Epistemic Logic

The relevance of any logical analysis lies in its ability to solve paradoxes and trace conceptual troubles back; with this respect, the task of epistemic logic is to handle paradoxes in connection with the concept of knowledge. Epistemic logic is currently introduced as the logical analysis of crucial concepts within epistemology, namely: knowledge, belief, truth, and justification. An alternative approach will be advanced here in order to enlighten such a discourse, as centred upon the word assertion and displayed in terms (...) of utterance. Insofar as epistemic modalities express some attitudes, the intentionality of discourse will be emphasized within an illocutionary modal logic. Two large views will range over the whole study: declarative and epistemic sentences have one and the same logic (assertion logic); the plurality of languages games doesn’t entail any logical pluralism. -/- La valeur d'une analyse logique réside dans sa capacité à résoudre des paradoxes et à comprendre l'origine de nos problèmes conceptuels ; à ce titre, le rôle d'une logique épistémique est de traiter des paradoxes liés au concept de connaissance. On présente généralement la logique épistémique comme une analyse logique de concepts centraux en épistémologie : connaissance, croyance, vérité, justification. Une autre approche sera proposée ici en vue de clarifier ce genre de discours, centrée sur la notion d'assertion et décrite en termes d'énonciation. Parce que les modalités épistémiques expriment des attitudes, c'est l'intentionnalité du discours qui sera mise en valeur dans le cadre d'une logique modale illocutoire. Deux thèses transversales parcourront l'ensemble du travail : les énoncés déclaratifs et épistémiques partagent la même logique (logique assertorique) ; la pluralité des jeux de langages n'implique pas un pluralisme logique. (shrink)

The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and (...) semi-negations. (shrink)

Recent years witnessed a growing interest in non-standard epistemic logics of knowing whether, knowing how, knowing what, knowing why and so on. The new epistemic modalities introduced in those logics all share, in their semantics, the general schema of ∃x◻φ, e.g., knowing how to achieve φ roughly means that there exists a way such that you know that it is a way to ensure that φ. Moreover, the resulting logics are decidable. Inspired by those particular logics, in this work, we (...) propose a very general and powerful framework based on quantifier-free predicate language extended by a new modality, which packs exactly ∃x◻ together. We show that the resulting language, though much more expressive, shares many good properties of the basic propositional modal logic over arbitrary models, such as finite-tree-model property and van Benthem-like characterization w.r.t.\ first-order modal logic. We axiomatize the logic over S5 frames with intuitive axioms to capture the interaction between the new modality and know-that operator in an epistemic setting. (shrink)

Epistemic logic has become a major field of philosophical logic ever since the groundbreaking work by Hintikka [58]. Despite its various successful applications in theoretical computer science, AI, and game theory, the technical development of the field has been mainly focusing on the propositional part, i.e., the propositional modal logics of “knowing that”. However, knowledge is expressed in everyday life by using various other locutions such as “knowing whether”, “knowing what”, “knowing how” and so on (knowing-wh hereafter). Such knowledge expressions (...) are better captured in quantified epistemic logic, as was already discussed by Hintikka [58] and his sequel works at length. This paper aims to draw the attention back again to such a fascinating but largely neglected topic. We first survey what Hintikka and others did in the literature of quantified epistemic logic, and then advocate a new quantifier-free approach to study the epistemic logics of knowing-wh, which we believe can balance expressivity and complexity, and capture the essential reasoning patterns about knowing-wh. We survey our recent line of work on the epistemic logics of ‘knowing whether”, “knowing what” and “knowing how” to demonstrate the use of this new approach. (shrink)

A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy’s logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically (...) defined categories, on iterated announcements, including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization. We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge, and for lying as private announcements to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts. (shrink)

You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. I defend three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is (...) not obvious. The Enkratic Intuition---that your first-order opinions must “line up” with your higher-order opinions---is incorrect; epistemic akrasia can be rational. If all this is right, then it leaves us without answers---but with a clear picture of the question, and a fruitful strategy for pursuing it. (shrink)

Justification logics are constructive analogues of modal logics. They are often used as epistemic logics, particularly as models of evidentialist justification. However, in this role, justification logics are defective insofar as they represent justification with a necessity-like operator, whereas actual evidentialist justification is usually probabilistic. This paper first examines and rejects extant candidates for solving this problem: Milnikel’s Logic of Uncertain Justifications, Ghari’s Hájek–Pavelka-Style Justification Logics and a version of probabilistic justification logic developed by Kokkinis et al. It then proposes (...) a new solution to the problem in the form of a justification logic that incorporates the essential features of both a fuzzy logic and a probabilistic logic. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with representations of belief by means of nonadditive probabilities of the Dempster-Shafer (DS) type. After surveying some foundational issues and results in the D.S. theory, including Suppes's related contributions, the paper proceeds to analyze the connection of the D.S. theory with some of the work currently pursued in epistemic logic. A preliminary investigation of the modal logic of belief functions à la Shafer is made. There it is shown that the Alchourrron-Gärdenfors-Makinson (A.G.M.) logic of belief change (...) is closely related to the D.S. theory. The final section compares the critique of Bayesianism which underlies the present paper with some important objections raised by Suppes against this doctrine. -/- . (shrink)

In this volume, the author investigates and argues for, a particular answer to the question: What is the right way to logically analyze modalities from natural language within formal languages? The answer is: by formalizing modal expressions in terms of predicates. But, as in the case of truth, the most intuitive modal principles lead to paradox once the modal notions are conceived as predicates. -/- The book discusses the philosophical interpretation of these modal paradoxes and argues that any satisfactory approach (...) to modality will have to face the paradoxes independently of the grammatical category of the modal notion. By systematizing modal principles with respect to their joint consistency and inconsistency, Stern provides an overview of the options and limitations of the predicate approach to modality that may serve as a useful starting point for future work on predicate approaches to modality. Stern also develops a general strategy for constructing philosophically attractive theories of modal notions conceived as predicates. The idea is to characterize the modal predicate by appeal to its interaction with the truth predicate. This strategy is put to use by developing the modal theories Modal Friedman-Sheard and Modal Kripke-Feferman. (shrink)

Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic can be used to give a simple, complete axiomatization of Yalcin's [16] semantic consequence relation for (...) a language with epistemic modals and indicative conditionals. In the other direction, the formal semantics for indicative conditionals due to Kolodny and MacFarlane [9] gives rise to a new dynamic operator that is very natural from the point of view of dynamic epistemic logic, allowing succinct expression of dependence (as in dependence logic) or supervenience statements. We prove decidability for the logic with epistemic modals and Kolodny and MacFarlane's indicative conditional via a full and faithful computable translation from their logic to the modal logic K45. (shrink)

After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one’s initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a (...) wholesale reduction of iterated to one-shot revision. The present paper offers grounds to hold that these principles should be significantly weakened and that the reductionist thesis should ultimately be rejected. Furthermore, the considerations provided suggest a close connection between the logic of iterated belief change and the logic of evidential relevance. (shrink)

We do not believe that logic is the sole answer to deep and intriguing questions about human behaviour, but we think that it might be a useful tool in simulating and understanding it to a certain degree and in specifically restricted areas of application. We do not aim to resolve the question of what rational behaviour in games with mistaken and changing beliefs is. Rather, we develop a formal and abstract framework that allows us to reason about behaviour in games (...) with mistaken and changing beliefs leaving aside normative questions concerning whether the agents are behaving “rationally”; we focus on what agents do in a game. In this paper, we are not concerned with the reasoning process of the economic agent; rather, our intended application is artificial agents, e.g., autonomous agents interacting with a human user or with each other as part of a computer game or in a virtual world. We give a story of mistaken beliefs that is a typical example of the situation in which we should want our formal setting to be applied. Then we give the definitions for our formal system and how to use this setting to get a backward induction solution. We then apply our semantics to the story related earlier and give an analysis of it. Our final section contains a discussion of related work and future projects. We discuss the advantages of our approach over existing approaches and indicate how it can be connected to the existing literature. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit R. M. Martin’s logic of belief. As with much of Martin’s work, his formal studies into belief and belief reports have gone largely unnoticed. However, in my article I suggest reasons for thinking that these studies warrant revisiting. One reason is that Martin adopted an account of the notion of belief which was more comprehensive than that employed by most rival theorists. Another reason is that Martin couched his theory in a formal pragmatics which utilised (...) a pragmatical meta-language. This method resulted in a rather novel approach which may turn out to be more enlightening than many popular alternative accounts. Martin was a constructivistic nominalist whose approach to philosophical analysis was characterised by a commitment to first-order extensional systems. Yet in the statement of his theory of belief he employed a platonistic syntax simply for the reason that this kind of syntax is a little easier to implement than one which is nominalistic. However Martin also supposed that a fully nominalised version of his theory could be developed. In my article I investigate whether it can. I do this by sketching an inscriptional pragmatics, where this pragmatical system presupposes an inscriptional semantics of the kind developed by Martin himself. While further work is required, I think that a nominalisation of Martin’s logic of belief may be developed. (shrink)

One of the many research projects of Jaakko Hintikka was entitled “Logical tools for human thinking and their history”. This is in fact an apt summary of the lifetime work of this master logician who developed several new methods and systems in mathematical and philosophical logic, among them distributive normal forms, model sets, possible-worlds semantics, epistemic logic, doxastic logic, inductive logic, semantic information, game-theoretical semantics, interrogative approach to inquiry, and independence-friendly logic. He applied them to study problems in philosophy of (...) language, formal epistemology, and philosophy of science. He combined systematic work with novel interpretations of important historical figures like Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Peirce, and Wittgenstein. Hintikka was one of the most cited analytic philosophers, and he influenced logic and philosophy also as a successful teacher and the long-time editor of the journal Synthese. (shrink)

In this work we define contingency logic with arbitrary announcement. In contingency logic, the primitive modality contingency formalises that a proposition may be true but also may be false, so that if it is non-contingent then it is necessarily true or necessarily false. To this logic one can add dynamic operators to describe change of contingency. Our logic has operators for public announcement and operators for arbitrary public announcement, as in the dynamic epistemic logic called arbitrary public announcement logic. However, (...) our language primitive is the more suitable notion of public announcement whether, instead of the public announcement that. We compare the expressive power of our logic and its various fragments to related dynamic epistemic logics. We further present an axiomatisation and show its completeness by adapting a method to demonstrate completeness of arbitrary public announcement logic. Various extensions are also shown to be complete with respect to the corresponding frame classes. (shrink)

In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers :149–225, 1999; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002; Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297–319, 2014; Lorini in J Philos Log 42:863–904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal comparison between (...) the two and a statement of semantic equivalence with respect to two different logical systems: a doxastic logic for belief and an epistemic–doxastic logic for belief and knowledge. Moreover, a sound and complete axiomatization of these logics with respect to the two equivalent Kripke semantics and type spaces semantics is provided. Finally, a probabilistic extension of the result is also presented. A further result of the paper is a study of the relationship between the epistemic–doxastic logic for belief and knowledge and the logic STIT by Belnap and colleagues. (shrink)

Modelling, reasoning and verifying complex situations involving a system of agents is crucial in all phases of the development of a number of safety-critical systems. In particular, it is of fundamental importance to have tools and techniques to reason about the doxastic and epistemic states of agents, to make sure that the agents behave as intended. In this paper we introduce a computationally grounded logic called COGWED and we present two types of semantics that support a range of practical situations. (...) We provide model checking algorithms, complexity characterisations and a prototype implementation. We validate our proposal against a case study from the avionic domain: we assess and verify the situational awareness of pilots flying an aircraft with several automated components in off-nominal conditions. (shrink)