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Normative Ethics > Moral Psychology > Moral States and Processes > Self-Deception

Self-Deception

Edited by Kevin Lynch (Huaqiao University)
About this topic
Summary

Sustained discussions of self-deception before the 1960s are difficult to find, with notable exceptions including Bishop Butler’s sermon ‘Upon Self-Deceit’ (1914), and Jean-Paul Sartre’s discussion of the related notion of ‘bad faith’ in Being and Nothingness (1956). Interest then took off in the 1960s and 70s, mainly prompted by the perception that the idea of self-deception is paradoxical. Key questions discussed in this period were whether and how self-deception is possible. In subsequent decades the reality of self-deception has tended to be taken for granted. Two fundamental questions that still preoccupy philosophers are what is the state of being self-deceived, and what is the process that gets us into and maintains us in that state. Other questions concern the moral implications and consequences of self-deception, the differences between self-deception and kindred phenomena, whether self-deception is an evolutionary adaptation, and whether it is good for us or makes us happy. A large literature from psychology is also highly relevant to this topic and is not covered in this database, which can generally be found under the heading of ‘motivated reasoning’ or ‘motivated cognition’ in the social psychology journals. Early philosophical work on self-deception did not engage much with this empirical literature, though from the 1980s onwards interdisciplinary work has become increasingly common.
Key works Donald Davidson's early papers on self-deception and irrationality, found in his 2004 collection, were much discussed, as was David Pears' 1984 book. An influential early collection of papers is McLaughlin & Rorty 1988. Important elaborations of the 'deflationary' approach are Barnes 1997 and Mele 2001.    
Introductions Encyclopedia articles on self-deception include Deweese-Boyd 2006, Kirsch 2007 (which is more focused on self-deception and morality) and Van Leeuwen 2013. Baghramian & Nicholson 2013 and Mele 1987 are relevant survey articles. 
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338 found
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1 — 50 / 338
  1. added 2019-02-04
    Realism, Self-Deception and the Logical Paradox of Repression.Simon Boag - 2007 - Theory and Psychology 17 (3):421-447.
  2. added 2018-12-10
    Slave Revolt, Deflated Self-Deception.Guy Elgat - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (3):524-544.
    The problem of self-deception lies at the heart of Nietzsche's account of the slave revolt in morality in the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. The viability of Nietzsche's genealogy of morality is thus crucially dependent on a successful explanation of the self-deception the slaves of the first essay are caught in. But the phenomenon of self-deception is notoriously puzzling. In this paper, after critically examining existing interpretations of the slaves’ self-deception, I provide, by drawing on Alfred Mele's (...)
  3. added 2018-11-13
    Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption.Emanuela Ceva & Lubomira Radoilska - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):789-809.
    The paper articulates a new understanding of individual responsibility focused on exercises of agency in reason-giving rather than intentional actions or attitudes towards others. Looking at how agents make sense of their actions, we identify a distinctive but underexplored space for assessing individual responsibility within collective actions. As a case in point, we concentrate on reason-giving for one's own involvement in systemic corruption. We characterize systemic corruption in terms of its public ‘unavowability’ and focus on the redescriptions to which corrupt (...)
  4. added 2018-11-06
    When Are We Self-Deceived?Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    This article’s point of departure is a proto-analysis that I have suggested of entering self-deception in acquiring a belief and an associated set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception that I have proposed. Partly with the aim of fleshing out an important member of the proposed set of conditions, I provide a sketch of my view about how self-deception happens. I then return to the proposed set of jointly sufficient conditions and offer a pair of amendments.
  5. added 2018-11-06
    Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:163-179.
    According to a traditional view of self-deception, the phenomenon is an intrapersonal analogue of stereotypical interpersonal deception. In the latter case, deceivers intentionally deceive others into believing something, p, and there is a time at which the deceivers believe that p is false while their victims falsely believe that p is true. If self-deception is properly understood on this model, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves into believing something, p, and there is a time at which they believe that p is false (...)
  6. added 2018-10-09
    The Unintended Consequences of Reframing Denial, Unrealistic Optimism, and Self-Deception.Andy Kondrat - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics 18 (9):36-37.
  7. added 2018-10-09
    The Influence of Self-Control and Social Status on Self-Deception.Mengmeng Ren, Bowei Zhong, Wei Fan, Hongmei Dai, Bo Yang, Wenjie Zhang, Zongxiang Yin, Juan Liu, Jin Li & Youlong Zhan - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  8. added 2018-09-28
    Bias.Daniel Moseley - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Following Kahneman and Tversky, I examine the term ‘bias’ as it is used to refer to systematic errors. Given the central role of error in this understanding of bias, it is helpful to consider what it is to err and to distinguish different kinds of error. I identify two main kinds of error, examine ethical issues that pertain to the relation of these types of error, and explain their moral significance. Next, I provide a four-level explanatory framework for understanding biases: (...)
  9. added 2018-09-26
    Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Mind:fzy061.
    Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not (at least in a straightforward sense) lying, but yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she’s doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking (...)
  10. added 2018-09-22
    Sich in die eigene Tasche lügen? Selbsttäuschung als irrationales Projekt.Amber Griffioen - 2017 - PHILOKLES: Zeitschrift Für Populäre Philosophie 21:4-23.
    This article for the PHILOKLES Journal for Popular Philosophy surveys a few common theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of self-deception before putting forward a thus far relatively unexplored intentionalist option, namely what the author calls the "project model of self-deception". On this model, self-deception is understood as a dynamic, diachronic activity, aimed at the preservation of a certain self-image, to which an agent is implicitly committed. The author shows how this model can make subjects responsible for their self-deceptions without running (...)
  11. added 2018-09-22
    Don’T Step on the Foul Line: On the (Ir)Rationality of Superstition in Baseball.Amber Griffioen - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 56 (223):319-32.
    Baseball is an exceptionally superstitious sport. But what are we to say about the rationality of such superstitious behavior? On the one hand, we can trace much of the superstitious behavior we see in baseball to a type of irrational belief. But how deep does this supposed irrationality run? It appears that superstitions may occupy various places on the spectrum of irrationality — from motivated ignorance to self-deception to psychological compulsion —depending on the type of superstitious belief at work and (...)
  12. added 2018-09-22
    Truthiness, Self-Deception, and Intuitive Knowledge.Amber Griffioen - 2007 - In Jason Holt (ed.), The Daily Show and Philosophy: Moments of Zen in the Art of Fake News. Malden, MA, USA: pp. 227-239.
    Analysis of Stephen Colbert's notion of 'truthiness' and its connection to epistemic irrationality and self-deception.
  13. added 2018-09-14
    Self-Deceptive Resistance to Self-Knowledge.Graham Hubbs - forthcoming - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum.
    Philosophical accounts of self-deception have tended to focus on what is necessary for one to be in a state of self-deception or how one might arrive at such a state. Less attention has been paid to explaining why, so often, the self-deceived individual resists the proper explanation of his condition. This resistance may not be necessary for self-deception, but it is common enough to be a proper explanandum of any adequate account of the phenomenon. The goals of this essay are (...)
  14. added 2018-09-14
    The Rational Unity of the Self.Graham Hubbs - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    The topic of my dissertation is selfhood. I aim to explain what a self is such that it can sometimes succeed and other times fail at thinking and acting autonomously. I open by considering a failure of autonomy to which I return throughout the dissertation. The failure is that of self-deception. I show that in common cases of self-deception the self-deceived individual fails, due to a motive on his part, to be able to explain the cause of some belief or (...)
  15. added 2018-09-03
    Self-Deception: A New Analysis.Tony Summer - 2018 - Charleston, SC, USA:
    This monograph presents a new analysis of the ‘straight’ self-deception that depends upon motivational bias as well as an account of the unstudied phenomenon of self-deception that is dependent on expectational bias. Cases of ‘twisted’ self deception are then explained as resulting from a conflict between motivational and expectational bias. In all cases, self-deception is shown to be an unintended result of an agent’s intentional activity directed at saving a theory toward which she is biased. The exposition is novel in (...)
  16. added 2018-09-03
    Social Strategies in Self-Deception.Roy Dings - 2017 - New Ideas in Psychology 47:16-23.
  17. added 2018-08-20
    Sartre on the Self-Deceiver's Translucent Consciousness.Phyllis Sutton Morris - 1992 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 23 (2):103-119.
  18. added 2018-07-30
    Self-Deception and the Second Factor: How Desire Causes Delusion in Anorexia Nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Empiricist models explain delusional beliefs by identifying the abnormal experiences which ground them. Recently, this strategy has been adopted to explain the false body size beliefs of anorexia nervosa patients. As such, a number of abnormal experiences of body size which patients suffer from have been identified. These oversized experiences convey false information regarding the patients’ own bodies, indicating that they are larger than reality. However, in addition to these oversized experiences, patients are also exposed to significant evidence suggesting their (...)
  19. added 2018-07-30
    Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control by Alfred Mele. [REVIEW]Leemon McHenry - 1988 - Review of Metaphysics 41:628-631.
  20. added 2018-07-28
    Authenticity in Kurosawa.Luc Bovens - 1999 - Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2):227-237.
    Much of the contemporary philosophical literature on authenticity is secondary work on figures like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus. I would like to find a different voice by searching for inspiration in the artistic expression that the theme of authenticity has found in the oeuvre of the Japanese film-maker Akira Kurosawa. To be authentic is to be true to ourselves. But what is it to be true to ourselves? The locution suggests that authenticity has something to do with the (...)
  21. added 2018-07-23
    Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform.Laura Papish - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Throughout his writings, and particularly in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant alludes to the idea that evil is connected to self-deceit, and while numerous commentators regard this as a highly attractive thesis, none have seriously explored it. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform addresses this crucial element of Kant's ethical theory. -/- Working with both Kant's core texts on ethics and materials less often cited within scholarship on Kant's practical philosophy (such as Kant's logic lectures), Papish (...)
  22. added 2018-07-23
    Can You Succeed in Intentionally Deceiving Yourself?Dion Scott-Kakures Scott-Kakures - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):17-40.
    According to intentionalists, self-deceivers exercise the sort of control over their belief-forming processes that, in standard cases of interpersonal deception, the deceiver exercises over the deceived’s belief forming processes — they intentionally deceive themselves. I’ll argue here that interpersonal deception is not an available model for the sort of putatively distinctive control the self-deceiver exercises over her belief-forming processes and beliefs. I concentrate attention on a kind of case in which an agent allegedly intentionally causes herself to come to have (...)
  23. added 2018-07-23
    Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    This paper focuses on the question of whether and, if so, when people can be responsible for their self-deception and its consequences. On Intentionalist accounts, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves, and it is easy to see how they can be responsible. On Motivationist accounts, in contrast, self-deception is a motivated, but not intentional, and possibly unconscious process, making it more difficult to see how self-deceivers could be responsible. I argue that a particular Motivationist account, the Desire to Believe account, together with (...)
  24. added 2018-07-23
    Narrative and Self-Deception in La Symphonie Pastorale.Julie Kirsch - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    Is it possible to develop a personal narrative that is not fictitious or self-deceptive? In this essay, I will look at the way that personal narratives contribute to self-deception. In so doing, I will consider the narrative that the narrator or pastor of André Gide’s Pastoral Symphonie develops while reflecting upon his romantic relationship with his blind adopted “daughter”, Gertrude. Although the pastor’s narrative is largely self-deceptive, we need not fear that all narratives are equally delusional. When a narrative is (...)
  25. added 2018-07-23
    Self-Deception: Intentional Plan or Mental Event?Anna Elisabetta Galeotti - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    The focus of this paper is the discussion between supporters of the intentional account of SD and supporters of the causal account. Between these two options the author argues that SD is the unintentional outcome of intentional steps taken by the agent. More precisely, she argues that SD is a complex mixture of things that we do and that happen to us; the outcome is however unintended by the subject, though it fulfils some of his practical, though short-term, goals. In (...)
  26. added 2018-07-23
    Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology.Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms. “Motivated” delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If self-deception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful experiences. (...)
  27. added 2018-07-23
    Remnants of Psychoanalysis. Rethinking the Psychodynamic Approach to Self-Deception.Massimo Marraffa - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    This article reflects on the phenomenon of self-deception in the context of the psychodynamic approach to defense mechanisms. Building on Giovanni Jervis’ criticism of psychoanalysis, I pursue the project of a full integration of that approach in the neurocognitive sciences. In this framework, the theme of self-deception becomes a vantage point from which to sketch out a philosophical anthropology congruent with the ontology of neurocognitive sciences.
  28. added 2018-07-23
    What Does the Self-Deceiver Want?Patrizia Pedrini - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    According to a recent theory of the motivational content of self-deception, the self-deceiver wants to be in a state of mind of belief that p, upon which her want that p be true would be merely contingent. While I agree with Funkhouser that the self-deceiver is considerably moved by an interest in believing that p, which makes it possible for her to relate to reality in a highly prejudiced way, I will argue that it is unlikely that the self-deceiver’s primary (...)
  29. added 2018-04-23
    Self-Deception Unmasked. [REVIEW]Kent Bach - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):203-206.
    Al Mele has been as persistent as anyone in his pursuit of self-deception. He has taken it on in a series of papers over the past twenty years and at various places in previous books. The present book brings together his main ideas on the subject, and readers unfamiliar with its puzzles or Mele's approach to it will learn a lot. The cognoscenti will not only have their memories refreshed but will be treated to much that is new, including recent (...)
  30. added 2018-04-02
    Political Self-Deception.Anna Elisabetta Galeotti - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    Self-deception, that is the distortion of reality against the available evidence and according to one's wishes, represents a distinctive component in the wide realm of political deception. It has received relatively little attention but is well worth examining for its explanatory and normative dimensions. In this book Anna Elisabetta Galeotti shows how self-deception can explain political occurrences where public deception intertwines with political failure - from bad decisions based on false beliefs, through the self-serving nature of those beliefs, to the (...)
  31. added 2018-04-02
    Self‐Deception Unmasked, by Alfred Mele. [REVIEW]Julie E. Kirsch - 2002 - Ethics 112 (3):628-631.
  32. added 2018-03-05
    Confabulation and Rational Requirements for Self-Knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology.
    This paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why (...)
  33. added 2018-02-17
    Self-Deception, Intentions and Contradictory Beliefs.José Luis Bermúdez - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):309-319.
    Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.
  34. added 2018-01-05
    The Irrational Project: Toward a Different Understanding of Self-Deception.Amber Leigh Griffioen - 2010 - Iowa Research Online.
    This dissertation focuses on questions regarding the metaphysical and psychological possibility of self-deception and attempts to show that self-deception is a phenomenon best characterized as both motivated and intentional, such that self-deceivers can be held responsible for their deceptions in a stronger sense than that of being merely epistemically negligent. -/- In Chapter One, I introduce the paradoxes of self-deception, which arise when one attempts to draw a close analogy between self- and other-deception, and I discuss the various ways in (...)
  35. added 2017-10-30
    Making Sense of Self-Deception: Distinguishing Self-Deception From Delusion, Moral Licensing, Cognitive Dissonance and Other Self-Distortions.Elias L. Khalil - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (4):539-563.
  36. added 2017-10-08
    Meaning and Fulfilment in Life: The Roles of Criticism, Self-Discovery and Autobiography.Tony Summer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 7 (3):391-405.
    I offer a personal case-study to show how poor self-knowledge due in part to self-deception led to wasted life, a life lacking in meaning, and descent into severe anxiety and depression. A meaningful human life connects with things of value outside of itself and provides fulfilment for its bearer. For humans, fulfilment depends upon self-discovery, which requires a process of conjecture and refutation, a willingness to question and criticise received views and to welcome challenges and criticism to views that one (...)
  37. added 2017-06-17
    Self-Deception and Selectivity: Reply to Jurjako.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):91-95.
    Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” (Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist approaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note responds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-deception, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.
  38. added 2017-05-25
    Self-Discovery, Criticism and Self-Deception.Tony Summer - manuscript
    Poor self-knowledge brought about my descent into depression, anxiety and uncontrollable bruxism. I wrote my life story as an attempt to discover who I am so that I could overcome my trauma. The attempt failed, partly due to self-deception and partly because there is more to discovering oneself than analysing critically how one has lived so far. I eventually discovered who I am by adopting a critical attitude and the method of conjecture and refutation. A person can best discover who (...)
  39. added 2017-05-21
    Is There Evidence of Robust, Unconscious Self-Deception? A Reply to Funkhouser and Barrett.Paul Doody - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):657-676.
    Robust self-deception, in Funkhouser and Barrett’s sense, consists in the strategic pursuit of the goal of misleading oneself with respect to some proposition. Funkhouser and Barrett’s thesis is that an evaluation of the relevant empirical literatures reveals that the unconscious mind engages in robust self-deception. If Funkhouser and Barrett are correct, the psychological evidence vindicates an account of self-deception that challenges the orthodox motivationalist approach and makes clear the distinction between self-deception and other forms of motivated belief formation such as (...)
  40. added 2017-05-21
    Reply to Doody.Eric Funkhouser & David Barrett - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):677-681.
    In an earlier paper, we appealed to various empirical studies to make the case that the unconscious mind is capable of robust self-deception. Paul Doody has challenged our interpretations of that empirical evidence. In this reply we defend our interpretations, arguing that the unconscious is engaged in strategic and flexible goal pursuit.
  41. added 2017-05-10
    Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues.Federico Lauria, Delphine Preissmann & Fabrice Clément - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:119-134.
    In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the (...)
  42. added 2017-05-06
    An Agentive Non-Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):779-798.
    The self-deception debate often appears polarized between those who think that self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves (‘intentionalists’), and those who think that intentional actions are not significantly involved in the production of self-deceptive beliefs at all. In this paper I develop a middle position between these views, according to which self-deceivers do end up self-deceived as a result of their own intentional actions, but where the intention these actions are done with is not an intention to deceive oneself. This account thus (...)
  43. added 2017-04-24
    Seeing Through Self-Deception, by Annette Barnes. [REVIEW]Dion Scott-Kakures - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):242-245.
  44. added 2017-04-16
    The Form and Function of Self-Deception.David Livingstone Smith - 2013 - Sistemi Intelligenti 25 (3):565-579.
  45. added 2017-02-27
    Discovering Oneself: A Philosophical Autobiography of a Boy Named 'Susie'.Tony Summer - 2017
    This autobiography addresses philosophical questions concerning the meaning of life, the possibility of knowledge, ethical challenges of the human condition, and how a person discovers who he or she is or ought to be. I wasted large stretches of my life being things, or trying to be things, that were not really me, such as a revolutionary, a drunk, a tough-guy and a heterosexual. I also spent years trying to hide from myself what I really was. I take myself to (...)
  46. added 2017-02-27
    Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Comparative Conceptual Analysis, Marc Sultana. [REVIEW]Béla Szabados - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):214-216.
  47. added 2017-02-27
    Sartre on Lying to Oneself.Michael W. Martin - 1978 - Philosophy Research Archives 4:27-54.
    How, if at all, could a person intentionally persuade himself into believing something he knew to be false? Acting upon his intention would apparently require that he knowingly use his grasp of some truth in the very act of concealing that truth and in getting himself to believe the opposite falsehood. Sartre's elaboration of this problem as well as his examples of self-deception are widely acclaimed, yet too often the remainder of his account has been dismissed as hopelessly riddled with (...)
  48. added 2017-01-22
    Review of Clancy Martin (Ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. [REVIEW]Dion Scott-Kakures - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (6).
  49. added 2017-01-17
    The Intersections Between Self-Deception and Inconsistency.Hannah Bahnmiller - 2015 - Stance 8:71-80.
    The relationship between the concepts of bad faith, coined by Jean-Paul Sartre, and cognitive dissonance, developed by Leon Festinger, is often misunderstood. Frequently, the terms are over-generalized and equivocated as synonymous ideas. This paper attempts to clarify the intricacies of these two concepts, outlining their similarities and differences.
  50. added 2017-01-17
    Self-Deception and Self-Understanding: New Essays In Philosophy and Psychology.Mike W. Martin ed - 1985
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