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CIRED20007 - Paper 267

This document summarizes recent developments in re-testing metal-enclosed switchgear to meet safety standards in South Africa. It discusses issues with aging oil-filled switchgear, including failures that have resulted in injuries and fatalities. As an alternative, gas-insulated and air-insulated switchgear that has been internally arc tested is highlighted. The document also covers internal arc faults, their dangers, and how internal arc classification helps safely vent emissions to manage risk and working distances for operators.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
76 views

CIRED20007 - Paper 267

This document summarizes recent developments in re-testing metal-enclosed switchgear to meet safety standards in South Africa. It discusses issues with aging oil-filled switchgear, including failures that have resulted in injuries and fatalities. As an alternative, gas-insulated and air-insulated switchgear that has been internally arc tested is highlighted. The document also covers internal arc faults, their dangers, and how internal arc classification helps safely vent emissions to manage risk and working distances for operators.

Uploaded by

bpd21
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 4

CIRED

19th International Conference on Electricity Distribution

Vienna, 21-24 May 2007


Paper 0256

OPERATOR AND PUBLIC SAFETY REVISITED: THE APPLICATION OF IEC 62271200/202 WITH SPECIFIC FOCUS ON INTERNAL ARC TESTING OF METAL-ENCLOSED
SWITCHGEAR AND CONTROLGEAR
Rhett KELLY
Eskom South Africa
[email protected]

Bernard MEYER
Eskom South Africa
[email protected]

ABSTRACT
Since January 1998, Eskom Distribution has latched on to
the international initiative of internal arc testing of indoor
metal-enclosed switchgear. Outdoor switchgear followed
suit, four years later in August 2002. Operator and public
safety has been put under the spotlight in the past few years
following catastrophic failure of metal-enclosed switchgear
elevating arc flash safety and hazards to new levels. This
has forced the utility to review the current design standards
from a product compliance, testing and application
perspective. This paper intends to share recent
developments in the re-testing of metal-enclosed switchgear
products to meet the safety requirements of the South
African Occupational Health and Safety Act and industryaligned requirements utilizing the recently published IEC
62271-200 and IEC 62271-202 as reference.

INTRODUCTION
Users in South Africa have a duty, in terms of safety
legislation (most notably the Occupational Health and
Safety Act 85 of 1993 [1]) to their employees and the public
to provide an acceptably safe environment and to take
reasonable measures to mitigate against possible dangers.
Developments in distribution switchgear technologies have
presented end users with a compelling argument for the use
of equipment that is not only safer, but is more reliable and
has a relatively low total cost of ownership. This includes
switchgear having an insulating/interrupting medium of gas,
air, vacuum and/or solid dielectric. In addition, modern
compact switchgear is available that is sealed for life
requiring minimal maintenance and intervention over its
lifetime. With developments in both technology and
knowledge, it is now possible to use switchgear that is fully
tested not only to withstand the effects of, but to safely
vent the emissions generated by, an internal (arc) fault.

OIL-FILLED
SWITCHGEAR
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

AND

The majority of oil-filled secondary switchgear, e.g. ring


main units (RMUs), in the South African Electricity
Distribution Industry (EDI) is classified as free-breathing
and therefore prone to moisture and pollutants
representing an uncontrolled environment. In order to
obtain access to the oil, the switchgear must be isolated and
earthed in terms of operating regulations before any
maintenance can be performed. Due to ever-increasing
quality of supply expectations from customers, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to schedule the onerous
outages required. This reality, coupled with pressure on
maintenance budgets, has resulted in instances where
maintenance is simply not being scheduled. The above
CIRED2007 Session 1

Paper No 0256

factors have all led to an all too common trend that the
required maintenance is not being performed on aging oilfilled switchgear. This leads to a gradual deterioration of the
insulating, and in particular, the interrupting properties of
the oil. The probability of mechanism failure in an
uncontrolled environment also increases through lack of
maintenance. As a direct result, numerous switchgear
failures have occurred which have been accompanied, in
many instances, by serious injuries, and in some more
severe cases, fatalities. The overall risk of failure increases
with the age of the inadequately maintained switchgear.
Issues pertaining to internal arc testing have emerged in the
process of addressing the safety concerns around increasing
switchgear failure risks. Prior to the advent of suitable
alternatives to oil-filled switchgear (e.g. gas-insulated
metal-enclosed switchgear), requirements such as internal
arc classification could not be seriously implemented. At
best, oil-filled switchgear having internal arc tested airfilled cable termination enclosures (i.e. excluding the main
oil-filled enclosures) may be available. The now well
known concept of internal arc classification (IAC) involves
designing and testing equipment that, should an internal
short circuit fault (arc) should occur in any of the
switchgear enclosures, it will fail in a controlled, safe and
predictable manner. The nature of an internal arc fault in oil
(i.e. between live parts not designed to interrupt current), is
deemed to be uncontrollable. Explosion vents, if provided,
would simply allow burning oil and vapour (at temperatures
of a few thousand degrees Celsius) to spew into the
surrounding atmosphere resulting in significant damage to
property and people. As a result, it is simply not possible or
practical to internally arc test oil-filled switchgear. Photo 1
shows an example of a failure due to an internal arc fault in
oil-filled switchgear. In contrast, internal arcs faults in airfilled and gas-insulated switchgear are classified as dryarcs. Dry-arcs can be simulated in a test laboratory and
therefore suitable methods developed to contain and/or
safely vent the emissions (including conductive vapour and
molten metal) created during an internal arc fault.

Photo 1 Oil switchgear failure due to an internal arc


Page 1 / 4

CIRED

19th International Conference on Electricity Distribution

Vienna, 21-24 May 2007


Paper 0256

Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) has proven itself to be a


preferred gas for filling enclosures for example busbar
compartments housing live equipment in compact
switchgear. SF6 offers superior performance in terms of
insulation and arc extinction. Amongst other benefits, it
allows for reduced clearances between live conductors and
thus smaller, more compact switchgear when compared to
air-insulated switchgear. As the energy released during an
arc between live conductors is proportional to the arc
length, these reduced clearances also result in lower arc
energy released. The expected service life before
maintenance/re-filling of SF6 enclosures is up to 30 years.
Arcing does cause decomposition of the gas, but in very
small amounts. The products of decomposition are toxic and
react with water, but since the tanks are sealed and filtered
neither of these issues present a problem.
It is worth noting that oil, when used purely as an insulating
and/or cooling medium (e.g. in conventional power
transformers), is not considered to present the same safety
risk as when used in switchgear. The principle of operation
of a transformer (i.e. mutual induction) is different to that of
oil-filled switchgear, where contact separation through
moving parts occurs in the oil. The drawing of an electrical
arc within oil and in particular contaminated oil between
conductive parts not designed to interrupt current (i.e. under
conditions of a short circuit internal arc) results in the rapid
expansion of the oil and vaporisation of moisture in an
uncontrolled and explosive manner as described above.

SAFETY REVISITED
Risk
Safety is achieved by reducing risk to a tolerable level.
Tolerable risk is determined by the search for an optimal
balance between the ideal of absolute safety and the
demands to be met by a product, process or service, and
factors such as benefit to the user, suitability for purpose,
cost effectiveness, and conventions of the society
concerned. Risk is considered to be the combination of the
probability of occurrence of a harm and the severity of the
harm [2]. It follows that there is a need to continually
review the tolerable level of risk in particular when
developments in both technology and knowledge can lead
to economically feasible improvements in order to greatly
reduce the risk associated with the use of a product, process
or service.

Internal arc
In essence, an internal arc is a short circuit between
components having different electrical potentials within a
chamber filled with a particular insulating medium. It is an
uncontrolled conduction of electrical current from phase to
earth and/or phase to phase accompanied by the ionization
of the surrounding medium (e.g. air/SF6). Because of the
expansive vaporization of conductive metal, a line-to-line or
line-to-ground arcing fault can escalate into a three phase
arcing fault in less than 1 ms. Arc energy is a function of
system voltage, short circuit current, and the time until the
upstream protection operates. Voltage is a function of
system design, current is a function of system design and
operation. Arc time is a function of protective device
response. The heat energy and intense light at the point of
the arc is called an arc flash. Arc flash energy absorbed by
CIRED2007 Session 1

Paper No 0256

a person is a function of arc energy, distance from arc and


personal protective equipment (PPE) where applicable.
An internal arc is accompanied by a rapid rise in pressure
followed by a burn-through period as indicated in figure 1.

Figure 1 Typical pressure rise in switchgear


In the absence of suitable pressure release mechanisms (e.g.
venting ducts or flaps), arc faults are extremely dangerous
and potentially fatal as temperatures at the arc can reach
four times the temperature of the sun's surface. The high arc
temperature vaporises the conductors in an explosive
change in state from solid to vapour. Copper vapour
expands to 67 000 times the volume of solid copper. Photo
2 shows an example of the release of arc flash energy where
inadequate pressure release mechanisms were provided.
However, through the specification and design of internal
arc classified switchgear, where the energy and emissions
resulting from and internal arc are suitably vented away
from the operator and/or people in the vicinity, the safe
working distance can be effectively managed.
The most common causes of an internal arc fault are:
General inadequate maintenance;
Insulation defects due to quality deterioration of the
components (including oil). The causes can, for
example, be adverse environmental conditions, a highly
polluted environment and lack of maintenance;
Overvoltages of atmospheric origin or generated by
operation of a component (inadequate insulation coordination);
Incorrect operations due to not respecting the
procedures or to inadequate training of the personnel in
charge of the installation;
Breakage or tampering of the safety interlocks;
Overheating of contact areas, due to the presence of
corrosive agents or when connections are not
sufficiently tightened;
Entry of vermin into the switchgear live compartments;
Material left behind inside the switchboard during
maintenance operations;
Interference with cable terminations during cable
testing particularly when integral cable test facilities
that are independent of the cable termination
enclosures are not provided (thus necessitating access
and interfere with the cable terminations);
Incorrect installation (e.g. striker pin facing wrong
direction) and/or replacement of MV HRC fuses (i.e.

Page 2 / 4

CIRED

19th International Conference on Electricity Distribution

Vienna, 21-24 May 2007


Paper 0256

all three fuses of the same make and rating not replaced
at the same time after a fuse operation).

Photo 2 Resulting arc flash

Risk reduction
The basic philosophy adopted for risk reduction can be
summarised as shown in figure 2. It is important to note
that, as always, personal protective equipment (PPE) should
be considered as a last line of defence, and not as a
replacement for appropriate equipment design and testing
(e.g. internal arc compliance), safe work practices or
engineering controls that can help limit exposure to arcflash hazards.

Figure 2 Risk reduction


In South Africa, the Occupational Health and Safety Act
has a general duty clause requiring employers to take
reasonable precautions to ensure their employees' health and
safety. In the absence of appropriate local electrical safety
regulations relating to internal arc (as is the case in South
Africa), users are encouraged to refer to the
recommendations given in the National Fire Prevention
Association document Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace (NFPA 70E) [3] adopted by the U.S.
Department of Labour, which requires that:
Limited
Approach,
Restricted
Approach,
Prohibited Approach and flash protection
boundaries need to be established in order to assure
that personnel do not accidentally contact exposed,
energized electrical equipment.
Employees are aware of potential hazards when
operating, changing the position of, or working in the
proximity of energized electrical equipment.
If an employee needs to enter a flash boundary to
perform work that could possibly cause an arc flash,

CIRED2007 Session 1

Paper No 0256

then appropriate PPE (personal protective equipment)


needs to be worn.
The type of PPE depends on the amount of energy to
which an employee could be exposed.

This would require an arc flash hazard analysis (risk


assessment) to be carried out in order to determine the type
of PPE needed for the arc energy level, the duration of the
arc flash and the working distance (degree of exposure or
impact). This is particularly critical for older installations
that are not fully internal arc tested. For new equipment, it
is possible to significantly limit the probability and impact
of an internal arc by providing switchgear that is specified
and tested with a suitable internal arc classification (see
below). An implication of having internal arc classified
(IAC) switchgear in accordance with IEC is that the
clothing category of PPE required would be entry level, i.e.
a single layer of untreated natural fibre clothing without any
arc rating (cal/cm2). Note however that IEC states that
classification IAC gives a tested level of protection of
persons under normal operating conditions as defined in
annex A.1 of IEC 62271-200 [4] (i.e. including manual
operating and monitoring of switchgear at normal working
distances). It is concerned with personnel protection under
these conditions and not under maintenance conditions nor
with service continuity. The latter would require additional
safety measures to be taken. Here, requirements such as
having metallic partitioning (PM) between enclosures and
specifying an appropriate loss of service continuity (LSC)
classification in accordance with IEC 62271-200 become
relevant.
It is often necessary to look into the introduction of other
possible supplementary measures to reduce risk such as
internal arc detection for rapid fault clearance, current
limiting devices (e.g. HRC fuses in combination with
switching devices), arc eliminators/suppressors, remote
control facilities, motorised racking devices, pressure relief
devices, and the transfer of withdrawable parts to or from
their service positions only when the front doors are closed.
A co-ordinated philosophy is required when approaching
the subject of internal arc classification and specifying new
equipment and safety measures. However, whether working
with new or older equipment, the requirements of NFPA
70E should always be considered.

Specifications for new switchgear in Eskom


Eskom and other major utilities have recently been involved
in the development and re-testing of switchgear products to
meet the safety requirements of the Occupational Health
and Safety Act and industry-aligned requirements utilising
the recently published IEC 62271-200 as well as IEC
62271-202 [5] as reference.
The applicable Eskom specifications for distribution
switchgear require that they be type tested to give them an
internal arc classification (IAC) in accordance with the
relevant IEC specifications. This has been made possible
due to the specification and purchasing of air-filled and/or
gas-insulated switchgear. The IEC specifications for
internal arc testing (detailed in annexures A of IEC 62271200 for metal enclosed switchgear and IEC 62271-202 for
prefabricated substations) cater for two relevant categories
of internal arc classification based on the type of
accessibility required by the user. Type A accessibility is

Page 3 / 4

CIRED

19th International Conference on Electricity Distribution

Vienna, 21-24 May 2007


Paper 0256

restricted to authorised personnel only and Type B


accessibility caters for unrestricted accessibility including
that of the general public. Different types of accessibility
may be applied to various sides of the switchgear /
enclosure i.e. front [F], lateral [L], and rear [R].
For indoor metal-enclosed primary switchgear (metalclad), the following is specified by Eskom Distribution:
Classification IAC
Internal arc

AR-BFL (IEC 62271-200)


25 kA 0,2 s (for 12 kV & 24kV)

Although the switchgear is generally housed indoors in a


brick-built switch room, the rear of the switchgear is
restricted to authorised personnel only, whereas the sides
and front provide what Eskom classifies as unrestricted
accessibility (e.g. taking into consideration the possibility of
having personnel indoors that are not responsible or
authorised in terms of the Eskom operating regulations).
The 0,2 s arc duration is based on the fact that internal arc
detection systems are specified for indoor switchboards.
These internal arc protection schemes employ detectors
sensitive to light that are installed in all switchgear
enclosures to act as fast sensing devices in the event of an
arc. They are designed to initiate an upstream circuit
breaker trip in less than 0,1 s. Arc venting is required to be
upwards (without exhausting ducts to the outside of the
building) and the key switch room dimensions are
standardised to coincide with the internal arc test
requirements. The switch room is also designed for pressure
relief (located in the switchroom doors). If necessary,
upstream current limiting devices (e.g. air-core reactors)
may be required to limit the prospective fault levels to
within the IAC rating.
For outdoor secondary switchgear (e.g. RMUs and MV/LV
miniature substations usually installed downstream of
indoor metal-clad primary switchgear), the following is
specified:
Classification IAC
Internal arc

AB (IEC 62271-202)
20 kA 0,5 s (for 12 kV); 16 kA
0,5 s (for 24 kV)

Outdoor secondary switchgear is normally installed in areas


of general public accessibility requiring type B
accessibility on all sides (with all doors closed). In addition,
with the front MV doors open (front access only), type A
accessibility is required for the operator. The 0,5 s arc
duration is based on the upstream protection settings
typically applied for grading considerations. No internal arc
detection systems are employed. As this type of outdoor
switchgear is usually installed on solid concrete plinths
(usually pre-cast) with cable trenches that are backfilled and
sealed (using a concrete screed), venting of the switchgear
can only be directed upwards requiring a 2m high arc
venting duct an example of which is shown in figure 3.
The duct/venting system is designed and tested to vent
emissions resulting from an internal arc fault in any of the
gas and/or air-filled enclosures within the switchgear (i.e. a
common venting system for the SF6-insulated busbar
enclosure/s and the air-filled cable boxes). Such a duct
system can be applied to free-standing RMUs as well as
RMUs installed within MV/LV miniature substations. The
proposed IEC 62271-202 makes special provision for the
MV interconnections (jumper cables) between the RMU T-

CIRED2007 Session 1

off and the MV/LV transformer located in the miniature


substation. The enclosure/compartment housing the
interconnections may be excluded from the internally arc
tested zone either by specifying a (fast operating) HRC fuse
(i.e. fuse-switch combination) in the RMU T-off or, if a
circuit breaker is specified, by using fully screened cable
and separable connectors onto the transformer.

Paper No 0256

Figure 3 RMU with internal arc venting duct for


IAC AF-BFLR

CONCLUSIONS
Eskom and other major utilities in South Africa have
responded to the changing risk profile associated with
switchgear in the light of developments in both knowledge
and alternative technologies. It is the view of the authors
that the introduction of mandatory type testing for internal
arc classified (IAC) switchgear and controlgear as detailed
in IEC 62271-200 and IEC 62271-202, together with the
implementation of safe working practices (such as those
detailed in NFPA 70E), has greatly enhanced the
employers ability to specify acceptable equipment that
significantly improves both operator and public safety.
Air and/or gas-insulated switchgear utilising vacuum and/or
SF6 interrupting technologies provide the users with
equipment that meets the required specifications and levels
of performance in a world where there is an ever increasing
focus on human safety (in respect to both employees and the
general public), service delivery and cost reduction. These
solutions offer improved reliability and require fewer and
shorter scheduled power interruptions required for
maintenance interventions.

REFERENCES
[1] Occupation Health and Safety Act (OHS Act) No 85 of
1993
[2] ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, Safety aspects Guidelines
for their inclusion in standards
[3] NFPA 70E, National Fire Protection Association
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace (2004
edition).
[4] IEC 62271-200, High-voltage switchgear and
controlgear Part 200: AC metal-enclosed switchgear and
controlgear for rated voltages above 1 kV and up to and
including 52 kV
[5] IEC 62271-202, High-voltage switchgear and
controlgear Part 202: High-voltage/low-voltage
prefabricated substations

Page 4 / 4

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