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© 2006 Duke University Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper >
Designed by Heather Hensley
‘Typeset in Minion by Keystone ‘Typesetting, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data
appear on the last printed page of this book.
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CONTENTS
Preface ix
Introduction: The Making and Remaking
of the Chinese Model 1
Chapter 1. China and Alternative Modernity 17
Globalization and noncapitalist development
Revolutionary and socialist modernity
Chapter 2. Chinese Socialism 60
Socialism, nationalism, and developmentalism
Egalitarianism’s predicament: the politics of class,
litarianism’s battle: ethnicity, locality, and citizenship
Egalitarianism’s pride and price: gender equality
Chapter 3. People’s Democracy? 132
Revolution and democracy
Revolution and bureaucracy
‘The moral and the institutional
Chapter 4. Liberty and Liberation 205
Liberalism and its Chinese fate
Ideology and legitimacy
Conclusion: Rethinking the Chinese Model 251
Socialism and the market
‘Toward Xiaokang socialism
Notes 289
References 323
Index 359
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PREFACE
This book took me many years to write. The long process of writing and
revising motivated not only my constant effort to keep pace with China's
profound and ever-puzzling changes but also a searching engagement with
debates about those changes. My debt to the influence of many thinkers is
acknowledged in the text and notes.
I remain most grateful to Michael Apple for his initial interest and trust.
Maurice Meisner inspired a transformation in my own perspective despite
any disagreements. I wish to thank him also for his persistent support,
including hosting a fruitful workshop at the University of Wisconsin, Mad-
ison in 1997 to discuss an early draft of this book. My gratitude also goes to
the workshop participants from afar for their invaluable responses: par-
ticularly Robert $. Cohen, Zhiyuan Cui, Katie Lynch, Tom Lutze, Carl
Riskin, and Marilyn Young. | cannot possibly specify all of those who
commented on my project at different stages, but | owe thanks for each
instance of time and insight generously offered to me. As the work traveled
from one publisher to another, Robin Blackburn, David Held, Michael
Moran, and Reynolds Smith found rigorous and perceptive reviewers for
me, whose constructive criticisms were truly beneficial.
At London School of Economics | was most fortunate to have four
successive departmental conveners who supported my work in every possi-
ble way; this was remarkable especially because they did not necessarily
share my views. Christopher Hood was a role model of high standards and
scholarly rigor. Brendan O'Leary understood all matters involved, both
personally and intellectually, in writing a critique of something in which
one was brought up. So did Dominic Lieven, who took the trouble to read a
rather messy early draft, and to meticulously make corrections and com-
ments
George Philip graciously allowed me a year of special leave so that
I could, though unexpectedly, carry out yet another round of revisions,
Meanwhile, Meghnad Desai and Michael Yahuda separately read the entire
manuscript and urged me, each in his distinct concern, to rethink certain
sets of issues. Their warm encouragement was once again granted in spite of,
serious differences of opinion. My students, coming from many parts of the
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world, were often my best critics in the ways they were not aware, and I
thank them, too, with hope.
‘Tani Barlow heroically went through several versions of the manuscript.
Her extensive and thoughtful suggestions were greatly and gratefully appre-
ciated. She, along with others, also pushed in terms of my writing (in a
foreign language). Bernard Crick was irritated by the “dense and difficult”
style of articulation and Dominic Lieven by the “Gucci handbag” of jargon.
Lieven also correctly insisted on the need to treasure national and cultural
traditions, an attitude toward the longue duree that my education was bi-
ased to overlook. As I struggled with grasping plain English I was lucky
enough to be assisted by Debra Keats, Deborah Strod, and Jean Brady,
whose intelligent and careful editing rescued the book. I certainly hope they
will find the final product a substantial improvement. Reynolds Smith at
Duke University Press has been both morally supportive and professionally
demanding. I deeply admire his recognition of the topical importance of
this book and his patience in bringing it to light. Justin Faerber and Sharon
Torian, also at Duke Press, were sources of cheer and effective assistance.
My academic affiliations with Boston University, Harvard University, and
Northeastern University were of essential help in terms of intellectual ex-
change as well as library privileges, for which facilitation by James Coony,
Laura Frader, Nancy Praser, Roderick MacFarquhar, Elizabeth Perry, Libby
Schweber, and Alfred Tauber will be appreciatively remembered. The de-
voted librarians at the Historical Studies—Social Science Library at the In-
stitute for Advanced Study in Princeton provided the best services | could
ever expect.
I was privileged as I undertook this project to have friends standing by
me through thick and thin. These friends are simply too numerous to list by
name, but each deserves my heartfelt gratitude. I nevertheless must specifi-
cally mention a few of those who lent a hand directly: my thanks to Marion
Kozak for her willingness to discuss my writings and for providing me a
home in a foreign land, and to Dorothy Wedderburn for much of the
same—she and Marion also broadened my horizons with their astute ques-
tions about China and their memorable answers to my questions about the
world. Thanks to Cui Zhiyuan for his critical reflections on the manuscript,
his refreshing discussions over the years, and his selfless efforts in selecting
and sharing information; to Wang Jin for her wise and principled advice on
x
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presentation at a time when political sensitivity was biased against “social-
ism”; to Wang Xiaoqiang for his extraordinary sense of duty and urgency,
and for pressing me to put an end to this work while other tasks were
waiting; to Evelyn Fox Keller for her daily check-up calls, at a crucial stage of
the project, to ensure that I was working, and for the use of her Cambridge
apartment as my refuge; to Sam Schweber for his kind help with books,
computer issues, and photocopying while he, like Evelyn, had far more
important things to do; and to Zhang Xiaodi for his noble deed of quietly
taking care of my parents in Beijing so as to partially relieve me from the
inflexible scheduling of family visits. Bob Cohen remains my first reader
and I continue to rely on his guidance and judgment. Cao Tianyu, a politi-
cal victim of communist repression yet a steadfast defender of the Chinese
revolution and the Marxist outlook, for me as a constant reminder of
conscience. As ever, this book was written also for Rosa, with my loving
appreciation of her youthful passion for truth and justice; and for my sisters
whose incredible generosity sustained me.
At the Princeton Institute I began and concluded the book. I still owe a
debt to the early mentorship of Joan Scott and Michael Walzer, as well as
Clifford Geertz and Albert Hirschman. Joan, in particular, was
ways there
for me to turn to. The School of Social Science w
sa wonderful place to
think, write, and argue, yet | missed my own country intensely. In the end,
this work is unfinished, and better works are bound to follow, To all of those
who played a role in what | managed to write here so far, I extend my
grateful acknowledgment.
Preface xi
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The Making and Remaking of the Chinese Model
(CHINESE SOCIALISM CAN BEST BE GRASPED AS A MODERN PROJECT THAT
has sought to develop by its own unique means into its own unique type,
always conscious of the other possibilities it has refused to emulate: that is,
Soviet-style bureaucratic socialism (and now Russian postcommunism) as
well as diverse forms of peripheral capitalism. From the beginning, the
Chinese communist revolution—the successor to and radical transformer
of a republican revolution—was self-consciously an alternative to coloni
modernity. The post-revolutionary Maoist experiment, in turn, aspired to
create an alternative to the Stalinist model, which it considered both a
failure and a betrayal of the project to construct a credible socialist society.
Even when the post-1978 reforms as a socialist self-adjusting movement
‘were set back by the logic of a market transition in the late 1980s and 1990s,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to search for a “so
market” alternative to capitalist integration. Insofar as this collect
has persisted, the chance of the Chinese model to succeed cannot be ruled
effort
out. As a country of 1,3 billion people and as an economy reaching $1.64
tri
jon in gross domestic product (cpr) in 2004 (the sixth largest economy
in the world), and with an ambition of resisting subordination to global
capitalism, China is at the epicenter of global transformation.
‘To conceptualize China's trajectory in these terms we must delve into the
Chinese model of socialism as well as the Chinese model of reform. Both
models synthesize contradictions; and Chinese alternative modernity is
conceptually based on the continuities and discontinuities between the two.
“To seek a coherent interpretation of these contradictory developments we
also need to clear the ground by rejecting a number of widespread myths
about contemporary Chinese experiences. For example, liberal commenta-
tors at home and abroad assume that China began to modernize econom-ically in a rational manner only after the market transition that was initiated
in the late 19708. This assumption amounts to a total dismissal of the
formidable socioeconomic progress made during the Maoist period. By
implication, it also blames the communist revolution for the inability of the
country to “catch up” with the other modern nations. However, a com-
parison of uncontested historical evidence suggests that such assumptions
are false. China, viewed as the “sick man of Asia” (a symptom and symbol of
forced opium consumption) until 1949, when the Chinese people were
declared to have stood up at the founding of the PR
» contrasts sharply
with the new China as a proud national power prior to the reform. There is,
definite proof that neither the revolution nor the socialist attempt was a
lengthy interruption of modernization. Rather, the communists, changing.
faces over time, had been effective modernizers in leading the “Chinese
nation’s great rejuvenation” (zhonghua minzu de weida fuxingi).'
Another example is seen in the view of neoliberal doctrine that China's,
remarkable economic successes since the 1980s are attributable to the open-
ing of its market to foreign investors and joint ventures, manufacturing
for export, measured privatization, and far-reaching decentralization. Yet
careful studies have found other contributing factors that are equally (if
‘not more) compelling than that of embracing globalization: the relatively
strong “human capital” accumulated through decades (including during
the pre-reform period) of investment in basic needs, public education, and
health care; state and rural collective ownership of the land; the dominant
Public sector that retains the nation’s strategic industries; government
sponsorship of trade and technology transfers; state regulation of the move-
ments of foreign capital, major financial transactions, and currency ex
change; coordination between the center and provinces in fiscal and tax
‘management, public spending, and developing regional comparative ad-
vantages: booming township and village enterprises (rvrs); a countrywide
increase in household incomes (including remittances sent home by mi-
grant workers) and, therefore, a “consuming revolution” of a major in-
crease in consumption. To be sure, the strengths of these determinants
Grastically declined in the 1990s, as typified in the hijacking of decentraliza-
tion by privatization. Itis also not always plausible to disentangle compe
ing causes. Nevertheless, the two modes of explanation sketched out above
provide different lessons for strategic and policy choices.
2 IntroductionYet another frequently repeated observation is that since the reform had
not replaced the one-party rule, it was solely an economic matter—as
though systemic shifts in the economy could be possible without thorough
political changes, and as though glasnost were the only road to transition
from state socialism. But politics surely comes first. The leadership succes-
sion in 1976-1978, followed by Deng Xiaoping’s campaign for “liberating
the mind” and extensive rehabilitation to rectify earlier purges, along with
the party's democratic platform of its watershed plenary session (the third
session of the eleventh congress), were each indispensable in paving the way
for subsequent economic reforms. No less important was the institutional
development—empowering the National People’s
rating government from the party and administration from management,
pursuing the rule of law, and opening public spaces for civic associations.
‘When accompanied by broad political participation in deliberation and de-
cision making, these institutional changes would be conducive to mean-
Congresses (NPC), sepa
ingful democratization even in the absence of multiparty elections.
Conversely, the degradation of common people, the abuses of labor
rights, and the rising inequalities and mounting corruption were regres-
sions from the democratic gains of China's century-long revolutionary and
socialist struggle, These erosions indicated a wrongheaded agenda aimed at
“market spontaneity.” rather than a lack of direction as is often suggested?
‘The point, then, is that the party system may not be a primary gauge of
regime type, and that a more fundamental issue i the purpose ofa national
state and, notably, the place of the citizenry in the power structure of a
polity. To the Chinese eye, postcommunist Russia (not to mention the post-
‘Tito war-torn Balkans}
particular demonstrated that “negative liberties”
alone, and economic liberalization and electoral competitions alike, could
not be the road to a functional democracy. Critics of authoritarianism are
yet to note three extraordinary things about the PRC politics. First, by
historical account the Chinese Communist Party (ccp), a massive and still
aggressively recruiting organization with a membership of sixty-six mil-
lion,’ was neither the sole obstacle nor solely an obstacle to democracy.
Second, the party had never been entirely unified while lacking formal
factions (Mao was known to have cheerfully admitted “parties within the
party”); and dedicated democrats were found as often within the party as
without, Third, by virtue of an official ideological stance guaranteeing pres-
‘The Making and Remaking ofthe Chinese Model 3sure for the norm, the party would be compelled to respond to public
demands in one way or another, including deterring certain aspects of the
(hardly democratic) process of globalization. In other words, as far as polit-
ical reform is concerned, the ccr must be treated not only as part of the
problem but also as carrying with it the needed sources of a solution. Thisis
the case not least because having changed from within beyond recognition,
the party remained the only institution powerful enough to shield national
tunity and to bring itself, for its own sake in accommodation with societal
Interests, to the authority of constitutionalism and legality.’
‘Yet another standard example of misconception about reforms in China
canbe noted when the contrast between the Chinese approach and posteom=
munist transitions is perceived as a contrast between incrementalism and
“shock therapy.” Superficially, the issues of China’s transitional “dual-track”
Price system, its “rural first” strategy, and the political caution with formal
democratization were indeed cases of gradualism. At the heart ofthe matter,
however, China's nonconformity exceeded mere method. Despite a clear
departure from conventional socialist ideologies and practices—above all
the repudiation of egalitarianism—the cce still could notabandon its consti-
tution centered in the commitment to the working classes, which originated
in the epic liberation endeavor of the Chinese people. Similarly, despite
‘waves of “spontaneous privatization” in which corrupt managers and offi-
