G.R. No. L-200.

March 28, 1946

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

VS.
ERIBERTO MISA, as Director of Prisons, respondent.

FACTS:

Anastacio Laurel is a Filipino citizen who was arrested in Camarines Sur in 1945 by the US Army and was
interned under a commitment order for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese
occupation. In September 1945, when active hostilities with Japan terminated, he, together with 6,000
other prisoners, was turned over to the Commonwealth Government by Gen. McArthur. Since then has
been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons. His present incarceration, which is merely
continuation of his previous apprehension, has lasted "more than six hours" counted from his delivery to
the respondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 provided that upon delivery by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the persons detained
by him as political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC
are deemed suspended insofar as the political prisoners are concerned until the filing of the
corresponding information with the People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than
six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners. Anastacio Laurel demands his release
form Bilibid Prison, mainly asserting that Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating the People's Court,
specially section 19, under which he is detained as a political prisoner, is unconstitutional and void. The
Solicitor General, meeting the issue, sustains the validity of the whole law.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner contends that the aforesaid section violates our Constitution, because it is:
(a) discriminatory in nature – it being made operative only to "the political prisoners concerned,"
that other citizens are not denied the six-hour limitation in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
that such discrimination is inexcusable and amounts to denial of the equal protection of the laws;
(b) unlawful delegation of legislative powers - that as "the duration of the suspension of article
125 is placed in the hands of the Special Prosecutor's Office," the section constitutes an invalid
delegation of legislative powers;
(c) retroactive in operation - that when he was arrested, (May, 1945), article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code was in force, and petitioner could have asked for release after six hours and,
therefore, Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that right is ex post facto, retroactive and
fundamentally objectionable.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 is unconstitutional and void for being:
a. Discriminatory in nature
b. Unlawful delegation of legislative powers
c. Retroactive in operation

HELD:

NO. Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 is constitutional and valid

REASONS:

a) It is not discriminatory in nature. The "equal protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate — so long as the classification is not unreasonable. Instances of valid
classification are numerous. The point to be determined then, is whether the differentiation
in the case of the political prisoner is unreasonable or arbitrary.

General MacArthur ordered the delivery of the Commonwealth of 6,000 prisoners. Criminal
informations against all, or a majority, or even a substantial number of them could not be properly
filed in the six-hour period. They could not obviously be turned loose, considering the conditions
of peace and order, and the safety of the prisoners themselves. So the President, by virtue of his
emergency powers, promulgated Executive Order No. 65 suspending article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, for not more than thirty days, with regard to said detainees or internees, having
found such suspension necessary to "enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to
adopt temporary measures in relation with their custody and the investigation, prosecution and
disposal of their respective cases." The Order added that it shall be in force and effect until the
Congress shall provide otherwise.

Congress later approved Commonwealth Act. No. 682, establishing the People's Court and the
Office of Special Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes against national security
committed during the second World War. It found the thirty-day period too short compared with
the facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at six months. We will allow that there
may be some dispute as to the wisdom or adequacy of the extension. Yet the point is primarily for
the Legislature to decide.

The only issue is the power to promulgate special rules for the custody and investigation of active
collaborationists, and so long as reasons exist in support of the legislative action courts should be
careful not to deny it. In this connection, it must be stated there can really be no substantial
ground to assail the six-month extension, in view of the provisions authorizing the release under
bail. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was intended to prevent any abuse resulting from
confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail.
Commonwealth Act No. 682 gives no occasion to such abuse. The political prisoners know, or
ought to know, they are being kept for crimes against national security. And they are generally
permitted to furnish bail bonds.

b) Section 19 does not constitute an invalid delegation of legislative powers. As explained by the
Solicitor-General, the result — some informations filed before, others afterwards — is merely the
"consequence of the fact that six thousand informations could not be filed simultaneously, and
that some one had to be first or some one else, necessarily the last." The law, in effect, permitted
the Solicitor-General to file the informations within six months. And statutes permitting officers
to perform their duties within certain periods of time may not surely be declared invalid
delegations of legislative power.

c) Section 19 is not retroactive in its operation. It refers to detention after its passage — not
before. Incidentally, there is no constitutional objection to retroactive statutes where they
relate, to remedies or procedure.

The argument is advanced that when he was arrested, (May, 1945), article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code was in force, and petitioner could have asked for release after six hours and,
therefore, Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that right is ex post facto, retroactive and
fundamentally objectionable. The premises are incorrect. In May, 1945, he could not have
asked for release after six hours. In other words, he would not have been discharged from the
custody. (Raquiza vs. Branford, supra.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, it is
true; but not as to him. The laws of the Commonwealth were revived in Camarines Sur by
operation of General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its liberation from
enemy control; but subject to his reservation to hold active collaborationists in restraint "for the
duration of the war." So, persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable collaboration,
could not necessarily invoke the benefits of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Undoubtedly
the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Had it done so,
herein petitioner would have no ground to protest on constitutional principles, as he could claim
no vested right to the continued enforcement of said section. Therefore, a fortiori he may not
complain, if, instead of repealing that section, our lawmaking body merely suspended its
operation for a definite period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or suspension must be
general to be valid, he will be referred to the preceding considerations regarding classification
and the equal protection of the laws.

The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was denied.

G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner

VS.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

FACTS:

In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas
corpus.

ARGUMENTS:

The petition is based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid
and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that:

(1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and

(2) there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic
(3)
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was suspended
2. Whether or not there was a change of sovereignty upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic

HELD:

1. NO. The sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was NOT suspended.
2. NO. There was NO change of sovereignty upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

REASONS:

1. a. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign;
and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance which of foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.

b. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier. Thus if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government;
c. The sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a
body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights
inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be
suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out
of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of
suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the
control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant;

d. the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by

the military forces of the enemy during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from
exercising the supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our times'; (II
Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23,
44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance
of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is
no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests;

e. As a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of rights of sovereignty by the legitimate

government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the
legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of
government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear
relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government
established by the occupant;

f. The crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage, inciting to war,
correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public
order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes
against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they cannot be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons);
and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him,
were also ill operative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the
preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal
Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their
allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;

g. Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social
and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de
facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones
when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for
the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience ( Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons,supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of
the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the
territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not
been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and
orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said
inhabitants;

h. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or
subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive
attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort , the
occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend
the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by
the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and
comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the
military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and
protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the
occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of
the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or
intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a
hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;

2. The change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth
because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for
Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that 'The government established by this Constitution shall
be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines';

Petition DENIED.