Critical Thinking

Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education as (...) the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically-driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education. (shrink)

This volume reflects the development and theoretical foundation of a new paradigm for critical thinking based on inquiry. The field of critical thinking, as manifested in the Informal Logic movement, developed primarily as a response to the inadequacies of formalism to represent actual argumentative practice and to provide useful argumentative skills to students. Because of this, the primary focus of the field has been on informal arguments rather than formal reasoning. Yet the formalist history of the field is still evident (...) in its emphasis, with respect to both theory and pedagogy, on the structure and evaluation of individual, de-contextualized arguments. It is our view that such a view of critical thinking is excessively narrow and limited, failing to provide an understanding of argumentation as largely a matter of comparative evaluation of a variety of contending positions and arguments with the goal of reaching a reasoned judgment on an issue. As a consequence, traditional critical thinking instruction is problematic in failing to provide the reasoning skills that students need in order to accomplish this goal. Instead, the goal of critical thinking instruction has been seen largely as a defensive one: of learning to not fall prey to invalid, inadequate, or fallacious arguments. (shrink)

We are pleased to publish this WSIA edition of Trudy’s Govier’s seminal volume, Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Originally published in 1987 by Foris Publications, this was a pioneering work that played a major role in establishing argumentation theory as a discipline. Today, it is as relevant to the field as when it first appeared, with discussions of questions and issues that remain central to the study of argument. It has defined the main approaches to many of those issues (...) and guided the ways in which we might respond to them. From this foundation, it sets the stage for further investigations and emerging research. This is a second edition of the book that is corrected and updated by the author, with new prefaces to each chapter. (shrink)

Christian Kock’s essays show the essential interconnectedness of practical reasoning, rhetoric and deliberative democracy. They constitute a unique contribution to argumentation theory that draws on – and criticizes – the work of philosophers, rhetoricians, political scientists and other argumentation theorists. It puts rhetoric in the service of modern democracies by drawing attention to the obligations of politicians to articulate arguments and objections that citizens can weigh against each other in their deliberations about possible courses of action.

This tribute to the breadth and influence of Trudy Govier’s philosophical work begins with her early scholarship in argumentation theory, paying special attention to its pedagogical expression. Most people first encounter Trudy Govier’s work and many people only encounter it through her textbooks, especially A Practical Study of Argument, published in many editions. In addition to the work on argumentation that has continued throughout her career, much of Govier’s later work addresses social philosophy and the problems of trust and response (...) to moral wrongs. The introduction by Catherine Hundleby situates Govier’s research along the path of her unusual academic life. While following the timeline of Govier’s research publication, in this collection the authors build on her work and suggest certain new connections between her argumentation theory and social philosophy. A Practical Study of Argument, first published in 1985, situates Govier among a distinct segment of informal logicians whose concerns about teaching reasoning to post-secondary students orient their research, Takuzo Konishi argues. Moira Kloster evaluates Govier’s progress in the challenge of providing critical thinking education to diverse and changing social contexts. Shifting gears to social philosophy but still addressing education, Laura Elizabeth Pinto explores the significance of Govier’s work on trust for explaining the problem of “audit culture” for teaching. At the centre of this volume, social philosophy receives an abstract meta-ethical defense from Linda Radzik. Moving solidly into the domain of normative social philosophy, Alice MacLachlan reconsiders Govier’s condemnation of revenge by viewing it as a form of moral address, but she notes how revenge as an act of communication contrasts with argumentation in lacking the respect that Govier maintains is intrinsic to argumentation. MacLachlan ultimately agrees that revenge is morally indefensible. The practical challenges of addressing others in the aftermath of wrongdoing, especially in public contexts, can make it difficult to distinguish between victims and combatants or wrongdoers, Alistair Little and Wilhelm Verwoerd explain, and Kathryn Norlock argues that forgiveness is psychologically vexed too. People may recognize transformation to be in principle possible for all people, Norlock argues, and yet we may find the evidence regarding some particular evildoer sufficient to count that person as an exception. Finally Govier responds to the various papers. (shrink)

This textbook is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Here, what we have attempted is compile a set of assignments and exercise that may be used in critical thinking courses. To that end, we have tried to make these assignments as diverse as possible while leaving flexibility in their application within the classroom. Of course these assignments and exercises could certainly be used in other classes as well. Our view is that critical thinking courses work best when they are (...) presented as skills based learning opportunities. We hope that these assignments speak to that desire and can foster the kinds of critical thinking skills that are both engaging and fun Please feel free to contact us with comments and suggestions. We will strive to correct errors when pointed out, add necessary material, and make other additional and needed changes as they arise. Please check back for the most up to date version. Rebeka Ferreira and Anthony Ferrucci. (shrink)

Paper presented at the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking meeting in conjunction with the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, April 2004.

This article analyses letters to the editor written on or about Muslims printed in a British broadsheet newspaper. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is applied as a model for explaining and understanding the arguments employed in the sampled letters. Our presentation of pragma-dialectical theory focuses on argumentative reasonableness. More specifically, we introduce the four dialectical stages through which any argument must pass and explain the ten rules of critical discussion that participants must follow throughout if they are to resolve the (...) argument. The article focuses in particular on the letter writers' use of argument schemes-that is, the manner in which these writers use arguments to support their standpoints. We conclude by highlighting the role that unreasonable arguments can play in perpetuating racialized inequalities and hence the importance of analyzing argumentation. (shrink)

This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Mark Alfano’s challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue epistemologies qua credit theories, and dual-process theories in cognitive psychology. It also a response to Lauren Olin and John Doris’ “vicious minds” thesis, (...) and their “tradeoff problem” for virtue theories. A genuine convergence between virtue epistemology and dual-process theory is called for, while acknowledging that this effort may demand new and more empirically well-informed projects on both sides of the division between Conservative virtue epistemology (including the credit theory of knowing) and Autonomous virtue epistemology (including projects for providing guidance to epistemic agents). (shrink)

Scientific reasoning has long been an integral part of critical thinking taxonomies. In practice, however, it is frequently limited to induction, hypothesis testing and experimental design, thereby neglecting the central importance of modeling to contemporary scientific reasoning. In this paper, I wish to establish that this neglect undermines the possibility of critical engagement with the public discourse surrounding scientific reasoning. As a step towards rectifying that disconnect, I present one resource that I have developed to teach modeling in an introductory (...) critical thinking course. (shrink)

This article brings forth a new perspective concerning the relation between stupidity and thinking by proposing to conceptualise the state of non-thinking in two different ways, situated at the opposite ends of the spectrum of thinking. Two conceptualisations of stupidity are discussed, one critical which follows a French line of continental thinkers, and the other one which will be called educational or ascetic, following the work of Agamben. The critical approach is conceptualised in terms of seriality of thinking, or thinking (...) captured by an apparatus, whereas the ascetic-educational approach is discussed by tracing the links between studying and stupidity. Both accounts assume that stupidity as non-thinking is a condition for thinking, either placed before thinking emerges or as an after-thought. However, the political implications concerning the role of philosophy in the public realm are divergent: for the critical approach, the task of the philosopher is to criticise the world, whereas for the ascetic approach, the task is to work on one’s own self and hope that the world will be changed through thinking. The wider aim of this article is to contribute to the debate concerning the public role of the intellectual starting from the assumption that there is a duty to think publicly and then clarifying what this duty entails in relation to the self and the others. (shrink)

يتمحور البحث حول نقد صادق جلال العظم للتابوهات، عمومًا، وللتابو الجنسي، خصوصًا، وينطلق البحث من التشديد على أهمية النقد في فكر العظم، على مستويي؛ التنظير له، وممارسته في معظم أو جل أعماله، ليحاول، بعد ذلك، إبراز تلك الممارسة النقدية في ميدان التابوهات عمومًا، وتابو الجنس خصوصًا، وانطلاقًا من ذلك؛ تتمثل الأسئلة الأساسية التي يحاول البحث الإجابة عنها، في الآتي: ما أهمية النقد عمومًا، ونقد التابوهات خصوصًا، في فكر العظم؟ ما العلاقة بين النقد والتحريم، من منظور العظم؟ وإلى أي حدٍّ، وبأي (...) معنىً سعى العظم إلى تجاوز (الخطوط الحمر) في نقده لثالوث التابوهات (الجنس والدين والسياسة)؟ ما الذي ينقده العظم، تحديدًا، في ميدان التابو الجنسي؟ وما هي الإشكاليات الأساسية التي يتضمنها ويثيرها هذا النقد؟ للإجابة عن هذه الأسئلة؛ ستتجسد مقاربتنا المنهجية لنصوص العظم، في ما يمكن تسميته ﺒـ "الهيرمينوطيقا النقدية"؛ فهي هيرمينوطيقا، أو تتّصف بالسمة الهيرمينوطيقية، ليس بسبب بعدها التأويلي الصريح، أو اعتمادها على التأويل فحسب، (فبهذا المعنى، كل مقاربةٍ أو دراسةٍ هي هيرمينوطيقيةٌ، لأنها تأويليةٌ بالضرورة)؛ وإنما بسبب افتراضها، أيضًا، أن هذه النصوص تتضمن دلالاتٍ متكاملةً، تجسِّد كليةً متسقةً أو متناسقة العناصر، يمكن الإمساك بها، انطلاقًا من "المقاصد المعلنة" للكاتب، وعلى هذا الأساس، سنحاول، في عرضنا ومناقشتنا لنقد التابو (الجنسي) عند العظم، أن نستند، بالدرجة الأولى، إلى تنظير العظم نفسه حول هذه المسألة؛ أي إلى أقواله المحدَّدة وآرائه الصريحة في هذا الخصوص، قبل أن نضع هذه الرؤية النظرية في مواجهةٍ ثنائيةٍ: مع ذاتها من جهةٍ، (ضمن إطار ما يمكن تسميته بالنقد المحايث)، ومع انتقادات بعض المفكرين الذين دخلوا في حوارٍ أو سجالٍ معه، ومع رؤيتنا للواقع أو الفكر الذي يحاول العظم دراسته، (في إطار ما يمكن تسميته بالنقد الخارجي)، من جهةٍ أخرى. وهذه المواجهة النقدية المزدوجة مع ما هو محايث لفكر العظم، ومفارقٌ له، هي التي تمثِّل أساس البعد النقديِّ في دراستنا لهذا الفكر. (shrink)

على الرغم من المحاولات الحثيثة أو المستمرة، في الفكر الغربي، كما في الفكر العربي، للتمييز بين النقد والانتقاد، ولتأكيد إيجابية النقد، لا سلبيته، ما زال الخلط أو اللبس بين النقد والانتقاد قائمًا وبارزًا، في كثيرٍ من الأحيان، حتى في بعض النصوص التي تتضمن محاولة القيام هذا التمييز¬، ولا زالت النظرة السلبية إلى النقد طاغيةً أو حاضرةً بقوةٍ، لدرجةٍ سمحت لفيصل دراج بالقول: «النقد في زماننا شبهة، ممارسة مشبوهة، فعل سيء الصيت.» وقبل مناقشة هذه النظرة السلبية للنقد، وربطها بالفكر النقدي عند (...) العظم، لا بد من التأكيد أن الخلط أو الالتباس بين النقد والانتقاد ليس قائمًا في اللغة العربية والفكر العربي فحسب، بل هو موجودٌ وبقوةٍ في اللغات الأجنبية (الإنكليزية والفرنسية والألمانية) والفكر الغربي عمومًا. -/- وإذا عدنا إلى "معجم اللغة العربية المعاصرة"، نجد في مادة "ن ق د": «نقد الشيء: بيَّن حسنه ورديئه، أظهر عيوبه ومحاسنه [...].» هنا يبدو أن النقد يتناول السلبيات والإيجابيات، لكن سرعان ما نجد: «نقَد الناس: أظهر ما بهم من عيوب [...].» هنا يصبح النقد مختصًّا بما هو سلبيٌّ فقط. والأمر ذاته نجده في شرح فعل "انتقد" والكلمات المرتبطة به اشتقاقيًّا (انتقاد، انتقادي ...إلخ): «انتقد الكتاب وغيره: أظهر عيوبه ومحاسنه، [...]. انتقد سلوك صديقه: استنكره وأبدى رأيًا شاجبًا له [...]. أسلوب انتقادي: يتميز بحدة النقد وإظهار المساوئ دون الالتفات إلى نقاط القوة.» فتارةً يتجسَّد الانتقاد في "إظهار العيوب والمحاسن"، وتارةً أخرى يتمثَّل في "إظهار المساوئ" فقط. -/- والالتباس ذاته تقريبًا موجودٌ في المصطلحات أو المفردات الإنكليزية والفرنسية والألمانية المعبرة عن النقد و/أو الانتقاد، ومعظم ترجماتها العربية. فإذا قبلنا التمييز الشائع بين مفردتي "critique" و"criticism" الإنكليزيتين (وسنقتصر هنا على وضع المقابل الإنكليزي، مع الإشارة إلى انطباق هذا التحليل اللغوي، انطباقًا كاملًا تقريبًا، على اللغتين الفرنسية والألمانية) على أساس أن الأولى تعني النقد (بمعنى إظهار الإيجابيات والسلبيات)، والثانية تعني الانتقاد (الاقتصار على إظهار السلبيات)، فإن هذا التمييز – الذي يستسهل بعض الكتَّاب( ) تبسيطه وإخفاء إشكاليته، أو يوحون، قصدًا أو عن غير قصدٍ، بوجود هذه البساطة – يتداعى إلى حدٍّ كبيرٍ، إذا أخذنا بعين الاعتبار، ليس فقط السيرورة التاريخية لنشوء واستخدام هذين المصطلحين( )، وإنما أيضًا دلالاتهما المتداخلة حاليًّا (من المعلوم أن "criticism"( ) تعني أيضًا النقد المختص أو "النقد الأدبي")، وإحالتهما، في اللغات الإنكليزية والفرنسية والألمانية، إلى فعلٍ واحدٍ "criticize أو criticise"، للتعبير عن فعلي "نَقَدَ" و"انتَقد" في اللغة العربية، وإلى صفةٍ واحدةٍ "critical"، للإشارة إلى ما هو "نقدي" و"انتقادي"، وإلى فاعلٍ، أو اسم فاعلٍ، واحدٍ "critic"، للإشارة إلى "الناقد" و"المنتقد". -/- كيف تعامل العظم - وهو المتقن للغات الأجنبية الثلاث المذكورة آنفًا - مع هذا التداخل الدلالي بين النقد والانتقاد؟ وإلى أيّ حدٍّ، وبأيّ معنىً، اتخذ، أو لم يتَّخذ، النقد عنده طابعًا أحاديًّا، من خلال الاقتصار على السلبيات فقط، أو على الإيجابيات فقط؟ وهل يمكن للتركيز على السلبيات، وإهمال الإيجابيات، أن يكون إيجابيًّا، أو ألا يكون سلبيًّا في المحصلة، على ما في ذلك من مفارقةٍ أو تناقضٍ ظاهريٍّ؟ إنَّ الإجابة عن هذه الأسئلة وغيرها يستلزم التحديد الدقيق والمتعدد المستويات أو الأبعاد، في الوقت نفسه، لمعاني كلٍّ من "النقد" و"الانتقاد" و"الإيجابي" و"السلبي"، إلخ. ويمكن لتعدد التحديدات أو التعريفات أن يسمح بإجابةٍ مركبةٍ وغنيةٍ متعددة المستويات عن هذه الأسئلة السابقة وما يماثلها، بحيث يكون النقد، على سبيل المثال، عند العظم، سلبيًّا على مستوىً أو أكثر، وإيجابيًّا على مستوىً أخر أو أكثر. وهذه الإجابات التي تأخذ شكل "نعم ولا" هو الأقرب إلى ما يمكن أن نسميه ﺒـ "الإجابة الفلسفية"، وهي في كل الأحوال، ليست غريبةً على الفلسفة، كما يؤكِّد العظم. -/- ولتوضيح مدى سلبية و/أو إيجابية النقد عند العظم، ومعنى أو معاني هذه السلبية و/أو الإيجابية، عمومًا، والعلاقة بين بعض صيغ النقد و/أو الانتقاد خصوصًا، سنستند إلى أربعة معايير مختلفةٍ أو متمايزةٍ نسبيًّا: التسويغ أو عدم التسويغ، المحايثة أو المفارقة، التركيز المتوازن على السلبيات والإيجابيات معًا، أم التركيز على السلبيات أو الإيجابيات فقط، وجود أو عدم وجود غرض أو هدف إيجابي. إن المحاكمات أو التقييمات التي تتسم بأنها مسوَّغة، و/أو محايثة، و/أو تركز، تركيزً "متوازنًا، على السلبيات والإيجابيات، و/أو التي تستهدف تحقيق أمر إيجابيٍّ، هي أقرب إلى ما يمكن تسميته، في هذا السياق، بالنقد؛ أما المحاكمات أو التقييمات التي تتسم بأنها غير مسوَّغةٍ، و/أو مفارقةٌ أو خارجيةٌ أو غير محايثةٍ، و/أو تقتصر على التركيز على السلبيات، و/أو لا تستهدف تحقيق أمرٍ إيجابيٍّ، فهي أقرب إلى ما يمكن تسميته، في هذا السياق، بالانتقاد. ومن الواضح أنه، واستنادًا إلى كل المعايير المذكورة، يكون النقد إيجابيًّا، أو أقرب إلى ما هو إيجابيٌّ، مقارنةً بالانتقاد الذي يكون سلبيًّا أو أقرب إلى ما هو سلبيٌّ. لكن تغير معاني السلبي والإيجابي أو "ماصدقاته"، يسمح لنا بزحزحة إشكالية العلاقة بينها (بين قيم السلب والإيجاب ومعانيها) بما يساعدنا على إبراز إيجابية ما نعدُّه، من منظورٍ آخر، سلبيًّا، وإبراز سلبية ما نعده، من منظورٍ آخر، إيجابيًّا. ويبقى أن نلفت الانتباه إلى أن محاولة التمييز بين مفهومي أو فكرتي النقد والانتقاد لا تهدف، ولا ينبغي أن تهدف، إلى الفصل الحاد أو الكامل بينهما؛ إذ يمكن النظر إلى بعض (وربما كل) صيغ الانتقاد على أنها مجرد أنواعٍ متميِّزةٍ من النقد، بوصفه حكمًا تقييميًّا في خصوص موضوعٍ ما. (shrink)

لا جدال في مركزية أو أهمية ممارسة النقد والتنظير له في فكر العظم. وللوصول إلى فهمٍ أوليٍّ لهذه الأهمية وتلك المركزية، سنعمل، في هذا النص، على إبراز الصلة الوثيقة لممارسة النقد والتنظير له، في فكر العظم، بخلفيته أو نزعاته العلمية أو العلموية والتنويرية واليسارية – الماركسية؛ ثم سنقوم بتوضيح أو تأكيد الارتباط الوجودي أو الضروري، لهذه الممارسة وذاك التنظير، بسمة أو بحالة «الأزمة» الملازمة للواقع والفكر العربيين المعاصرين.

Research into the cognition of conditionals has predominantly focused on conditional reasoning, producing a range of theories which explain associated phenomena with considerable success. However, such theories have been less successful in accommodating experimental data concerning how agents assess the probability of indicative conditionals. Since an acceptable account of conditional reasoning should be compatible with evidence regarding how we evaluate conditionals’ likelihoods, this constitutes a failing of such theories. Section 1 introduces the most dominant established approach to conditional reasoning: mental (...) models theory. Surveying a range of experimental results, I show that mental models theory (along with competing theories) is incapable of fully accounting for findings regarding judgements about conditionals’ probabilities. Section 2 introduces an alternative account of deductive reasoning, the erotetic theory, recently proposed by Koralus and Mascarenhas (2013). Section 3 argues that, given a natural extension, this theory is able to explain the otherwise unaccounted for data. (shrink)

It is argued that case studies can be classified as either describing or explaining a particular research phenomenon and as such researchers first need to finalize which approach they are going to adopt. The concept of explanation suggests a realist approach and description suggests an interpretive approach. If explanation is the target, the selection of a theoretical approach for a longitudinal study is made more difficult as organizational contexts can alter radically from that in place at the initiation of a (...) study—totally different approaches may be necessary to best explain the underlying "reality" of the situation. This article suggests that Bhaskar's philosophy of critical realism can provide some guidance as to the theoretical approach to adopt. A framework is developed based on a critical realist argument for the consideration of both structure and agency in research, the suggestion being that different organizational situations require differing emphasis on structure or agency. (shrink)

The subject of the paper is a polemic between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer mainly concerning the understanding of the critical method in philosophy. Nelson refutes the accusation of psychologism and attacks the core of the philosophy of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. In response to those allegations, Cassirer feels obliged to defend the position of his masters and performs this task brilliantly. The present paper considers similarities and differences in the positions of both sides in this debate. I try (...) to evaluate the arguments of both sides and argue that they took basically the same positions, while the existing discrepancies did not justify such an intense polemic. If the disputing sides had approached the discussion in a less emotional way, it could have led to substantive and interesting conclusions. (shrink)

In this paper I analyse the notion of critique, its subject and scope of validity in the context of critical metaphysics of Otto Liebmann. The main argument is preceded by introductory remarks in which historical context and intellectual background of this notion are discussed. The main focus of the paper is on the standpoint of Otto Liebmann, author of curricular for neo-Kantianism "Kant und die Epigonen", and who — however usually conceived to be forerunner of neo-Kantianism — quite paradoxically takes (...) somehow different position on metaphysics. It is different from so-called late neo-Kantianism which declared itself as opposite to metaphysics. Contrary to this, Liebmann accepted the possibility of metaphysics as a kind of crowning achievement and climax of scientific theories. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to an analysis of the epistemology of Johannes Volkelt, its main arguments and the relation of Volkelt's theory of certainty to Kant and other contemporary philosophers, such as Edmund Husserl. Volkelt's problem of scepticism is closely related to the positivist principle, which aimed at limiting all knowledge to our individual sphere of representations. This principle in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason means the unknowableness of the thing in itself. Volkelt seeks for answer to the question about (...) the trans-subjective knowledge. He finds a basis for the certainty in the dispresuppositional theory of the transsubjective minimum. The acceptance of the trans-subjective minimum determines too the possibility of metaphysics. (shrink)

_You've Got to Be Kidding!: How Jokes Can Help You Think_ is a thoughtful and accessible analysis of the ways in which jokes illustrate how we think critically, and how the thinking process goes awry in everyday human situations Uses jokes to illustrate the various mistakes or fallacies that are typically identified and discussed in courses on critical reasoning Provides an effective way to learn critical thinking skills since jokes often describe real-life situations where it really matters whether a person (...) thinks well or not Demonstrates how philosophy is actually very practical and clearly related to real- life human experiences Explains how developing good reasoning habits can make a real difference in all aspects of one’s life. (shrink)

This article is a general introduction to the psychology of reasoning. Specifically, it focuses on the dual process theory of human cognition. Proponents of the said two-system view hold that human cognition involves two processes (viz., System 1 and System 2). System 1 is an automatic, intuitive thinking process where judgments and reasoning rely on fast thinking and ready-to-hand data. On the other hand, System 2 is a slow, logical cognitive process where our judgments and reasoning rely on reflective, careful (...) analysis and data evaluation. Supposedly, these two cognitive processes are at play in every thinking task, and they sometimes work together and sometimes go against each other. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a theoretical framework for instruction in Critical Thinking courses which integrates informal logic with both psycho­logical work on error tendencies in human reasoning and the intellectual virtues. I argue that matters of cogency, which concern the content of one’s arguments, should be distinguished from matters of reasoning, which concern the actual inferences people draw. Informal logic and the intellectual virtues supply the normative standards for each of these dimensions of critical think­ing, and the fallacies and (...) error tendencies supply students with a stock of common errors. Understanding this framework has important pedagogical consequences for how we teach these courses. In particular, instructors ought to aim at developing metacognitive skill at reflection upon the inferences one draws in addition to logical skill in evaluating the cogency of one’s arguments. I conclude by drawing concrete lessons for Critical Thinking pedagogy. (shrink)

Why is it so hard to learn critical thinking skills? Traditional textbooks focus almost exclusively on logic and fallacious reasoning, ignoring two crucial problems. As psychologists have demonstrated recently, many of our mistakes are not caused by formal reasoning gone awry, but by our bypassing it completely. We instead favor more comfortable, but often unreliable, intuitive methods. Second, the evaluation of premises is of fundamental importance, especially in this era of fake news and politicized science. This highly innovative text is (...) psychologically informed, both in its diagnosis of inferential errors, and in teaching students how to watch out for and work around their natural intellectual blind spots. It also incorporates insights from epistemology and philosophy of science that are indispensable for learning how to evaluate premises. The result is a hands-on primer for real world critical thinking. The authors bring over four combined decades of classroom experience and a fresh approach to the traditional challenges of a critical thinking course: effectively explaining the nature of validity, assessing deductive arguments, reconstructing, identifying and diagramming arguments, and causal and probabilistic inference. Additionally, they discuss in detail, important, frequently neglected topics, including testimony, the nature and credibility of science, rhetoric, and dialectical argumentation. Key Features and Benefits: Uses contemporary psychological explanations of, and remedies for, pervasive errors in belief formation. There is no other critical thinking text that generally applies this psychological approach as we do. Assesses premises, notably premises based on the testimony of others, and evaluation of news and other information sources. No other critical thinking textbook gives detailed treatment of this crucial topic. Typically, they only provide a few remarks about when to accept expert opinion / argument from authority. Covers argument evaluation before argument identification. Other textbooks generally reverse the order, and focus on the use of premise and conclusion indicator words as the primary tool for argument identification. Carefully explains the concept of validity, paying particular attention in distinguishing logical possibility from other species of possibility, and demonstrates how we may mistakenly judge invalid arguments as valid because of belief bias. Instead of assessing an argument’s validity using formal/mathematical methods, provides one technique that is generally applicable: explicitly showing that it is impossible to make the conclusion false and the premises true together. Uses frequency trees and the frequency approach to probability more generally, a simple method for understanding and evaluating quite complex probabilistic information Uses arguments maps, which have been shown to have significantly improve students’ reasoning and argument evaluation. (shrink)

Aristotle's epistemology is related to his dialectical method, whose steps are 1- collect the endoxa (accepted opinions of wise and philosophers), 2- contrast endoxa each other, 3- make his own observations over the objects/animals, 4- preserve the corrections and eliminate the errors, 5- conclusion. This method is very similar to what is today called "scientific method", based on the recollection of previous contributions, observations and experiments, and testing of hypotheses.

In the dissertation, I explore several models of critical thinking as these address the question of the fixation of belief and the limitations of rationality. Each of the models discussed are represented as epistemological models of critical thinking. I investigate several of the important epistemic issues raised by these models; such as, the relationship of rationality to critical thinking, reflective scepticism, the role of justification in critical thought and the ways in which beliefs are revised in light of critical thinking. (...) I argue that these models are too dependent on internalism in justification and a representational conception of belief. ;I then argue that the models of critical thought presented have attendant constraints associated with the limitation of rationality and the fixation of belief. Persons tend to have and to hold beliefs tenaciously and, at times, utilize irrational procedures in the formation and revision of beliefs. I argue that an adequate model of critical thinking ought to engage the philosophical and psychological problems which belief fixation poses. These models, because of their dependence on internalism, posit an apsychological/ahistorical approach to critical thinking. I reject that account. ;The assumed tradition of epistemology holds to a limited notion of belief. My account illustrates the complexity of belief and discusses various kinds of belief such as memorial or control beliefs. I advance a conception of belief which attends to psychological issues. In support of the limitation of rationality notion and belief fixation, I then explore the research of Tversky on irrational belief, Rokeach on the issue of belief isolation within one's belief system, and the issue of cognitive dissonance represented in the work of Elster. These limitations will lead to a discussion of an alternative definition of critical thinking in the fourth chapter. The emphasis is placed on the agent and the proper function of cognitive processes, the practices involved in the maturation of these processes and the intellectual passions which move these. (shrink)

As a philosophy professor, one of my central goals is to teach students to think critically. However, one difficulty with determining whether critical thinking can be taught, or even measured, is that there is widespread disagreement over what critical thinking actually is. Here, I reflect on several conceptions of critical thinking, subjecting them to critical scrutiny. I also distinguish critical thinking from other forms of mental processes with which it is often conflated. Next, I present my own conception of critical (...) thinking, wherein it fundamentally consists in acquiring, developing, and exercising the ability to grasp inferential connections holding between statements. Finally, given this account of critical thinking, and given recent studies in cognitive science, I suggest the most effective means for teaching students to think critically. (shrink)

How are biases encoded in our representations of social categories? Philosophical and empirical discussions of implicit bias overwhelmingly focus on salient or statistical associations between target features and representations of social categories. These are the sorts of associations probed by the Implicit Association Test and various priming tasks. In this paper, we argue that these discussions systematically overlook an alternative way in which biases are encoded, that is, in the dependency networks that are part of our representations of social categories. (...) Dependency networks encode information about how features in a conceptual representation depend on each other. This information determines the degree of centrality of a feature for a conceptual representation. Importantly, centrally encoded biases systematically disassociate from those encoded in salient-statistical associations. Furthermore, the degree of centrality of a feature determines its cross-contextual stability: in general, the more central a feature is for a concept, the more likely it is to survive into a wide array of cognitive tasks involving that concept. Accordingly, implicit biases that are encoded in the central features of concepts are predicted to be more resilient across different tasks and contexts. As a result, the distinction between centrally encoded and salient-statistical biases has important theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

This text is not only perfect for a college course in argument analysis, but also as a reference tool when confronted with arguments outside the classroom experience.

Offering an innovative approach to critical thinking, Good Reasoning Matters! identifies the essential structure of good arguments in a variety of contexts and also provides guidelines to help students construct their own effective arguments. In addition to examining the most common features of faulty reasoning--slanting, bias, propaganda, vagueness, ambiguity, and a common failure to consider opposing points of view--the book introduces a variety of argument schemes and rhetorical techniques. This edition adds material on visual arguments and more exercises.

In this era of increased polarization of opinion and contentious disagreement, CRITICAL REASONING presents a cooperative approach to critical thinking and formation of beliefs. CRITICAL REASONING emphasizes the importance of developing and applying analytical skills in real life contexts. This book is unique in providing multiple, diverse examples of everyday arguments, both textual and visual, including hard to find long argument passages from real-life sources. The book provides clear, step-by-step procedures to help you decide for yourself what to believe--to be (...) a consumer of information in our contemporary "world of experts.". (shrink)

The Vocabulary of Critical Thinkingtakes an innovative, practical, and accessible approach to teaching critical thinking and reasoning skills. With the underlying notion that a good way to practice fundamental reasoning skills is to learn to name them, the text explores one hundred and eight words that are important to know and employ within any discipline. These words are about comparing, generalizing, explaining, inferring, judging sources, evaluating, referring, assuming and creating - actions used to assess relationships and arguments - and the (...) words are grouped according to these and other concepts essential to critical thinking. Featuring five or more words and an introduction on how they are related, each chapter is organized into three parts. Part I includes definitions of the words, brief examples of their use, and matching exercises. To further contextualize the words, Part II, Understanding the Meaning, provides numerous real-world examples, with commentary, of the words in use. Finally, Part III, providing practice of the associated critical thinking skills. Questions also appear throughout the chapters to encourage reflection and to highlight important points. Thirty-five photographs and illustrations additionally enrich the text. The book is an ideal text for critical thinking and reasoning courses as well as a variety of courses that prepare students to succeed. (shrink)

Part one: Acquiring critical thinking skills -- Out of the fog : the pathway to critical thinking -- Nuts and bolts : the basics of argument -- Analysis : the heart of critical thinking -- Handling claims, drawing inferences -- The logic machine : deductive and inductive reasoning -- Part two: Sharpening the tools -- The persuasive power of analogies -- Fallacies, fallacies : steering clear of argumentative quicksand -- Roll the dice : causal and statistical reasoning -- Syllogisms -- (...) Patterns of deductive reasoning: rules of inference -- Part three: Going out into the world -- Out of the silence: the power of language -- Desire and illusion: analyzing advertising -- Web sight : critical thinking and the internet -- Voices and visions : the media -- Clearing the path : legal reasoning. (shrink)

Identifying arguments -- Formal analysis of arguments -- Presenting your case -- Attacking an argument -- Defending your case -- Cause-and-effect reasoning.

This book was written to try to integrate various strands of concern about communication, language, and thinking. There are two related questions that have served to initiate the enquiries that resulted in this book: Why do people hold false beliefs? And why do they accept and use inadequate arguments in support of their beliefs? The author has provided a clear conceptual framework to address these issues and in doing so he folds into the arguements the marvelous richness of language as (...) a vehicle of communication. (shrink)

The classical tradition of testimony in topics -- Three medieval traditions : Augustine, Boethius, and Cassiodoras -- Two renaissance traditions : Ciceronian and Augustinian -- The long influence of the port-royal logic -- Appreciating Aristotle : Thomists, Scots, and Oxford noetics -- Testimony becomes experience : the rise of critical thinking.

Extensively classroom-tested, Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning provides a non-technical vocabulary and analytic apparatus that guide students in identifying and articulating the central patterns found in reasoning and in expository writing more generally. Understanding these patterns of reasoning helps students to better analyze, evaluate, and construct arguments and to more easily comprehend the full range of everyday arguments found in ordinary journalism. Critical Thinking distinguishes itself from other texts in the field by emphasizing analytical reading as (...) an essential skill. It also provides detailed coverage of argument analysis, diagnostic arguments, diagnostic patterns, and fallacies. Opening with two chapters on analytical reading that help students recognize what makes reasoning explicitly different from other expository activities, the text then presents an interrogative model of argument to guide them in the analysis and evaluation of reasoning. This model allows a detailed articulation of "inference to the best explanation" and gives students a view of the pervasiveness of this form of reasoning. The author demonstrates how many common argument types--from correlations to sampling--can be analyzed using this articulated form. He then extends the model to deal with several predictive and normative arguments and to display the value of the fallacy vocabulary. Designed for introductory courses in critical thinking, critical reasoning, informal logic, and inductive reasoning, Critical Thinking features hundreds of exercises throughout and includes worked-out solutions and additional exercises (without solutions) at the end of each chapter. An Instructor's Manual, including solutions to the text's unanswered exercises and featuring other pedagogical aids, is available. (shrink)

Thinking from A-Z is a lively and incisive introduction to critical thinking by the bestselling author of Philosophy: The Basics. The alphabetically-arranged entries cover a wide range of reasoning techniques, fallacies, rhetorical tricks and psychological obstacles to clear thought. The new entries in this updated edition include: catch-22, contraries, counterexample, domino effect, exception that proves the rule, Ockham's Razor, paradox, Socratic fallacy, "that's a value judgement," and truth by adage. Topical examples, extensive cross-referencing, and a witty, straightforward style make this (...) an indispensable reference tool, as well as an irresistible guide to dip into. (shrink)

We all engage in the process of reasoning, but we do not always pay attention to whether we are doing it well. This book offers students the opportunity to practise reasoning in a clear-headed and critical way, with the aims of developing an awareness of the importance of reasoning well, and of improving the reader's skill in analysing and evaluating arguments. In this second edition of the highly successful _ Critical Reasoning: A Practical Introduction _, Ann Thomson has updated and (...) revised the book to include new and topical examples which will guide students through the processes of critical reasoning in a clear and engaging way. (shrink)