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International Journal of Project Management 30 (2012) 781 790

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

Keeping it simple? A case study into the advantages and disadvantages of

reducing complexity in mega project planning
Mendel Giezen
Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development and Innovation, Utrecht University, The Netherlands
Received 27 July 2011; received in revised form 14 December 2011; accepted 17 January 2012

Abstract
There are many articles discussing time and cost overruns in mega projects. This research, however, looks at a case that was successful in
managing these aspects: a metro extension in the Rotterdam Region in the Netherlands. The literature identies several causes for overruns
and the question thus becomes what prevented these causes from occurring? The answer in Rotterdam's case seems to be a strict focus on reducing complexity, or in other words to keep it simple. Therefore, the main focus in this article is on the reduction of complexity and its effects
on the planning of mega infrastructure projects. Are there only advantages to this approach or do certain facets of this approach have negative
consequences? Using a case study method with interviews, this article shows the conditions under which the reduction of complexity is benecial
or detrimental.
2012 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Project success and strategy; Managing context - political, economic, social and technical; Managing design, planning and appraisal; Decision-making;
Risk, uncertainty and complexity

1. Introduction
Sometimes things are not as simple as they seem, but sometimes they are not as complex as they seem, either. The same is
true of mega infrastructure projects. Not all of these are necessarily of the same complexity. Especially line infrastructure
projects, such as rail and highways, start with a single primary
function (connecting several places) but can become very complex over time. They have to deal with a frequently changing
context of different interests, purposes, constraints and ambitions. It has been a natural inclination in academic works to
have a negative view of large infrastructure projects. They
cost too much; they take too long to complete; they do not deliver on promises of patronage. As Flyvbjerg et al. (Flyvbjerg,
2007; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2004) show, the large majority
of large transport projects do indeed show these symptoms.
However, not all mega projects are planning disasters and this
Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), Universiteit van
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 30 2536725.
E-mail address: [email protected].
0263-7863/$36.00 2012 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2012.01.010

paper looks at a project that was successful in keeping budget

and schedule in order to see what its secret is. Although project success has many potential definitions (e.g. patronage, economic spin-off, public appreciation), most mega project
literature focuses on time and cost aspects for project successfulness (Shenhar et al., 2001). As this literature is the basis of
the exploration of the case, we will keep success limited to
cost and time management aspects. The analysis in this case
also does not extend to the time after delivery, thus an analysis
on other success factors, such as patronage, is beyond the scope
of this article.
The metro project Beneluxlijn in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, was finished nearly on time and with budget to spare.
It is one of the most expensive infrastructure projects finished
in the Netherlands in the last decades, and therefore can be considered a mega infrastructure project. Patronage was not taken
into account during the appraisal period, making it difficult to
evaluate the project on that basis. What is interesting is that
this is also one of the largest projects, in total cost, which was
finished in the first decade of this millennium. At first sight it
seems the project success can be found in it being kept simple

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M. Giezen / International Journal of Project Management 30 (2012) 781790

in process, and project scope and management. However, was

this indeed key to its success and did it come at a cost?
Keeping it Simple Stupid, or the KISS principle, (Terano,
2008) is a common expression (albeit with slight variations)
in project management and ICT. It is a design standard that
aims to keep the used techniques, originally in aerospace engineering, as uncomplicated as possible (simple) and as easy as
possible to understand and repair (stupid). Keeping it simple
is, more formally put, the reduction of complexity. The reason
for doing so is that with the reduction of complexity comes a
reduction of uncertainty as complexity is often defined in relation to uncertainty (Antoniadis et al., 2011; Bosch-Rekveldt et
al., 2011). For instance, after a literature review, Vidal et al.
(2011: 719) state: project complexity is the property of a project which makes it difficult to understand, foresee and keep
under control its overall behavior, even when given reasonably
complete information about the project system. The reduction
of complexity means that there are fewer unknowns and fewer
variables to predict, and thus the project and planning of the
project arguably becomes more manageable. However, as we
know from our own academic writing, simplicity is good but
it often comes at the cost of richness. We feel we cannot describe the full richness of our case or data because we are limited by words and structures. The same is true for planning and
decision-making processes on mega projects. The more we try
to close the process and reduce the scope of the project, the
less influences we get from outside and the less feedback
about alternatives and uncertainties is brought into the process
(Deutsch, 1966; Innes and Booher, 2010). The tunneling of
decision-making lessens the strategic potential of crosspollination between different trajectories and streams of policymaking (Marchau et al., 2010; Priemus, 2007; Swyngedouw et
al., 2002). Two questions are thus raised. First, what are the advantages and disadvantages of reducing complexity by simplification? And second, can we say something about the type of
projects that are more appropriate for either side of the complexity dimension?
This article starts with an overview of the factors behind the
cost and time overruns in mega projects as identified in the literature. It relates them to issues of complexity and uncertainty
because overruns are the manifestation of problems associated
with these issues in this type of project. In the following section
the research design is discussed. The subsequent section presents the case and the analysis of the mechanisms leading to
its successful management of time and cost. The concluding
section discusses the opportunities and threats of the approach
identified and considers the findings in the light of existing
literature.
2. Mega projects on a budget
It is analytically attractive to treat political decision-making
and project management as separate fields of analysis, as it enables a researcher to separate the political aspects from the engineering side. In practice however these fields are strongly
related. Mega projects remain under political scrutiny well
after the official final decision is made. Decisions made early

on can have disastrous effects when abstract political ambitions

crystalize in specific technical challenges. The literature review
will therefore deal with literature from mega project research,
decision-making and project management. I will use a backtracking approach moving from effects (cost and time overruns), through identified causes, to finally link them to the
strategies for dealing with uncertainty and complexity.
Mega projects take a special position in public policy. They
require large amounts of financing and staffing, and are often
part of very politically charged processes. As Flyvbjerg et al.
(2003) and Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) indicate mega projects have a bad track record in keeping to budget and time
schedules. Cost escalations happen in almost nine out of ten
projects with a cost increase of 28 per cent on average
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). In recent decades the cost of mega projects worldwide has increased dramatically despite technological improvements in building and management techniques
(Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). Although there are no articles
addressing comparative analysis of time delays in large projects, there is a strong relation between delays and cost overruns. For instance, the delays in the Channel Tunnel increased
the construction cost by about $1 million a day (Flyvbjerg et
al., 2004). There seem to be several phenomena contributing
to the overruns affecting mega projects.
Cost and time overruns are a mismatch between the estimation and the practical result. It therefore makes sense to first
look at the accuracy of cost and time estimations. To be sure,
there is a great uncertainty in estimations related to mega projects (Bruzelius et al., 2002). However, Flyvbjerg argues that
uncertainty cannot be the only reason and that there is often a
tendency of optimism bias or strategic misrepresentation
(Flyvbjerg, 2008). Optimism bias relates to the fact that people
are naturally inclined to estimate things more positively than
one could objectively derive from practice. We hope that this
time things will go right and thus are pre-disposed to neglect
the elements that can go wrong. By contrast, strategic misrepresentation means deliberately under-estimating cost and time for
political and strategic reasons. The rationale here is that if you
were to show the real cost, the project would never be built;
however, once you start building infrastructure it is difficult
to stop even if the costs are far higher than previously expected.
Thus it can be strategically beneficial to keep the estimates deliberately low. Flyvbjerg (2008) concludes that these two are
the most prominent variables in explaining the inaccuracy of
estimations and forecasts. The contested nature of information
makes it attractive for different actors to present their information strategically (De Bruijn and Leijten, 2007). However,
Osland & Strand disagree with the findings of Flyvbjerg and
argue that his empirical data is not sufficient to support his argument of strategic misrepresentation and argue that he is
guilty of applying the logic of suspicion. For Flyvbjerg and
other proponents for the hermeneutics of suspicion, the actors
actually admitting telling lies can be seen as the tip of the iceberg. However, it is also a perspective that would not be falsified if no examples of actors admitting lying were found. On
the contrary, it could easily be interpreted as a verification
that they were lying also for the researchers (Osland and