On the Causes of the Kalmar Union

The following paper was published in the jubilee-year 1997, when much happened to celebrate the 600 years since the more or less formal birth of the Kalmar Union between the then three Scandinavian kingdoms in 1397. It was published on the initiative of historians from the University of Greifswald in Detlev Kattinger, Dörte Putensen, Horst Wernicke (Hrsg.): “huru thet war talet j kalmarn” Union und Zusammenarbeit in der Nordischen Geschichte. 600 Jahre Kalmarer Union (1397-1997), Greifswalder Historische Studien Bd. 2, Verlag Dr. Kovac, Hamburg 1997 In 2003 I published a book called “Sejren i kvindens hånd”, Kampen om magten I Norden ca. 1365-89" (Aarhus Universitetsforlag) where of cause I returned to many of the subjects treated below, but not all and not in the same way. Fortunately though I felt able to stand by the conclusions reached below. Anders Bøgh: On the causes of the Kalmar Union In Scandinavian historical writing there has been two predominant attitudes towards the Kalmar Union:1 On the one hand a nationalistic-sceptical attitude in parts of Swedish and Norwegian historiography, on the other an attitude inspired by the Scandinavist ideas, which from around 1830 and to the present day have had considerable influence - not least among intellectuals. A core theme in the Scandinavist approach was from the start the idea of a rallying round a Scandinavian linguistic/historical community against German nationalism and German influence in Scandinavia.2 During the latest 40 years or so these attitudes have to a large extent been mixed up with the discussions around the EEC/EU, so that Scandinavian/Nordic unification to a smaller or greater extent has been seen as the alternative to "Europe".3 From a Scandinavist point of view, the actual unification of the Scandinavian Kingdoms 1 W h a t f o llo w s i s t o s o m e e x t e n t b a s e d o n H . B R U U N , D e n o r d is k e U n io n e r 1 3 8 0 1 5 2 3 , O m s t r id t e S p ø r g s m å l i N o r d e n s H is t o r ie I , K ø b e n h a v n 1 9 4 0 . I h a v e a ls o profited v e r y m u c h f r o m p r e lim in a r y w o r k s f o r a p a p e r o n d if f e r e n t w ie v s o n t h e c a u s e s o f t h e K a lm a r U n io n m a d e b y s t u d .m a g . K a t r in e B u s k . I s h o u ld lik e v e r y m u c h t o t h a n k K a t r in e f o r p la c in g t h is m a t e r ia l a t m y d is p o s a l. I a m a ls o v e r y g r a t e f u l t o m y s is t e r , M a r it L is e B ø g h , w h o h a v e g e n e r o u s ly t a k e n t h e p a in s a n d t im e t o t r y t o c o r r e c t m y a w f u ll E n g lis h . 2 T h e w o r d 'S c a n d in a v ia ' w ill b e u s e d f o r w h a t is t o d a y I c e la n d , F in la n d , N o r w a y , S w e d e n a n d D e n m a r k , a lt h o u g h in S c a n d in a v ia t o d a y w e u s e t h e e q u iv a le n t s o f t h e w o r d s 't h e N o r t h ' a n d 'N o r d i c ' f o r t h a t g e o g r a p h ic a l a r e a . I n n o n - s c a n d in a v ia n la n g u a g e s t h e s e w o r d s d o n o t n e c e s s a r ily h a v e t h is m e a n in g . I n t h e M id d le A g e s t h e s e f iv e c o u n t r ie s b e lo n g e d t o t h e t h r e e k in g d o m s o f N o r w a y , S w e d e n a n d D e n m a r k , w h ic h in t h e ir p r e s e n t s i z e s a r e w h a t is m e a n t b y S c a n d in a v ia in t h e S c a n d in a v ia n la n g u a g e s . 3 C f . la t e r c o n t r ib u t io n s t o t h is b o o k a n d e .g . C .M . J Ø R G E N S E N e t a l. ( e d .) : D e n o r d is k e f æ lle s s k a b e r , D e n jy s k e H is t o r ik e r n r . 6 9 - 7 0 , Å r h u s 1 9 9 4 . 2 in the Kalmar Union (1389-1448, 1457-71, 1497-1501, 1520-21) was of course seen as a model. So for historians, who shared these ideas, it was quite natural to interpret the Kalmar Union as a result of conscious Scandinavian efforts towards unification. In Denmark the Scandinavist ideas were an integrated part of the rising of national and liberal sentiments during the first half of the 19th century. Thus the national-liberal historian par excellence, C.F. Allen (1811-71) in his "Handbook of the History of the Fatherland" from 18404 perceived the Kalmar Union as an almost natural result of the previous history of the Scandinavian Kingdoms. But in addition, he stressed that the Kalmar Union was a conscious unification of Scandinavian resources in order to cope with the overwhelming mercantile strength of the Hanseatic towns in Scandinavia and in order to defend Scandinavia against other German plus Russian expansion. With these viewpoints he had hit upon themes that up to the present have not lost their relevance to the discussions about the causes of the Kalmar Union. Especially in connection with the Nazi takeover of power in Germany and the Second World War, the perception of the Kalmar Union as a conscious unification against threats from Germany seems to have been felt as relevant. The most consistent formulation of these ideas appeared in 1934 in a since then very influential book by the Swedish historian Erik Lönnroth (born 1910) about Sweden and the Kalmar Union 1397-1457. Here the Kalmar Union was a result of German pressure against Scandinavia throughout the 14th century, while later internal antagonisms were seen as a struggle between a royal power, who understood and continued its mission, and the people and aristocracy (of Sweden), who were not willing to pay the price necessary to fulfil the programme.5 The idea of a reaction against German influence found support among other Swedish (or rather Scanian) historians such as Curt Weibull (1896-1991)6 and Gottfrid Carlsson (18871964) and the below mentioned Norwegian Halvdan Koht. The most important contribution of Gottfrid Carlsson to the discussion about the Kalmar Union was a book from 1945, in which his main ambition was to reformulate the ideas about the Kalmar Union as a natural result of previous historical developments in Scandinavia. He focussed on developments in the 14th century after the Swedish-Norwegian Personal Union from 1319 with, among other things, the (temporary) Swedish reign over Scania from 1332 and the marriage of the Danish Princess Margrethe to King Håkon of Norway 1363 serving as important contributions to a growing sense of community among people in Scandinavia.7 Also the Norwegian historian Halvdan Koht (1873-1965) perceived in 1956 an organic development 4 C . F . A L L E N , H a a n d b o g i F æ d r e la n d e t s H is t o r ie , K ø b e n h a v n 1 8 4 0 . 5 E . L Ö N N R O T H , S v e r ig e o c h K a lm a r u n io n e n 1 3 7 9 - 1 4 5 7 , G ö t e b o r g 1 9 3 4 . S e e a ls o b y t h e s a m e a u t h o r : K a lm a r u n io n e n , 1 9 4 7 , r e p r in t e d in E . L Ö N N R O T H , F r å n s v e n s k M e d e lt id , S t o c k h o lm 1 9 5 9 . 6 7 C . W E IB U L L , E n h e d sta n k e n i N o rd e n , T ø n d e r 1 9 4 2 . G . C A R L S S O N , M e d e lt id e n s n o r d is k e u n io n s t a n k e , S t o c k h o lm 1 9 4 5 . 3 with the coming of a 'transnational' aristocracy as a main factor behind the Union.8 The theory of a growing 'Noble Scandinavism' as one of the main causes of the Union is one of the more palpable arguments in the tradition of finding interscandinavian explanations. The main argument behind this theory is that because of different political constellations across the (former) borders of the three kingdoms, the nobility married in growing numbers across the borders. That in turn meant that many nobles via inheritance came to possess lands in more than one country and consequently wanted peace between the Scandinavian Kingdoms, and eventually became the driving force behind the Kalmar Union. This theory was long ago more or less refuted by the Danish historian Kr. Erslev, who could not find a sufficient number of marriages between Danish and Swedish nobles to sustain the theory. In 1951 Henry Bruun reformulated the theory, indicating that especially the nobles living in the border regions of the Scandinavian countries wanted peace and consequently backed the Union.9 In Halvdan Koht's version of the theory, the fundamental argument was that from the end of the 13th century a process of feudalisation took place in all three realms. This process crossed the borders as the nobles, eager to wrest prerogatives and power from the kings, allied with their colleagues in the other kingdoms and in that process became 'denationalised'. On this base then the noble support for the Union was built.10 The principal work on the making of the Kalmar Union is still on the whole Kr. Erslev's monograph on Queen Margrethe from 1882.11 Kr. Erslev (1852-1930) wrote this book in a period when Scandinavist sentiments were at a low point after the Danish defeat to Prussia and Austria in the war of 1864. Many Danes felt that they had been betrayed by Sweden and Norway during the war, and some drew the conclusion that excessive nationalism and hate of Germans was dangerous. Kr. Erslev thus did not attach importance to the Scandinavist explanations and instead stressed the role of the personality of Queen Margrethe and her ambitions on behalf of and inherited from the dynasty as his main explanation of the Union. Among other things he perceived the ability of the queen to limit the power of the aristocracy and maintain order as an inspiration to the Swedes in their clash with their inept King Albrecht of Mecklenburg. Erslev viewed the resulting Union as a Danish hegemony over Norway and Sweden. He was not critical of a Scandinavian union as such, but certainly of the way it was implemented. One might say, that Kr. Erslev placed himself between the two aforementioned main attitudes to the Kalmar Union; and that is H . K O H T , D r o n n in g M a r g a r e t a o g K a lm a r - U n io n e n , O s lo 1 9 5 6 . 8 K . E R S L E V , S læ g t s s k a b s f o r b in d e ls e r n e m e lle m s v e n s k o g d a n s k a d e l i t id e n f ø r K a lm a r u n io n e n , 1 8 8 2 , r e p r in t in K . E R S L E V , H is t o r is k e A f h a n d l i n g e r b d . I , K ø b e n h a v n 1 9 3 7 - H . B R U U N , A d e ls s k a n d in a v is m e n , N o r d is k T id s s k r if t f ö r V e t e n s k a p , K o n s t o c h I n d u s t r i, 1 9 5 1 . 9 10 C f . a ls o H . K O H T , D e t n y e i n o r d e r le n d s k h is t o r ia k r in g o m 1 3 0 0 , S c a n d ia b d . IV , 1 9 3 1 . K . E R S L E V , D r o n n in g M a r g r e t h e o g K a lm a r u n io n e n s D a n n n e ls e , K ø b e n h a v n 1882. 11 4 probably one of the reasons for the lasting popularity of his work. The critical approach to the Scandinavist explanations were to a certain extent resumed and continued by the Danish historian Aksel E. Christensen (1906-81) in his last book from 1980 about "the Kalmar Union and Scandinavian politics 1319-1439".12 Its most obvious aim is a minute refutation of many of the ideas of Gottfrid Carlsson concerning the preconditions for the Kalmar Union. The idea of a rising "Noble Scandinavism" is not completely discarded, nor the idea of a certain feeling of community among the Scandinavian people or a wish for peace and order. The main explanation is the same as Erslev's, that the Union arose out of dynastic fortuitousness and Queen Margrethe's ability to seize the opportunity and realize her own programme for a Scandinavian union. But even the dangers from Mecklenburg, the Hanseatic towns and The Teutonic Order played a role. Aksel E. Christensen cites the famous words of the Swedish historian E.G. Geijer from 1832, that the Kalmar Union was "an incident that looks as if there were thoughts behind it," and states that these words are not without truth. For Geijer these words were an expression of cool sentiments towards a Kalmar Union dominated by Danes, and such attitudes are quite common also in later Swedish historical writing.13 Among Norwegian historians attitudes like these can likewise be found, for instance in Johan Schreiners (1903-67) theory that the Norwegian aristocracy sabotaged the treaty which was meant to lay the foundation for the Union in Kalmar in 1397.14 The dominating trend in Norwegian historiography on this period, however, has for many years been the effort to explain why Norway during the late Middle Ages became so weak that it was not possible to maintain its independence, wherefore the country came under the same kings as Denmark until 1814. But in recent years a certain opposition towards this approach has emerged. Grethe Authén Blom in her large investigation of the reign of King Håkon VI and his father, concludes that Norway at the death of King Håkon in 1380 was a kingdom that functioned very well. Therefore it was no necessity that the country should be governed by a foreign king.15 Actually that was not the case at the beginning of the Personal Union with Denmark in 1380, as King Håkon's son Olav, who had been elected King of Denmark in 1376, succeeded him. Margrethe's only official position in the beginning was as Queen of Norway. In a strict sense, it was the Norwegian royal family who gained power in all Scandinavian countries. A certain satisfaction concerning this fact may be discerned in the latest A . E . C H R I S T E N S E N , K a l m a r u n io n e n o g n o r d is k p o lit ik 1 3 1 9 - 1 4 3 9 , K øbenhavn 1980. 12 13 E . L Ö N N R O T H , 1 9 4 7 (a s n o te 5 ) p . 8 8 f. 14 J . S C H R E I N E R , M ö t e t i k a l m a r , ( S w e d is h ) H is t o r is k T id s s k r if t 1 9 5 1 , ib ., K a lm a r b r e v e n e f r a 1 3 9 7 , ( N o r w e g ia n ) H is t o r is k T id s s k r if t b d . 4 0 , 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 . 15 G .A . B L O M , N o r g e i U n io n p å 1 3 0 0 - t a lle t , D e l I I , O s lo 1 9 9 2 , p . 8 2 1 f f . 5 scholarly book on the period, Elbjørn Haug's about the Norwegian Church from 1996.16 The attempts to describe and explain the preconditions for the Kalmar Union have mainly focussed on conditions inside Scandinavia. A reaction to German expansion has, however, been an ever reappearing motive.17 That a German expansion took place in Scandinavia in the 14th century, nobody can deny. The economic importance of the Hansa towns was clearly growing, the Counts of Holstein moved forward in the Danish Duchy of Schleswig and tried to extend their influence even further into Denmark, and from time to time moved forward in Sweden as well. In 1363/64 the Dukes of Mecklenburg and their men together with leading Swedish aristocrats drove away the King of Sweden and his son, the King of Norway, and took possession of the Swedish Crown and most of Sweden. Shortly before that, the only son of King Valdemar Atterdag of Denmark had died, and as his two surviving sisters were married to a Duke of Mecklenburg and the King of Norway, it was a reasonable guess that eventually either a Norwegian or a Mecklenburg dominion of Scandinavia would ensue. A possible Mecklenburg dominion of Scandinavia would not have been the same as German expansion in the Scandinavist sense, however. The many different German powers in Northern Germany and in the Baltic area were far from political unity. And that is true even for the ones who actually had political interests in Scandinavia. The end of the great coalition against King Valdemar of Denmark 1368-70, with the aim of sharing Denmark between German princes, clearly shows that the Hansa towns were far from enthusiastic and unconditional supporters of the ambitions of German princes in Scandinavia. There can be few doubts also that the many historians are right, who have argued the view, that the leading Hansa towns favoured the Norwegian Olav as King of Denmark after the death of King Valdemar, rather than his Mecklenburg adversary. The general feeling in Scandinavia at this time was hardly anti-German in a modern sense. German merchants and noblemen immigrated into all the three kingdoms, were to a large extent accepted and married to indigenous women and individual noblemen could reach the highest posts in government - especially in Denmark. During the reign of King Valdemar, a substantial part of the nobility of Jutland revolted no less than three times against their king, each time allying with the Rendsburg Counts of Holstein. What the Scandinavian aristocracies could not accept, were large groups of foreigners who moved in and took over their lucrative positions in the administration of the kingdoms. This is quite an evident motive in the numerous confrontations between King Albrecht and the Swedish aristocracy, and again in the Swedish uprisings against King Erik of Pommerania E . H A U G , P r o v in s ia N id r o s ie n s is i d r o n n in g M a r g r e t e s u n io n s - o g m a k t p o lit ik k , T r o n d h e im 1 9 9 6 . S h e a ls o a d h e r e s t o t h e w ie v t h a t t h e U n io n w a s a r e a c t io n t o G e r m a n e x p a n s io n ( p . 3 8 6 , 3 9 3 ) . 16 17 W h a t f o llo w s s u m m a r iz e s s o m e o f t h e m a in p o in t s o f a b o o k t h a t I p .t . a m t r y in g t o f in is h . I t w ill n o t b e p o s s ib le t o p r o v id e a f u ll d o c u m e n t a t io n o f a ll t h e f o llo w in g h e r e , s o t h e v e r y c u r io u s w ill h a v e t o a r m h im - o r h e r s e lf w it h p a t ie n c e , a n d le a r n D a n is h a s t h e b o o k is w r it t e n in t h a t la n g u a g e . 6 in the 1430-ties. But the same problem was at stake in Brandenburg, when the native aristocracy in 1369 reacted strongly against outsiders who were appointed administrators by Emperor Karl IV, even though they were Germans as well.18 There can hardly be any doubt that the fear that the royal castles of Sweden as pawns should once again come into the hands of German noblemen, played quite a decisive role in the final clash with King Albrecht of Mecklenburg 1386-89. If King Albrecht were to win the struggle for power over the Swedish castles which broke out in 1386, he had no other choice than to hand over most of the country as pawns to German creditors. Considerations of that kind may also have played a role in the election of King Olav in Denmark in 1376, although many other factors were at stake at this point. But at another very critical moment on the road to the Kalmar Union, there are reasons to believe that considerations of this kind played a major role. In august 1387 King Olav died, and the princes from Mecklenburg were suddenly the only surviving heirs to the three Crowns of Scandinavia. The result was, however, that Olav's mother, Queen Margrethe, quickly took over power in all the kingdoms. It is rather obvious, that the leading aristocrats preferred this solution to the risk that Mecklenburg noblemen came to power together with their princes. The Kalmar Union was the result of the battle for power in Scandinavia between the princely House of Mecklenburg (the Niklotids) and the originally Swedish dynasti of the Folkungs. If we look at the German angle again, there can be no doubt that the result was disappointing to all other powers in the Baltic area and their neighbours. The Kalmar Union meant an enormous shift in the balance of power in Northern Europe, and it was foreseeable, that King Erik of Pommerania would later try to use this power base to expand and increase his power in the Baltic area.19 That such considerations were not foreign to contemporaries, can be seen e. g. from a letter from the council of Wismar to Duke Wilhelm of Geldern, probably from 1392, in which they wrote that it "can mean eternal ruin and insuperable damage to the merchant of the Hansa and the towns, if she (Margrethe) gets Stockholm and the three kingdoms together"; earlier in the letter they regretted that Margrethe was already in possession of most of Sweden.20 An explanation of the making of the Kalmar Union is then to a large extent the same as a query why something else did not happen - a so-called contrafactual hypothesis. Why were the Mecklenburg party not able to mobilize sufficient resources to win the contest about Denmark after the death of King Valdemar 1375 - or to win partly and get hold of some of the Danish territory? And why could they not mobilize resources to keep their positions in Sweden? Especially during the battle over Sweden there might, as we have 18 J . S C H U L T Z E , D ie M a r k B r a n d e n b u r g B d . I I , 1 9 6 1 , s . 1 4 5 f f . 19 G . C A R L S S O N , K ö n ig E r ic h d e r P o m m e r u n d s e in b a lt is c h e r I m p e r ia lis m u s , B a lt is c h e S t u d ie n , N e u e F o lg e 4 0 , 1 9 3 8 . 20 D ip lo m a t a r iu m D a n ic u m ( D D ) I V ,4 n r . 5 7 3 d a t e d 1 6 .6 . 1 3 9 2 = H R V I I I n r . 9 4 6 d a t e d 2 8 .5 . 1 3 9 1 . C f . a l s o D e t m a r s e v id e n t s y m p a t h y f o r k in g A lb r e c h t o f S w e d e n a f t e r 1 3 8 5 ( E . D A E N E L L , D ie B lü t e z e it d e r D e u t s c h e n H a n s e B d . I , 1 9 0 6 , p . 1 1 7 ) . 7 seen, be good reasons to wonder why nobody else interfered to try to prevent Scandinavia from becoming one united political power. After King Valdemar died in 1375, the Mecklenburgers were in possession of rather extensive areas of Denmark: the island Lolland, and the castles Ribe and Kolding from which great parts of Jutland were administered,21 as well as positions on the islands of Falster and Funen in the hands of some German noblemen who joined the Mecklenburg party. They allied with the Counts of Holstein, who were eager to get hold of the Duchy of Schleswig. The latter were apparently fully occupied with that endeavour, however, and thus hardly in a position to contribute much to the conquest of the Kingdom of Denmark. Apart from the Counts of Holstein, the natural allies of Duke Albrecht II of Mecklenburg were the Emperor Karl IV and the princes who had helped Karl IV secure the power over Brandenburg up to 1373. That means first and foremost the Dukes Wenzel and Albrecht of Sachsen-Wittenberg - Duke Albrecht's near relatives through his mother.22 The Dukes of Sachsen-Wittenberg had in 1373 secured the lion's share in the war of succession to the large Duchy of Lüneburg. The war over Lüneburg broke out again in 1375 though, until the situation was again stabilized to the advantage of the Wittenbergers with the help of the Emperor in 1377.23 This surely meant that the Mecklenburgers could get no help from the Wittenbergers during the war in Denmark in 1376. After peace was reinstalled in Lüneburg in 1378, no less than three alliance and marriage agreements were contracted between members of the princely House of Mecklenburg and the Wittenbergers and their nearest allies. Among others, the pretender to the Danish crown, Albrecht IV, was engaged to a daughter of Duke Albrecht of Sachsen-Wittenberg-Lüneburg, and an agreement made that the Dukes of Wittenberg would help with all might and if by the help of God Denmark was conquered, the jointure (Leibgeding, vitalitium) of the bride should be placed in Denmark. In another agreement the dowry was stipulated as the service of 100 knights for half a year.24 As Duke Albrecht had furthermore secured the support of a number of leading Scanian nobles, everything was ready for a very serious war-effort in the spring of 1379. But in February 1379 Duke Albrecht II died, and such plans had to be postponed.25 The Emperor, Karl IV, died three months before (November, 1378). He had repeatedly 21 E v i d e n t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y w e r e a b le t o h a n d o v e r t h e s e a r e a s t o t h e C o u n t s o f H o ls t e in ja n u a r y 1 3 7 6 ( D D I V ,1 n r . 9 ) a n d f r o m o t h e r m a t e r i a l . T h is t r e a t y w it h H o ls t e in w a s la t e r a b o lis h e d , b u t t h e M e c k le n b u r g e r s w e r e a llie d t o t h e C o u n t s o f H o ls t e in t o 1 3 8 6 . W .- D . M O H R M A N N , K a r l I V u n d H e r z o g A lb r e c h t I I v o n M e c k le n b u r g , in : H . P A T Z E ( e d .) , K a is e r K a r l I V 1 3 1 6 - 1 3 7 8 , 1 9 7 8 , p a s s im , e s p . p . 3 8 7 f . 22 23 O . H O F F M A N N , D e r L ü n e b u r g e r E r b f o lg e s t r e it , 1 8 9 6 , p . 5 9 f f . 24 D D IV , 1 n r. 4 2 7 ; M U B n r. 1 1 0 8 8 , M U B n r. 1 1 0 7 7 . W . S T R E C K E R , D ie ä u s s e r e P o lit ik A lb r e c h t s I I . v o n M e c k le n b u r g , J b . d e s V e r . f . m e c k l. G e s c h . u . A lt e r t . 6 8 . J a h r g ., 1 9 1 3 , p . 2 3 7 f f . 25 8 promised Duke Albrecht to help the Mecklenburgers in Denmark and Sweden; lastly in connection with a marriage agreement contracted on behalf of the youngest son of the Emperor and a daughter of one of the sons of Albrecht in March, 1376. At that time the Emperor promised help "to get and acquire the Kingdom of Denmark, so that they can get it and keep it in their undisturbed possession".26 So it has been argued that the deaths of Karl and Albrecht were the main reasons why the Mecklenburgers lost in Denmark. Not least because the close relations between the Mecklenburgers and the Luxemburgers could not be maintained under Karl's successors. Karl's motive for substantial aid to the Mecklenburgers is then supposed to have been his ambitions to establish imperial suzerainty in Scandinavia.27 In 1374 Karl IV wrote a letter, however, in which he urged that King Valdemar remarried so that he could have male offspring. And this fact casts serious doubt on Karl's real interest in seeing the Mecklenburgers in power in Denmark. He was hardly interested in an overwhelming Mecklenburg block of power consisting of all of Scandinavia plus their homelands immediately to the north of Brandenburg.28 If Karl had been really interested in helping the Mecklenburgers to power in Denmark, he had the opportunity in connection with Albrechts warfare against Denmark in 1376. This campaign was no great success, however, so the contribution of the Emperor to this enterprise was probably modest. A more likely hypothesis is that the cunning imperial politician would gladly have seen the Mecklenburgers continuously occupied with struggles for power in Scandinavia, so that they were not tempted to interfere in Brandenburg or challenge the hegemony in North German politics he was establishing, with the peaceassociation of Prenzlau from 137429 as an important step. A continuos unclear situation in Scandinavia could also reduce the risk that Denmark again became an important political factor in Northern Germany, the way it had been under King Valdemar. From this line of reasoning follows, that Karl probably would have given some kind of support to the Mecklenburgers, maybe especially in Sweden, had he been able to do so. But this of course is highly hypothetical. The realities were that none of the Emperor's sons were able to maintain their father's powerful position in Northern Germany. King Wenceslas was struggling to keep his position in Bohemia, and he was dethroned as German king in 1400. Sigismund, who inherited most of Brandenburg, was fully occupied with his ambitions to become King of Hungary and Poland. His only interest in Brandenburg was as a means of financing these plans. In 1388 he gave Brandenburg as pawn to his cousin Jobst of Moravia, who displayed M U B 19851, 10875. 26 M O H R M A N N ( a s n o t e 2 2 ) p . 3 8 9 , 3 8 4 f , c f . V . N I I T E M A , D e r K a is e r u n d d ie n o r d is c h e U n io n , H e ls in k i 1 9 6 0 , p . 1 0 0 . 27 28 E . H O F F M A N N , D ie d ä n is c h e K ö n ig s w a h l im n o rd d e u ts c h e n M ä c h te , Z G S H G B d . 9 9 , 1 9 7 4 , p . 1 9 0 f. Jah re 1376 und d ie W .- D . M O H R M A N N , D e r L a n d f r ie d e i m O s t s e e r a u m w ä h r e n d d e s s p ä t e n M it t e la lt e r s , 1 9 7 2 , p . 1 9 6 f f . 29 9 much the same lack of interest in a Brandenburg that was evermore dominated by anarchy and chaos.30 The Hansa towns, especially the Wendish, have traditionally been ascribed great potential importance to the outcome of the struggles for power in Scandinavia. Since the peace of Stralsund May 24th, 1370, they had a right to council concerning the election of King Valdemar's successor in Denmark. In older historiography much interest have been devoted to this. In 1970 von Brandt argued, however, that the purpose of this stipulation was only to secure that the next King of Denmark endorsed the conditions of the peace of Stralsund, not that the Hansa towns were to have some sort of quasi constitutional influence on the election of the next King of Denmark.31 Regardless of this, the Hansa towns have also often been ascribed such a powerful position that they could have decided the outcome, had they wanted.32 The position of the Wendish towns in relation to this matter was extremely difficult, however. They were very much divided. Rostock and Wismar were bound to follow their Prince in Mecklenburg. On the other hand support for Mecklenburg would bring Stralsund and Greifswald into trouble. Because of old antagonisms, their Dukes would hardly accept a Mecklenburger as King of Denmark and overlord of the principality of Rügen, in which Stralsund was placed.33 In April, 1376, the Dukes of Vorpommern concluded an alliance with "the realm of Denmark and the King, that will be elected by the council of the realm".34 Apart from that, Stralsund, in case, had reason to fear the very prominent 'Danes' who were big landowners in their vicinity: The leader of the Danish council, Henning Podebusk, owned enormous land areas on Rügen and had a kind of princely position here. The island belonged to the see of Roskilde, and the bishop also owned large areas of land here, and on the continental part of the principality the very influential captain of the Castle of 30 S C H U L T Z E (a s n o te 1 8 ) p . 1 7 6 ff. 31 A . V O N B R A N D T , D e r S t r a ls u n d e r F r ie d e , H G B d . 8 8 , 1 9 7 0 . T h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h is in t e r p r e t a t io n is s t r o n g ly s u p p o r t e d b y a p a r a lle l f r o m 1 4 3 9 , w h e n D u k e A d o lf o f S c h le s w ig w a s p r o m is e d t h a t h e w o u ld g e t t h e p a r t s o f t h e D u c h y t h a t w e r e in D a n is h p o s s e s io n , in c o n n e c t io n w it h t h e d e p o s it io n o f K in g E r ik o f P o m m e r a n ia . I f t h e s e p a r t s o f t h e D u c h y w e r e d e liv e r e d b e f o r e a n e w k in g w a s e le c t e d , t h e D a n e s w e r e n o t t o a s k h is c o u n s e l c o n c e r n in g t h e e le c t io n ( R e p e r t o r iu m R e g n i D a n ic i M e d iæ v a lis e d . K . E R S L E V e t a l. b d . I I I , 1 9 0 6 , n r . 7 0 1 7 .) . E v id e n t ly i f t h is c o n d it io n w a s n o t f u lf ille d , t h e y h a d t o a s k h im a n d t h e n w it h t h e p u r p o s e t h a t t h e n e w k in g s h o u ld b e b o u n d b y t h e a g r e e m e n t . 32 E .g . H O F F M A N N ( a s n o t e 2 8 ) p . 1 7 6 . 33 T h e M e c k le n b u r g e r s a n d t h e P o m m e r a n ia n D u k e s o f W o lg a s t h a d f o r m a n y y e a r s f o u g h t o v e r t h e p r in c ip a lit y o f R ü g e n a f t e r t h e e x t in c t io n o f t h e n a t iv e H o u s e o f P r in c e s 1 3 2 5 ( S t r e c k e r ( a s n o t e 2 5 ) p . 8 3 f f , 2 5 5 f f , d f . p . 1 9 4 f f ) . T h a t t h e P r in c ip a lit y o f R ü g e n w a s a f ie f o f t h e D a n is h C r o w n w a s a g a in e s t a b lis h e d 1 3 5 0 , a n d c o n f ir m e d 1 3 7 6 ( D D I I I ,5 n r . 2 1 3 , D D I V ,1 n r . 1 9 w it h w r o n g d a t in g a s O la v w a s n o t y e t k in g 4 .3 . 1 3 7 6 .) . 34 D D I V ,1 n r . 3 0 . 10 Vordingborg, Conrad Moltke of Redebas, had his home base.35 It is hardly a coincidence that a large number of the meetings of the Hansa towns, where Danish problems were on the agenda, took place at Stralsund. Support for Mecklenburg would also endanger the Hanseatic dominion over the castles on the coast of Scania. Captain here on behalf of the Hansa towns was the abovementioned Henning Podebusk,36 and he of course would not have accepted that the castles were used to support a Mecklenburg offensive against Denmark. On the other hand, open and active support for Prince Olav would probably have made the problems with piracy even worse. Already on November 1st, 1375, and January 20th, 1376, there was serious fear of piracy in the Baltic, and the pirates were or very soon came under protection and promotion from Mecklenburg,37 so the perspective might easily be a total stop to commerce in the Baltic and in Danish waters. During these years some of the Hansa towns had serious internal problems to cope with. In Hamburg there were riots and protests against taxes in 1375, and the year before or the year after the council of Lübeck had to yield to demands for the removal of an already levied extraordinary tax. This then led to the famous rising of the Knochenhauers in Lübeck 138084. Behind these riots were, among other things, reactions against taxes which probably were necessitated by debts contracted during the war 1368-69.38 It was certainly not advisable for the Wendish towns to further policies which meant risks of war, and the heavy extra costs which followed from that. Finally the Hansa towns had growing problems in Brügge, which of course was a very vital place to the Hansa, from around 1375, aggravated in 1377-78 and leading to a blockade of all Flanders in 1388, until a satisfactory solution was found in 1393.39 So even if the traditional point of view is right, that most Hansa towns following their traditional interest in a balance of power preferred a Norwegian solution in Denmark, it is probably more right to say, that the Hansa towns did not want to get involved in the matter, and therefore were not factors of (potential) power in this connection. 40 35 D . K A U S C H E , G e s c h ic h t e d e s H a u s e s P u t b u s , 1 9 3 7 , p . 1 5 2 - B . W I B E R G ( e d .) , B is t u m R o s k ild e a n d R ü g e n , R o s k ild e 1 9 3 7 - P . H O L S T E I N , S t a m t a v le o v e r s læ g t e n M o lt k e , in : D a n m a r k s A d e ls Å r b o g 1 9 9 1 - 9 3 , 1 9 9 4 , p . 8 2 2 f f . 36 K a u s c h e (a s n o te 3 5 ) p . 1 2 3 ff. 37 D D I I I ,9 n r . 5 2 7 , D D I V ,1 n r . 4 . D A E N E L L ( a s n o t e 2 0 ) p . 1 1 0 . 38 A . V O N B R A N D T , L ü b e c k e r K n o c h e n h a u e r a u f s t ä n d e , 1 9 5 9 , r e p r in t e d in : K . F R I E D L A N D /R . S P R A N D E L , L ü b e c k , H a n s e , N o r d e u r o p a , 1 9 7 9 p . 1 3 1 , 1 8 7 f f . 39 H . S T O O B , D ie H a n s e , 1 9 9 5 , p . 1 9 9 f . E r n s t D a e n e ll ( D ie K ö ln e r K o n f ö d e r a t io n v o m J a h r e 1 3 6 7 u n d d e s c h o n is c h e n P f a n d s c h a f t e n , 1 8 9 4 , p . 1 3 5 f , 1 3 9 f , 1 5 2 f ) h a s e m p h a s iz e d t h a t t h e in n e r p r o b le m s o f L ü b e c k d u r in g t h e s e y e a r s w e a k e n e d t h e p o s s ib ilit ie s o f a c t iv e in v o lv e m e n t o f t h e W e n d is h t o w n s in S c a n d in a v ia n p o lit ic s . M o h r m a n n ( a s n o t e 2 9 p . 1 0 4 , c f . p . 9 7 , p . 2 1 4 ) o n t h e c o n t r a r y b e lie v e s t h a t t h e H a n s a t o w n s w e r e in d if f e r e n t t o t h e m a k in g o f t h e K a lm a r U n io n , a s it d id n o t a f f e c t t h e ir e m in e n t p o s it i o n i n t h e B a l t ic a r e a . A n d A . v o n B r a n d t ( D ie H a n s e u n d d ie n o r d is c h e n M ä c h t e im M it t e la lt e r , 1 9 6 2 , p .2 5 f f ) h a d t h e o p in io n t h a t e s p e c ia lly L ü b e c k d u r i n g t h e w h o le c o u r s e o f e v e n t s p r e f e r r e d M a r g r e t h e a s s h e h a d t h e b e s t p o t e n t ia l t o e s t a b lis h a n d m a in t a in p e a c e a n d o r d e r in t h e B a lt ic a n d o n t h e S c a n d in a v ia n m a r k e t s . 40 11 A strong Mecklenburg position in Sweden would of course have been of great value in the battle for power in Denmark. But after another clash with the Swedish aristocrats in 137475, King Albrecht was forced to accept that the extensive parts of Sweden that his father possessed as pawns, were to be redeemed from Duke Albrecht and his pawntakers by a consortium of aristocrats led by the famous seneschal (drost) Bo Jonsson. This seems on the whole to have been realised in the summer of 1376, and from then on power in Sweden more or less resided with this consortium. King Albrechts contributions to warfare against Denmark then were occasional raids into Scania without much avail.41 Despite all, the result of Duke Albrecht's siege of Copenhagen in September, 1376, was a treaty according to which his grandson should have a part of Denmark. What part was to be determined by an arbitrator named in the treaty.42 This agreement was sabotaged by the Danish government, however, and as mentioned, it looked very much like war in 1379. After the death of Duke Albrecht, his three sons had to try to continue the battle for power in Scandinavia. It seems as though it was almost impossible to handle this legacy. The main reason for this was a growing endemic unrest caused by plundering and fighting nobles in Mecklenburg and neighbouring territories.43 These problems certainly had a negative effect on the already hard tried ducal finances. An important stage on the way, was the return to the Danish government of the Scanian castles from the Hansa towns in the summer of 1385. Before that King Albrecht, now the only surviving son of Duke Albrecht II, addressed himself to the Prussian Hansa towns. According to a report from a meeting at Marienburg in December, 1384, "the Duke of Mecklenburg has ordered and commanded the Hansa towns not to give away the castles as he has a share and a claim in them". The last part was quite correct. As a result of a discussion in 1373, the council of Lübeck had promised that the Hansa towns would come to a decision as to the rightful demands of Duke Albrecht concerning the Scanian castles, when from possessing the castles and revenues from them they had been compensated for their costs of war.44 A natural consequence of this promise certainly was that it was fulfilled, rather than that (all) the castles were returned to Denmark. At the meeting of the Hansa towns in Lübeck on Midsummer Day 1385, King and Duke Albrecht then offered to enter an alliance with the Hansa towns against Denmark. The meeting, dominated by the 41 V . A . N O R D M A N N , A lb r e c h t , H e r z o g v o n M e c k le n b u r g , K ö n ig v o n S c h w e d e n , A n n a le s A c a d e m iæ S c ie n t ia r u m F e n n ic æ B X L I V ,1 , H e ls in k i 1 9 3 8 , p . 1 6 4 f f , 1 9 2 f f . 42 D D I V ,1 n r . 8 3 - 8 4 . A c c o r d in g t o e a r lie r r e s e a r c h ( b a s e d o n K . E R S L E V ( a s n o t e 1 1 ) p . 6 6 f f ) , t h is t r e a t y is c o n s c io u s ly e n ig m a t ic t o c o v e r u p t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p a r t ie s c o u ld n o t a g r e e o n a n y t h in g . T h a t is n o t t h e c a s e t h o u g h , b u t t h is is n o t t h e p la c e f o r a lo n g a r g u m e n t a t io n a b o u t t h e s e p r o b le m s . 43 D e t m a r C D S B d . 1 9 , 1 8 8 4 , p . 5 7 8 , 5 8 6 , 5 8 8 . M u c h d o c u m e n t a t io n f o r t h e u n r e s t in t h e s e y e a r s c a n b e f o u n d in M U B . 44 D D I V ,2 n r . 5 2 4 , D D I I I , 9 n r . 2 8 5 , n r . 2 9 1 . 12 Wendish towns, decided to hand over the castles, however.45 This of course could have been the opportunity to try to check the expansion of Margrethe and possibly contribute to a more balanced solution in Scandinavia. That the leading Hansa towns slipped this chance most probably has to do with the difficulties mentioned above and below.46 At an unknown date in 1386 King Albrecht gathered his father's allies for festivities and tournaments at Wismar.47 This party was soon to be seriously decimated, however. In august 1386 Margrethe pulled the Counts of Holstein away from their alliance with Mecklenburg by enfeoffing them with the Duchy of Schleswig, which even by contemporaries was seen as a very smart move. And in the spring of 1388, the third and decisive act in the war in Lüneburg started. Soon Duke Wenzel of Sachsen-Wittenberg had to follow his nephew Albrecht, who died in 1385, in the grave. And as early as the summer of 1388 a peace was concluded in which the Wittenbergers resigned from any rights to the Duchy of Lüneburg.48 Then King Albrecht had lost his by far most important allies before the final war in Sweden. Another important power in the Baltic area was Poland. In 1381 King Albrecht authorized his brother to conclude an alliance with King Louis of Hungary and Poland.49 King Louis died the next year, however. He left two daughters, who were both minors, and after some confusion one of these at the age of ten was elected King of Poland, whereby the personal union with Hungary was severed. A year later, it was decided that she should marry Grand Duke Jagiello of Lithuania, who was to be baptized and contribute to the reconquest of areas conquered from Poland by the Teutonic Order. In 1386 Jagiello became King Wladislav of Poland. Poland and Lithuania were united in a personal union, which was to a large extent directed against the Teutonic Order.50 These developments meant that Poland's possible interests in the Mecklenburg case was by far overshadowed by other problems. The Teutonic Order was the strongest military power of the Baltic. It was favourably disposed towards King Albrecht, while the Prussian towns, which were under the command 45 D D I V ,2 n r . 5 9 0 . 46 P . G I R G E N S O H N ( D ie S c a n d in a v is c h e P o lit ik d e r H a n s e , U p p s a la U n iv e r s it e t s Å r s s k r if t 1 8 9 9 , U p p s a la 1 8 9 8 , p . 5 2 ) s t r o n g ly r e p r o a c h e s t h e H a n s a t o w n s f o r n o t u s in g t h is o p p o r t u n it y , a n d P . D O L L I N G E R ( D ie B e d e u t u n g d e s S t r a ls u n d e r F r ie d e n s in d e r G e s c h i c h t e d e r H a n s e , H G B d . 8 8 , 1 9 7 0 , p . 1 5 7 ) is n o t w it h o u t s y m p a t h y f o r t h a t w a y o f s e e in g t h in g s . 47 H . K O R N E R , C h r o n ik a N o v e lla h g g . v . J . S C H W A L M , 1 8 9 5 , p . 3 2 4 . 48 D E T M A R , C D S B d . 1 9 , 1 8 8 4 , p . 5 9 3 f - H O F F M A N N (a s n o te 2 3 ) p . 9 1 ff. 49 M U B 11370. 50 A . G I E Y S T O R e t a l., A H is t o r y o f P o la n d , W a r z a w a 1 9 7 9 , p . 1 1 4 f f - H . B O O C K M A N , D e r D e u ts c h e O rd e n , 1 9 8 1 , p . 1 7 0 ff. 13 of the Order, were more or less hostile to Margrethe.51 Around 1380 King Albrecht even negotiated the selling of Finland to the Order; this plan was thwarted by the Swedish aristocracy.52 The Order, then, was seemingly a natural ally for King Albrecht. The very raison d'être of the Order, however, was as a crusading order of knights to fight the heathen - at this time the Lithuanians. It was heavily dependent on both economic and military contributions from the rest of Europe, and it could not wage war on Christian powers without serious damage to its prestige. This became apparent from 1308, when the Order conquered Pommerellen from Poland. Before the final peace with Poland, 1343, the Order among many other problems had to suffer a papal excommunication - not a very pleasant thing for an ecclesiastical Order. At the end of the 14th century and the beginning of the 15th, the Order received strong recommendations and orders from the Pope and the German King Wenceslas to stop waging war on the now Christian Lithuanians.53 Regardless of this, developments in Poland-Lithuania of course meant that the Order could not engage itself neither with military nor with economic aid in the amounts necessary to keep King Albrecht on the Swedish throne.54 In the eighties of the 14th century, the problems of the Hansa towns concerning their most important trading posts were getting definitively worse. To the above mentioned serious problems in Flanders were added problems in England and at Novgorod. Against Novgorod was also in 1388 established a blockade lasting to 1392, and at the same time quarrels with England were culminating.55 So simultaneously the Hansa towns experienced very serious problems on their three most important markets. And these problems of course were of a much more acute and pressing kind than the question of balance of power in the Baltic area. These problems, however, were all solved in time to the satisfaction of the Hansa towns. 51 G I R G E N S O H N ( a s n o t e 4 6 ) p . 2 4 f - M . L I N T O N , D r o t t n in g M a r g a r e t a f u llm ä k t ig f r u o c h r ä t t h u s b o n d e , G ö t e b o r g 1 9 7 1 , p . 9 7 f f . T h e p o w e r o f t h e O r d e r o v e r t h e P r u s s ia n t o w n s is c le a r ly s h o w n in J a n u a r y 1 3 8 4 , w h e n t h e G r a n d m a s t e r o f t h e O r d e r a n n u lle d a d e c is io n m a d e a t a m e e t i n g o f t h e P r u s s ia n t o w n s ( D D I V ,2 n r . 4 2 9 - 4 3 1 ) . 52 N O R D M A N (a s n o te 4 1 ) p . 1 7 1 ff. 53 B O O C K M A N (a s n o te 4 9 ) p . 1 5 0 , 1 7 2 f. 54 H .- G . V O N R U N D S T E D T , D ie H a n s e u n d d e r D e u t s c h e O r d e n , 1 9 3 7 , p . 2 9 . E r ik L ö n n r o t h in 1 9 7 1 a r g u e d t h a t t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f T im u r L e n k in R u s s ia f r o m 1 3 9 6 le d t o d é t e n t e in r e la t io n s b e t w e e n L it h u a n ia a n d t h e O r d e r . T h e O r d e r t h e n w a s f r e e t o p u r s u e it s p o lit ic a l in t e r e s t s in t h e B a lt ic , w h ic h a m o n g o t h e r t h in g s le d t h e O r d e r t o c o n q u e r G o t la n d in 1 3 9 8 . A t t h is t im e , h o w e v e r , it w a s f a r t o o la t e t o p r e v e n t t h e m a k in g o f t h e K a lm a r U n io n . T h e c o n q u e s t o f G o t la n d c o u ld b e ju s t if ie d b y t h e f a c t t h a t G o t la n d a t t h is t im e w a s a n e s t o f p ir a t e s ( E . L Ö N N R O T H , G o t la n d , O s t e u r o p a u n d d ie U n io n v o n K a lm a r , 1 9 7 1 , r e p r i n t e d in : Å . H O L M B E R G e t a l. ( e d s .) , S c a n d in a v ia n s . S e le c t e d H is t o r ic a l E s s a y s b y E r ik L ö n n r o t h , G ö t e b o r g 1 9 7 7 , p . 9 8 ff.) . 55 S T O O B (a s n o te 3 9 ) p . 1 9 6 , 2 0 0 ff. 14 The final battle for power in Sweden broke out in the late summer of 1386, when the seneschal Bo Jonsson died. If King Albrecht were ever to win power in Sweden, he had to get hold of Bo Jonsson's inheritance. The first round led to open rebellion by the Swedish aristocrats in the summer of 1387.56 These then made their final alliance with Margrethe in March 1388. In the battle at Åsle on February 24th, 1389, the fate of Scandinavia was determined as King Albrecht, his son and many others were taken prisoners. According to the contemporary Detmar, the incessant robberwars between nobles from Mecklenburg and Brandenburg had the effect that Albrecht got little help in Sweden from his own people in Mecklenburg. Support from other princes was - as far as we know limited to Count Günther of Ruppin-Lindow in Brandenburg, a contingent of the men of Duke Bugislaw VI from the Wolgast part of Vorpommern,57 and the youngest of the Counts of Holstein who at least officially acted on his own, plus possibly some help from Prince Lorenz of Werle-Güstrow.58 King Albrecht's army probably was not very large and certainly not large enough. The most important cause of the Kalmar Union, then, was that despite their fairly good positions in Scandinavia, the Dukes of Mecklenburg were never able to finance from their own resources the maintenance and expansion of these positions, plus the fact that it was not possible to recruit support from other powers, neither among such who had an interest in obtaining profits for themselves in Scandinavia, nor from such who mainly had an interest in affecting the balance of power in Northern Europe. It looks very much as if developments in the Lüneburg War of Inheritance was thoroughly to the disadvantage of Mecklenburg. To that was added the total breakdown of central power in Brandenburg, which ruled out the possibility of help from the emperor's sons. Finally various (in this connection) fortuitousnesses had the effect that no important powers of the Baltic area were able to engage themselves in keeping a balance of powers in the critical years, when the battle about Sweden was going on. A common feature of many of these problems was the serious inner disturbances that troubled most of Northern Germany at the end of the 14th century - and also Denmark till approx. 1385, as well as Sweden. These disturbances seriously weakened princely power and made external expansion more or less impossible. One likely explanation of these disturbances are the repeated outbursts of the plague, and the resulting agricultural crisis that hit landowners hard and made some of them put alternative ways of maintaining their 56 D E TM A R , C D S B d. 26, 1899, p. 33. 57 T h e D u k e s o f V o r p o m m e r n in t h e m e a n t im e h a d le f t t h e ir a llia n c e w it h D e n m a r k t o t h e p r e f e r e n c e o f o n e w it h M e c k le n b u r g ( S T R E C K E R ( a s n o t e 2 5 ) p . 2 4 0 ) . 58 D E T M A R , C D S B d . 2 6 , 1 8 9 9 , p . 2 5 f, cf. M U B 1 2 9 3 3 , D D I V ,2 n r . 5 8 , D D I V ,4 n r . 5 8 3 - 5 8 4 , M U B 1 2 0 3 8 . 15 social position on the agenda. It would seem as if these troubles had a tendency to flare up after a prince had died, as in Lüneburg after 1369, in Denmark after 1375, in the principalities controlled by the Luxemburg Dynasty from 1378, and in Mecklenburg from 1379. This could support an idea that things might indeed have looked different, had some princes lived for a longer time. However, it is also possible that things grew worse with the accumulated results of the epidemics of the plague during the second half of the 14th century. It is hard, though, to abandon the thought, that especially the death of Duke Albrecht II in February 1379 had consequences - to what extent and for how long a timespan is of course purely a matter of conjectures. A leading idea behind the above, then, is that the Kalmar Union could have been prevented, if various powers had had the possibility of pursuing their interests in such an outcome.59 This would have led to a Mecklenburg rule at least in Sweden, and maybe also in Scania. A necessary condition for a stable and lasting rule would, however, have been a reconciliation with the Swedish aristocracy. That means that the Swedish aristocracy should have kept their positions in the administration of the country at the same time as they allowed Albrecht to fill his role as king. A most unlikely outcome, as these were the very problems the battle was all about. A victory for King Albrecht in 1389 would have led to renewed government by foreign holders of castles and land as pawns, and as experience had shown - also from Denmark in the thirties of the 14th century - this would have been unstable and impossible in the long run. One might also conjecture, that King Albrecht with sufficient economic resources could have bought the support of a suitable part of the Swedish aristocracy: In the actual circumstances an equally hopeless line of thought. Greater success for the Mecklenburgers at an earlier stage in the chain of events would probably have led to a permanent condition of disturbances as in the most troubled parts of Northern Germany. To succeed permanently in conquering foreign territory only with the force of arms was in Scandinavia, as in the rest of Western Europe, almost impossible after the establishment of a 'feudal system'. But of course much trouble could have been achieved before that was realized. And what alternative solutions to the Kalmar Union that might have resulted from of a long period of internal and external disturbances, it would certainly be unwise to say anything about. The Kalmar Union was not a conscious joining of Scandinavian powers against a German threat. It was rather the result of confrontation with one German princely house, who could 59 I n h is b o o k a b o u t " D r o n n in g M a r g a r e t a . F u llm ä k t ig f r u o c h r ä t t h u s b o n d e " ( G ö t e b o r g 1 9 7 1 ), M ic h a e l L in t o n h a s s h o w n t h e la c k in g p o s s ib ilit ie s o f s u p p o r t f o r t h e M e c k le n b u r g e r s o n s e v e r a l o c c a s io n s d u r in g t h e c o u r s e o f e v e n t s . H e h a s a ls o e m p h a z is e d t o a g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n in e a r lie r r e s e a r c h t h e la c k in g r e s o u r c e s o f t h e M e c k le n b u r g h o m e b a s e t o c a r r y t h r o u g h t h e a m b it io n s o f t h e p r in c e s . 16 not mobilize the resources necessary to win the battle - neither wholly nor partly. To that was of course added the dynastic fortuitousnesses which made King Olav the last nonMecklenburg male heir of the three Scandinavian royal houses, plus the fact that Scandinavian aristocrats preferred a 'homegrown' princely power to a rule of foreigners, as they knew from experience that such a rule would keep them away from power and wealth. Apart from that, the Interscandinavian political constellations of the 14th century hardly made it much more likely that there should arise a Scandinavian union at this time, than would have been the case earlier in the Middle Ages. The very geographical position of the Scandinavian countries and that of some Northern German powers too always made various constellations possible between them. Finally concerning the celebrated 'Noble Scandinavism': This, in the sense of Scandinavian intermarriage between nobles, was clearly strengthened as a result of the Kalmar Union. As this factor was not able to keep together the Union in the long run, it is hard to believe that in a much weaker materialisation it should have been a main reason why it was made. If these factors were causes of the Kalmar Union, they were surely minor ones. Unfortunately it is hardly possible to draw any parallels from these conclusions to the relations between Scandinavia and "Europe" 600 years later. But when considering possible alternatives to the Kalmar Union, there might be reason to congratulate the Scandinavians of that time with the result - even 608 years later.