19th Century Ethics

This book tells the story of modern ethics, namely the story of a discussion which, after two centuries of truce, or warlike coexistence between more than one paradigm – that is, Scholastic of natural law doctrines, humanistic ethics as therapy of the passions and art of living, Reformed supposedly philosophy-free moral theology, casuistry as a kind of applied ethics – went through a methodological revolution that gave birth to Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s new science of natural law, leaving room for two (...) centuries of explorations of the possible developments and implications of this new paradigm, up to the crisis of the Eighties in the eighteenth century, a crisis that carried a kind of mitosis, the act of birth of both basic paradigms of the two following centuries: Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. The new science of natural law carried a fresh start for ethics, resulting from a mixture of the Old and the New. It was, as suggested by Schneewind, an attempt at rescuing the content of Scholastic and Stoic doctrines on a new methodological basis. The former was the claim of existence of objective and universal moral laws; the latter was the self-aware attempt at justifying a minimal kernel of such laws facing skeptical doubt. What Bentham and Kant did was precisely carrying this strategy further on, even if restructuring it each of them around one out of two alternative basic claims. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century critics of the Enlightenment attacked both not on their alleged failure in carrying out their own projects, but precisely on having adopted Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s project. What counter-enlightenment has been unable to spell out is which alternative project could be carried out facing the modern condition of pluralism, while on the contrary, if we takes a closer look at developments in twentieth-century ethics or at on-going discussions on practical issues, we might feel inclined to believe that Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s project is as up-to-date as ever. (shrink)

Celebrated today for his groundbreaking work in logic and the foundations of mathematics, Bernard Bolzano was best known in his own time as a leader of the reform movement in his homeland . As professor of religious science at the Charles University in Prague from 1805 to 1819, Bolzano was a highly visible public intellectual, a courageous and determined critic of abuses in Church and State. Based in large part on a carefully argued utilitarian practical philosophy, he developed a non-violent (...) program for the reform of the authoritarian institutions of the Empire, which he himself set in motion through his teaching and other activities. Rarely has a philosopher had such a great impact on the political culture of his homeland. This volume contains a substantial collection of Bolzano's writings on ethics and politics, translated into English for the first time. It includes a complete translation of the treatise On the Best State, his principal writings on ethics, an essay on the contemporary situation in Ireland, and a selection of his Exhortations, dealing with such topics as enlightenment, civil disobedience, the status of women, anti-Semitism and Czech-German relations in Bohemia. It will be of particular interest to students of central European philosophy and history, and more generally to philosophers and historians of ideas. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham is often interpreted as defending a satisficing, rather than maximizing, version of utilitarianism, where an act is right as long as it produces more pleasure than pain. This lack of maximization is surprising given Bentham’s maximizing slogan ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Against the satisficing interpretation, I argue that Bentham consistently defends a maximizing version of utilitarianism, where an act’s consequences are compared to those of not performing the act. I show that following this version of (...) utilitarianism requires that one realizes the greatest happiness for all affected individuals. (shrink)

I sketch an interpretation of Tolstoy’s implicit moral theory on the basis of his masterpieces War and Peace and Anna Karenina. I suggest that Tolstoy is a theistic moral realist who believes that God’s will identifies the mind-independent truths of morality. He also thinks that, roughly, it suffices to heed natural moral emotions (like love and compassion) to know the right thing to do, that is, God’s will. In appraisal of Tolstoy’s interesting and original theory that I dub ‘theistic populist (...) sentimentalism’, I argue that it prima facie runs into a string of fallacies and undertakes dubious assumptions that render it open to question. (shrink)

This is a critical review of Roger Crisp's The Cosmos of Duty. The review praises the book but, among other things, takes issue with some of Crisp's criticisms of Sidgwick's view that resolution of the free will problem is of limited significance to ethics and with Crisp's claim that in Methods III.xiii Sidgwick defends an axiom of prudence that undergirds rational egoism.

Second part of the book. Textos sobre anarquismo por Bunge, Brenan, Ingenieros y otros.

The aim of this paper is to look at Søren Kierkegaard's defence of an ethical way of life in the light of Harry Frankfurt's work. There are salient general similarities connecting Kierkegaard and Frankfurt: Both are sceptical towards the Kantian idea of founding morality in the laws of practical reason. They both deny that the concerns, which shape our lives, could simply be validated by subject-independent values. Furthermore, and most importantly, they both emphasize the importance of reflective endorsement of one's (...) way of life. This endorsement is understood by both not as an exercise of reason but as an exercise of our will without which boredom, anxiety and, ultimately, the dissolution of the self threatens. We can, the author of the paper argues, directly impose Frankfurt's hierarchical account of psychological attitudes on Kierkegaard in the sense that Frankfurt clearly helps us to elucidate Kierkegaard. This interpretation, however, also shows the limitations of any attempt, inspired by Kierkegaard, to justify moral rules without appealing to a religious foundation of morality. /// O propósito do presente artigo é, antes de mais, proceder, à luz da obra de Harry Frankfurt, a uma análise da defesa que Søren Kierkegaard faz do modo ético de conceber a existência humana. Com efeito, segundo o autor do artigo, são várias as similitudes existentes entre Kierkegaard e Frankfurt: ambos se mostram cépticos em relação ao projecto kantiano de fundar a moralidade nas leis da razão prática; ambos negam que as nossas preocupações existenciais possam simplesmente ser validadas por valores independentes do sujeito; acima de tudo, tanto Kierkegaard como Frankfurt enfatizam a importância de uma validação reflexiva do próprio modo de vida. Tanto um como o outro compreendem esta validação não como um exercício da razão, mas sobretudo como um exercício da vontade, sem o qual, na verdade, o sujeito se expõe não só ao tédio e à angústia, mas também, em última análise, ao perigo da auto-dissolução. Neste sentido, o artigo defende a possibilidade de se impor a Kierkegaard a narrativa de Frankfurt sobre as atitudes psicológicas, de modo que, conclui o autor, Frankfurt decididamente nos pode ajudar a elucidar Kierkegaard. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, esta interpretação mostra igualmente os limites de toda e qualquer tentativa, inspirada por Kierkegaard, de justificar as normas morais sem apelar aos fundamentos religiosos da moralidade. (shrink)

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) war ein leidenschaftlicher Reformator der Philosophie, der nicht das reine Wissen, sondern den ganzen Menschen ins Zentrum seines Bemühens stellte. In dieser einzigen Biographie auf dem deutschen Markt erzählt Josef Winiger höchst lebendig und anschaulich vom Denken des großen Philosophen, stellt es in den Kontext seiner Zeit und arbeitet die für Feuerbachs philosophische Entwicklung fruchtbaren Fragestellungen heraus.