Informal Logic 32 (3):327-356 (2012)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Denying the antecedent is an invalid form of reasoning that is typically identified and frowned upon as a formal fallacy. Contrary to arguments that it does not or at least should not occur, denying the antecedent is a legitimate and effective strategy for undermining a position. Since it is not a valid form of argument, it cannot prove that the position is false. But it can provide inductive evidence that this position is probably false. In this role, it is neither defective nor deceptive. Denying the antecedent provides inductive support for rejecting a claim as improbable
|
Keywords | Argument, argumentation, conditional, denying the antecedent, fallacy, undermine |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism.James Rachels - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
View all 17 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Denying Antecedents and Affirming Consequents: The State of the Art.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (1):88-134.
A Plea for Ecological Argument Technologies.Fabio Paglieri - 2017 - Philosophy and Technology 30 (2):209-238.
Denying the Antecedent: The Fallacy That Never Was, or Sometimes Isn’T?Luis Duarte D’Almeida & Euan MacDonald - 2016 - Informal Logic 36 (1):26-63.
Logical Fallacies as Codified Within the Conceptual System of the Lvov-Warsaw School.Marcin Koszowy - 2012 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 30 (43).
Similar books and articles
Human Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities: Modus Ponens and Denying the Antecedent.Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter - 2007 - In Proceedings of the 5 T H International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications. pp. 347--356.
Denying the Antecedent as a Legitimate Argumentative Strategy: A Dialectical Model.David Godden & Douglas Walton - 2004 - Informal Logic 24 (3):219-243.
Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals.William Lycan - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press. pp. 148--164.
Stoic Conditionals, Necessity and Explanation.Scott Labarge - 2002 - History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (4):241-252.
Chrysippus's Response to Diodorus's Master Argument.Harry Ide - 1992 - History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):133-148.
Indicative Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities, and the “Defective Truth-Table”: A Request for More Experiments.Peter Milne - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):196 - 224.
On the Argumentative Strength of Indirect Inferential Conditionals.Sara Verbrugge & Hans Smessaert - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (3):337-362.
Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Yujin Nagasawa - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.
What Makes Us Believe a Conditional? The Roles of Covariation and Causality.Klaus Oberauer, Andrea Weidenfeld & Katrin Fischer - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):340 – 369.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2013-04-19
Total views
53 ( #207,400 of 2,467,681 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #114,776 of 2,467,681 )
2013-04-19
Total views
53 ( #207,400 of 2,467,681 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #114,776 of 2,467,681 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads