento uma crítica aos proponentes da infiltração pragmática que parece ainda não ter sido tratada. Concluo que embora controversa, tal tese está longe de ser refutada completamente. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento; Contexto; Justificação; (...)
  41. added 2017-09-18
    Pragmatic Encroachment: It's Not Just About Knowledge.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
    There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough (...)
  42. added 2017-08-17
    Strange-but-True: A New Argument for Contextualism About ‘Know’.Paul Dimmock - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2005-2015.
    A powerful objection to subject-sensitive invariantism concerns various ‘strange-but-true’ conditionals. One popular response to this objection is to argue that strange-but-true conditionals pose a problem for non-sceptical epistemological theories in general. In the present paper, it is argued that strange-but-true conditionals are not a problem for contextualism about ‘know’. This observation undercuts the proposed defence of SSI, and supplies a surprising new argument for contextualism.
  43. added 2017-07-12
    4. Probability and Prodigality.Daniel Greco - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:82.
    I present a straightforward objection to the view that what we know has epistemic probability 1: when combined with Bayesian decision theory, the view seems to entail implausible conclusions concerning rational choice. I consider and reject three responses. The first holds that the fault is with decision theory, rather than the view that knowledge has probability 1. The second two try to reconcile the claim that knowledge has probability 1 with decision theory by appealing to contextualism and sensitive invariantism, respectively. (...)
  44. added 2017-07-03
    Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.
    Epistemology orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it separates out the epistemic from the practical. What counts as evidence is independent of what we care about. Which beliefs count as justified and which count as knowledge are independent of our practical concerns. In recent years, many epistemologists have abandoned such purist views and embraced varying degrees of pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic. I survey a variety of these views and explore the main arguments that proponents of pragmatic (...)
  45. added 2017-06-22
    Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-Stakes Cases​.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Episteme.
    One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in high stakes when the target propositions seem to be inappropriate premises for practical reasoning. According to an account suggested by Williamson, our intuitive judgments are erroneous due to an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between first-order and higher-order knowledge: the high-stakes subject lacks the latter but possesses the former. In this paper, I provide three objections to Williamson’s account: i) his account delivers (...)
  46. added 2017-06-07
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.James Fritz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661.
    Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person’s knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person’s environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge-attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This paper (...)
  47. added 2017-05-28
    Précis of Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):476–481.
  48. added 2017-05-15
    Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests.T. Basboll - 2007 - Philosophy in Review 27 (3):225.
  49. added 2017-05-15
    Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects.Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
    In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretske's Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozick's Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various forms of contextualism and the ways contextualists try to (...)
  50. added 2017-05-15
    Now You Know It, Now You Don't.Keith DeRose - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.
    Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s (...)
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