Publication info:
Shigekazu Kondo. „The ‚Horse-Race’ for the Throne: Court, Shogunate, and Imperial Succession in
Early Medieval Japan,” translated by Christian Werner. In Die ‚Alleinherrschaft’ der russischen
Zaren in der ‚Zeit der Wirren‘ in transkultureller Perspektive, edited by Diana Ordubadi and
Dittmar Dahlmann, 105–128. Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2021.
Printed chapter available as download via the publisher at:
https://doi.org/10.14220/9783737012416.105
Pre-publication manuscript made available by the translator as open-access for the purpose of
research, under permission from the original author and V&R unipress.
Shigekazu Kondo
The “Horse‑Race” for the Throne:
Court, Shogunate, and Imperial Succession in Early Medieval Japan
Abstract
From 1183 until 1333 – what historians now call the Kamakura period – two governments
coexisted on the Japanese archipelago, respectively located in the eastern and western parts of
its largest island Honshu. Their political centers were separated by a distance of about 500 km:
the imperial court, ruled by its sovereign, the Tenno, had already existed for 600 years and was
located in the west, in Kyoto; Kamakura in the east was home to the newly established
shogunate, headed by the eponymous shogun. Although both these governments constituted
distinct polities, six of the shogunate’s rulers were invited from the court’s elites, and the court
also heeded the shogunate’s counsel pertaining issues of imperial succession.
During the latter half of this period, the imperial line was divided into two competing lineages,
each with a legitimate claim to the throne. This friction established a practice of dispatching
messengers to Kamakura, with the objective to obtain a shogunate counsel that would be in
support of one’s own lineage. At the time, the fact that both imperial lineages were sending
messengers to Kamakura was subjected to mockery: it was colloquially called a “horse‑race”.
This paper discusses the topic of imperial succession in the later Kamakura period, elucidating
the circumstances surrounding these “horse‑races”.
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Introduction
It was the first month of 1325 when two messengers departed the imperial capital of
Kyoto for Kamakura. These two noblemen were Yoshida Sadafusa 吉田定房 (1274–
1338), emissary of Emperor Godaigo 後醍醐天皇 (1288–1339, r. 1318–1339), and
Rokujō Aritada 六条有忠 (1281–1339), a supporter of Crown Prince Kuniyoshi 邦良親
王 (1300–1326).1 The princely courier was entrusted with realizing his lord’s claim to
the throne, but the imperial envoy had been instructed to prevent Kuniyoshi’s ascension.
Both men were eager to ensure that the shogunate’s arbitration would be in favor of
their own agenda, since the imperial house itself was in disagreement on matters of
imperial succession: the reigning sovereign had no intention to abscond the throne in
favor of his nephew Kuniyoshi. However, the prince saw himself as the legitimate heir
to the throne: his uncle’s enthronement was merely an interim arrangement – and
clearly, Godaigo were to gracefully abdicate in his favor. Godaigo’s immediate
predecessor, the Retired Emperor Hanazono 花園天皇 (1297–1348, r. 1308–1318)
noted in his diary that the people were gossiping about the two men’s efforts in securing
shogunate support, calling the affair a “horse‑race”.2
Godaigo could not claim to be a linear descendant of Hanazono, his second cousin.
Moreover, Hanazono had been preceded by Godaigo’s elder brother Gonijō 後二条天
皇 (1285–1308, r. 1301–1308), who, in turn, had succeeded Hanazono’s elder brother
Gofushimi 後伏見天皇 (1288–1336, r. 1298–1301). In other words, neither of the last
four sovereigns – Gofushimi, Gonijō, Hanazono, and Godaigo – had directly succeeded
a member of their own direct lineage, and all of them were second cousins to each other.
The imperial line bifurcated during the time of their grandfather Gosaga’s 後嵯峨天皇
(1220–1272, r. 1242–1246), and the two resulting lineages had henceforth taken turns
on the throne. The lineage that Gofushimi and Hanazono belonged to was known as the
Jimyōin‑line 持明院統; Gonijō and Godaigo were members of the Daikakuji‑line 大覚
寺統. Originally, the conflict for the throne had been between these two lineages;
likewise, the colloquial “horse‑race” had first been used in referral to the couriers
dispatched by these rivaling factions in their efforts to secure shogunate support.
However, another rift occurred within the Daikakuji‑line, birthing enmity between
Tenno Godaigo and his nephew Kuniyoshi.
Translator’s note: the correct reading of the prince’s name is not known; hence, some dictionaries also
refer to him as Kuninaga. Names of historical persons as well as Japanese authors cited follow the order
of family name, personal name; members of the imperial family do not possess a family name.
2
Hanazono‑tennō 花園天皇, Hanazono‑tennō shinki 花園天皇宸記, ed. MURATA Masashi (Shiryō
sanshū kokiroku hen 62/66/80), 3 vols., Tokyo 1982–1986, Shōchū 2 (1325) 1/13.
1
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Thus, the political status quo of the early 14th century was characterized by the
necessity of shogunate arbitration to mediate matters of imperial succession, since the
imperial line – and with it the supporting nobility at court – was inherently divided on
the issue. Let us investigate the circumstances that caused this situation.
Court and Shogunate
About five hundred kilometers to the east of Kyoto lies the city of Kamakura, the seat of
the shogunate during this period. It was established in the year 1180, when revolt
against the court was ravaging the countryside. Its founder was Minamoto no Yoritomo
源頼朝 (1147–1199), one of several rebel leaders. At first, the court declared the
shogunate an enemy that needed to be subdued; however, in 1183, Kyoto was occupied
by rebels and then‑sovereign Antoku 安徳天皇 (1178–1185, r. 1180–1185) escaped the
capital. His brother Gotoba 後鳥羽天皇 (1180–1239, r. 1183–1198) replaced the child
on the throne, and the imperial court, united under its new sovereign, acknowledged
Yoritomo’s hegemony over the east. This marked the birth of a polity in which court
and shogunate co‑existed for 150 years.3
Over the years, scholarship had proposed several competing interpretations of the
court‑shogunate relationship: originally, historians had defined the court as a ‘classical’
polity, and the shogunate as ‘medieval’; a long‑term process outlined a shift away from
the classical polity towards the emergence of a medieval state. 4 However, in 1963,
Kuroda Toshio criticized the established perception of the Kyoto court as an inherently
classical polity: he redefined it as (having undergone a transformation to) a medieval
polity, therefore relocating it to a position of parity with the shogunate. Furthermore,
Kuroda proposed the theory that these two political constructs – as well as a third entity,
which was representing the totality of the various religious institutions – conjointly
constituted the medieval Japanese state.5 These three elements were each corresponding
to one sociopolitical function: administration (court), military (shogunate), and religion
(religious institutions). He defined their relationship as ‘reciprocal complementarity’.6
For a detailed study of the complex relationship between court and shogunate, see KONDŌ Shigekazu,
Kamakura bakufu to chōtei (Shirīzu Nihon chūseishi 2), Tokyo 2016. Translator’s note: English‑language
research tends to refer to this arrangement as a diarchy, or ‘dual polity’.
4
ISHIMODA Shō, Chūsei ni okeru tennōsei no kokufuku, in: AOKI Kazuo et al. (ed.), Ishimoda Shō
chosakushū, 15 vols., vol. 8: Kodaihō to chūseihō, Tokyo 1989 (Orig. 1946), 19–32.
5
Translator’s note: religious institutions refers to Buddhist monasteries as well as the various indigenous
cults that are nowadays summarily described as Shintō; these two practices of worship were not isolated
from each other and can be understood as forming a syncretistic relationship. Furthermore, many
institutions of both types were influential landholders.
6
KURODA Toshio, Chūsei no kokka to tennō, in: KURODA, Kuroda Toshio chosakushū, 8 vols., vol. 1:
Kenmon taisei ron, Kyoto 1994 (Orig. 1963), 3–46.
3
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Twenty years later, Satō Shin’ichi, in part supporting Kuroda’s argument, suggested
that whereas the court should indeed be perceived as having undergone a transformation
into a medieval entity, both court and shogunate had to be evaluated as co‑existing – but
distinct – medieval states of their own. 7 The persistent opposition of these two
influential theories shapes the discourse of contemporary research until the present day.
In view of the fact that the relationship between court and shogunate is anything but
simple, neither theory could be refuted. One common argument for the rejection of the
notion that court and shogunate together constituted a singular state is their spatial
separation: for 150 years, a distance of five‑hundred kilometers separated both political
centers. Consequently, it can be argued that the existence of two centers, separated by
such a distance for such a notable span of time can only mean the existence of not one,
but two distinct governments.
Having said that, arguments against the notion of an independent shogunate persist.
One reason for this is that not only the shogun himself, but also many other
functionaries of the shogunate were recipients of appointments to office by the court.
On top of that, these were not even particularly high‑ranked offices: the only member of
the warrior government who received rank and title equivalent to the court’s ruling
aristocracy was the shogun himself; but even he did not receive these honors at a
younger age.8 In addition, the members of the Hōjō family 北条氏, who exercised the
true power in the shogunate, were only appointed to offices classifiable as mid‑ranked
bureaucratic or provincial posts. In other words, had the shogunate been located in
Kyoto, the court’s center, then the ruling elites of the shogunate would be unable to
negotiate on equal footing with the court’s aristocrats due to their significant disparity in
social status.
However, during this period only very few offices still retained their original
function: the vast majority had been repurposed to only signify the rank of an official
within court society – most office denominations were no longer indicative of any
administrative purpose. Meanwhile, new organizations that de facto fulfilled the
administrative duties had been created independently of these original court offices;
hence, the shogunate elites that received appointments by the court did not serve as staff
in the court’s administration proper.9 In effect, they were simply borrowing court titles
SATŌ Shin’ichi, Nihon no chūsei kokka, Tokyo 2007 (1st edition 1983).
Translator’s note: in this case, the ruling aristocracy refers to those members of the high‑ranked court
nobility (the kugyō 公卿) who also held posts in the central ministry of state (the dajōkan 太政官) at
court; the shogun, apart from his rank as either a kugyō or, later, a prince, typically was also awarded with
one of these central positions. This should be seen more as a symbolical gesture, especially in view of the
fact that he was geographically separated from the court’s administration.
9
SATŌ 2007, 14–27.
7
8
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in order to represent the status they occupied within their own administration – the
shogunate.
Consequently, the shogunate elites were not subordinated to the court
administration despite being appointed to court offices. Kuroda’s single‑state theory,
which defined the medieval state as constituent of court, shogunate, and religious
institutions, did also not consider the various court offices held by important shogunate
members to be fulfilling an administrative function – it was the institution of shogunate
as a totality that fulfilled its role as the element of state tasked with military and
policing duties.10
Another important point of debate concerning the court‑shogunate relationship is
the question of their respective ‘sphere of domination’: overly simplified, if these were
identical for each of the two governments, then they would constitute a single state;
however, if it were possible to delineate each polity’s sphere as distinct from each other,
it would indicate the existence of separate states.
A similarly simplified answer to this problem might look like this: the respective
geographical territories both governments had jurisdiction over was indeed overlapping,
but their domination over the people within these territories was markedly distinct from
each other.11 In order to understand this discrepancy, we need to understand a major
constitutive unit of early medieval Japanese society: the shōen 荘園 (estate).
Shōen describe land which, under permission of the imperial court polity, is in
possession of a legal person who would oversee part of public functions that originally
were the responsibility of the state, in order to provide for the expenses required to
fulfill the purpose of the estate’s establishment.12 In practice, many of these estates were
associated with temples dedicated to the religious objectives (e.g., personal as well as
public welfare) of their founders, who for the most part were members of the imperial
family. Although originally funded by taxes from the (re‑)development of arable lands
through its subordinate administrative (e.g., provincial) organizations, over the years,
the court became unable to secure the required economic resources to fund its public
and religious endeavors on a large scale, thus leading to the birth of the shōen system.
The legal person acknowledged as ‘proprietor’ of a shōen was referred to as honjo 本所;
KURODA 1994, 25–27.
Translator’s note: it could indeed be debated whether both court and shogunate had jurisdiction – or
enacted domination – over the exact same territory to the same degree or if there were differences; as
such, this is, as the author made clear, a massive simplification of the complex state of landownership and
administration during the medieval period in Japan.
12
For contemporary studies representative of the state of research on shōen, see for example: KAWABATA
Shin, Shōensei seiritsushi no kenkyū, Kyoto 2000; TAKAHASHI Kazuki, Chūsei shōensei to Kamakura
bakufu, Tokyo 2004; KAMAKURA Saho, Nihon chūsei shōensei seiritsushi ron, Tokyo 2009.
10
11
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but the person responsible for the estate’s (re‑)development on‑site was a jitō 地頭 (land
steward). The honjo wielded authority over instating and dismissing jitō, and thus
secured their share of the profits from the estate.
These very jitō, who wished to break free of their dependence on the honjo, were
the shogunate’s foundations. Their desires formed the bed upon which the shogunate
grew, since the new warrior government guaranteed the delivery of profits from the
shōen to the honjo; in exchange, the shogunate appropriated the estate proprietor’s
authority over the jitō for itself. With the loss of the associated appointment rights on
the side of the estate proprietors, the shogunate’s sphere of domination over jitō became
dissociated from that of the court, and two distinct spheres emerged.
Kuroda’s theory of court, shogunate, and religious institutions collectively
constituting a singular state had defined the relationship between its constituent
elements as ‘reciprocal complementarity’, since neither constituent was fulfilling all the
functions of the state on its own.13 In contrast, Satō’s notion of court and shogunate as
separate states defined the relationship between the two as ‘reciprocal determination’:
whereas both polities were by itself ‘complete’, they intrinsically were endowed with
the potential to influence each other’s specific identity and boundaries through
interaction.14 For example, determining the head of each polity (i.e., Tenno and shogun)
was a matter relevant to both parties. In order to elucidate this relationship, it is
necessary to explain who the respective ruling figures – de jure and de facto – in both
court and shogunate were.
De jure and de facto rulers within the imperial court
It goes without saying that the de jure leader of the imperial court is the Tenno. Without
its sovereign, the court cannot exist. However, during the Kamakura period (1183–
1333), it was the linear ascendant of the reigning sovereign – his father or grandfather –
who de facto controlled the government.15 Rule of a sovereign’s linear ascendant (i.e., a
retired emperor) is called insei 院生 and is the sole prerogative of a linear ascendant,
who not necessarily had to have directly preceded the current sovereign on the throne;
KURODA 1994, 18.
SATŌ 2007, iv. Translator’s note: whereas Satō’s choice of words (相互規定的 sōgo kiteiteki) is
obviously conscious of Kuroda’s terminology (相互補完的 sōgo hokanteki), his concept might best be
understood as a relationship similar to that of diplomatic ties between states, although on a more
fundamental level than that between truly separate countries whose relationship is clearly distinguished
by separate territories and a more or less “independent” society.
15
Translator’s note: textbooks typically cite 1185 as the beginning of the Kamakura period; however, the
author considers a different interpretation more plausible and thus defines the period as beginning in 1183.
Several other interpretations also exist and are debated by Japanese scholarship.
13
14
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accordingly, instating an insei government without a living linear ascendant was
impossible. Having said that, periods of direct rule by the reigning sovereign were
limited to situations when this was deemed inevitable: when a heir to the throne was
born to a reigning sovereign, the monarch would typically abdicate in favor of his son
and instate an insei government by virtue of now being father to the throne. We can
count ten insei rulers over the span of the Kamakura period; three of them – Gofukakusa,
Gouda 後宇多天皇 (1267–1324, r. 1274–1287), and Gofushimi – ceded the throne to a
successor who was not their direct descendant, and therefore did not come to head an
insei government immediately after abdication (refer to the timeline provided at the end
of this paper for an overview of rulers during the Kamakura period). Furthermore, two
of these retired emperors each saw two of their sons ascend to the throne; consequently,
they each enacted insei rule twice. These two men were the fathers of the four monarchs
initially mentioned in the introduction: Fushimi 伏見天皇 (1265–1317, r. 1287–1298),
father of Gofushimi and Hanazono; and Gouda, father of Gonijō and Godaigo. One last
exception was Gotakakura 後 高 倉 院 (1179–1223), who had never ascended the
imperial throne himself; nevertheless, his son did, which qualified him to instate insei
government.
Moreover, out of the sixteen monarchs which ascended to the throne over the course
of the Kamakura period, only two – Gohorikawa 後堀河天皇 (1212–1234, r. 1221–
1232) and Gosaga – were designated by the shogunate. Gohorikawa was enthroned in
the aftermath of the Jōkyū no ran 承久の乱 (Jōkyū Disturbance) in 1221, when the
court was defeated by the shogunate: in order to deny Retired Emperor Gotoba –
instigator of the conflict – further access to power, it was necessary to deny his
descendants a claim to the throne. As a result, Gotoba’s older brother Gotakakura took
over insei rule when his son Gohorikawa was proclaimed the new monarch. Past
research even evaluated the shogunate’s military triumph in this conflict as the warrior
government securing the authority to designate the imperial sovereign for itself.16 But in
reality, the shogunate’s designation of Gohorikawa presented an anomaly. As long as
the court’s inner circles were reaching a consensus on a candidate for the throne on their
own, the shogunate did neither disapprove of, nor attempt to interfere in their decision.
It was only when the court, struggling to come to an agreement, actively sought out the
shogunate’s arbitration that the eastern government reluctantly complied with the
request. When Gosaga ascended to the throne aided by shogunate influence, it was
because his predecessor Shijō 四条天皇 (1231–1242, r. 1232–1242) met an untimely
UWAYOKOTE Masataka, Kamakura bakufu to kuge seiken, in: UWAYOKOTE, Kamakura jidai seijishi
kenkyū, Tokyo 1991 (Orig. 1975), 2–45, here: 27–28.
16
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death at the age of 10, ending the line of succession. Gosaga was only a relative of the
sixth degree to Shijō; yet he ascended to the throne by virtue of the shogunate’s
nomination.
De jure and de facto rulers within the shogunate
Nine men received the title of shogun over the course of 1183 to 1333 (again, refer to
the appendix for an overview). The first shogun, Minamoto no Yoritomo, was
succeeded by his two sons. But with them, his lineage met its end: his eldest son Yoriie
源頼家 (1182–1204) fell victim to political strife and was assassinated a year after
being exiled; Yoriie’s brother Sanetomo 源実朝 (1192–1219) was murdered during
office. Their next two successors stemmed from the Kujō‑family, one of the most
exalted lineages within the court aristocracy; the last four were all imperial princes. All
of these courtly shoguns, except for the very last one, were deposed during their lifetime
and exiled to Kyoto, and the last head of the shogunate witnessed the fall of the
shogunate and returned to the imperial capital, where he died soon after.
The shogun‑title, which signified the shogunate headship, was granted by the
imperial court. 17 However, when it came to the de facto authority of the shogunate
leader, this title was ultimately inconsequential: for example, Minamoto no Yoritomo,
the shogunate founder, was appointed as shogun only thirteen years (in 1192) after he
had established his government in Kamakura, and he even renounced the title during his
lifetime.18 The same held true for his successor Yoriie: although he inherited his father’s
position in 1199, he was not appointed until 1202. But when Yoriie was deposed and
replaced by his brother Sanetomo in the wake of a political disturbance, the boy was
immediately declared shogun by the court to strengthen his authority as the new head of
the shogunate. Yet, when Sanetomo was murdered in 1219, there was no living male
successor from the Minamoto lineage remaining. The shogunate elites welcomed a son
of the Kujō‑family 九條家 from Kyoto as his successor. This child, Yoritsune 九条頼
経 (1218–1256), was a great‑grandchild of Yoritomo’s sister. The future shogun was
only two years old. Until his adulthood, Yoritomo’s widow (Yoriie’s and Sanetomo’s
mother) Hōjō Masako 北 条 政 子 (1157–1225) acted as provisional head of the
shogunate. She was never declared shogun by the court. Soon after her death in 1225,
the eight‑year‑old Yoritsune’s coming‑of‑age ceremony was held, and the following
Translator’s note: the title is properly called seii taishōgun 征夷大将軍 – supreme general to submit
the barbarians in the east.
18
Translator’s note: this discrepancy between the shogun title and being the de facto ruler of Kamakura is
being reflected in the appendix, where the term “Lord of Kamakura” (Kamakura‑dono 鎌倉殿) is being
used instead.
17
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year, the court declared the young boy shogun at the anniversary of his predecessor’s
death. All of his successors were appointed by the court, as well. In all instances, the
court merely fulfilled the shogunate’s request; accordingly, it did not rule over the
shogunate just because of its authority over the title of shogun.
The shogunate was a government established by warriors, who submitted
themselves to the authority of the person they accepted as their supreme leader:
Yoritomo. 19 But Yoritomo’s successor Yoriie was incapable of truly inheriting his
father’s authority. When the warrior elites deposed Yoriie and replaced him with his
brother Sanetomo, they refrained from investing the boy with direct decision‑making
capacity; his grandfather Hōjō Tokimasa 北条時政 (1138–1215), acknowledged as the
shogunate’s preeminent warrior, governed in his stead. His position later came to be
called shikken 執権.20 When, after the death of her son Sanetomo, Masako was acting as
interim head of the shogunate until Yoritsune’s adulthood, her brother Yoshitoki 北条
義時 (1163–1224) served in this position.
The Jōkyū Disturbance in 1221 was caused by Gotoba’s plot to eliminate Yoshitoki,
whom he perceived as the de facto ruler of the shogunate. Many warriors stationed in
the vicinity of Kyoto joined Gotoba, but the eastern warriors flocked to the banner of
the Hōjō siblings in Kamakura. Yoshitoki’s son Yasutoki 北 条 泰 時 (1183–1242)
commandeered the shogunate army heading towards the imperial capital and defeated
Gotoba’s forces – their victory consolidated the authority of shikken Yoshitoki. The
victorious general Yasutoki remained in Kyoto and dedicated himself to sorting out the
various problems that arose in the aftermath of the conflict. When his father died in
1224, Masako summoned him back to Kamakura, declaring him the next shikken. Years
later, in 1232, Yasutoki was responsible for the promulgation of the fundamental 51
articles of shogunate law (the ‘Goseibai shikimoku’ 御成敗式目), indicative of the
existence of a shogunate law distinct from the court’s one.
Until the time of Yasutoki’s grandson Tokiyori 北条時頼 (1227–1263, shikken
1246–1256), all men appointed to the office were acknowledged as the head of the Hōjō
main branch. Tokiyori cracked down on his rivals and consolidated his position as both
shikken and leader of the Hōjō clan. His linear descendants all inherited the position of
the main branch’s headship: Tokimune 北条時宗 (1251–1284, shikken 1268–1284),
Originally it had been thought that the jitō armed themselves and thus became warriors; however, more
recently the opposite interpretation became dominant: warriors became jitō as a side‑effect of large‑scale
land development over the course of the 12th century; GOMI Fumihiko, Bushi to bunshi no chūseishi,
Tokyo 1992, 14–15.
20
Translator’s note: Often translated as “shogunate regent” or “shogunal regent”. However, whereas the
shikken’s role within the shogunate might overlap with that of a “regent”, it could be argued that he
possesses a type of authority not derived from merely representing the shogun.
19
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Sadatoki 北条貞時 (1272–1311, shikken 1284–1301), and Takatoki 北条高時 (1304–
1333, shikken 1316–1326). 21 Apart from the head of the Hōjō’s main branch, who
always became shikken, there were also other members of the lineage group that would
be elevated to the office: for the eighty‑seven years between Tokiyori assuming the
position and the fall of the Kamakura shogunate in 1333, he and his direct descendants
held the office for a total of fifty‑three years. For the remaining time, eight other
members of the Hōjō were designated shikken; however, even if someone besides the
main branch’s head was in office, the actual power remained within the hands of the
clan headship. For example, when Sadatoki died in 1311, he had already ceded the
office for a decade – the court nonetheless commemorated his death in a way befitting
of the shogunate’s most powerful man.22
Bifurcation of the imperial lineage
When Gosaga ascended to the throne in 1242, all of his linear ascendants had already
passed away; accordingly, there was no insei government. One year later, Gofukakusa
was born to the sovereign, who ceded his position to his son at the first opportunity in
1246, instating insei government. Three years later, Gosaga had another son in
Kameyama 亀山天皇 (1249–1305, r. 1260–1274), who was named crown prince in
1258 (see figure 1 for an overview of the developing family relations). The following
year, the reigning Tenno Gofukakusa heeded his father’s request and abdicated in favor
of his little brother. In 1267, Gouda was born to Kameyama and named crown prince
just a year later. But Gofukakusa’s son, Prince Fushimi, was two years older than the
new heir apparent: Gouda’s designation as crown prince was tantamount to removing
Gofukakusa’s descendants from the line of imperial succession, effectively establishing
Kameyama’s line as the sole heirs to the throne. All of this transpired during Gosaga’s
insei rule; therefore, we can surmise that all of these developments reflected the retired
emperor’s will. (Figure 1 fig002.eps)
Gosaga died peacefully in 1272, after 26 years of insei. Gofukakusa, his direct
successor on the throne, now was the only living retired emperor; however, he was not a
linear ascendant to his brother and therefore unqualified to follow in his father’s
footsteps. Therefore, reigning sovereign Kameyama would govern personally. Around
this time, the looming Mongol threat pressed for a stable government – and with Gouda,
Translator’s note: the main branch’s headship (called tokusō 得宗) had a certain degree of authority
over the various Hōjō branch lineages that emerged over time.
22
KONDŌ 2016, 182–183.
21
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there already was a crown prince who could succeed to the throne.23 Hence, Kameyama
was beseeched to abdicate as soon as possible, restoring the status quo of insei
governance. This indicates just how strongly the concept of insei was perceived as a
constancy by its contemporaries; in contrast, direct rule by the reigning emperor was
regarded as a temporary measure, restricted to periods when external circumstances did
not permit the instatement of insei. For that reason, Kameyama abdicated in favor of
Gouda in 1274. But at the time, Kameyama had no other son besides Gouda who could
have been named the successor. His brother recognized the opportunity: Gofukakusa
rallied for support of his own son Fushimi’s installation as new crown prince. The
erstwhile monarch sought the dialogue with the shogunate’s leader, shikken Hōjō
Figure 1: Abridged genealogy of the Jimyōin and Daikakuji lines (order on the throne indicated by
numbers).
Tokimune, and succeeded in securing the warrior government’s endorsement of his
plan.24 Formally, the presence of a governing retired emperor, reigning sovereign, as
well as a crown prince was symbolic of the ideal stable government; on that account,
Tokimune had no reason to withhold his support of Fushimi’s designation.
Translator’s note: the so‑called Mongol Invasions of Japan under the Yuan dynasty occurred in 1274
and 1281.
24
KONDŌ 2016, 147–149.
23
11 of 23
In 1287, Gouda ceded the throne to Fushimi. However, this was neither of his own
volition nor by his father Kameyama’s behest: it was by shogunate recommendation.25
The proposal reflected that the rulers in Kamakura were well aware of the situation
between Gosaga’s successors. It should also be noted that the enthronement of Fushimi
by itself was of no advantage to the shogunate; however, since Gouda and Fushimi were
not father and son, this, indirectly, also brought an end to Kameyama’s insei, and
Fushimi’s father Gofukakusa came to exercise power instead.
Prince Gofushimi was born to Emperor Fushimi in 1288 and named crown prince
the following year. But his cousin Gouda already had a son three years older than the
new heir apparent: Prince Gonijō. Moreover, six months later, another prince – Godaigo
– was born to the former emperor. Still, the authority to decide on the crown prince lay
in the hands of the insei ruler; hence, in accordance with Gofukakusa’s and Fushimi’s
wishes, the infant Gofushimi became crown prince.26 In the same year, the shogunate
elites deposed the seventh shogun Koreyasu 惟康親王 (1264–1326), replacing him with
Prince Hisaakira 久明親王 (1276–1328), yet another one of Gofukakusa’s children.
Gofukakusa, satisfied by achieving all the glory he could wish for in this life, entered
monkhood and left the governance affairs to his son Fushimi. The retired monarch
remained in good health until his death in 1304 – but formally his insei government was
dissolved and the court was ruled directly by the reigning sovereign Fushimi.27
In 1298, the abdicated in favor of his son Gofushimi. Naturally, this signified a
return to insei rule – Fushimi remained the de facto ruling figure at court. After
Gofushimi, the throne was scheduled to fall into the hands of Gouda’s son, the new
crown prince Gonijō. Although Gofushimi had a little brother, Hanazono, born a year
earlier, the child was not designated crown prince. Despite being backed by the
authority invested in the leader of insei government, Fushimi failed at bestowing the
title of crown prince to his other son; the arrogance of his close retainer Kyōgoku
Tamekane 京極為兼 (1254–1332) had incurred the shogunate’s wrath, which saw to it
that the nobleman was exiled. As the aristocrat’s patron, the sovereign was deemed
partially responsible for Tamekane’s transgressions, directly leading to his abdication.28
Although Fushimi had renounced the throne, his reign was not yet over, since he
dominated the government as head of insei; however, his abdication meant that if the
next crown prince were not of his line, his insei would inevitably come to an end. After
a decade of patience, the time had come for Kameyama and Gouda: they succeeded in
Ibid., 152.
Ibid., 154.
27
Ibid., 154–155.
28
Ibid., 159–161.
25
26
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having Gonijō, Gouda’s son, appointed as the new sovereign‑designate. A few years
later, in 1301, the shogunate proposed a change of the throne, and Gouda, as father to
the newly instated Emperor Gonijō, came to preside over an insei government of his
own.29
The principle of alternate imperial succession
Both Gofukakusa and Kameyama still witnessed their respective grandchildren –
Gofushimi and Gonijō – ascend to the throne: they passed away in 1304 and 1305,
respectively. Both rulers had been unrelenting in their devotion to seeing their own
descendants assume the exalted honors of emperorship; however, since they also had
been equally powerful rulers, the descendants of both former sovereigns were perceived
as being invested with a legitimate claim to the throne.
Gofushimi’s reign had been cut short after only three years, ending his father’s insei
as well. But the Jimyōin line did not have the luxury of remaining passive: Gonjiō’s
enthronement naturally vacated the position of crown prince. If Fushimi’s faction did
not take the initiative, they risked being overwhelmed by the supporters of retired
emperor Gouda. The Jimyōin faction had permitted the installation of Gonijō as crown
prince and, recently, even ceded the throne to the prince; accordingly, it seemed
plausible to again nominate a crown prince from their own line as a successor to Gonijō.
Unfortunately, Gofushimi had no male heir. Certainly, he had a brother in Hanazono,
but his brother’s enthronement would not qualify Gofushimi to establish insei.
Moreover, should Gofushimi eventually have an heir, then Fushimi’s descendants
would bifurcate into two lines: those of Gofushimi and Hanazono. In order to prevent
this, Fushimi decreed that Gofushimi were to adopt Hanazono, and should a son be born
to Gofushimi, then Hanazono were to adopt the child; thus, their lineage would remain
united. Moreover, a messenger dispatched by the Jimyōin faction succeeded in
garnering the shogunate’s support for the installation of Hanazono as the new crown
prince. Consequently, Gonijō ascended to the throne on the twenty‑first day of the first
month of 1301, and Hanazono was named heir apparent on the twenty‑fourth of the
eight month.30 Unsurprisingly, Gouda’s faction opposed Hanazono’s designation: they,
too, dispatched a messenger to the shogunate, stressing that it was not desirable to
establish two separate imperial lines with claims to the throne. Furthermore, they
claimed that it had been Gosaga’s intent to have the throne transmitted through
29
30
Ibid., 162.
Ibid., 162–163.
13 of 23
Kameyama’s descendants. 31 The shogunate admitted in its reply that its support of
Hanazono might have been a premature decision; however, the letter also stated that
both Gofukakusa’s as well as Kameyama’s descendants had a legitimate claim to the
throne – so it should be up to the reigning sovereign personally to decide when he
would cede the throne to the crown prince.32 This became the standard after which the
shogunate would handle affairs of the imperial succession in the future. Gouda, as one
of the recipients of the shogunate’s document, noted in his reply to the shogunate that it
had been thoughtless to have two competing messengers head to Kamakura. 33
Nevertheless, after this incident, sending messengers to the shogunate became
established practice by the rivaling factions in order to obtain support for their own
claims to the throne. This did come to be colloquially referred to as a “horse‑race”.
Gonijō unexpectedly passed away in 1308. He was succeeded by Hanazono. 34
Gonijō’s younger brother Godaigo was proclaimed the new crown prince. Although
Godaigo, too, was a son of Gouda, it had been Gouda’s wish that an offspring of Gonijō
should eventually ascend the throne. But there were obstacles to the designation of
Gonijō’s son Kuniyoshi as crown prince: it had been Kameyama’s deathbed wish (he
passed away in 1305) that his son Tsuneaki 恒明親王 (1303–1351), who had been born
to him shortly before his death, should eventually follow him on the throne. Despite that,
Gouda ignored his father’s request and established Kuniyoshi as his successor instead.
However, members of the court aristocracy raised their voices in support of Prince
Tsuneaki, proclaiming their endorsement of Kameyama’s last will. Therefore, opposed
factions were pushing for the installation of both princes as sovereign‑designate. Hence,
when Gonijō passed away and a new crown prince had to be named, enforcing
Kuniyoshi’s designation would certainly have resulted in open discord between these
two factions – in order to prevent the escalation of the situation, the solution for the time
being was the installation of a third prince as heir apparent: Godaigo.35
After ten years on the throne, Hanazono abdicated in favor of Godaigo in 1318.
Originally, the next crown prince would have to be chosen out of Gofushimi and
Hanazono’s descendants – in Prince Kōgon 光厳天皇 (1313–1364, r. 1331–1333) they
Yoshida Tsunenaga 吉田経⾧, Kichizokuki 吉続記, ed. Zōho Shiryō Taisei Kankōkai (Zōho shiryō
taisei 30), Tokyo 1965, 163–428, Shōan 3 (1301) 11/25. The Kichizokuki is the diary of court aristocrat
Yoshida Tsunenaga (1239–1309).
32
Ibid., the entries for Shōan 3 (1301) 11/24 and 11/25.
33
Tsunenaga was the official who drafted the letter in Gouda’s name and recorded it in his diary. Ibid.,
Shōan 3 (1301) 12/2.
34
Shijō and Gonijō were the only sovereigns during this period (1183–1333) who passed away before
ceding the throne to a successor.
35
KONDŌ 2016, 223–225.
31
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even had a suitable candidate available – but Gouda pressured the court to designate
Gonijō’s son Kuniyoshi instead. 36 Had the court strictly adhered to the principle of
alternate succession, it would have been Kuniyoshi’s turn only after Godaigo had ceded
the throne to Kōgon; however, Gouda was not willing to wait. He wanted to make sure
that Gonijō’s offspring would be enthroned during his own lifetime. It is suffice to say
that both factions corresponded multiple times with the shogunate concerning the
selection of the next crown prince. The shogunate, however, was not invested in the
issue of selection at all, but feeling unable to disrespect Gouda, its arbitration ended up
being in support of the former monarch’s request.
Although both the Jimyōin (Gofukakusa’s descendants) and the Daikakuji
(Kameyama’s descendants) lines had a claim to the throne, both reigning Emperor
Godaigo and Crown Prince Kuniyoshi stemmed from the Daikakuji line. However,
Godaigo was the prince’s uncle: in other words, if his nephew were to ascend to the
throne, Godaigo’s descendants would be removed from the line of imperial succession.
Without a doubt, Godaigo must have seen Kuniyoshi and his patron Gouda as obstacles
to securing his own enduring rule; however, his animosity was directed against the
shogunate, which had endorsed both Gofushimi’s and Kuniyoshi’s nomination, thus
effectively removing his own children from the line of imperial succession. Beginning
in 1321, the sovereign began plotting to overthrow the shogunate. At the same time, he
abolished Gouda’s insei and ruled directly. A mere three months after Gouda’s death in
the sixth month of 1324, a conspiracy instigated by Godaigo was exposed and several of
his close associates were imprisoned. Despite that, the shogunate, overwhelmed by
Godaigo’s fearless stance, as portrayed by the messenger who had been sent to
Kamakura in order to illuminate the incident’s details, chose to not further question the
sovereign’s personal involvement. At the time, the shogunate’s political leadership was
weakened, feeling incapable of taking a harsh stance against the sovereign.37
Shortly after this incident, both Godaigo and Kuniyoshi sent messengers on a
“horse‑race” towards Kamakura; with Godaigo’s plotting against the shogunate having
become public, the prince saw a chance to rally for the sovereign’s abdication in his
favor. Although both were of the Daikakuji line, they were rivals competing for an
advantageous shogunate reaction concerning the imperial succession. Thus, the
“horse‑race” that originally had taken place between the Jimyōin and Daikakuji lines
occurred yet again – but this time between members of the same lineage. Hanazono,
who wrote about this event in his diary, was of the Jimyōin line; thus, he belonged to
36
37
Ibid., 2016, 227–228.
Ibid., 2016, 228–229.
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the traditional rivals of the Daikakuji‑line. However, whereas he commented on the
“race” between the two with contempt, he also noted that his own faction, the
Jimyōin‑line, should side with the crown prince: after all, if Kuniyoshi’s efforts were
rewarded and Godaigo had to cede the throne to the prince, then – finally! – Kōgon,
who had been passed over once due to Gouda’s pressure, could be nominated as the
new crown prince. In other words, the conflict of interests between Godaigo and
Kuniyoshi indicated the aligning of interests between Kuniyoshi and the Jimyōin‑line.
However, their hopes would be shattered, since the shogunate’s arbitration did not
endorse Kuniyoshi’s motion. Had the warrior government enforced Godaigo’s
abdication and punished the sovereign for his intrigue, it certainly would have had the
support of the majority of the imperial court’s aristocracy. In light of this situation, one
cannot fathom why the shogunate leaders decided in Godaigo’s favor. Their mistake did
come back to haunt them a few years later, since it directly led to the fall of the
Kamakura shogunate. Moreover, Prince Kuniyoshi never saw himself on the throne: he
passed away in 1326 at the age of twenty‑seven. Nonetheless, Kōgon was instated as the
new crown prince.
In 1331, Emperor Godaigo escaped the capital, raising an army to overthrow the
shogunate; the shogunate troops, which had occupied the capital, installed Kōgon on the
throne by Retired Emperor Gofushimi’s decree. Godaigo was defeated, captured by the
shogunate forces, and banished. The deceased Prince Kuniyoshi’s son, Prince Yasuhito
雍仁親王 (1320–1355), was installed as the next crown prince. The struggle for the
throne between the Jimyōin and Daikakuji lines had endured for decades. However, not
even Godaigo’s downfall and the enthronement of Kōgon, tantamount to the
replacement of the Daikakuji with the Jimyōin line, did abolish the precedent: the new
crown prince still was of the Daikakuji line. The shogunate upheld its adherence to the
established principle of alternate succession between the two lines.38
Conclusion
In 1333, widespread warrior revolt toppled the shogunate under Hōjō control. The
exiled Godaigo declared his continued reign on the imperial throne and triumphantly
returned to Kyoto, deposing of both the reigning Emperor Kōgon and Crown Prince
Yasuhito. He instated his own son Tsuneyoshi 恒良親王 (1324–1338) as heir apparent
instead. Under Godaigo’s reign, court and shogunate were erstwhile unified. But his
unified government did only last for a mere two years, and Ashikaga Takauji 足利高氏
(1305–1358), one of the military leaders of the former shogunate, became head of a new
38
KONDŌ 2016, 239–241.
16 of 23
shogunate government, which was opposed to Godaigo’s polity. In 1336 Takauji
instated Retired Emperor Kōgon’s insei, and installed Kōgon’s younger brother Kōmyō
光明天皇 (1321–1380, r. 1336–1348) on the throne – because Kōgon was head of an
insei government, he most likely had adopted his brother Kōmyō. Godaigo survived an
attack by the Ashikaga, fleeing the capital. But when he returned to Kyoto (implicitly
acknowledging both Ashikaga rule and Kōmyō’s right to the throne), Kōgon, Kōmyō,
and the Ashikaga all revered him as a former sovereign, and designated his son
Nariyoshi 成良親王 (1326–1344) the next crown prince. Despite the fact that Kōmyō
was victorious over Godaigo and acceded to the throne, Godaigo’s son was declared to
be his eventual successor. The victors both within court and within the new shogunate
aimed for reconciliation by honoring the principle of both imperial lines possessing a
legitimate claim to the throne.
Godaigo, however, was not satisfied: again, he left the capital and erected his base
of operations in the countryside roughly one‑hundred kilometers to the south of Kyoto,
announcing his continued reign on the imperial throne. He died in 1339, and his rule
was continued by his descendants; however, since there was another sovereign –
descended from Kōgon and Kōmyō – in Kyoto, for about sixty years there were two
emperors heading a northern and southern court. Despite that, Kyoto had always been
the location of the imperial court: it would be a stretch to say that the southern faction,
comprised of Godaigo and his supporters, truly functioned as a government on the same
level of sophistication as its northern counterpart. The southern court did not possess the
strength to fight the Ashikaga shogunate on equal footing, but since the new polity was
plagued by constant internal strife, Godaigo and his descendants were able to find allies
in the ranks of the shogunate segregationists and thus maintained their own
independence – until 1392, when one of Godaigo’s descendants submitted to the
Ashikaga shogunate, ending the era of two courts.
Overall, Godaigo’s achievement of uniting court and shogunate under his own
person remained just an intermission in the larger developments of history, which saw
the end of the Kamakura shogunate under Hōjō control, and the resurgence of shogunate
rule by the hands of the Ashikaga. However, in 1867 the last shogunate, ruled by the
Tokugawa, was overthrown. The new Meiji government declared the Tenno its nominal
sovereign. The masterminds behind the creation of this modern imperial nation‑state
looked back upon Godaigo, who once had achieved the establishment of a united
government by destroying the Kamakura shogunate, as their archetype. The militaristic
nation of their design persisted until 1945, promoting a view of history that idealized
Godaigo’s achievements. Post‑war historiography has spent decades to revise this
17 of 23
perception of history – but even today, remnants of a romanticized Godaigo‑image
remain. Hence, historians today still need to direct their efforts towards an objective
reassessment of Godaigo’s reign.
Translated from Japanese by Christian Werner
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Hanazono‑tennō 花園天皇, Hanazono‑tennō shinki 花園天皇宸記, ed. MURATA
Masashi (Shiryō sanshū kokiroku hen 62/66/80), 3 vols., Tokyo 1982–1986.
Yoshida Tsunenaga 吉 田 経 ⾧ , Kichizokuki 吉 続 記 , ed. Zōho Shiryō Taisei
Kankōkai (Zōho shiryō taisei 30), Tokyo 1965, 163–428.
Secondary Sources
GOMI Fumihiko, Bushi to bunshi no chūseishi, Tokyo 1992.
ISHIMODA Shō, Chūsei ni okeru tennōsei no kokufuku, in: AOKI Kazuo et al. (ed.),
Ishimoda Shō chosakushū, 15 vols., vol. 8: Kodaihō to chūseihō, Tokyo 1989 (Orig.
1946), 19–32.
KAMAKURA Saho, Nihon chūsei shōensei seiritsushi ron, Tokyo 2009.
KAWABATA Shin, Shōensei seiritsushi no kenkyū, Kyoto 2000.
KONDŌ Shigekazu, Kamakura bakufu to chōtei (Shirīzu Nihon chūseishi 2), Tokyo
2016.
KURODA Toshio, Chūsei no kokka to tennō, in: KURODA, Kuroda Toshio
chosakushū, 8 vols., vol. 1: Kenmon taisei ron, Kyoto 1994 (Orig. 1963), 3–46.
SATŌ Shin’ichi, Nihon no chūsei kokka, Tokyo 2007 (1st edition 1983).
TAKAHASHI Kazuki, Chūsei shōensei to Kamakura bakufu, Tokyo 2004.
UWAYOKOTE Masataka, Kamakura bakufu to kuge seiken, in: UWAYOKOTE,
Kamakura jidai seijishi kenkyū, Tokyo 1991 (Orig. 1975), 2–45.
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Appendix: Overview of ruling personages, 1183–133339
Year
Emperor
Ret. Emperor
Lord of Kamakura
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
Goshirakawa
1188
(1127–1192)
1189
1190
Gotoba
Minamoto no
(1180–1239)
Yoritomo (1147–
1191
1199)
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
Minamoto no Yoriie
1201
(1182–1204)
1202
1203
Tsuchimikado
1204
(1196–1231)
1205
Gotoba
1206
1207
Minamoto no
1208
Sanetomo (1192–
1209
1219)
1210
1211
Juntoku
1212
(1197–1242)
1213
39
Light grey indicates Jimyōin, dark grey Daikakuji heritage.
19 of 23
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
Chūkyō (1218–
1234)
Gotakakura
(1179–1223)
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
Gohorikawa
(1212–1234)
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
Gohorikawa
1233
1234
Kujō Yoritsune
1235
(1218–1256)
1236
Shijō
1237
(1231–1242)
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
Gosaga
1244
(1220–1272)
Kujō Yoritsugu
1245
1246
Gofukakusa
(1239–1256)
Gosaga
20 of 23
1247
(1243–1304)
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
Prince Munetaka
1259
(1242–1274)
1260
1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
Kameyama
1267
(1249–1305)
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
Prince Koreyasu
1274
(1264–1326)
1275
1276
1277
Gouda
1278
(1265–1324)
Kameyama
1279
1280
1281
21 of 23
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
Gofukakusa
1289
1290
1291
1292
Fushimi
(1265–1317)
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
Prince Hisaakira
Gofushimi
(1288–1336)
(1287–1328)
Fushimi
1301
1302
1303
1304
Gonijō
(1285–1308)
Gouda
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
Fushimi
Hanazono
Prince Morikuni
(1297–1348)
(1301–1333)
1313
1314
1315
Gofushimi
1316
22 of 23
1317
1318
1319
Gouda
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324
Godaigo
(1288–1339)
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
Kōgon (1313–
1364)*
Gofushimi*
1333
*Refer to the contents of this paper for specifics on the relationship between Godaigo,
Kōgon, and Gofushimi in the 1330s.
23 of 23