The "Horse-Race" for the Throne: Court, Shogunate, and Imperial Succession in Early Medieval Japan (Shigekazu Kondo, trans. by Christian Werner)

Publication info: Shigekazu Kondo. „The ‚Horse-Race’ for the Throne: Court, Shogunate, and Imperial Succession in Early Medieval Japan,” translated by Christian Werner. In Die ‚Alleinherrschaft’ der russischen Zaren in der ‚Zeit der Wirren‘ in transkultureller Perspektive, edited by Diana Ordubadi and Dittmar Dahlmann, 105–128. Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2021. Printed chapter available as download via the publisher at: https://doi.org/10.14220/9783737012416.105 Pre-publication manuscript made available by the translator as open-access for the purpose of research, under permission from the original author and V&R unipress. Shigekazu Kondo The “Horse‑Race” for the Throne: Court, Shogunate, and Imperial Succession in Early Medieval Japan Abstract From 1183 until 1333 – what historians now call the Kamakura period – two governments coexisted on the Japanese archipelago, respectively located in the eastern and western parts of its largest island Honshu. Their political centers were separated by a distance of about 500 km: the imperial court, ruled by its sovereign, the Tenno, had already existed for 600 years and was located in the west, in Kyoto; Kamakura in the east was home to the newly established shogunate, headed by the eponymous shogun. Although both these governments constituted distinct polities, six of the shogunate’s rulers were invited from the court’s elites, and the court also heeded the shogunate’s counsel pertaining issues of imperial succession. During the latter half of this period, the imperial line was divided into two competing lineages, each with a legitimate claim to the throne. This friction established a practice of dispatching messengers to Kamakura, with the objective to obtain a shogunate counsel that would be in support of one’s own lineage. At the time, the fact that both imperial lineages were sending messengers to Kamakura was subjected to mockery: it was colloquially called a “horse‑race”. This paper discusses the topic of imperial succession in the later Kamakura period, elucidating the circumstances surrounding these “horse‑races”. 1 of 23 Introduction It was the first month of 1325 when two messengers departed the imperial capital of Kyoto for Kamakura. These two noblemen were Yoshida Sadafusa 吉田定房 (1274– 1338), emissary of Emperor Godaigo 後醍醐天皇 (1288–1339, r. 1318–1339), and Rokujō Aritada 六条有忠 (1281–1339), a supporter of Crown Prince Kuniyoshi 邦良親 王 (1300–1326).1 The princely courier was entrusted with realizing his lord’s claim to the throne, but the imperial envoy had been instructed to prevent Kuniyoshi’s ascension. Both men were eager to ensure that the shogunate’s arbitration would be in favor of their own agenda, since the imperial house itself was in disagreement on matters of imperial succession: the reigning sovereign had no intention to abscond the throne in favor of his nephew Kuniyoshi. However, the prince saw himself as the legitimate heir to the throne: his uncle’s enthronement was merely an interim arrangement – and clearly, Godaigo were to gracefully abdicate in his favor. Godaigo’s immediate predecessor, the Retired Emperor Hanazono 花園天皇 (1297–1348, r. 1308–1318) noted in his diary that the people were gossiping about the two men’s efforts in securing shogunate support, calling the affair a “horse‑race”.2 Godaigo could not claim to be a linear descendant of Hanazono, his second cousin. Moreover, Hanazono had been preceded by Godaigo’s elder brother Gonijō 後二条天 皇 (1285–1308, r. 1301–1308), who, in turn, had succeeded Hanazono’s elder brother Gofushimi 後伏見天皇 (1288–1336, r. 1298–1301). In other words, neither of the last four sovereigns – Gofushimi, Gonijō, Hanazono, and Godaigo – had directly succeeded a member of their own direct lineage, and all of them were second cousins to each other. The imperial line bifurcated during the time of their grandfather Gosaga’s 後嵯峨天皇 (1220–1272, r. 1242–1246), and the two resulting lineages had henceforth taken turns on the throne. The lineage that Gofushimi and Hanazono belonged to was known as the Jimyōin‑line 持明院統; Gonijō and Godaigo were members of the Daikakuji‑line 大覚 寺統. Originally, the conflict for the throne had been between these two lineages; likewise, the colloquial “horse‑race” had first been used in referral to the couriers dispatched by these rivaling factions in their efforts to secure shogunate support. However, another rift occurred within the Daikakuji‑line, birthing enmity between Tenno Godaigo and his nephew Kuniyoshi. Translator’s note: the correct reading of the prince’s name is not known; hence, some dictionaries also refer to him as Kuninaga. Names of historical persons as well as Japanese authors cited follow the order of family name, personal name; members of the imperial family do not possess a family name. 2 Hanazono‑tennō 花園天皇, Hanazono‑tennō shinki 花園天皇宸記, ed. MURATA Masashi (Shiryō sanshū kokiroku hen 62/66/80), 3 vols., Tokyo 1982–1986, Shōchū 2 (1325) 1/13. 1 2 of 23 Thus, the political status quo of the early 14th century was characterized by the necessity of shogunate arbitration to mediate matters of imperial succession, since the imperial line – and with it the supporting nobility at court – was inherently divided on the issue. Let us investigate the circumstances that caused this situation. Court and Shogunate About five hundred kilometers to the east of Kyoto lies the city of Kamakura, the seat of the shogunate during this period. It was established in the year 1180, when revolt against the court was ravaging the countryside. Its founder was Minamoto no Yoritomo 源頼朝 (1147–1199), one of several rebel leaders. At first, the court declared the shogunate an enemy that needed to be subdued; however, in 1183, Kyoto was occupied by rebels and then‑sovereign Antoku 安徳天皇 (1178–1185, r. 1180–1185) escaped the capital. His brother Gotoba 後鳥羽天皇 (1180–1239, r. 1183–1198) replaced the child on the throne, and the imperial court, united under its new sovereign, acknowledged Yoritomo’s hegemony over the east. This marked the birth of a polity in which court and shogunate co‑existed for 150 years.3 Over the years, scholarship had proposed several competing interpretations of the court‑shogunate relationship: originally, historians had defined the court as a ‘classical’ polity, and the shogunate as ‘medieval’; a long‑term process outlined a shift away from the classical polity towards the emergence of a medieval state. 4 However, in 1963, Kuroda Toshio criticized the established perception of the Kyoto court as an inherently classical polity: he redefined it as (having undergone a transformation to) a medieval polity, therefore relocating it to a position of parity with the shogunate. Furthermore, Kuroda proposed the theory that these two political constructs – as well as a third entity, which was representing the totality of the various religious institutions – conjointly constituted the medieval Japanese state.5 These three elements were each corresponding to one sociopolitical function: administration (court), military (shogunate), and religion (religious institutions). He defined their relationship as ‘reciprocal complementarity’.6 For a detailed study of the complex relationship between court and shogunate, see KONDŌ Shigekazu, Kamakura bakufu to chōtei (Shirīzu Nihon chūseishi 2), Tokyo 2016. Translator’s note: English‑language research tends to refer to this arrangement as a diarchy, or ‘dual polity’. 4 ISHIMODA Shō, Chūsei ni okeru tennōsei no kokufuku, in: AOKI Kazuo et al. (ed.), Ishimoda Shō chosakushū, 15 vols., vol. 8: Kodaihō to chūseihō, Tokyo 1989 (Orig. 1946), 19–32. 5 Translator’s note: religious institutions refers to Buddhist monasteries as well as the various indigenous cults that are nowadays summarily described as Shintō; these two practices of worship were not isolated from each other and can be understood as forming a syncretistic relationship. Furthermore, many institutions of both types were influential landholders. 6 KURODA Toshio, Chūsei no kokka to tennō, in: KURODA, Kuroda Toshio chosakushū, 8 vols., vol. 1: Kenmon taisei ron, Kyoto 1994 (Orig. 1963), 3–46. 3 3 of 23 Twenty years later, Satō Shin’ichi, in part supporting Kuroda’s argument, suggested that whereas the court should indeed be perceived as having undergone a transformation into a medieval entity, both court and shogunate had to be evaluated as co‑existing – but distinct – medieval states of their own. 7 The persistent opposition of these two influential theories shapes the discourse of contemporary research until the present day. In view of the fact that the relationship between court and shogunate is anything but simple, neither theory could be refuted. One common argument for the rejection of the notion that court and shogunate together constituted a singular state is their spatial separation: for 150 years, a distance of five‑hundred kilometers separated both political centers. Consequently, it can be argued that the existence of two centers, separated by such a distance for such a notable span of time can only mean the existence of not one, but two distinct governments. Having said that, arguments against the notion of an independent shogunate persist. One reason for this is that not only the shogun himself, but also many other functionaries of the shogunate were recipients of appointments to office by the court. On top of that, these were not even particularly high‑ranked offices: the only member of the warrior government who received rank and title equivalent to the court’s ruling aristocracy was the shogun himself; but even he did not receive these honors at a younger age.8 In addition, the members of the Hōjō family 北条氏, who exercised the true power in the shogunate, were only appointed to offices classifiable as mid‑ranked bureaucratic or provincial posts. In other words, had the shogunate been located in Kyoto, the court’s center, then the ruling elites of the shogunate would be unable to negotiate on equal footing with the court’s aristocrats due to their significant disparity in social status. However, during this period only very few offices still retained their original function: the vast majority had been repurposed to only signify the rank of an official within court society – most office denominations were no longer indicative of any administrative purpose. Meanwhile, new organizations that de facto fulfilled the administrative duties had been created independently of these original court offices; hence, the shogunate elites that received appointments by the court did not serve as staff in the court’s administration proper.9 In effect, they were simply borrowing court titles SATŌ Shin’ichi, Nihon no chūsei kokka, Tokyo 2007 (1st edition 1983). Translator’s note: in this case, the ruling aristocracy refers to those members of the high‑ranked court nobility (the kugyō 公卿) who also held posts in the central ministry of state (the dajōkan 太政官) at court; the shogun, apart from his rank as either a kugyō or, later, a prince, typically was also awarded with one of these central positions. This should be seen more as a symbolical gesture, especially in view of the fact that he was geographically separated from the court’s administration. 9 SATŌ 2007, 14–27. 7 8 4 of 23 in order to represent the status they occupied within their own administration – the shogunate. Consequently, the shogunate elites were not subordinated to the court administration despite being appointed to court offices. Kuroda’s single‑state theory, which defined the medieval state as constituent of court, shogunate, and religious institutions, did also not consider the various court offices held by important shogunate members to be fulfilling an administrative function – it was the institution of shogunate as a totality that fulfilled its role as the element of state tasked with military and policing duties.10 Another important point of debate concerning the court‑shogunate relationship is the question of their respective ‘sphere of domination’: overly simplified, if these were identical for each of the two governments, then they would constitute a single state; however, if it were possible to delineate each polity’s sphere as distinct from each other, it would indicate the existence of separate states. A similarly simplified answer to this problem might look like this: the respective geographical territories both governments had jurisdiction over was indeed overlapping, but their domination over the people within these territories was markedly distinct from each other.11 In order to understand this discrepancy, we need to understand a major constitutive unit of early medieval Japanese society: the shōen 荘園 (estate). Shōen describe land which, under permission of the imperial court polity, is in possession of a legal person who would oversee part of public functions that originally were the responsibility of the state, in order to provide for the expenses required to fulfill the purpose of the estate’s establishment.12 In practice, many of these estates were associated with temples dedicated to the religious objectives (e.g., personal as well as public welfare) of their founders, who for the most part were members of the imperial family. Although originally funded by taxes from the (re‑)development of arable lands through its subordinate administrative (e.g., provincial) organizations, over the years, the court became unable to secure the required economic resources to fund its public and religious endeavors on a large scale, thus leading to the birth of the shōen system. The legal person acknowledged as ‘proprietor’ of a shōen was referred to as honjo 本所; KURODA 1994, 25–27. Translator’s note: it could indeed be debated whether both court and shogunate had jurisdiction – or enacted domination – over the exact same territory to the same degree or if there were differences; as such, this is, as the author made clear, a massive simplification of the complex state of landownership and administration during the medieval period in Japan. 12 For contemporary studies representative of the state of research on shōen, see for example: KAWABATA Shin, Shōensei seiritsushi no kenkyū, Kyoto 2000; TAKAHASHI Kazuki, Chūsei shōensei to Kamakura bakufu, Tokyo 2004; KAMAKURA Saho, Nihon chūsei shōensei seiritsushi ron, Tokyo 2009. 10 11 5 of 23 but the person responsible for the estate’s (re‑)development on‑site was a jitō 地頭 (land steward). The honjo wielded authority over instating and dismissing jitō, and thus secured their share of the profits from the estate. These very jitō, who wished to break free of their dependence on the honjo, were the shogunate’s foundations. Their desires formed the bed upon which the shogunate grew, since the new warrior government guaranteed the delivery of profits from the shōen to the honjo; in exchange, the shogunate appropriated the estate proprietor’s authority over the jitō for itself. With the loss of the associated appointment rights on the side of the estate proprietors, the shogunate’s sphere of domination over jitō became dissociated from that of the court, and two distinct spheres emerged. Kuroda’s theory of court, shogunate, and religious institutions collectively constituting a singular state had defined the relationship between its constituent elements as ‘reciprocal complementarity’, since neither constituent was fulfilling all the functions of the state on its own.13 In contrast, Satō’s notion of court and shogunate as separate states defined the relationship between the two as ‘reciprocal determination’: whereas both polities were by itself ‘complete’, they intrinsically were endowed with the potential to influence each other’s specific identity and boundaries through interaction.14 For example, determining the head of each polity (i.e., Tenno and shogun) was a matter relevant to both parties. In order to elucidate this relationship, it is necessary to explain who the respective ruling figures – de jure and de facto – in both court and shogunate were. De jure and de facto rulers within the imperial court It goes without saying that the de jure leader of the imperial court is the Tenno. Without its sovereign, the court cannot exist. However, during the Kamakura period (1183– 1333), it was the linear ascendant of the reigning sovereign – his father or grandfather – who de facto controlled the government.15 Rule of a sovereign’s linear ascendant (i.e., a retired emperor) is called insei 院生 and is the sole prerogative of a linear ascendant, who not necessarily had to have directly preceded the current sovereign on the throne; KURODA 1994, 18. SATŌ 2007, iv. Translator’s note: whereas Satō’s choice of words (相互規定的 sōgo kiteiteki) is obviously conscious of Kuroda’s terminology (相互補完的 sōgo hokanteki), his concept might best be understood as a relationship similar to that of diplomatic ties between states, although on a more fundamental level than that between truly separate countries whose relationship is clearly distinguished by separate territories and a more or less “independent” society. 15 Translator’s note: textbooks typically cite 1185 as the beginning of the Kamakura period; however, the author considers a different interpretation more plausible and thus defines the period as beginning in 1183. Several other interpretations also exist and are debated by Japanese scholarship. 13 14 6 of 23 accordingly, instating an insei government without a living linear ascendant was impossible. Having said that, periods of direct rule by the reigning sovereign were limited to situations when this was deemed inevitable: when a heir to the throne was born to a reigning sovereign, the monarch would typically abdicate in favor of his son and instate an insei government by virtue of now being father to the throne. We can count ten insei rulers over the span of the Kamakura period; three of them – Gofukakusa, Gouda 後宇多天皇 (1267–1324, r. 1274–1287), and Gofushimi – ceded the throne to a successor who was not their direct descendant, and therefore did not come to head an insei government immediately after abdication (refer to the timeline provided at the end of this paper for an overview of rulers during the Kamakura period). Furthermore, two of these retired emperors each saw two of their sons ascend to the throne; consequently, they each enacted insei rule twice. These two men were the fathers of the four monarchs initially mentioned in the introduction: Fushimi 伏見天皇 (1265–1317, r. 1287–1298), father of Gofushimi and Hanazono; and Gouda, father of Gonijō and Godaigo. One last exception was Gotakakura 後 高 倉 院 (1179–1223), who had never ascended the imperial throne himself; nevertheless, his son did, which qualified him to instate insei government. Moreover, out of the sixteen monarchs which ascended to the throne over the course of the Kamakura period, only two – Gohorikawa 後堀河天皇 (1212–1234, r. 1221– 1232) and Gosaga – were designated by the shogunate. Gohorikawa was enthroned in the aftermath of the Jōkyū no ran 承久の乱 (Jōkyū Disturbance) in 1221, when the court was defeated by the shogunate: in order to deny Retired Emperor Gotoba – instigator of the conflict – further access to power, it was necessary to deny his descendants a claim to the throne. As a result, Gotoba’s older brother Gotakakura took over insei rule when his son Gohorikawa was proclaimed the new monarch. Past research even evaluated the shogunate’s military triumph in this conflict as the warrior government securing the authority to designate the imperial sovereign for itself.16 But in reality, the shogunate’s designation of Gohorikawa presented an anomaly. As long as the court’s inner circles were reaching a consensus on a candidate for the throne on their own, the shogunate did neither disapprove of, nor attempt to interfere in their decision. It was only when the court, struggling to come to an agreement, actively sought out the shogunate’s arbitration that the eastern government reluctantly complied with the request. When Gosaga ascended to the throne aided by shogunate influence, it was because his predecessor Shijō 四条天皇 (1231–1242, r. 1232–1242) met an untimely UWAYOKOTE Masataka, Kamakura bakufu to kuge seiken, in: UWAYOKOTE, Kamakura jidai seijishi kenkyū, Tokyo 1991 (Orig. 1975), 2–45, here: 27–28. 16 7 of 23 death at the age of 10, ending the line of succession. Gosaga was only a relative of the sixth degree to Shijō; yet he ascended to the throne by virtue of the shogunate’s nomination. De jure and de facto rulers within the shogunate Nine men received the title of shogun over the course of 1183 to 1333 (again, refer to the appendix for an overview). The first shogun, Minamoto no Yoritomo, was succeeded by his two sons. But with them, his lineage met its end: his eldest son Yoriie 源頼家 (1182–1204) fell victim to political strife and was assassinated a year after being exiled; Yoriie’s brother Sanetomo 源実朝 (1192–1219) was murdered during office. Their next two successors stemmed from the Kujō‑family, one of the most exalted lineages within the court aristocracy; the last four were all imperial princes. All of these courtly shoguns, except for the very last one, were deposed during their lifetime and exiled to Kyoto, and the last head of the shogunate witnessed the fall of the shogunate and returned to the imperial capital, where he died soon after. The shogun‑title, which signified the shogunate headship, was granted by the imperial court. 17 However, when it came to the de facto authority of the shogunate leader, this title was ultimately inconsequential: for example, Minamoto no Yoritomo, the shogunate founder, was appointed as shogun only thirteen years (in 1192) after he had established his government in Kamakura, and he even renounced the title during his lifetime.18 The same held true for his successor Yoriie: although he inherited his father’s position in 1199, he was not appointed until 1202. But when Yoriie was deposed and replaced by his brother Sanetomo in the wake of a political disturbance, the boy was immediately declared shogun by the court to strengthen his authority as the new head of the shogunate. Yet, when Sanetomo was murdered in 1219, there was no living male successor from the Minamoto lineage remaining. The shogunate elites welcomed a son of the Kujō‑family 九條家 from Kyoto as his successor. This child, Yoritsune 九条頼 経 (1218–1256), was a great‑grandchild of Yoritomo’s sister. The future shogun was only two years old. Until his adulthood, Yoritomo’s widow (Yoriie’s and Sanetomo’s mother) Hōjō Masako 北 条 政 子 (1157–1225) acted as provisional head of the shogunate. She was never declared shogun by the court. Soon after her death in 1225, the eight‑year‑old Yoritsune’s coming‑of‑age ceremony was held, and the following Translator’s note: the title is properly called seii taishōgun 征夷大将軍 – supreme general to submit the barbarians in the east. 18 Translator’s note: this discrepancy between the shogun title and being the de facto ruler of Kamakura is being reflected in the appendix, where the term “Lord of Kamakura” (Kamakura‑dono 鎌倉殿) is being used instead. 17 8 of 23 year, the court declared the young boy shogun at the anniversary of his predecessor’s death. All of his successors were appointed by the court, as well. In all instances, the court merely fulfilled the shogunate’s request; accordingly, it did not rule over the shogunate just because of its authority over the title of shogun. The shogunate was a government established by warriors, who submitted themselves to the authority of the person they accepted as their supreme leader: Yoritomo. 19 But Yoritomo’s successor Yoriie was incapable of truly inheriting his father’s authority. When the warrior elites deposed Yoriie and replaced him with his brother Sanetomo, they refrained from investing the boy with direct decision‑making capacity; his grandfather Hōjō Tokimasa 北条時政 (1138–1215), acknowledged as the shogunate’s preeminent warrior, governed in his stead. His position later came to be called shikken 執権.20 When, after the death of her son Sanetomo, Masako was acting as interim head of the shogunate until Yoritsune’s adulthood, her brother Yoshitoki 北条 義時 (1163–1224) served in this position. The Jōkyū Disturbance in 1221 was caused by Gotoba’s plot to eliminate Yoshitoki, whom he perceived as the de facto ruler of the shogunate. Many warriors stationed in the vicinity of Kyoto joined Gotoba, but the eastern warriors flocked to the banner of the Hōjō siblings in Kamakura. Yoshitoki’s son Yasutoki 北 条 泰 時 (1183–1242) commandeered the shogunate army heading towards the imperial capital and defeated Gotoba’s forces – their victory consolidated the authority of shikken Yoshitoki. The victorious general Yasutoki remained in Kyoto and dedicated himself to sorting out the various problems that arose in the aftermath of the conflict. When his father died in 1224, Masako summoned him back to Kamakura, declaring him the next shikken. Years later, in 1232, Yasutoki was responsible for the promulgation of the fundamental 51 articles of shogunate law (the ‘Goseibai shikimoku’ 御成敗式目), indicative of the existence of a shogunate law distinct from the court’s one. Until the time of Yasutoki’s grandson Tokiyori 北条時頼 (1227–1263, shikken 1246–1256), all men appointed to the office were acknowledged as the head of the Hōjō main branch. Tokiyori cracked down on his rivals and consolidated his position as both shikken and leader of the Hōjō clan. His linear descendants all inherited the position of the main branch’s headship: Tokimune 北条時宗 (1251–1284, shikken 1268–1284), Originally it had been thought that the jitō armed themselves and thus became warriors; however, more recently the opposite interpretation became dominant: warriors became jitō as a side‑effect of large‑scale land development over the course of the 12th century; GOMI Fumihiko, Bushi to bunshi no chūseishi, Tokyo 1992, 14–15. 20 Translator’s note: Often translated as “shogunate regent” or “shogunal regent”. However, whereas the shikken’s role within the shogunate might overlap with that of a “regent”, it could be argued that he possesses a type of authority not derived from merely representing the shogun. 19 9 of 23 Sadatoki 北条貞時 (1272–1311, shikken 1284–1301), and Takatoki 北条高時 (1304– 1333, shikken 1316–1326). 21 Apart from the head of the Hōjō’s main branch, who always became shikken, there were also other members of the lineage group that would be elevated to the office: for the eighty‑seven years between Tokiyori assuming the position and the fall of the Kamakura shogunate in 1333, he and his direct descendants held the office for a total of fifty‑three years. For the remaining time, eight other members of the Hōjō were designated shikken; however, even if someone besides the main branch’s head was in office, the actual power remained within the hands of the clan headship. For example, when Sadatoki died in 1311, he had already ceded the office for a decade – the court nonetheless commemorated his death in a way befitting of the shogunate’s most powerful man.22 Bifurcation of the imperial lineage When Gosaga ascended to the throne in 1242, all of his linear ascendants had already passed away; accordingly, there was no insei government. One year later, Gofukakusa was born to the sovereign, who ceded his position to his son at the first opportunity in 1246, instating insei government. Three years later, Gosaga had another son in Kameyama 亀山天皇 (1249–1305, r. 1260–1274), who was named crown prince in 1258 (see figure 1 for an overview of the developing family relations). The following year, the reigning Tenno Gofukakusa heeded his father’s request and abdicated in favor of his little brother. In 1267, Gouda was born to Kameyama and named crown prince just a year later. But Gofukakusa’s son, Prince Fushimi, was two years older than the new heir apparent: Gouda’s designation as crown prince was tantamount to removing Gofukakusa’s descendants from the line of imperial succession, effectively establishing Kameyama’s line as the sole heirs to the throne. All of this transpired during Gosaga’s insei rule; therefore, we can surmise that all of these developments reflected the retired emperor’s will. (Figure 1 fig002.eps) Gosaga died peacefully in 1272, after 26 years of insei. Gofukakusa, his direct successor on the throne, now was the only living retired emperor; however, he was not a linear ascendant to his brother and therefore unqualified to follow in his father’s footsteps. Therefore, reigning sovereign Kameyama would govern personally. Around this time, the looming Mongol threat pressed for a stable government – and with Gouda, Translator’s note: the main branch’s headship (called tokusō 得宗) had a certain degree of authority over the various Hōjō branch lineages that emerged over time. 22 KONDŌ 2016, 182–183. 21 10 of 23 there already was a crown prince who could succeed to the throne.23 Hence, Kameyama was beseeched to abdicate as soon as possible, restoring the status quo of insei governance. This indicates just how strongly the concept of insei was perceived as a constancy by its contemporaries; in contrast, direct rule by the reigning emperor was regarded as a temporary measure, restricted to periods when external circumstances did not permit the instatement of insei. For that reason, Kameyama abdicated in favor of Gouda in 1274. But at the time, Kameyama had no other son besides Gouda who could have been named the successor. His brother recognized the opportunity: Gofukakusa rallied for support of his own son Fushimi’s installation as new crown prince. The erstwhile monarch sought the dialogue with the shogunate’s leader, shikken Hōjō Figure 1: Abridged genealogy of the Jimyōin and Daikakuji lines (order on the throne indicated by numbers). Tokimune, and succeeded in securing the warrior government’s endorsement of his plan.24 Formally, the presence of a governing retired emperor, reigning sovereign, as well as a crown prince was symbolic of the ideal stable government; on that account, Tokimune had no reason to withhold his support of Fushimi’s designation. Translator’s note: the so‑called Mongol Invasions of Japan under the Yuan dynasty occurred in 1274 and 1281. 24 KONDŌ 2016, 147–149. 23 11 of 23 In 1287, Gouda ceded the throne to Fushimi. However, this was neither of his own volition nor by his father Kameyama’s behest: it was by shogunate recommendation.25 The proposal reflected that the rulers in Kamakura were well aware of the situation between Gosaga’s successors. It should also be noted that the enthronement of Fushimi by itself was of no advantage to the shogunate; however, since Gouda and Fushimi were not father and son, this, indirectly, also brought an end to Kameyama’s insei, and Fushimi’s father Gofukakusa came to exercise power instead. Prince Gofushimi was born to Emperor Fushimi in 1288 and named crown prince the following year. But his cousin Gouda already had a son three years older than the new heir apparent: Prince Gonijō. Moreover, six months later, another prince – Godaigo – was born to the former emperor. Still, the authority to decide on the crown prince lay in the hands of the insei ruler; hence, in accordance with Gofukakusa’s and Fushimi’s wishes, the infant Gofushimi became crown prince.26 In the same year, the shogunate elites deposed the seventh shogun Koreyasu 惟康親王 (1264–1326), replacing him with Prince Hisaakira 久明親王 (1276–1328), yet another one of Gofukakusa’s children. Gofukakusa, satisfied by achieving all the glory he could wish for in this life, entered monkhood and left the governance affairs to his son Fushimi. The retired monarch remained in good health until his death in 1304 – but formally his insei government was dissolved and the court was ruled directly by the reigning sovereign Fushimi.27 In 1298, the abdicated in favor of his son Gofushimi. Naturally, this signified a return to insei rule – Fushimi remained the de facto ruling figure at court. After Gofushimi, the throne was scheduled to fall into the hands of Gouda’s son, the new crown prince Gonijō. Although Gofushimi had a little brother, Hanazono, born a year earlier, the child was not designated crown prince. Despite being backed by the authority invested in the leader of insei government, Fushimi failed at bestowing the title of crown prince to his other son; the arrogance of his close retainer Kyōgoku Tamekane 京極為兼 (1254–1332) had incurred the shogunate’s wrath, which saw to it that the nobleman was exiled. As the aristocrat’s patron, the sovereign was deemed partially responsible for Tamekane’s transgressions, directly leading to his abdication.28 Although Fushimi had renounced the throne, his reign was not yet over, since he dominated the government as head of insei; however, his abdication meant that if the next crown prince were not of his line, his insei would inevitably come to an end. After a decade of patience, the time had come for Kameyama and Gouda: they succeeded in Ibid., 152. Ibid., 154. 27 Ibid., 154–155. 28 Ibid., 159–161. 25 26 12 of 23 having Gonijō, Gouda’s son, appointed as the new sovereign‑designate. A few years later, in 1301, the shogunate proposed a change of the throne, and Gouda, as father to the newly instated Emperor Gonijō, came to preside over an insei government of his own.29 The principle of alternate imperial succession Both Gofukakusa and Kameyama still witnessed their respective grandchildren – Gofushimi and Gonijō – ascend to the throne: they passed away in 1304 and 1305, respectively. Both rulers had been unrelenting in their devotion to seeing their own descendants assume the exalted honors of emperorship; however, since they also had been equally powerful rulers, the descendants of both former sovereigns were perceived as being invested with a legitimate claim to the throne. Gofushimi’s reign had been cut short after only three years, ending his father’s insei as well. But the Jimyōin line did not have the luxury of remaining passive: Gonjiō’s enthronement naturally vacated the position of crown prince. If Fushimi’s faction did not take the initiative, they risked being overwhelmed by the supporters of retired emperor Gouda. The Jimyōin faction had permitted the installation of Gonijō as crown prince and, recently, even ceded the throne to the prince; accordingly, it seemed plausible to again nominate a crown prince from their own line as a successor to Gonijō. Unfortunately, Gofushimi had no male heir. Certainly, he had a brother in Hanazono, but his brother’s enthronement would not qualify Gofushimi to establish insei. Moreover, should Gofushimi eventually have an heir, then Fushimi’s descendants would bifurcate into two lines: those of Gofushimi and Hanazono. In order to prevent this, Fushimi decreed that Gofushimi were to adopt Hanazono, and should a son be born to Gofushimi, then Hanazono were to adopt the child; thus, their lineage would remain united. Moreover, a messenger dispatched by the Jimyōin faction succeeded in garnering the shogunate’s support for the installation of Hanazono as the new crown prince. Consequently, Gonijō ascended to the throne on the twenty‑first day of the first month of 1301, and Hanazono was named heir apparent on the twenty‑fourth of the eight month.30 Unsurprisingly, Gouda’s faction opposed Hanazono’s designation: they, too, dispatched a messenger to the shogunate, stressing that it was not desirable to establish two separate imperial lines with claims to the throne. Furthermore, they claimed that it had been Gosaga’s intent to have the throne transmitted through 29 30 Ibid., 162. Ibid., 162–163. 13 of 23 Kameyama’s descendants. 31 The shogunate admitted in its reply that its support of Hanazono might have been a premature decision; however, the letter also stated that both Gofukakusa’s as well as Kameyama’s descendants had a legitimate claim to the throne – so it should be up to the reigning sovereign personally to decide when he would cede the throne to the crown prince.32 This became the standard after which the shogunate would handle affairs of the imperial succession in the future. Gouda, as one of the recipients of the shogunate’s document, noted in his reply to the shogunate that it had been thoughtless to have two competing messengers head to Kamakura. 33 Nevertheless, after this incident, sending messengers to the shogunate became established practice by the rivaling factions in order to obtain support for their own claims to the throne. This did come to be colloquially referred to as a “horse‑race”. Gonijō unexpectedly passed away in 1308. He was succeeded by Hanazono. 34 Gonijō’s younger brother Godaigo was proclaimed the new crown prince. Although Godaigo, too, was a son of Gouda, it had been Gouda’s wish that an offspring of Gonijō should eventually ascend the throne. But there were obstacles to the designation of Gonijō’s son Kuniyoshi as crown prince: it had been Kameyama’s deathbed wish (he passed away in 1305) that his son Tsuneaki 恒明親王 (1303–1351), who had been born to him shortly before his death, should eventually follow him on the throne. Despite that, Gouda ignored his father’s request and established Kuniyoshi as his successor instead. However, members of the court aristocracy raised their voices in support of Prince Tsuneaki, proclaiming their endorsement of Kameyama’s last will. Therefore, opposed factions were pushing for the installation of both princes as sovereign‑designate. Hence, when Gonijō passed away and a new crown prince had to be named, enforcing Kuniyoshi’s designation would certainly have resulted in open discord between these two factions – in order to prevent the escalation of the situation, the solution for the time being was the installation of a third prince as heir apparent: Godaigo.35 After ten years on the throne, Hanazono abdicated in favor of Godaigo in 1318. Originally, the next crown prince would have to be chosen out of Gofushimi and Hanazono’s descendants – in Prince Kōgon 光厳天皇 (1313–1364, r. 1331–1333) they Yoshida Tsunenaga 吉田経⾧, Kichizokuki 吉続記, ed. Zōho Shiryō Taisei Kankōkai (Zōho shiryō taisei 30), Tokyo 1965, 163–428, Shōan 3 (1301) 11/25. The Kichizokuki is the diary of court aristocrat Yoshida Tsunenaga (1239–1309). 32 Ibid., the entries for Shōan 3 (1301) 11/24 and 11/25. 33 Tsunenaga was the official who drafted the letter in Gouda’s name and recorded it in his diary. Ibid., Shōan 3 (1301) 12/2. 34 Shijō and Gonijō were the only sovereigns during this period (1183–1333) who passed away before ceding the throne to a successor. 35 KONDŌ 2016, 223–225. 31 14 of 23 even had a suitable candidate available – but Gouda pressured the court to designate Gonijō’s son Kuniyoshi instead. 36 Had the court strictly adhered to the principle of alternate succession, it would have been Kuniyoshi’s turn only after Godaigo had ceded the throne to Kōgon; however, Gouda was not willing to wait. He wanted to make sure that Gonijō’s offspring would be enthroned during his own lifetime. It is suffice to say that both factions corresponded multiple times with the shogunate concerning the selection of the next crown prince. The shogunate, however, was not invested in the issue of selection at all, but feeling unable to disrespect Gouda, its arbitration ended up being in support of the former monarch’s request. Although both the Jimyōin (Gofukakusa’s descendants) and the Daikakuji (Kameyama’s descendants) lines had a claim to the throne, both reigning Emperor Godaigo and Crown Prince Kuniyoshi stemmed from the Daikakuji line. However, Godaigo was the prince’s uncle: in other words, if his nephew were to ascend to the throne, Godaigo’s descendants would be removed from the line of imperial succession. Without a doubt, Godaigo must have seen Kuniyoshi and his patron Gouda as obstacles to securing his own enduring rule; however, his animosity was directed against the shogunate, which had endorsed both Gofushimi’s and Kuniyoshi’s nomination, thus effectively removing his own children from the line of imperial succession. Beginning in 1321, the sovereign began plotting to overthrow the shogunate. At the same time, he abolished Gouda’s insei and ruled directly. A mere three months after Gouda’s death in the sixth month of 1324, a conspiracy instigated by Godaigo was exposed and several of his close associates were imprisoned. Despite that, the shogunate, overwhelmed by Godaigo’s fearless stance, as portrayed by the messenger who had been sent to Kamakura in order to illuminate the incident’s details, chose to not further question the sovereign’s personal involvement. At the time, the shogunate’s political leadership was weakened, feeling incapable of taking a harsh stance against the sovereign.37 Shortly after this incident, both Godaigo and Kuniyoshi sent messengers on a “horse‑race” towards Kamakura; with Godaigo’s plotting against the shogunate having become public, the prince saw a chance to rally for the sovereign’s abdication in his favor. Although both were of the Daikakuji line, they were rivals competing for an advantageous shogunate reaction concerning the imperial succession. Thus, the “horse‑race” that originally had taken place between the Jimyōin and Daikakuji lines occurred yet again – but this time between members of the same lineage. Hanazono, who wrote about this event in his diary, was of the Jimyōin line; thus, he belonged to 36 37 Ibid., 2016, 227–228. Ibid., 2016, 228–229. 15 of 23 the traditional rivals of the Daikakuji‑line. However, whereas he commented on the “race” between the two with contempt, he also noted that his own faction, the Jimyōin‑line, should side with the crown prince: after all, if Kuniyoshi’s efforts were rewarded and Godaigo had to cede the throne to the prince, then – finally! – Kōgon, who had been passed over once due to Gouda’s pressure, could be nominated as the new crown prince. In other words, the conflict of interests between Godaigo and Kuniyoshi indicated the aligning of interests between Kuniyoshi and the Jimyōin‑line. However, their hopes would be shattered, since the shogunate’s arbitration did not endorse Kuniyoshi’s motion. Had the warrior government enforced Godaigo’s abdication and punished the sovereign for his intrigue, it certainly would have had the support of the majority of the imperial court’s aristocracy. In light of this situation, one cannot fathom why the shogunate leaders decided in Godaigo’s favor. Their mistake did come back to haunt them a few years later, since it directly led to the fall of the Kamakura shogunate. Moreover, Prince Kuniyoshi never saw himself on the throne: he passed away in 1326 at the age of twenty‑seven. Nonetheless, Kōgon was instated as the new crown prince. In 1331, Emperor Godaigo escaped the capital, raising an army to overthrow the shogunate; the shogunate troops, which had occupied the capital, installed Kōgon on the throne by Retired Emperor Gofushimi’s decree. Godaigo was defeated, captured by the shogunate forces, and banished. The deceased Prince Kuniyoshi’s son, Prince Yasuhito 雍仁親王 (1320–1355), was installed as the next crown prince. The struggle for the throne between the Jimyōin and Daikakuji lines had endured for decades. However, not even Godaigo’s downfall and the enthronement of Kōgon, tantamount to the replacement of the Daikakuji with the Jimyōin line, did abolish the precedent: the new crown prince still was of the Daikakuji line. The shogunate upheld its adherence to the established principle of alternate succession between the two lines.38 Conclusion In 1333, widespread warrior revolt toppled the shogunate under Hōjō control. The exiled Godaigo declared his continued reign on the imperial throne and triumphantly returned to Kyoto, deposing of both the reigning Emperor Kōgon and Crown Prince Yasuhito. He instated his own son Tsuneyoshi 恒良親王 (1324–1338) as heir apparent instead. Under Godaigo’s reign, court and shogunate were erstwhile unified. But his unified government did only last for a mere two years, and Ashikaga Takauji 足利高氏 (1305–1358), one of the military leaders of the former shogunate, became head of a new 38 KONDŌ 2016, 239–241. 16 of 23 shogunate government, which was opposed to Godaigo’s polity. In 1336 Takauji instated Retired Emperor Kōgon’s insei, and installed Kōgon’s younger brother Kōmyō 光明天皇 (1321–1380, r. 1336–1348) on the throne – because Kōgon was head of an insei government, he most likely had adopted his brother Kōmyō. Godaigo survived an attack by the Ashikaga, fleeing the capital. But when he returned to Kyoto (implicitly acknowledging both Ashikaga rule and Kōmyō’s right to the throne), Kōgon, Kōmyō, and the Ashikaga all revered him as a former sovereign, and designated his son Nariyoshi 成良親王 (1326–1344) the next crown prince. Despite the fact that Kōmyō was victorious over Godaigo and acceded to the throne, Godaigo’s son was declared to be his eventual successor. The victors both within court and within the new shogunate aimed for reconciliation by honoring the principle of both imperial lines possessing a legitimate claim to the throne. Godaigo, however, was not satisfied: again, he left the capital and erected his base of operations in the countryside roughly one‑hundred kilometers to the south of Kyoto, announcing his continued reign on the imperial throne. He died in 1339, and his rule was continued by his descendants; however, since there was another sovereign – descended from Kōgon and Kōmyō – in Kyoto, for about sixty years there were two emperors heading a northern and southern court. Despite that, Kyoto had always been the location of the imperial court: it would be a stretch to say that the southern faction, comprised of Godaigo and his supporters, truly functioned as a government on the same level of sophistication as its northern counterpart. The southern court did not possess the strength to fight the Ashikaga shogunate on equal footing, but since the new polity was plagued by constant internal strife, Godaigo and his descendants were able to find allies in the ranks of the shogunate segregationists and thus maintained their own independence – until 1392, when one of Godaigo’s descendants submitted to the Ashikaga shogunate, ending the era of two courts. Overall, Godaigo’s achievement of uniting court and shogunate under his own person remained just an intermission in the larger developments of history, which saw the end of the Kamakura shogunate under Hōjō control, and the resurgence of shogunate rule by the hands of the Ashikaga. However, in 1867 the last shogunate, ruled by the Tokugawa, was overthrown. The new Meiji government declared the Tenno its nominal sovereign. The masterminds behind the creation of this modern imperial nation‑state looked back upon Godaigo, who once had achieved the establishment of a united government by destroying the Kamakura shogunate, as their archetype. The militaristic nation of their design persisted until 1945, promoting a view of history that idealized Godaigo’s achievements. Post‑war historiography has spent decades to revise this 17 of 23 perception of history – but even today, remnants of a romanticized Godaigo‑image remain. Hence, historians today still need to direct their efforts towards an objective reassessment of Godaigo’s reign. Translated from Japanese by Christian Werner Bibliography Primary Sources Hanazono‑tennō 花園天皇, Hanazono‑tennō shinki 花園天皇宸記, ed. MURATA Masashi (Shiryō sanshū kokiroku hen 62/66/80), 3 vols., Tokyo 1982–1986. Yoshida Tsunenaga 吉 田 経 ⾧ , Kichizokuki 吉 続 記 , ed. Zōho Shiryō Taisei Kankōkai (Zōho shiryō taisei 30), Tokyo 1965, 163–428. Secondary Sources GOMI Fumihiko, Bushi to bunshi no chūseishi, Tokyo 1992. ISHIMODA Shō, Chūsei ni okeru tennōsei no kokufuku, in: AOKI Kazuo et al. (ed.), Ishimoda Shō chosakushū, 15 vols., vol. 8: Kodaihō to chūseihō, Tokyo 1989 (Orig. 1946), 19–32. KAMAKURA Saho, Nihon chūsei shōensei seiritsushi ron, Tokyo 2009. KAWABATA Shin, Shōensei seiritsushi no kenkyū, Kyoto 2000. KONDŌ Shigekazu, Kamakura bakufu to chōtei (Shirīzu Nihon chūseishi 2), Tokyo 2016. KURODA Toshio, Chūsei no kokka to tennō, in: KURODA, Kuroda Toshio chosakushū, 8 vols., vol. 1: Kenmon taisei ron, Kyoto 1994 (Orig. 1963), 3–46. SATŌ Shin’ichi, Nihon no chūsei kokka, Tokyo 2007 (1st edition 1983). TAKAHASHI Kazuki, Chūsei shōensei to Kamakura bakufu, Tokyo 2004. UWAYOKOTE Masataka, Kamakura bakufu to kuge seiken, in: UWAYOKOTE, Kamakura jidai seijishi kenkyū, Tokyo 1991 (Orig. 1975), 2–45. 18 of 23 Appendix: Overview of ruling personages, 1183–133339 Year Emperor Ret. Emperor Lord of Kamakura 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 Goshirakawa 1188 (1127–1192) 1189 1190 Gotoba Minamoto no (1180–1239) Yoritomo (1147– 1191 1199) 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 Minamoto no Yoriie 1201 (1182–1204) 1202 1203 Tsuchimikado 1204 (1196–1231) 1205 Gotoba 1206 1207 Minamoto no 1208 Sanetomo (1192– 1209 1219) 1210 1211 Juntoku 1212 (1197–1242) 1213 39 Light grey indicates Jimyōin, dark grey Daikakuji heritage. 19 of 23 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 Chūkyō (1218– 1234) Gotakakura (1179–1223) 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 Gohorikawa (1212–1234) 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 Gohorikawa 1233 1234 Kujō Yoritsune 1235 (1218–1256) 1236 Shijō 1237 (1231–1242) 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 Gosaga 1244 (1220–1272) Kujō Yoritsugu 1245 1246 Gofukakusa (1239–1256) Gosaga 20 of 23 1247 (1243–1304) 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 Prince Munetaka 1259 (1242–1274) 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 Kameyama 1267 (1249–1305) 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 Prince Koreyasu 1274 (1264–1326) 1275 1276 1277 Gouda 1278 (1265–1324) Kameyama 1279 1280 1281 21 of 23 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 Gofukakusa 1289 1290 1291 1292 Fushimi (1265–1317) 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 Prince Hisaakira Gofushimi (1288–1336) (1287–1328) Fushimi 1301 1302 1303 1304 Gonijō (1285–1308) Gouda 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 Fushimi Hanazono Prince Morikuni (1297–1348) (1301–1333) 1313 1314 1315 Gofushimi 1316 22 of 23 1317 1318 1319 Gouda 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 Godaigo (1288–1339) 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 Kōgon (1313– 1364)* Gofushimi* 1333 *Refer to the contents of this paper for specifics on the relationship between Godaigo, Kōgon, and Gofushimi in the 1330s. 23 of 23