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Lin Chun - The Transformation of Chinese Socialism (2006) PDF

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Lin Chun - The Transformation of Chinese Socialism (2006) PDF

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Copyrighted MaterialPAXBAAD Copyrighted Material © 2006 Duke University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper > Designed by Heather Hensley ‘Typeset in Minion by Keystone ‘Typesetting, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data appear on the last printed page of this book. Copyrighted Mati ww.wengewang.orgPAXBAAD Copyrighted Material CONTENTS Preface ix Introduction: The Making and Remaking of the Chinese Model 1 Chapter 1. China and Alternative Modernity 17 Globalization and noncapitalist development Revolutionary and socialist modernity Chapter 2. Chinese Socialism 60 Socialism, nationalism, and developmentalism Egalitarianism’s predicament: the politics of class, litarianism’s battle: ethnicity, locality, and citizenship Egalitarianism’s pride and price: gender equality Chapter 3. People’s Democracy? 132 Revolution and democracy Revolution and bureaucracy ‘The moral and the institutional Chapter 4. Liberty and Liberation 205 Liberalism and its Chinese fate Ideology and legitimacy Conclusion: Rethinking the Chinese Model 251 Socialism and the market ‘Toward Xiaokang socialism Notes 289 References 323 Index 359 Copyrighted Material WWww.wengewang.orgPAXBAAD Copyrighted Material PREFACE This book took me many years to write. The long process of writing and revising motivated not only my constant effort to keep pace with China's profound and ever-puzzling changes but also a searching engagement with debates about those changes. My debt to the influence of many thinkers is acknowledged in the text and notes. I remain most grateful to Michael Apple for his initial interest and trust. Maurice Meisner inspired a transformation in my own perspective despite any disagreements. I wish to thank him also for his persistent support, including hosting a fruitful workshop at the University of Wisconsin, Mad- ison in 1997 to discuss an early draft of this book. My gratitude also goes to the workshop participants from afar for their invaluable responses: par- ticularly Robert $. Cohen, Zhiyuan Cui, Katie Lynch, Tom Lutze, Carl Riskin, and Marilyn Young. | cannot possibly specify all of those who commented on my project at different stages, but | owe thanks for each instance of time and insight generously offered to me. As the work traveled from one publisher to another, Robin Blackburn, David Held, Michael Moran, and Reynolds Smith found rigorous and perceptive reviewers for me, whose constructive criticisms were truly beneficial. At London School of Economics | was most fortunate to have four successive departmental conveners who supported my work in every possi- ble way; this was remarkable especially because they did not necessarily share my views. Christopher Hood was a role model of high standards and scholarly rigor. Brendan O'Leary understood all matters involved, both personally and intellectually, in writing a critique of something in which one was brought up. So did Dominic Lieven, who took the trouble to read a rather messy early draft, and to meticulously make corrections and com- ments George Philip graciously allowed me a year of special leave so that I could, though unexpectedly, carry out yet another round of revisions, Meanwhile, Meghnad Desai and Michael Yahuda separately read the entire manuscript and urged me, each in his distinct concern, to rethink certain sets of issues. Their warm encouragement was once again granted in spite of, serious differences of opinion. My students, coming from many parts of the Copyrighted Material WWww.wengewang.orgPAXBAAD Copyrighted Material world, were often my best critics in the ways they were not aware, and I thank them, too, with hope. ‘Tani Barlow heroically went through several versions of the manuscript. Her extensive and thoughtful suggestions were greatly and gratefully appre- ciated. She, along with others, also pushed in terms of my writing (in a foreign language). Bernard Crick was irritated by the “dense and difficult” style of articulation and Dominic Lieven by the “Gucci handbag” of jargon. Lieven also correctly insisted on the need to treasure national and cultural traditions, an attitude toward the longue duree that my education was bi- ased to overlook. As I struggled with grasping plain English I was lucky enough to be assisted by Debra Keats, Deborah Strod, and Jean Brady, whose intelligent and careful editing rescued the book. I certainly hope they will find the final product a substantial improvement. Reynolds Smith at Duke University Press has been both morally supportive and professionally demanding. I deeply admire his recognition of the topical importance of this book and his patience in bringing it to light. Justin Faerber and Sharon Torian, also at Duke Press, were sources of cheer and effective assistance. My academic affiliations with Boston University, Harvard University, and Northeastern University were of essential help in terms of intellectual ex- change as well as library privileges, for which facilitation by James Coony, Laura Frader, Nancy Praser, Roderick MacFarquhar, Elizabeth Perry, Libby Schweber, and Alfred Tauber will be appreciatively remembered. The de- voted librarians at the Historical Studies—Social Science Library at the In- stitute for Advanced Study in Princeton provided the best services | could ever expect. I was privileged as I undertook this project to have friends standing by me through thick and thin. These friends are simply too numerous to list by name, but each deserves my heartfelt gratitude. I nevertheless must specifi- cally mention a few of those who lent a hand directly: my thanks to Marion Kozak for her willingness to discuss my writings and for providing me a home in a foreign land, and to Dorothy Wedderburn for much of the same—she and Marion also broadened my horizons with their astute ques- tions about China and their memorable answers to my questions about the world. Thanks to Cui Zhiyuan for his critical reflections on the manuscript, his refreshing discussions over the years, and his selfless efforts in selecting and sharing information; to Wang Jin for her wise and principled advice on x Copyrighted Material Www.wengewang.orgPAXBAAD Copyrighted Material presentation at a time when political sensitivity was biased against “social- ism”; to Wang Xiaoqiang for his extraordinary sense of duty and urgency, and for pressing me to put an end to this work while other tasks were waiting; to Evelyn Fox Keller for her daily check-up calls, at a crucial stage of the project, to ensure that I was working, and for the use of her Cambridge apartment as my refuge; to Sam Schweber for his kind help with books, computer issues, and photocopying while he, like Evelyn, had far more important things to do; and to Zhang Xiaodi for his noble deed of quietly taking care of my parents in Beijing so as to partially relieve me from the inflexible scheduling of family visits. Bob Cohen remains my first reader and I continue to rely on his guidance and judgment. Cao Tianyu, a politi- cal victim of communist repression yet a steadfast defender of the Chinese revolution and the Marxist outlook, for me as a constant reminder of conscience. As ever, this book was written also for Rosa, with my loving appreciation of her youthful passion for truth and justice; and for my sisters whose incredible generosity sustained me. At the Princeton Institute I began and concluded the book. I still owe a debt to the early mentorship of Joan Scott and Michael Walzer, as well as Clifford Geertz and Albert Hirschman. Joan, in particular, was ways there for me to turn to. The School of Social Science w sa wonderful place to think, write, and argue, yet | missed my own country intensely. In the end, this work is unfinished, and better works are bound to follow, To all of those who played a role in what | managed to write here so far, I extend my grateful acknowledgment. Preface xi Copyrighted Material WWW.wengewang.orgae etl The Making and Remaking of the Chinese Model (CHINESE SOCIALISM CAN BEST BE GRASPED AS A MODERN PROJECT THAT has sought to develop by its own unique means into its own unique type, always conscious of the other possibilities it has refused to emulate: that is, Soviet-style bureaucratic socialism (and now Russian postcommunism) as well as diverse forms of peripheral capitalism. From the beginning, the Chinese communist revolution—the successor to and radical transformer of a republican revolution—was self-consciously an alternative to coloni modernity. The post-revolutionary Maoist experiment, in turn, aspired to create an alternative to the Stalinist model, which it considered both a failure and a betrayal of the project to construct a credible socialist society. Even when the post-1978 reforms as a socialist self-adjusting movement ‘were set back by the logic of a market transition in the late 1980s and 1990s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to search for a “so market” alternative to capitalist integration. Insofar as this collect has persisted, the chance of the Chinese model to succeed cannot be ruled effort out. As a country of 1,3 billion people and as an economy reaching $1.64 tri jon in gross domestic product (cpr) in 2004 (the sixth largest economy in the world), and with an ambition of resisting subordination to global capitalism, China is at the epicenter of global transformation. ‘To conceptualize China's trajectory in these terms we must delve into the Chinese model of socialism as well as the Chinese model of reform. Both models synthesize contradictions; and Chinese alternative modernity is conceptually based on the continuities and discontinuities between the two. “To seek a coherent interpretation of these contradictory developments we also need to clear the ground by rejecting a number of widespread myths about contemporary Chinese experiences. For example, liberal commenta- tors at home and abroad assume that China began to modernize econom-ically in a rational manner only after the market transition that was initiated in the late 19708. This assumption amounts to a total dismissal of the formidable socioeconomic progress made during the Maoist period. By implication, it also blames the communist revolution for the inability of the country to “catch up” with the other modern nations. However, a com- parison of uncontested historical evidence suggests that such assumptions are false. China, viewed as the “sick man of Asia” (a symptom and symbol of forced opium consumption) until 1949, when the Chinese people were declared to have stood up at the founding of the PR » contrasts sharply with the new China as a proud national power prior to the reform. There is, definite proof that neither the revolution nor the socialist attempt was a lengthy interruption of modernization. Rather, the communists, changing. faces over time, had been effective modernizers in leading the “Chinese nation’s great rejuvenation” (zhonghua minzu de weida fuxingi).' Another example is seen in the view of neoliberal doctrine that China's, remarkable economic successes since the 1980s are attributable to the open- ing of its market to foreign investors and joint ventures, manufacturing for export, measured privatization, and far-reaching decentralization. Yet careful studies have found other contributing factors that are equally (if ‘not more) compelling than that of embracing globalization: the relatively strong “human capital” accumulated through decades (including during the pre-reform period) of investment in basic needs, public education, and health care; state and rural collective ownership of the land; the dominant Public sector that retains the nation’s strategic industries; government sponsorship of trade and technology transfers; state regulation of the move- ments of foreign capital, major financial transactions, and currency ex change; coordination between the center and provinces in fiscal and tax ‘management, public spending, and developing regional comparative ad- vantages: booming township and village enterprises (rvrs); a countrywide increase in household incomes (including remittances sent home by mi- grant workers) and, therefore, a “consuming revolution” of a major in- crease in consumption. To be sure, the strengths of these determinants Grastically declined in the 1990s, as typified in the hijacking of decentraliza- tion by privatization. Itis also not always plausible to disentangle compe ing causes. Nevertheless, the two modes of explanation sketched out above provide different lessons for strategic and policy choices. 2 IntroductionYet another frequently repeated observation is that since the reform had not replaced the one-party rule, it was solely an economic matter—as though systemic shifts in the economy could be possible without thorough political changes, and as though glasnost were the only road to transition from state socialism. But politics surely comes first. The leadership succes- sion in 1976-1978, followed by Deng Xiaoping’s campaign for “liberating the mind” and extensive rehabilitation to rectify earlier purges, along with the party's democratic platform of its watershed plenary session (the third session of the eleventh congress), were each indispensable in paving the way for subsequent economic reforms. No less important was the institutional development—empowering the National People’s rating government from the party and administration from management, pursuing the rule of law, and opening public spaces for civic associations. ‘When accompanied by broad political participation in deliberation and de- cision making, these institutional changes would be conducive to mean- Congresses (NPC), sepa ingful democratization even in the absence of multiparty elections. Conversely, the degradation of common people, the abuses of labor rights, and the rising inequalities and mounting corruption were regres- sions from the democratic gains of China's century-long revolutionary and socialist struggle, These erosions indicated a wrongheaded agenda aimed at “market spontaneity.” rather than a lack of direction as is often suggested? ‘The point, then, is that the party system may not be a primary gauge of regime type, and that a more fundamental issue i the purpose ofa national state and, notably, the place of the citizenry in the power structure of a polity. To the Chinese eye, postcommunist Russia (not to mention the post- ‘Tito war-torn Balkans} particular demonstrated that “negative liberties” alone, and economic liberalization and electoral competitions alike, could not be the road to a functional democracy. Critics of authoritarianism are yet to note three extraordinary things about the PRC politics. First, by historical account the Chinese Communist Party (ccp), a massive and still aggressively recruiting organization with a membership of sixty-six mil- lion,’ was neither the sole obstacle nor solely an obstacle to democracy. Second, the party had never been entirely unified while lacking formal factions (Mao was known to have cheerfully admitted “parties within the party”); and dedicated democrats were found as often within the party as without, Third, by virtue of an official ideological stance guaranteeing pres- ‘The Making and Remaking ofthe Chinese Model 3sure for the norm, the party would be compelled to respond to public demands in one way or another, including deterring certain aspects of the (hardly democratic) process of globalization. In other words, as far as polit- ical reform is concerned, the ccr must be treated not only as part of the problem but also as carrying with it the needed sources of a solution. Thisis the case not least because having changed from within beyond recognition, the party remained the only institution powerful enough to shield national tunity and to bring itself, for its own sake in accommodation with societal Interests, to the authority of constitutionalism and legality.’ ‘Yet another standard example of misconception about reforms in China canbe noted when the contrast between the Chinese approach and posteom= munist transitions is perceived as a contrast between incrementalism and “shock therapy.” Superficially, the issues of China’s transitional “dual-track” Price system, its “rural first” strategy, and the political caution with formal democratization were indeed cases of gradualism. At the heart ofthe matter, however, China's nonconformity exceeded mere method. Despite a clear departure from conventional socialist ideologies and practices—above all the repudiation of egalitarianism—the cce still could notabandon its consti- tution centered in the commitment to the working classes, which originated in the epic liberation endeavor of the Chinese people. Similarly, despite ‘waves of “spontaneous privatization” in which corrupt managers and offi-

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