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Issue 5 Evil Winter 2001/02
On Evil: An Interview with Alenka upancic
!hristoph !ox and Alenka upancic
In the past several years, we have seen a marked return to "the question of evil"
amon philosophers and psy!hoanalyti! theorists" Is there somethin a#out our
parti!ular histori!al moment that for!es us to rethink what "evil" miht mean$ %r
is the question of evil perennial, somethin repressed that !ontinues to return
and assert itself$
"he theoretical necessit# o$ rethinking the concept o$ evil is linked to the more general
interest in the %uestion o$ ethics. "o a considerable extent& this interest is polemical:
"he wa# the word 'ethics' has been used latel# in public discourse is bound to provoke
some theoretical and conceptual nausea. It is used either to back up some political or
legal decision that nobod# is willing to assume $ull#& or else to keep in check certain
developments (in science& $or instance) that seem to move much more %uickl# than our
'morals' do. "o put it simpl#& 'ethics' is thought o$ as something strictl# restrictive*
something that& in the hustle and bustle o$ our societ#& marks a place $or our intimate
$ears. In philosoph# as well as in ps#choanal#sis& a conceptual revolt against this notion
o$ ethics took place. "he %uestion o$ evil and its possible de$initions arose in reaction to
this broader conceptual $rame.
"he $act that something keeps returning usuall# means that we are dealing with a
con+unction o$ the impossible and the necessary. Evil seems to be a per$ect candidate
$or such a con+unction. ,h# is this return happening toda#- "he best I can do to provide
a general answer to this %uestion is to point out that the political& economical& and
technological events o$ the recent past have had an important impact on our notion o$
'the impossible.' "he impossible has& so to speak& lost its rights. On the economic level
it seems as i$ what was once re$erred to as an economic impossibilit# (i.e. the limits that
a given economic order sets to our pro+ects& as well as to our li$e in general) is being
rede$ined as some kind o$ natural impossibilit# or natural law& (i.e. as something that
cannot be changed in an# wa#). "he explosion o$ new technologies inspires something
that one could call a 'desperate optimism.' On this level& it seems that almost
ever#thing is possible& but in a wa# that makes us $eel that none o$ these possibilities
contains what .acan calls a /eal& an 'absolute condition' that could catch and sustain
our desire $or more than +ust a passing moment. On the political level& the $all o$
!ommunism has made western democracies lose sight o$ their own contradictions and
all alternatives are declared impossible. 0o& i$ we consider all this& what #ou call the
return o$ the %uestion o$ evil might be a wa# $or the impossible to remind us that we
have not #et done awa# with its necessit#.
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"he philosophical categor# o$ evil can also introduce some distance and re$lection into
what is1and alwa#s has been1an inherent bond between evil and the Imaginar#. Evil
has alwa#s been an ob+ect o$ $ascination& with all the ambiguit# and ambivalence that
characterize the latter. 2ascination could be said to be the aesthetic $eeling o$ the state
o$ contradiction. It implies& at the same time& attraction and repulsion. 'Evil' is not onl#
something that we abhor more than an#thing else* it is also something that manages to
catch hold o$ our desire. One could even sa# that the thing that makes a certain ob+ect
or phenomenon 'evil' is precisel# the $act that it gives bod# to this ambiguit# o$ desire
and abhorrence. "he link between 'evil' (in the common use o$ this word) and the
Imaginar# springs $rom the $act that we are dealing precisel# with something that has no
image. "his is not as paradoxical as it might sound. 0trictl# speaking1and here I am
drawing more on .acanian ps#choanal#sis than on philosoph#1the Imaginar# register
is in itsel$ a response to the lack o$ the Image. "he more this lack or absence is
burdensome& the more $renetic is the production o$ images. 3ut also (and here we come
back to the %uestion o$ evil)& the more closel# an image gets to occup# the ver# place o$
the lack o$ the Image& the greater will be its power o$ $ascination.
,ithin realit# as it is constituted via what .acan calls the Imaginar# and the 0#mbolic
mechanisms& there is a 'place o$ the lack o$ the Image&' which is symbolically
designated as such. "hat is to sa# that the ver# mechanism o$ representation posits its
own limits and designates a certain be#ond which it re$ers to as 'unrepresentable.' In
this case& we can sa# that the place o$ something that has no image is designated
s#mbolicall#* and it is this ver# designation that endows whatever $inds itsel$ in this
place with the special power o$ $ascination. 0ince this unrepresentable is usuall#
associated with the transgression o$ the given limits o$ the 0#mbolic& it is spontaneousl#
perceived as 'evil&' or at least as disturbing. .et us take an example: ,hen it comes to
the stories that pla# upon a neat distinction between 'good' and 'evil' and their con$lict&
we are not onl# more $ascinated b# 'evil' characters* it is also clear that the $orce o$ the
stor# depends on the strength o$ the 'evil' character. ,h# is this so- "he usual answer
is that the 'good' is alwa#s somehow $lat& whereas 'evil' displa#s an intriguing
complexit#. 3ut what exactl# is this complexit# about- It is certainl# not about some
deeper motives or reasons $or this 'evil' being 'evil.' "he moment we get an# kind o$
ps#chological or other explanation $or wh# somebod# is 'evil&' the spell is broken& so to
speak. "he complexit# and depth o$ 'evil' characters are related to the $act that the#
seem to have no other reason $or doing what the# are doing but the $un (or spite) o$ it. In
this sense& the# are as '$lat' as can be. 3ut at the same time& this lack o$ depth can itsel$
become something palpable& a most oppressive and massive presence. In these
stories& as well as in what constitutes the individual or the collective Imaginar#& evil is
usuall# precisel# this: that which lends its '$ace' to some disturbing void 'be#ond
representation.'
"he important point to remember here is that this 'void' is structural and not empirical. It
is not some empt# space or no man4s land that could be graduall# reduced to nothing or
con%uered b# the advance o$ knowledge and science. "he $act that science itsel$ can
$unction as the embodiment or the agent o$ evil is signi$icant enough in this regard. "ake
the recent example o$ 5oll#& or o$ cloning in general. It is clear that here we are dealing
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with a striking transgression o$ the limits o$ our 0#mbolic universe. In this example& we
can also grasp what makes the di$$erence between image and Image. 5oll# looks like
an# other sheep* her 'image' is +ust like the image o$ an# other sheep. And #et& her
place in the 0#mbolic& or rather& the $act that there is no established place $or such a
being in the given 0#mbolic order& endows her image with a special 'glow.'
0o& the $irst important thing that the philosophical (as well as ps#choanal#tical)
perspective can bring to the %uestion o$ evil is thus to establish and maintain the
di$$erence between this void& which is an e$$ect o$ structure& and the images that come
to represent or embod# it. 6ot to con$ound the two is the $irst step in an# anal#sis o$
phenomena that are re$erred to as 'evil.'
I&m interested in the idea that "evil has no imae"" In our reservoir of imaes, is
there an adequate imae of evil$ Is there an imae of evil that "o!!upies the very
pla!e of the la!k of the Imae"$ 'hose imaes that sprin to mind (monsters, the
fa!e of )itler, representations of the devil* always seem somehow inadequate"
.et4s start with 7itler. It is probabl# no coincidence that the two best movies about 7itler
are comedies: .ubitsch4s To Be or Not to Be and !haplin4s The Great Dictator. "he
image o$ 7itler is $unn#. It is $unn# because it is so inade%uate. In !haplin4s movie& the
image o$ 7itler is the same as that o$ the 8ewish barber& which is precisel# the point.
Images o$ monsters and devils are inade%uate because the# tr# to 'illustrate' evil. "he
point is not that real evil cannot be illustrated or represented& but that we have tendenc#
to call 'evil' precisel# that which is not represented in a given representation. As to the
%uestion o$ whether there is an image o$ evil that occupies the ver# place o$ the lack o$
the Image& I would sa# #es& there is. It is what we could call a 'sublime splendor&'
'shine&' 'glare&' 'glow&' or 'aura.' It belongs to the Imaginar# register& although it is not
an image& in the strict sense o$ the word* rather& it is that which makes a certain image
'shine' and stand out. 9ou could sa# that it is an e$$ect o$ the /eal on our imagination&
the last veil or 'screen' that separates us $rom the impossible /eal.
In To Be or Not To Be& .ubitsch provides a ver# good example o$ 'the image that
occupies the ver# place o$ the lack o$ the Image.' At the beginning o$ the $ilm& there is a
brilliant scene in which a group o$ actors is rehearsing a pla# that $eatures 7itler. "he
director is complaining about the appearance o$ the actor who pla#s 7itler& sa#ing that
his make:up is bad and that he doesn4t look like 7itler at all. 7e also sa#s that what he
sees in $ront o$ him is +ust an ordinar# man. "he scene continues& and the director is
tr#ing desperatel# to name the m#sterious 'something more' that distinguishes the
appearance o$ 7itler $rom the appearance o$ the actor in $ront o$ him. One could sa#
that he is tr#ing to name the 'evil' that distinguishes 7itler $rom this man who actuall#
looks a lot like 7itler. 7e is searching and searching& and $inall# he notices a photograph
o$ 7itler on the wall& and triumphantl# cries out: '"hat4s it; "his is what 7itler looks like;'
'3ut sir&' replies the actor& 'this picture was taken o$ me.' 6eedless to sa#& we as
spectators were ver# much taken in b# the enthusiasm o$ the director who saw in the
picture something %uite di$$erent $rom this poor actor. 6ow& I would sa# that there is
probabl# no better 'image' o$ the lack o$ the Image than this 'thing' that the director (but
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also ourselves) has 'seen' in the picture on the wall and that made all the di$$erence
between the photograph and the actor. One should stress& however& that this
phenomenon is not linked exclusivel# to the %uestion o$ evil& but to the %uestion o$ the
'unrepresentable' in general.
At le$t is a photograph o$ 9akov <eters& the chie$ o$ 0talin4s secret police& as he
appeared in the =>?5 political album Ten Years of Uzbekistan designed b# Alexander
/odchenko. ,hen <eters and other part# members were later li%uidated b# 0talin&
posessing images o$ them became illegal. /odchenko used thick black India ink to
de$aace their portraits in his own copies o$ the album. "he de$aced copies remained in
his apartment until the# were discovered b# 5avid @ing during a =>AB visit to the late
artist4s studio where three generations o$ /odchenkos were still living together. <hotos
courtes# o$ 5avid @ing !ollection
Why is it that evil !aptures the imaination #ut the ood does not$ Ethi!s would
seem to #e #ound to the idea that the ood is attra!tive, allied with the #eautiful
and, as su!h, somethin that soli!its our desire" +ut, as you suest, the
opposite is perhaps more plausi#le" 'he !om#ination of attra!tion and repulsion
one finds in evil seems, perversely, more attra!tive to us" What does this tell us
a#out our desire and a#out the nature of evil and the ood$
7ere I turn to @antian ethics& which utterl# breaks with the idea that the good is
attractive and& as such& can solicit our desire. @ant calls this kind o$ attraction1this kind
o$ causalit#1'pathological' or nonCethical. Doreover& @ant re+ects the ver# idea that
ethics can be $ounded on an# given notion o$ the good. In @antian ethics& we start with
an unconditional law that is not $ounded on an# pre:established notion o$ the good. "he
singularit# o$ this law lies in the $act that it doesn4t tell us what we must or mustn4t do&
but onl# re$ers us to the universalit# that we are ourselves supposed to bring about with
our action: 'Act onl# according to that maxim b# which #ou can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law&' goes the $amous $ormulation o$ @ant4s categorical
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imperative. "he onl# de$inition o$ 'good' in @antian ethics is that o$ an action which&
$irstl#& satis$ies this demand o$ the universal and& secondl#& has this demand $or its onl#
motive. "he @antian notion o$ the good has no other content. Onl# an action that is
accomplished according to the (moral) law and onl# because of the law is 'good.' I$ I act
out o$ an# other inclination (s#mpath#& compassion& $ear& desire $or recognition& etc.)&
m# action cannot be called ethical (or 'good'). "he uneasiness that this aspect o$
@antian theor# o$ten provokes springs $rom the $act that he re+ects as 'non:ethical' not
onl# egoistic motives but also altruistic ones. @ant doesn4t claim that altruism cannot be
genuine or that it alwa#s masks some deeper egoism. 7e simpl# insists on the $act that
ethics is not a %uestion o$ lower or higher motives& but a %uestion o$ principles.
,e!all that, in )annah -rendt&s famous e.ample, /a0i fun!tionaries like
Ei!hmann took themselves to #e 1antians in this respe!t2 'hey !laimed to a!t
simply on prin!iple without any !onsideration for the empiri!al !onsequen!es of
their a!tions" In what way is this a perversion of 1ant$
"his attitude is 'perverse' in the strictest clinical meaning o$ the word: "he sub+ect has
here assumed the role o$ a mere instrument o$ the ,ill o$ the Other. In relation to @ant& I
would simpl# stress the $ollowing point& which has alread# been made b# 0lavo+ izek:
In @antian ethics& we are responsible $or what we re$er to as our dut#. "he moral law is
not something that could clear us o$ all responsibilit# $or our actions* on the contrar#& it
makes us responsible not onl# $or our actions& but also1and $oremost1$or the
principles that we act upon.
/eturning to the %uestion o$ the good& what is most intriguing in @ant4s conception o$
ethics is that& strictl# speaking& there is no reason (or necessit#) $or the good being
good. "he good has no empirical content in which its goodness could be $ounded. "he
good is good $or itsel$* it is good because it is good. ,ith this conception& @ant
revolutionized the $ield o$ ethics. 3# separating the notion o$ good $rom ever# positive
content& preserving it onl# as something which holds open the space $or the
unconditional& he accomplished several important things. One that should interest us in
this discussion is that he undermined the classical opposition between good and evil. In
m# reading o$ @ant& this is related to the $act that the moral law is not something that
one could transgress. One can $ail to act 'according to the principle and onl# out o$ the
principle'* but this $ailure cannot be called a transgression. "his has some important
conse%uences $or the @antian notion o$ evil. .et me brie$l# sketch this notion.
@ant identi$ies three di$$erent modes o$ 'evil.' "he $irst two re$er precisel# to the $act that
we fail to act 'according to the (moral) law and onl# because o$ the law.' One technical
detail that will help us to $ollow @ant4s argument: @ant calls 'legal' those actions that are
per$ormed in accordance with the law& and 'ethical' those which are also per$ormed
only because of the law. 6ow& i$ we $ail to act 'ethicall#&' this can happen either because
we #ield to motives that drive us awa# $rom the 'legal' course o$ action& or because our
course o$ action& 'legal' in itsel$& is motivated b# something other than the (moral) law.
An example: .et4s sa# that someone is tr#ing to make me give a $alse testimon# against
someone that he wants to get rid o$& and he threatens to hurt me i$ I re$use. I$ I give the
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$alse testimon# because I want to avoid being hurt& this implies the $irst con$iguration
described above. 3ut it can also happen that I re$use to give the $alse testimon#
because& $or instance& I $ear being punished b# Eod. ,hich means that I do the right
thing $or the wrong (@ant would sa# 'pathological') reasons. D# action is 'legal&' but it is
not 'ethical' or 'good.' One can see immediatel# that these two modes o$ 'evil' have
little to do with what we usuall# call 'evil.' In these instances& 'evil' simpl# names the
$act that the 'good' did not take place.
@ant goes on to $ormulate a third mode o$ evil& which he calls 'radical evil.' A simple
wa# o$ de$ining this notion is that it re$ers to the $act that we give up on the ver#
possibilit# o$ the good. "hat is to sa#& we give up on the ver# idea that something other
than our inclinations and interests could ever dictate our conduct. 7ere again& the term
'radical evil' does not re$er to some empirical content o$ our actions or to the '%uantit#
o$ bad' caused b# them. In m# view& it is completel# wrong to relate this @antian notion
to examples such us the 7olocaust& mass murders& massacres& and so on. /adical evil
is not some most horrible deed* its 'radicalness' is linked to the $act that we renounce
the possibilit# o$ ever acting out o$ principle. It is radical because it perverts the roots o$
all possible ethical conduct& and not because it takes the $orm o$ some terrible crime. I
said be$ore that the principal $unction o$ the @antian notion o$ the good is to hold open
the space $or the unconditional or& to use another word& $or $reedom. /adical evil could
be de$ined as that which closes up this space.
<hotographs o$ "rotsk# $rom a =>FG album Ten Years of oviet !ower. "he imgae to
the right is $rom a de$aced cop# o$ the book $ound b# 5avid @ing at a Doscow
bookstore. It is unknown who de$aced the book. <hotos courtes# o$ 5avid @ing
!ollection
Is your !on!lusion, then, that our "!ontemporary ethi!al ideoloy" is "radi!ally
evil," insofar as it ives up on the idea of "the impossi#le," of anythin #eyond
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the empiri!al$
<recisel#. It is noteworth# that in the "riti#ue of !ractical $eason (=GAA)& when @ant
speaks o$ 'empiricism in morals&' he describes this empiricism with exactl# the same
words that he later uses to describe 'radical evil' ($eligion within the %imits of $eason
&lone H=G>?I). A radicall# evil man is not someone whose onl# motive is to do 'bad
things&' or someone who couldn4t care less about the law. It is rather someone who
willingl# con$orms to the law& provided that he can get the slightest bene$it out o$ it. In
@antian theor# (which has little to do with what I was speaking about earlier in terms o$
'the collective or individual Imaginar# o$ evil') radical evil re$ers onl# to two things. It
re$ers& $irstl#& to the $act that our inclinations are the onl# determining causes o$ our
actions and& secondl#& to the $act that we have consented to our inclinations $unctioning
as the onl# possible motives o$ our actions. "his consent or decision is& in $act& a matter
o$ principle. 3ut it does not impl# that we do 'bad things' (in the sense o$ actions that
are not in con$ormit# with the moral law) out o$ principle. It implies that& on principle& our
inclinations are the exclusive criteria upon which we decide the course o$ our actions.
"hese actions ma# ver# well be 'legal' in the @antian sense o$ the word. "he# ma# well
be in con$ormit# with the law. "here needs to be nothing 'horrible' about them.
I should& perhaps& point out that there is #et a $ourth notion o$ evil that @ant speaks
about: so:called 'diabolical evil.' ,ithin the architectonic o$ practical reason& diabolical
evil is the conceptual counterpart o$ the supreme good. @ant claims that diabolical evil is
conceptuall# necessar#& but empiricall# impossible. In m# view& one should rather sa#
that this notion is conceptuall# redundant& since& strictl# speaking& it implies nothing
other than what is alread# implied in the notion o$ the supreme good. 7ere I am& so to
speak& going with @ant against @ant. .et me explain. According to @ant& 'diabolical evil'
would occur i$ we were to elevate opposition to the moral law to the level o$ a maxim. In
this case the maxim would be opposed to the law not +ust negatively (as it is in the case
o$ radical evil)& but directly. "his would impl#& $or instance& that we would be read# to act
contrar# to the moral law even i$ this meant acting contrar# to all our inclinations&
contrar# to our sel$:interest and to our well:being. ,e would make it a principle to act
against the moral law and we would stick to this principle no matter what (that is& even i$
it meant our own death).
"he di$$icult# that occurs with this concept o$ diabolical evil lies in its ver# de$inition:
6amel#& diabolical evil would occur i$ we elevated opposition to the moral law to the
level o$ a maxim (a principle or a law). ,hat is wrong with this de$inition- Eiven the
@antian concept o$ the moral law1which is not a law that sa#s 'do this' or 'do that&' but
an enigmatic law that onl# commands us to act in con$ormit# with dut# and onl#
because o$ dut#1the $ollowing ob+ection arises: I$ opposition to the moral law were
elevated to a maxim or principle& it would no longer be opposition to the moral law* it
would be the moral law itsel$. At this level& no opposition is possible. It is not possible to
oppose onesel$ to the moral law at the level o$ the (moral) law. 6othing can oppose
itsel$ to the moral law on principle (i.e.& $or non:pathological reasons)& without itsel$
becoming a moral law. "o act without allowing pathological incentives to in$luence our
actions is to do good. In relation to this de$inition o$ the good& (diabolical) evil would then
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have to be de$ined as $ollows: It is evil to oppose onesel$& without allowing pathological
incentives to in$luence one4s actions& to actions which do not allow an# pathological
incentives to in$luence one4s actions. And this is +ust absurd.
Earlier, in your dis!ussion of evil and the imae, you des!ri#ed "evil" as
o!!upyin the spa!e of the impossi#le" 3et, on your view, "the impossi#le" is
also pre!isely the spa!e of ethi!s" What, then, is the relationship #etween evil and
the impossi#le, evil and ethi!s$
All along& I have been speaking about evil on two di$$erent levels: One is the @antian
theor# o$ evil* the other is the %uestion o$ what we generall# tend to call 'evil.' 9our
%uestion is related to this second level.
I would agree that the space o$ ethics and the space o$ 'evil' meet around the %uestion
o$ the impossible. 7owever& the 'impossible' shouldn4t be understood here simpl# as
something that cannot happen (empiricall#)& although we (as ethical sub+ects) must
never give up on it. I believe that one should re$ormulate this concept o$ the impossible&
which is predominant in @ant& in terms o$ what .acan calls the '/eal as impossible.'
"he point o$ .acan4s identi$ication o$ the /eal is not that the real cannot happen. On the
contrar#& the whole point o$ the .acanian concept o$ the /eal is that the impossible
happens. "his is what could be so traumatic& disturbing& shattering1but also $unn#1
about the /eal. "he /eal happens precisel# as the impossible. It is not something that
happens when we want it& or tr# to make it happen& or expect it& or are read# $or it. It
alwa#s happens at the wrong time and in the wrong place. It is alwa#s something that
doesn4t $it the (established or the anticipated) picture. "he /eal as impossible means
that there is no right time or place $or it& and not that it is impossible $or it to happen.
"his notion o$ the impossible as 'the impossible that happens' is the ver# core o$ the
space o$ ethics. "here is nothing 'evil' in the impossible* the %uestion is how we
perceive its o$ten shattering e$$ect. "he link that #ou point out between the impossible
and evil springs $rom the $act that we tend to perceive& or to de$ine& the ver# 'impossible
that happens' as (automaticall#) evil. I$ one takes this identi$ication o$ evil with the
impossible as the de$inition o$ evil& then I would in $act be inclined to sa#& '.ong live
evil;'
%n Evil2 -n Interview with -lain +adiou
!hristoph !ox& Doll# ,halen and Alain 3adiou
In philosoph# and ps#choanal#tic theor#& evil is back. "he %uestion o$ evil is& o$ course&
an old and venerable one in ,estern philosoph#& having $ascinated philosophers $rom
0ocrates and Augustine through .eibniz and @ant. 2or much o$ this histor#& 'the
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%uestion o$ evil' was a theological one& namel#: I$ Eod is bene$icent and omnipotent&
wh# does he allow there to be such evil in the world- A$ter @ant& philosoph# largel#
severed its ties with theolog#& and& with that& the %uestion o$ evil receded. Evil seemed
no longer to be a %uestion $or philosoph#& but instead became a %uestion $or ps#chiatr#&
sociolog#& and biolog#. 9et& in the past $ew #ears& a loosel# connected group o$
philosophers and theorists& in$luenced b# the work o$ Immanuel @ant and 8ac%ues
.acan& has returned to the %uestion o$ evil. Opening this section are interviews with two
ke# $igures in this reexamination o$ the place o$ evil in contemporar# societies.
In =>>?& the philosopher Alain 3adiou published 'thics( &n 'ssay on the Understanding
of 'vil& an anal#sis& criti%ue& and re$ormulation o$ the discourse o$ evil in contemporar#
thought. /e+ecting both the theological and the scienti$ic (ps#chological& sociological&
etc.) interpretations o$ evil. he locates good and evil in the ver# structure o$ human
sub+ectivit#& agenc#& and $reedom.
"he editorial group o$ "abinet $irst began planning this issue in the spring o$ FJJ=. ,e
$ound ourselves repeatedl# returning to the initial terms o$ our theme1more than one
editorial meeting was dominated b# discussions o$ its slipperiness and complexit#& b#
long and sometimes contentious debates over de$inition and scope. 0omething that was
o$ interest to us was that the proli$eration o$ images o$ evil in contemporar# popular
culture in $act seemed to go hand in hand with a $undamental inabilit# to con$ront the
%uestion o$ evil within its religious& philosophical& and metaph#sical contexts. It seemed&
as one writer has put& that 0atan had died. Although the content o$ this issue is
e$$ectivel# the same one we planned almost > months ago& there can be no doubt&
however& that the events o$ == 0eptember have changed the $rame o$ re$erence around
it. In August& the word evil was likel# to draw a smile or even laughter. "hat is no longer
true as we write this in 6ovember. On the other hand& it seems that the incessant
rhetorical appeal to the word evil since 0eptember == has in no wa# made the
possibilit# o$ real debate about the concept an# more likel#.
"he interview with Alain 3adiou was conducted via email in 8ul#:August FJJ=. Alain
3adiou asked to add the $inal paragraphs o$ his interview a$ter the events o$ ==
0eptember. A small number o$ other authors also asked and were allowed to make
slight amendments to pieces the# had alread# submitted.
3ou arue that in our philosophi!al and politi!al dis!ourses today, evil is "self4
evident," and that #oth this "self4eviden!e" and this !on!eption of "evil" are
pro#lemati!" What is "our !onsensual representation of evil" and what is wron
with it$
"he idea o$ the sel$:evidence o$ Evil is not& in our societ#& ver# old. It dates& in m#
opinion& $rom the end o$ the =>KJs& when the big political movement o$ the KJs was
$inished. ,e then entered into a reactive period& a period that I call the /estoration. 9ou
know that& in 2rance& '/estoration' re$ers to the period o$ the return o$ the @ing& in =A=5&
a$ter the /evolution and 6apoleon. ,e are in such a period. "oda# we see liberal
capitalism and its political s#stem& parlimentarianism& as the onl# natural and acceptable
9
solutions. Ever# revolutionar# idea is considered utopian and ultimatel# criminal. ,e are
made to believe that the global spread o$ capitalism and what gets called 'democrac#'
is the dream o$ all humanit#. And also that the whole world wants the authorit# o$ the
American Empire& and its militar# police& 6A"O.
In truth& our leaders and propagandists know ver# well that liberal capitalism is an
inegalitarian regime& un+ust& and unacceptable $or the vast ma+orit# o$ humanit#. And
the# know too that our 'democrac#' is an illusion: ,here is the power o$ the people-
,here is the political power $or third world peasants& the European working class& the
poor ever#where- ,e live in a contradiction: a brutal state o$ a$$airs& pro$oundl#
inegalitarianCwhere all existence is evaluated in terms o$ mone# aloneCis presented to
us as ideal. "o +usti$# their conservatism& the partisans o$ the established order cannot
reall# call it ideal or wonder$ul. 0o instead& the# have decided to sa# that all the rest is
horrible. 0ure& the# sa#& we ma# not live in a condition o$ per$ect Eoodness. 3ut we4re
luck# that we don4t live in a condition o$ Evil. Our democrac# is not per$ect. 3ut it4s better
than the blood# dictatorships. !apitalism is un+ust. 3ut it4s not criminal like 0talinism. ,e
let millions o$ A$ricans die o$ AI50& but we don4t make racist nationalist declarations like
Dilosevic. ,e kill Ira%is with our airplanes& but we don4t cut their throats with machetes
like the# do in /wanda& etc.
"hat4s wh# the idea o$ Evil has become essential. 6o intellectual will actuall# de$end the
brutal power o$ mone# and the accompan#ing political disdain $or the disen$ranchised&
or $or manual laborers& but man# agree to sa# that real Evil is elsewhere. ,ho indeed
toda# would de$end the 0talinist terror& the A$rican genocides& the .atin American
torturers- 6obod#. It4s there that the consensus concerning Evil is decisive. Lnder the
pretext o$ not accepting Evil& we end up making believe that we have& i$ not the Eood& at
least the best possible state o$ a$$airs1even i$ this best is not so great. "he re$rain o$
'human rights' is nothing other than the ideolog# o$ modern liberal capitalism: ,e won4t
massacre #ou& we won4t torture #ou in caves& so keep %uiet and worship the golden cal$.
As $or those who don4t want to worship it& or who don4t believe in our superiorit#& there4s
alwa#s the American arm# and its European minions to make them be %uiet.
6ote that even !hurchill said that democrac# (that is to sa# the regime o$ liberal
capitalism) was not at all the best o$ political regimes& but rather the least bad.
<hilosoph# has alwa#s been critical o$ commonl# held opinions and o$ what seems
obvious. Accept what #ou4ve got because all the rest belongs to Evil is an obvious idea&
which should there$ore be immediatel# examined and criti%ued. D# personal position is
the $ollowing: It is necessar# to examine& in a detailed wa#& the contemporar# theor# o$
Evil& the ideolog# o$ human rights& the concept o$ democrac#. It is necessar# to show
that nothing there leads in the direction o$ the real emancipation o$ humanit#. It is
necessar# to reconstruct rights& in ever#da# li$e as in politics& o$ "ruth and o$ the Eood.
Our abilit# to once again have real ideas and real pro+ects depends on it.
3ou say that, for li#eral !apitalism, evil is always elsewhere, the dreaded other,
somethin that li#eral !apitalism #elieves it has thankfully #anished and kept at
#ay" 3et isn&t there also, in the !ontemporary imaination, a powerful idea of
10
internal (so!ial, psy!holoi!al, domesti!* evil$ 5or de!ades, popular films and
novels have #een o#sessed with the idea of evil lurkin within (in the mind, in the
house, in the neih#orhood*" 'he 'imothy 6!7eih affair in the 89 seems to have
renewed politi!al worries a#out "the evil within" (within ea!h one of us, within the
heart of the 89*" :ust over a month ao, -ndrea 3ates, a 'e.as mother,
systemati!ally drowned her five !hildren, promptin a national dis!ussion a#out
whether or not we are all !apa#le of su!h evil" ;hilosophi!ally, the new interest in
1ant&s !on!eption of "radi!al evil" (and its <a!anian reinterpretation* would seem
to fall in line with this idea of internal (rather than e.ternal, politi!al* evil" Indeed,
throuhout most of the history of the West, it would seem that evil has #een
!on!eived as "internal," as somethin that morally haunts ea!h one of us" 9o, my
questions2 In addition to the notion of "e.ternal" evil you propose, do you also
re!oni0e this notion of "internal" evil$ Is this idea perennial, or does it tell us
somethin pe!uliar a#out our histori!al moment$ =o you see these two notions
of evil (e.ternal and internal* as !onne!ted with one another in any way$
"here is no contradiction between the a$$irmation that liberal capitalism and democrac#
are the Eood and the a$$irmation that Evil is a permanent possibilit# $or an# individual.
"he second thesis (Evil inside o$ each o$ us) is simpl# the moral and religious
complement to the $irst thesis& which is political (parliamentar# capitalism as the Eood).
"here is even a 'logical' connection between the two a$$irmations& as $ollows:
=. 7istor# shows that democratic liberal capitalism is the onl# economic& political& and
social regime that is trul# humane& that trul# con$orms to the Eood o$ humanit#.
F. Ever# other political regime is a monstrous and blood# dictatorship& completel#
irrational.
?. "he proo$ o$ this $act is that political regimes that have $ought against liberalism and
democrac# all share the same $ace o$ Evil. "hus& 2ascism and !ommunism& which
appeared to be opposites& were actuall# ver# similar. "he# were both o$ the 'totalitarian'
$amil#& which is the opposite o$ the democratic:capitalism $amil#.
B. "hese monstrous regimes cannot produce a rational pro+ect& an idea o$ +ustice or
something o$ that sort. "hose who have led these regimes (2ascist or !ommunist) were
necessaril# pathological cases: One needs to stud# 7itler or 0talin with the tool o$
criminal ps#cholog#. As $or those who have supported them& and there were thousands
o$ them& the# were alienated b# the totalitarian m#sti%ue. "he# were $inall# directed b#
evil and destructive passions.
5. I$ thousands o$ people were able to participate in such ridiculous and criminal
undertakings& it is obviousl# because the possibilit# o$ being $ascinated b# Evil exists in
each o$ us. "his possibilit# will be called 'hatred o$ the Other.' "he conclusion will be&
$irst& that we must support liberal democrac# ever#where& and& second& that we must
teach our children the ethical imperative o$ the love o$ the Other.
D# position is obviousl# that this 'reasoning' is purel# illusor# ideolog#. 2irst& liberal
capitalism is not at all the Eood o$ humanit#. Muite the contrar#* it is the vehicle o$
savage& destructive nihilism. 0econd& the !ommunist revolutions o$ the FJth centur#
have represented grandiose e$$orts to create a completel# di$$erent historical and
political universe. <olitics is not the management o$ the power o$ the 0tate. <olitics is
11
$irst the invention and the exercise o$ an absolutel# new and concrete realit#. <olitics is
the creation o$ thought. "he .enin who wrote )hat is to be Done*& the "rotsk# who
wrote +istory of the $ussian $evolution& and the Dao edong who wrote ,n the
"orrect +andling of "ontradictions &mong the !eople are intellectual geniuses&
comparable to 2reud or Einstein. !ertainl#& the politics o$ emancipation& or egalitarian
politics& have not& thus $ar& been able to resolve the problem o$ the power o$ the 0tate.
"he# have exercised a terror that is $inall# useless. 3ut that should encourage us to pick
up the %uestion where the# le$t it o$$& rather than to rall# to the capitalist& imperialist
enem#. "hird& the categor# 'totalitarianism' is intellectuall# ver# weak. "here is& on the
side o$ !ommunism& a universal desire $or emancipation& while on the side o$ 2ascism&
there is a national and racial desire. "hese are two radicall# opposed pro+ects. "he war
between the two has indeed been the war between the idea o$ a universal politics and
the idea o$ racial domination. 2ourth& the use o$ terror in revolutionar# circumstances or
civil war does not at all mean that the leaders and militants are insane& or that the#
express the possibilit# o$ internal Evil. "error is a political tool that has been in use as
long as human societies have existed. It should there$ore be +udged as a political tool&
and not submitted to in$antilizing moral +udgment. It should be added that there are
di$$erent t#pes o$ terror. Our liberal countries know how to use it per$ectl#. "he colossal
American arm# exerts terrorist blackmail on a global scale& and prisons and executions
exert an interior blackmail no less violent. 2i$th& the onl# coherent theor# o$ the sub+ect
(mine& I might add& in +est;) does not recognize in it an# particular disposition toward
Evil. Even 2reud4s death drive is not particularl# tied to Evil. "he death drive is a
necessar# component o$ sublimation and creation& +ust as it is o$ murder and suicide. As
$or the love o$ the Other& or& worse& the 'recognition o$ the Other&' these are nothing but
!hristian con$ections. "here is never 'the Other' as such. "here are pro+ects o$ thought&
or o$ actions& on the basis o$ which we distinguish between those who are $riends& those
who are enemies& and those who can be considered neutral. "he %uestion o$ knowing
how to treat enemies or neutrals depends entirel# on the pro+ect concerned& the thought
that constitutes it& and the concrete circumstances (is the pro+ect in an escalating
phase- is it ver# dangerous- etc.).
>iven what you have said, one miht e.pe!t you to turn the ta#les, to assert that,
!ontrary to the prevailin view, li#eral !apitalism is itself "evil"" +ut you don&t do
that" Instead, you offer an alternative theory of evil"
,ere I to reverse the tables& as #ou suggest& I would leave ever#thing in place. "o sa#
that liberal capitalism is Evil would not change an#thing. I would still be subordinating
politics to humanistic and !hristian moralit#: I would sa#: '.et4s $ight against Evil.' 3ut
I4ve had enough o$ '$ighting against&' o$ 'deconstructing&' o$ 'surpassing&' o$ 'putting an
end to&' etc. D# philosoph# desires a$$irmation. I want to $ight $or* I want to know what I
have $or the Eood and to put it to work. I re$use to be content with the 'least evil.' It is
ver# $ashionable right now to be modest& not to think big. Erandeur is considered a
metaph#sical evil. De& I am $or grandeur& I am $or heroism. I am $or the a$$irmation o$ the
thought and the deed.
!ertainl#& it is necessar# to propose another theor# o$ Evil. 3ut that is to sa#&
12
essentiall#& another theor# o$ the Eood. Evil would be to compromise on the %uestion o$
the Eood. "o give up is alwa#s Evil. "o renounce liberation politics& renounce a
passionate love& renounce an artistic creationN. Evil is the moment when I lack the
strength to be true to the Eood that compels me.
"he real %uestion underl#ing the %uestion o$ Evil is the $ollowing: ,hat is the Eood- All
m# philosoph# strives to answer this %uestion. 2or complex reasons& I give the Eood the
name '"ruths' (in the plural). A "ruth is a concrete process that starts b# an upheaval
(an encounter& a general revolt& a surprising new invention)& and develops as $idelit# to
the novelt# thus experimented. A "ruth is the sub+ective development o$ that which is at
once both new and universal. 6ew: that which is un$oreseen b# the order o$ creation.
Lniversal: that which can interest& rightl#& ever# human individual& according to his pure
humanit# (which I call his generic humanit#). "o become a sub+ect (and not remain a
simple human animal)& is to participate in the coming into being o$ a universal novelt#.
"hat re%uires e$$ort& endurance& sometimes sel$:denial. I o$ten sa# it4s necessar# to be
the 'activist' o$ a "ruth. "here is Evil each time egoism leads to the renunciation o$ a
"ruth. "hen& one is de:sub+ectivized. Egoistic sel$:interest carries one awa#& risking the
interruption o$ the whole progress o$ a truth (and thus o$ the Eood).
One can& then& de$ine Evil in one phrase: Evil is the interruption o$ a truth b# the
pressure o$ particular or individual interests. Even the case that #ou cite above1the
woman who drowns her $ive in$ants1springs $rom this vision o$ things. "he debate #ou
raise is absurd: Obviousl#& ever#one is 'capable' o$ ever#thing. One has seen
ever#where good people becoming torturers& or peace$ul citizens brutalizing people
over insigni$icant things. "his consideration is o$ no interest. It onl# reminds us that the
human species is an animal species& governed b# the lowest interests& o$ which
moreover capitalist pro$it is merel# the legal $ormalization. All that is short o$ Eood and
Evil& it is nothing more than the rule o$ impulses. "he %uestion o$ Evil starts when one
can sa# what Eood one is talking about. I am convinced that the murder o$ $ive children
is actuall# tied to a brutal renunciation o$ the Eood& in the $orm o$ a love process. In an#
case& that4s the onl# case in which it makes an# sense to speak o$ Evil. "he m#th that
one thinks o$ is Dedea. 0he also kills her children. And it4s not Evil& in the tragic sense
o$ the term& because this murder is entirel# dependent on her love $or 8ason.
In your view, then, is the realm of the human animal simply #eneath ood and evil
(su!h that a!ts of torture, for e.ample, are not properly "evil"*$ =oes one not
have a moral o#liation to #e!ome a su#?e!t (instead of remainin a human
animal*$ -nd, thus, is one&s failure to #e!ome a su#?e!t not a moral failure$
"he %uestion actuall# combines two common conceptions o$ moralit# (and thus o$ the
distinction between Eood and Evil): the 'natural' conception& derived $rom /ousseau&
and the '$ormal' conception& derived $rom @ant:
=. "here is a 'natural' moralit#& things that are obviousl# bad in the opinion o$ an#
human consciousness. Accordingl#& Evil exists $or the human animal. "he example
given is that o$ torture.
13
F. "here is a '$ormal' moralit#& a universal obligation that is above an# particular
situation. And there$ore there is a universal Evil& which& too& is independent o$
circumstances. "he example given is that o$ the obligation to become a sub+ect& to place
onesel$ above the basic human animalism. It is bad to re$use to become a $ull# human
sub+ect& no matter what might be the particular terms o$ this becoming.
I must& o$ course& speci$# that I am absolutel# opposed to these two conceptions. I
maintain that the natural state o$ the human animal has nothing to do with Eood or Evil.
And I maintain that the kind o$ $ormal moral obligation described in @ant4s categorical
imperative does not actuall# exist. "ake the example o$ torture. In a civilization as
sophisticated as the /oman Empire& not onl# is torture not considered an Evil& it is
actuall# appreciated as a spectacle. In arenas& people are devoured b# tigers* the# are
burned alive* the audience re+oices to see combatants cut each other4s throats. 7ow&
then& could we think that torture is Evil $or ever# human animal- Aren4t we the same
animal as 0encea or Darcus Aurelius- I should add that the armed $orces o$ m#
countr#& 2rance& with the approval o$ the governments o$ the era and the ma+orit# o$
public opinion& tortured all the prisoners during the Algerian ,ar. "he re$usal o$ torture
is a historical and cultural phenomenon& not at all a natural one. In a general wa#& the
human animal knows cruelt# as well as it knows pit#* the one is +ust as natural as the
other& and neither one has an#thing to do with Eood or Evil. One knows o$ crucial
situations where cruelt# is necessar# and use$ul& and o$ other situations where pit# is
nothing but a $orm o$ contempt $or others. 9ou won4t $ind an#thing in the structure o$ the
human animal on which to base the concept o$ Evil& nor& moreover& that o$ the Eood.
3ut the $ormal solution isn4t an# better. Indeed& the obligation to be a sub+ect doesn4t
have an# meaning& $or the $ollowing reason: "he possibilit# o$ becoming a sub+ect does
not depend on us& but on that which occurs in circumstances that are alwa#s singular.
"he distinction between Eood and Evil alread# supposes a sub+ect& and thus can4t appl#
to it. It4s alwa#s $or a sub+ect& not a pre:sub+ectivized human animal& that Evil is possible.
2or example& i$& during the occupation o$ 2rance b# the 6azis& I +oin the /esistance& I
become a sub+ect o$ 7istor# in the making. 2rom the inside o$ this sub+ectivization& I can
tell what is Evil (to betra# m# comrades& to collaborate with the 6azis& etc.). I can also
decide what is Eood outside o$ the habitual norms. "hus the writer Darguerite 5uras
has recounted how& $or reasons tied to the resistance to the 6azis& she participated in
acts o$ torture against traitors. "he whole distinction between Eood and Evil arises $rom
inside a becoming:sub+ect& and varies with this becoming (which I m#sel$ call
philosoph#& the becoming o$ a "ruth). "o summarize: "here is no natural de$inition o$
Evil* Evil is alwa#s that which& in a particular situation& tends to weaken or destro# a
sub+ect. And the conception o$ Evil is thus entirel# dependent on the events $rom which
a sub+ect constitutes itsel$. It is the sub+ect who prescribes what Evil is& not a natural
idea o$ Evil that de$ines what a 'moral' sub+ect is. "here is also no $ormal imperative
$rom which to de$ine Evil& even negativel#. In $act& all imperatives presume that the
sub+ect o$ the imperative is alread# constituted& and in speci$ic circumstances. And thus
there can be no imperative to become a sub+ect& except as an absolutel# vacuous
statement. "hat is also wh# there is no general $orm o$ Evil& because Evil does not exist
except as a +udgment made& b# a sub+ect& on a situation& and on the conse%uences o$
14
his own actions in this situation. 0o the same act (to kill& $or example) ma# be Evil in a
certain sub+ective context& and a necessit# o$ the Eood in another.
I must particularl# insist that the $ormula 'respect $or the Other' has nothing to do with
an# serious de$inition o$ Eood and Evil. ,hat does 'respect $or the Other' mean when
one is at war against an enem#& when one is brutall# le$t b# a woman $or someone else&
when one must +udge the works o$ a mediocre 'artist&' when science is $aced with
obscurantist sects& etc.- Oer# o$ten& it is the 'respect $or Others' that is in+urious& that is
Evil. Especiall# when it is resistance against others& or even hatred o$ others& that drives
a sub+ectivel# +ust action. And it4s alwa#s in these kinds o$ circumstances (violent
con$licts& brutal changes& passionate loves& artistic creations) that the %uestion o$ Evil
can be trul# asked $or a sub+ect. Evil does not exist either as nature or as law. It exists&
and varies& in the singular becoming o$ the "rue.
In response to an earlier question, you remarked that "@iAt is ne!essary to
re!onstru!t rihts, in everyday life as in politi!s, of 'ruth and of the >ood"" Ban
you say more a#out how the ethi! of truths miht et mo#ili0ed in pra!ti!al terms,
and how this miht !onstitute an alternative to the !urrent !on!eption of "human
rihts"$
"ake the nearest example: the terrible criminal attack in 6ew 9ork in 0eptember& with
its thousands o$ casualties. I$ #ou reason in terms o$ the moralit# o$ human rights& #ou
sa#& with <resident 3ush: '"hese are terrorist criminals. "his is a struggle o$ Eood
against Evil.' 3ut are 3ush4s policies& in <alestine or Ira% $or example& reall# Eood-
And& in sa#ing that these people are Evil& or that the# don4t respect human rights& do we
understand an#thing about the mindset o$ those who killed themselves with their
bombs- Isn4t there a lot o$ despair and violence in the world caused b# the $act that the
politics o$ ,estern powers& and o$ the American government in particular& are utterl#
destitute o$ ingenuit# and value- In the $ace o$ crimes& terrible crimes& we should think
and act according to concrete political "ruths& rather than be guided b# the stereot#pes
o$ an# sort o$ moralit#. "he whole world understands that the real %uestion is the
$ollowing: ,h# do the politics o$ the ,estern powers& o$ 6A"O& o$ Europe and the L0A&
appear completel# un+ust to two out o$ three inhabitants o$ the planet- ,h# are $ive
thousand American deaths considered a cause $or war& while $ive hundred thousand
dead in /wanda and a pro+ected ten million dead $rom AI50 in A$rica do not& in our
opinion& merit outrage- ,h# is the bombardment o$ civilians in the L0 Evil& while the
bombardment o$ 3aghdad or 3elgrade toda#& or that o$ 7anoi or <anama in the past& is
Eood- "he ethic o$ "ruths that I propose proceeds $rom concrete situations& rather than
$rom an abstract right& or a spectacular Evil. "he whole world understands these
situations& and the whole world can act in a disinterested $ashion prompted b# the
in+ustice o$ these situations. Evil in politics is eas# to see: It4s absolute ine%ualit# with
respect to li$e& wealth& power. Eood is e%ualit#. 7ow long can we accept the $act that
what is needed $or running water& schools& hospitals& and $ood enough $or all humanit#
is a sum that corresponds to the amount spent b# wealth# ,estern countries on
per$ume in a #ear- "his is not a %uestion o$ human rights and moralit#. It is a %uestion
o$ the $undamental battle $or e%ualit# o$ all people& against the law o$ pro$it& whether
15
personal or national.
In the same wa#& the Eood in artistic action is the invention o$ new $orms that conve#
the meaning o$ the world. "he Eood in science is the audacit# o$ $ree thought& the +o# o$
exact knowledge. .ikewise& the Eood in love is the understanding o$ what di$$erence
reall# is& o$ what it is to construct a world when one is two& and not one. And Evil& then&
is academic rehearsals or 'cultural' commerce* it is knowledge in the service o$
capitalist pro$it* it is sexualit# considered as merel# a techni%ue o$ pleasure H-ouissanceI.
I4ll repeat it: All the world shares these experiences. "he ethics o$ "ruth alwa#s returns&
in precise circumstances& to $ighting $or the "rue against the $our $undamentals $orms o$
Evil: obscurantism& commercial academicism& the politics o$ pro$it and ine%ualit#& and
sexual barbarism.
16