(1997).

International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 78:1085-1103

From Instinct To Self: The Evolution And

Implications Of W. R. D. Fairbairn's Theory Of
Object Relations
David E. Scharff and Ellinor Fairbairn Birtles
The authors argue that fifty years after the initial publication of W. R. D.
Fairbairn's object-relations theory of the personality, his ideas have moved to the
centre of psychoanalysis and provide the most cogent theoretical rationale for
many modern concepts of technique and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis.
In particular, Fairbairn centred object-relations theory on the person's need for
relationships from infancy and throughout life, and gave the first detailed
description of the sequential processes of internalisation of the rejecting object,
followed by splitting of the ego and repression of painful internal object relations.
He described the way these processes led to the organisation of the ego as an
internal system of subegos and part objects (which are actually organisations of
the ego, too) which are always in dynamic interaction with each other and which
determine the quality of external relationships. This paper draws on Fairbairn's
early writings, many of them recently published for the first time, to describe the
origin of Fairbairn's ideas in his study of philosophy, to outline his theory of object
relations, and to consider current developments and applications of these ideas in
psychoanalysis and beyond.

In 1952 Ernest Jones wrote in his introduction to Fairbairn's Psychoanalytic

Studies of the Personality:
Instead of starting, as Freud did, from stimulation of the nervous
system proceeding from excitation of various erotogenous zones
and internal tension arising from gonadic activity, Dr. Fairbairn
starts at the centre of the personality, the ego, and depicts its
strivings and difficulties in its endeavour to reach an object where
it may find support … All this constitutes a fresh approach in
psycho-analysis which should lead to much fruitful discussion (p.
v).
W. R. D. Fairbairn brought an original voice and formulation to
psychoanalysis. Without general awareness among analysts, his theoretical
contributions have guided the revolution in psychoanalysis during the past twenty-
five years (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Sutherland, 1989), and his
formulations have contributed to the widespread application of analysis to other
areas—to the study of trauma and multiple personality, infant development,
marriage and the family, religion and pastoral care, to the understanding of groups,
institutions and society, to psychology of the arts, and to an evolution in the
philosophical understanding of human experience. Nevertheless, his ideas passed
from being little known to being general
—————————————

Presented at the 40th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association,

Barcelona, 31 July 1997.
(Initial version received 6/2/97) 
(Final version received 24/9/97)
Copyright © Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1997
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assumptions without ever being widely and distinctly acknowledged. In this paper
we begin by discussing Fairbairn's background and the philosophical and
psychoanalytic origins of his thought; we then outline the central tenets of his
object-relations theory of the personality, and finally we briefly consider its wider
implications.
It has been suggested that the extent of Fairbairn's contribution has been
largely unrecognised because he worked in relative isolation in Edinburgh,
Scotland from the 1920s until his death in 1964. Close study of the context in
which he developed his innovative ideas shows that the seeds of his mature ideas
were present from his first records of his thinking in the middle 1920s, when he
was writing and teaching graduate and post-graduate students in philosophy,
psychology and medicine. Despite his distance from London, Fairbairn kept well
informed about psychoanalytic developments in London, and especially the new
work of Melanie Klein, but it is true that he was unable to respond in person to the
issues taken up in the ‘controversial discussions’ undertaken in London during the
war, although he did submit one brief contribution that was read for him (King &
Steiner, 1991).
He also had frequent if periodic contact with many of the important British
analysts during the 1940s and 1950s. The geographical separation from major
analytic societies may even have helped preserve Fairbairn's independence of
mind, but it may also have kept his ideas from receiving the understanding and
recognition they deserved. For instance, critical commentary written in response to
Fairbairn's articles and his book within British psychoanalysis in the 1940s and
1950s failed to appreciate the magnitude of Fairbairn's move from a biological
instinct theory to a psychological theory of a self chiefly motivated by the need for
relationships throughout life. Although Fairbairn provided a new paradigm for the
twentieth century (Sutherland, 1989), one which ultimately organised the ensuing
development of psychoanalysis, only a few analysts recognised this at the time he
was writing.
Soon, however, the heart of Fairbairn's work became an intrinsic, accepted
core of the thinking of the Independent Group of British analysts, whose
prominent members included Balint, Winnicott, Sutherland and Bowlby. His work
was always of immediate interest to Melanie Klein and her followers, as was hers
to him (Klein, 1946; Scharff, 1996). However, because Klein remained dedicated
to Freud's drive theory even while stressing the importance of object relationships
from the beginning, we will see later how her theory, like Freud's, remained
grounded in the mould of nineteenth-century mechanical physics, in the need of
the child to rid itself of excessive increments of the drive derivatives. Since
instinct theory retains a somatic rather than psychological basis for mental
function, Klein's theory works best for those conditions in which the model of
early infantile dependence based on somatic need offers a useful metaphor. It is
more problematic as an account of mature adult responsibility and
interdependence.
Fairbairn altered his orientation fundamentally, shifting from Freud's
topographical, impulse and structural models to a psychology based on the need
for and internalisation of relationships. His theoretical shift was based on the
alternative motivation of a dynamic self seeking an object from whom it gained
recognition and security. This shift also provided the theoretical basis for the
centrality of the therapeutic relationship, and therefore presaged the clinical shift
in the writing of the Kleinians and others to the use of countertransference and of
the therapist's subjective experience (Winnicott, 1949; Heimann, 1950; Klein,
1952). His understanding of the importance of the relationship with the mother
and family in infant and child development came fifteen years before Winnicott
and Bowlby's published accounts and expansion of ideas in this realm, and were
an important part of the climate in
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which they later developed their contributions. His theory still remains
fundamental to a rigorous underpinning of their work.
Fairbairn's training and experience
On 16 November 1916, while on active duty in the Royal Artillery in
Scotland and shortly before his posting to the Middle East, Fairbairn visited the
‘Craiglockart Hosp. (for nerve-shaken officers)’, where he met ‘the Cambridge
psychologist Capt. [W. H. R.] Rivers’ (Fairbairn's diary, 1916). The hysterical
injuries, or war neuroses, that he saw there made an indelible impression on him
and he decided to undertake medical training in order to become a
psychotherapist. His study of Freud began in 1919 with The Interpretation of
Dreams and continued until his death in 1964. In 1921, while still a medical
student, he began analysis with Dr Ernest Connell three to five times per week
from July 1921 probably until the end of December 1922. Connell was an
Australian, who came to Edinburgh in 1920 and practised psychoanalysis there
from 1921. From Fairbairn's diaries, it appears that Connell held an appointment
at Craighouse Mental Hospital during the 1920s. It has not been possible to
establish when his analysis with Connell ended as the diaries for 1923, 24, and 25
are the only ones missing in a series that goes from 1910-1964. However,
Fairbairn started private psychoanalytic practice in 1923, when he qualified in
medicine. From that date until 1935 he held a variety of appointments at mental
hospitals in and around Edinburgh, which ran concurrently with his Lectureships
in Psychology in the discipline of mental philosophy from 1927- 1935, and in
Psychiatry from 1931-1932. His special subject was adolescence, and he also
taught philosophy. He used psychoanalytic techniques in his clinical work at the
University Psychological Clinic, and, from 1933, at the Child and Juvenile Clinic.
In 1929, while acting as an expert witness, he was the first person to introduce the
concept of ‘diminished responsibility’ in a Court of Law.
From 1929, when Fairbairn attended the International Psychoanalytical
Congress in Oxford, he was internationally acknowledged in psychoanalysis. He
was elected as an Associate Member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in
1931 and a full Member in 1939. His experience of the dissociative
symptomatology of sexually and physically abused children, and of adults
suffering from war neurosis, began with his clinical work in 1923 and continued to
the end of his life. In spite of his personal reservations as to its validity (1932,
unpublished) Fairbairn followed Freud's example and undertook self-analysis
(Sutherland, 1989, pp. 65-82).
The philosophical origins of fairbairn's thought
Fairbairn brought to his own writing a careful study of Freud's major
contributions and a dedication to logical thought derived from his training in
philosophy. For this reason it is relevant to review the philosophical origins of his
point of view. There are two distinct philosophical traditions within European
thought. The first, Platonic tradition, is dissociative in that it examines discrete
parts of functions in isolation from the whole. The second, derived from Aristotle,
is integrative, relating parts to each other within a whole. Freud's view of human
nature assumed a Platonic division between mind and body, a dualism that was
enshrined in the Christian intellectual tradition and which was consistent with
nineteenth-century scientific tradition. In this view, mind and body are concrete
entities whose mode of connection is conflictual opposition, leading by analogy to
Freud's ideas of conflict between life and death instincts or between sex and
aggression, id and ego, and the individual and society. In Freud's view of mental
health, conflictual dualism is expressed in the form of what Isaiah Berlin (1969)
called ‘negative
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freedom’, that is freedom ‘from’ interference from internal or external forces. In

this way a fundamentally exclusive and defensive psychology was incorporated
into psychoanalytic theory.
In contrast, Fairbairn's critical reorientation of psychoanalysis assumes a
dialectical idea of human nature, an Aristotelian view expanded in the nineteenth
century by Kant and Hegel, who defined human nature as integral and
participatory: each individual strives for integration and reciprocity. Mind and
body have equal status, and conflict is accommodated through the medium of
change and mutually influencing reciprocity between differing elements.
Fairbairn's philosophical roots sprang from his extensive studies in the
Department of Mental Philosophy, undertaken as his first degree at Edinburgh
University before his medical studies. There the focus was on the psychology of
man and the products of his mind, undertaken in such studies as logic, ethics and
the philosophies of law and education. The metaphysical content of the syllabus
was influenced by the interest of Professor Andrew Seth, later called Pringle-
Pattison (1882) and that of his contemporaries, in the philosophical development
of Kantian and Hegelian ideas. Fairbairn supplemented this background with post-
graduate studies in Greek philosophy and the German language, undertaken in
Germany. This course of study gave him a thorough knowledge of the
philosophical accounts of the subjective experience of that which is ‘other’, a
sensibility that includes the subject's capacity for self-reflection. We will see
shortly that this background eventually crystallised as a mainstay of Fairbairn's
own theory of internalised object relations.
In the Hegelian philosophical account, the innate capacities for language,
symbolisation, and rational thought are understood to be dependent for their
development on an adequate environment. The dialectic exchange between subject
and object (the ‘other’) results in a new relationship or synthesis. The relationships
between subject and object provide the progressive epistemological element
necessary for the growth of language and thought. Fairbairn's understanding of this
philosophical point of view enabled him to place relational meaning and value,
rather than gratification, at the motivational centre.
In order to discuss Fairbairn's intellectual shift in more detail, let us review
the Aristotelian and Hegelian origins of his thinking in more detail. Aristotle was
the first western philosopher to develop a holistic psychology based on his
observations of the effects that one object had on another, and the extent to which
the one was active in response to the other. Using this methodology, Aristotle
moved from Platonic psychology in which the form of the human being—the body
—was devalued and the power of reason exalted, to one in which the experience
of existing in a world of phenomena is contained with the form of the person.
Mind and body thus have equal status. Aristotle wrote, ‘Man is an animal naturally
formed for society’. The major consequence of a shift from a discrete entity in
which development is preprogrammed to one in which ‘Man’ is defined as a
‘social animal’ is to highlight the role of physical and emotional dependence. It is
for this reason that infantile dependence and its vicissitudes play such a significant
role in Fairbairn's psychoanalytic account.
In 1807 Hegel wrote that the dissatisfactions of unsatisfied desire are allied to
each person's need to possess that which is ‘other’. This notion of the
unsatisfactory nature of encounters motivated by desire became, in Fairbairn's
theory, the root motivation for splitting of the ego, and thus for the construction of
endopsychic structure, personality development and psychopathology. Through
these routes, Fairbairn developed a psychology of individuation and of the identity
of the self essentially based on the meaning of relationships rather than on
instinctual gratification.
Hegel drew on three major factors described
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by Aristotle (Schacht, 1972, pp. 292-3). In the first, ‘essence’ is defined as ‘your
very nature’, what we now recognise as genetic inheritance, within which
rationality is a defining characteristic of the human species. The second factor is
‘coming-to-be’—the change from potentiality to actuality that can be seen in the
case of the infants who have the unactualised potentiality to become fully rational
beings. The third is the ‘originative source of change … in one thing in relation to
another’. Many changes in living creatures appear at first to be of their own doing,
but on closer inspection can be seen to be responses reactive to their experience in
the environment. The changes involved in physical maturation originate within the
child itself ‘coming-to-be’, while the child's adaptive response to its parents and to
external reality would fit in the category of reactive change. When the
environment is satisfactory, ‘self-realisation’ occurs—that is to say, optimal
actualisation of potential.
For Hegel, rational decisions have to be self-conscious. Being human involves
the capacity for rational thought and self-reflection. Perhaps it was in following
Hegel's lead in this area that Fairbairn posited an early capacity for mental sorting
as the basis for splitting and repression, which he thought begins so early in life. It
has been argued that Fairbairn assumed too great a capacity for cognition in
infants. One of his arguments against Freud's theory of the unconscious was that
there is no reason for infantile affective experience to be repressed if it is the result
of instinctual stimulation alone. Experience must first reach some level of
cognition or recognised experience before repression is required. Modern infant
research as reported by Stern (1985) has confirmed the early functioning of
cognition in infants. Fairbairn, following Stout (1927), had already argued that
‘although the mental life of the infant belongs characteristically to the perceptual
level, it is not altogether devoid of ideational, and even conceptual, elements’
(Fairbairn, 1943b, p. 293).
Now let us listen to Hegel,
It is the facts or the contents in our consciousness, of whatever kind
they are, that give character or determination to our feelings,
perceptions, fancies and figurative conceptions; to our aims and
duties; and to our thoughts and notions. From this point of view,
feeling, perception, etc. are the forms assumed by these contents.
The contents remain one and the same, whether they are merely
felt, or felt with an admixture of thoughts, or merely and simply
thought. In any one of these forms, or in the admixture of several,
the contents confront the consciousness, or are its object. But when
they are thus objects of consciousness, the modes of the several
forms ally themselves with the contents, and each form of them
appears in consequence to give rise to a special object (Hegel,
1817, p. 243).
Here Hegel can be seen to be describing an unconscious process through
which affect is associated with ‘facts’ or ‘contents’ in the mind. It is this
association, which may be a complex of affects connected with the ‘fact’ or mental
image, that is the ‘special object’. Thus inner objects are composed of ‘fact’— the
image of the object—and the affects attached to it. In Fairbairn, the mother as the
‘fact’ or ‘content’ is seen in three affective modes: alluring, rejecting, and
acceptable or ‘good’. These are the ‘forms assumed by contents’. Each form, in
conjunction with the ‘fact’—the mother—then gives rise to the objects which
Fairbairn described as ‘exciting’, ‘rejecting’, or ‘ideal’ respectively. We will
discuss the details of this idea later, but the point here is that because the mother is
defined by three separate affective experiences, she becomes three separate
mothers, each of whom embodies a separate relationship with the child. This view
of the child as experiencing separate mothers is consistent with Fairbairn's
postulation of splitting of the object.
For Hegel, self-consciousness ‘requires an object from which to differentiate
itself’. Such an object has to be recognised as alien and a ‘form of opposition to
it’. The Hegelian scholar, Singer, writes:
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There is therefore a peculiar kind of love-hate relationship between

self-consciousness and the external object. The relationship, in the
best tradition of love-hate relationships, comes to the surface in the
form of desire. To desire something is to wish to possess it … to
transform it into something that is yours and thus to strip it of its
foreignness (1983, p. 57).
Singer notes that such desire arises from the need for self-consciousness to
find an external object but ‘yet finds itself limited by anything that is outside
itself’ (p. 58). To ‘desire something is … an unsatisfactory state for self-
consciousness’. In this dilemma, Singer notes that Hegel makes ‘the object of self-
consciousness another self-consciousness’. This implies that the object is returned
to the external world, and has its own autonomy —no longer controlled by the
subject. In Fairbairn's model, splitting of the object into three parts occurs in order
that the individual retain limited control over unsatisfactory aspects of the object,
leaving the ideal or satisfactory object free for interaction and connection with the
external world. This is Fairbairn's way of representing the infant's recognition of
another independent ‘self-consciousness’. Because the central ego is associated
with the ideal object in the inner world, external reality always plays an important
role in relationships of the inner world.
The acknowledgement by the infant that the mother is separate also carries the
implication that the infant itself is perceived by the mother as separate, and that
the infant understands this mental separateness. Self-consciousness includes
recognition that the self is an object both to the mother and to itself. That is to say,
the condition of self consciousness is one of fundamental splits in the ego, fitting
Fairbairn's contention that splitting of the ego is universal.
We saw that Hegel made ‘the object of self-consciousness another self-
consciousness’. For Hegel this took the form of God or the Absolute Spirit. In
secular form, the State is a representation of the Absolute. The important point
here is complex: that which is other is also that within which the self is
incorporated. Fairbairn also drew attention to this phenomenon:
The process of differentiation of the object derives particular
significance from the fact that infantile dependence is characterised
not only by identification, but also by an oral attitude of
incorporation. In virtue of this fact the object with which the
individual is identified becomes equivalent to an incorporated
object, or, to put the matter in a more arresting fashion, the object
in which the individual is incorporated is incorporated in the
individual (1941, pp. 42-3).
We have stressed the Hegelian origins of Fairbairn's philosophical position
because it serves to clarify the distinction between his view of human nature and
that of Freud. Although Hegelian ideas provided the underpinning from German
philosophy in Freud's student days, it was Schopenhauer's ideas that provided the
cultural milieu within which he was educated. Discussing Freud's philosophical
background, Ellenberger (1970, pp. 541-2) and Anzieu (1986, p. 32) record his
attendance at Brentano's lectures. Brentano's (1973) main contribution to
philosophy was a theory in which it is ‘the intentionality or directedness of mental
states that marks off the mental from the physical’ (Blackburn, 1994, p. 49). Here
we can see a possible connection with Freud's early notions of wish fulfilment, but
the notion of intentionality also fits well with Schopenhauer's (1886) contention of
will as the driving force of human motivation.
Additionally, Schopenhauer suggested that drives and desires can become
psychically suppressed and distorted. Ellenberger wrote that Thomas Mann ‘felt
that Freud's description of the id and ego was “to a hair” Schopenhauer's
description of the will and the intellect, translated from philosophy to
metaphysics’ (1970, p. 209). While the accuracy of this comment can be
questioned, another
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aspect of Schopenhauer relevant to Freud is his contention that it is only when the
individual achieves a state of dissociation from drives and desires that peace or
‘Nirvana’ can be attained. While Nirvana is an eastern concept, it is compatible
with the Freudian idea that the psyche seeks a condition of stasis. It is also
compatible with the theory of inertia of Helmholtz (1847), to whom Freud was
connected by Brücke, a teaching colleague of both Helmholtz and Freud. In
summary, we can say that the view of human nature assumed by Brentano,
Schopenhauer, Brücke and Freud is that of an atomistic individual acted upon by
both internal (instinctual) and external (environmental) forces. In contrast, for
Hegel and Fairbairn the individual person is acting within specific relationships,
initially within the family and then within increasingly larger units of human
society, which are themselves in an active dialectic with the environment. Thus for
Hegel and Fairbairn the person seeks the optimum development of potential in
common and in concert with others, rather than in spite of them.
Fairbairn and the philosophy of science
A fuller understanding of the philosophical origin of Fairbairn's contribution
allows us to locate psychoanalysis as an integrated discipline within the
mainstream of twentieth-century thought. When we turn to the contrasting
scientific frameworks that Freud and Fairbairn used to develop their
metapsychology, we can see a difference that parallels the contrast between
Freud's Platonic dualism and Fairbairn's Aristotelian integration. It was Fairbairn's
revised view of the scientific assumptions underpinning psychoanalysis that gave
his theory an essential philosophical and scientific coherence that cannot be
separated from his clinical insights.
Freud's ideas relied upon the nineteenthcentury mechanical view of physics
dominated by Helmholtz's (1847) conception of energy as divorced from structure,
that is to say that a body is essentially inert until there is an outside application of
a ‘quanta’ of energy. When the energy source is withdrawn, the body's energy is
determined by the laws of inertia, and because of resistance, tends to return to rest.
Freud viewed mental energy as if it were an external source of energy applied to
the mind, which he viewed almost as if it were made up of contents analogous to
things with a measurable mass. Energy, therefore, came to bear on opposing forces
that took the form of opposing instincts with conflicting aims. When Freud applied
this model to mental structure, the conflicting aims of the ego and id instincts—
and later the life and death instincts—had to be resolved. He perceived that a state
of inertness would take over if the energy was suppressed or neutralised. Freud's
theory of repression fit both his clinical observations and his view of the mind as
conforming to the laws of Newtonian physics. In this model, repression acts as a
de-energising force, producing a steady state of the mind at rest, and thus a stable
mental structure.
Freud's (1923) structural model also postulates the apparently evolutionary
development of the ego out of the id, and of the superego out of the ego. This use
of phylogenic ideas in association with evolutionary ones can be traced to Freud's
friendship with Stanley Hall (1904). Hall thought that just as the foetus passes
through the full evolutionary process (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny), so the
individual psyche's development recapitulates the evolution of mind. Hall's
postulation of this process during adolescence led him to suggest that phylogenic
development was responsible for disruptive social and pathological behaviour.
Freud followed the implications of this evolutionary model of mind in Civilization
and its Discontents (1930), where he depicted the individual in direct conflict with
society throughout the life cycle. Hence, Freud extended the conflictual and
dualistic mode to the entire realm
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of discourse between the individual and the external world. The individual,
divided against his instincts internally, was also beset beyond himself by being
inherently in conflict with society.
In contrast, the twentieth-century view of science is interactive and
interdependent. It originated with Einstein, Planck and Heisenberg among others.
The shift in scientific model came directly as a result of the implications of
Einstein's 1901 theory of relativity in which E=MC². In this formula, energy and
mass are interchangeable and interrelated. From this discovery, a new model of
physics conceptualised physical bodies as composite entities that contain an
inherent potential that is actualised by means of active interactions with the
external environment. Moreover, the idea of ‘opposing forces’ was reformulated
into a theory of mutual attraction and synthesis. An example from physics occurs
when atoms combine to form molecular structures with different and distinct
characteristics unlike the elements that make up the new molecule. The qualities
of the new molecules cannot be predicted by a knowledge of the component
elements nor of the energy involved in the transformation. In the modern scientific
view, all substances have spatial relationships within their environment that are
determined both by physical and energic factors. Thus energy and structure are
inseparable.
From his first study of The Ego and the Id, Fairbairn found Freud's use of
energy problematic without knowing exactly how to resolve his sense of the
incongruity in Freud's argument (Scharff & Birtles, 1994). He already understood
that energy and structure could not be divorced in the way that Freud's mind/body
dualism implied. Eventually, he was able to formulate a psychology in which
mental structure and content are interrelated. In his new object-relations theory of
the personality, he replaced Freud's idea of mental energy with the postulation that
mental structure and content are joined by an affective charge that gives meaning
and that is the hallmark of the relationship between the two.
The early studies
Fairbairn's early writing and teaching were unpublished until 1994
(Fairbairn, 1994, a, b). In the years from 1928 to 1930, he concentrated on
understanding three aspects of Freud's contribution: psychic structure, instinct
theory and the nature of repression. He seemed to have intended to write a book-
length explication and critique of Freud. The early seminar notes and papers are
extremely thorough, but his ambition to write a book on Freud was apparently
given up in the mid-1930s when he moved from his academic post at Edinburgh
University to full time private practice.
Initially, Fairbairn focused his attention on psychic structure. In lectures notes
for classes he taught at Edinburgh University (Fairbairn, 1928), he identified
logical inconsistencies in Freud that he felt were associated with Freud's postulates
concerning the topography of mental structure. It was logically inconsistent,
Fairbairn wrote, to say that the ego grew out of the id but was in fundamental
opposition to it, as it was to assert a similar opposition of the superego to the ego.
In his papers on the superego written in the next year, Fairbairn explored Freud's
account of the relationship between the three structures (1929a). His arguments
hinge on the primitive nature of the Freudian superego and its functioning as both
a conscious and an unconscious phenomenon, and as both agent and subject of
repression. He thought his own clinical experience demonstrated that Freud
mistook psychic functions and phenomena for structures. While he had no doubt
about the reality of the observable phenomena of superego functioning, he
concluded that its operation within the psyche does not signify a separate structure
opposed to the ego and imposed upon it. Instead, he followed Freud's account of
the
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development of the superego function as analogous to a process of object

identification, but he added that this development is associated with ‘sentiment
formation’, a first step along the path of locating the central role of affects in
object relations. He wrote, ‘If the superego is usually more organised than a
complex and less organised than a secondary personality, it would yet appear to be
a psychical organisation of a similar order’ (1929a, p. 101).
These early papers and seminar notes follow Freud in viewing the id as the
home of instinctive impulses, but the questions Fairbairn raised in writing them
mark the beginning of his theoretical reorientation from instinct theory to a theory
of personality based on the relationship of the ego to its objects. Already in 1929
Fairbairn asked, ‘How is the super-ego repressed if it is itself the structural agent
of repression?’ He concluded that the ego is a dynamic entity and the superego a
mental function designed to promote progressive adaptation to the environment.
The superego function can then be undertaken by any relationship into which the
ego, ‘or part of the ego’, enters with an object.
In this early attitude of questioning, he took a first step to his later position,
based on the inseparability of matter and energy, in which superego functions are
matters of internal relations of mutual influence between ego and object, that is,
towards his later description of superego functions carried out by internalised ego
structures derived from the early mother-child relationship and from the
reorganisation of these in the oedipal period (Fairbairn, 1954, 1963). It is of more
than incidental interest that it is in these lectures that Fairbairn first used the term
‘organised self’ instead of the term ‘ego’, a first step on the road to personalising
endopsychic structure. Although he never fully delineated this shift himself, it
remains an assumption within his theory that was later elaborated by his students
Guntrip (1969) and Sutherland (1994) with Fairbairn's approval.
Fairbairn's study of Freud's structural theory was followed by a study of libido
theory and of the life and death instincts (1930). He related Helmholtz's influence
to Freud's use of the idea of ‘opposing forces’. Much later, Fairbairn summarised
this early work when he wrote,
although Freud's whole system of thought was concerned with
object-relationships, he adhered theoretically to the principle that
libido is primarily pleasure seeking, i.e. that it is directionless. By
contrast, I adhere to the principle that libido is primarily object-
seeking, i.e. that it has direction … Thus Freud's view that libido is
primarily pleasure-seeking follows directly from his divorce of
energy from structure; for, once energy is divorced from structure,
the only psychical change which can be envisaged as other than
disturbing, i.e. as pleasant, is one which makes for the
establishment of an equilibrium of forces, i.e. a directionless
change. By contrast, if we conceive of energy as inseparable from
structure, then the only changes which are intelligible are changes
in structural relationships and in relationships between structures,
and such changes are essentially directional (1944, p. 126).
Fairbairn's doctoral thesis (1929b), written at about the same time as the early
papers on the superego, was entitled ‘Dissociation and Repression’. In it, he traced
contributions from Freud, Janet, Rivers, and McDougall, among others. He was
still bound by Freud's use of the pleasure principle when he concluded that
dissociation is a general capacity of man, while repression is a specific instance of
the operation of dissociation in relation to that which is ‘unpleasant’. But he
continued his early move beyond the pleasure principle when he wrote, ‘in the
case of repression the dissociated elements consist essentially in tendencies
belonging to mental structure’ (p. 79). If we widen the notion of that which is
‘unpleasant’ beyond the notion of simple gratification and take note of the
affective component in its meaning, we move towards Fairbairn's later contention
that what is repressed is the experience of failures of
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loving care that are most perceived as ‘unpleasant’ by the infant. This study of the
relationship of dissociation and repression formed the background for Fairbairn's
later idea of splitting of the personality under the impact of extreme experience of
the ‘unpleasant’, as illustrated in his later formulation that splitting and repression
of the personality occur under the impact of a person's ‘frustration of his desire to
be loved as a person and to have his love accepted’ (1941, pp. 39- 40).
Fairbairn's object-relations theory
Between 1940 and 1944, Fairbairn wrote the series of papers which constitute
the heart of his contribution and which were published as the first four papers of
Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (1952). In the first of the papers,
‘Schizoid factors in the personality’ (1940), he described the ubiquitous quality of
splitting in the personality.
This was followed by ‘A revised psychopathology of the psychoses and
neuroses’ (1941), in which he based the framework of psychopathology on the
vicissitudes of dependence. Aristotelian psychology holds that dependency is
necessary for development, as we have noted. Fairbairn wrote in this paper that the
total dependence of the new-born takes a gradual developmental path to the
mature dependence of the adult personality. Neither physical nor psychic
development is attainable in isolation, so the individual is necessarily dependent
upon relationships with other individuals in the external world. The child's initial
dependence on parents is gradually transformed to adult dependence on other
adults, and on culture, education, political order, law and nature. Fairbairn
described mature dependence as ‘a capacity on the part of the differentiated
individual for cooperative relationships with differentiated objects’ (1941, p. 145).
In mature dependence, individuals are able to accept and relate to the integrity of
other selves. In this paper, Fairbairn goes on to describe phobic, obsessional,
hysterical and paranoid syndromes as varying ‘transitional techniques’ for
handling internal object relationships during the transition from infantile
dependence to mature dependence, rather than seeing these symptoms as deriving
from failures at specific psychosexual stages to which the individual later
regresses.
The third paper of the collection, ‘The repression and return of bad objects
(with special reference to the “war neuroses”)’ (1943a) described the dedication of
the ego to painful object relationships lest it lose part of itself. Here Fairbairn must
also have been drawing on his considerable experience with psychic trauma,
obtained as a combat officer in World War I, and from seeing abused children
clinically in the 1930s (Sutherland, 1989; Scharff & Birtles, 1994). In trauma
and rejection, painful part-object relations are split off and repressed, but they
continue to press for expression and recognition—for a return to consciousness.
Here Fairbairn was able to explain why children tend so persistently to blame
themselves for bad experiences even in the face of abuse. They are, he said, trying
to maintain the object as good in order to maximise the chance of being loved. If
the object is seen as bad, then nothing the child can do, not even atonement for
badness, will secure love—a condition he termed ‘unconditional badness’, while if
the child sees itself as bad and the object as good but treating the child badly
because of the child's own badness, there is a chance of being loved if only the
child can right things himself (‘conditional badness’) (pp. 65-72).
By 1944, Fairbairn could make a formulation of object-relations theory which
was essentially complete. In ‘Endopsychic structure considered in terms of object-
relationships’ (1944) he wrote that the infant is born with an ego that is initially
whole but undifferentiated. In the face of inevitable dissatisfactions in handling by
the mother, the infant first incorporates the object to deal with the pain of
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the frustration. However, now faced with the problem of having a painfully
rejecting object inside, the central part of the ego—or Central Ego—splits off and
represses those aspects of the object still felt to be intolerably painful. He added
that a part of the ego itself is always split off in conjunction with these part-
objects, and that this constellation of ego and object is characterised by the
affective tone of the problematic relationship which cannot be borne in
consciousness. He described the fate of ego and object constellations organised
around persecution and rejection, which he termed a relationship between the
Internal Saboteur (the ego component) and the Rejecting Object. (He later called
these the Anti-Libidinal Ego and Rejecting Object.) The other class of painful
object relationship is that between the Libidinal Ego and Libidinal Object (later
termed the Exciting Object) described as a relationship built around the excessive
excitement of need —that is, the relationship with part of the mother who is felt to
overfeed, hover anxiously, or act seductively. The Central Ego itself acts to
repress both the rejecting object constellation and the libidinal object constellation,
the motive being that they are too painful to be borne in consciousness.
Some years later, Fairbairn added that there was a parallel relationship
between Central Ego and its object, which he called the Ideal Object—that aspect
of the object not subject to repression. In the case of the hysteric, the Ideal Object
is shorn of sexuality and aggression, leaving it a neutralised object (Fairbairn,
1954). The complete endopsychic structure is therefore made up of six subparts,
which are in dynamic relation to each other through repression and mutual
influence. He further noted that even the object parts of the self are actually ego
structures, and therefore capable of initiating psychic action (1944, p. 132), a
situation illustrated by the possibility of patient acting in a way that can be seen as
being in identification with the way the patient felt previously treated by a parent.
The following diagram provides a synopsis of Fairbairn's six-part structure of
the personality.
Figure 1:
Figure 1:Fairbairn's model of psychic organisation. The central ego in
relation to the ideal object is in conscious interaction with the caretaker. The
central ego represses the split-off libidinal and antilibidinal aspects of its
experience along with corresponding parts of the ego that remain
unconscious. The libidinal system is further repressed by the anti-libidinal
system. (From D. E. Scharff, 1982. By permission.)

Finally, Fairbairn described the way the internal ego and object structures
exert dynamic influence on each other. The situation he described specifically
involved what he called Secondary Repression of Libidinal Ego and Libidinal
Object by the Anti-Libidinal Ego. (This situation is indicated by an arrow in
Figure 1.) Clinically we see patients who use anger to cover up the affect of
unrequited longing stemming from their libidinal object constellation. They are
more comfortable with an angry stance towards objects than with painfully
unsatisfied longing. Although Fairbairn did not describe the parallel situation,
once he pointed the way to the internal dynamic relationship between object
relations sets, we can see that the libidinal
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ego can also secondarily repress the antilibidinal relationship, as represented in

patients who show an exaggerated sense of love and hope—a too-good-to-be-true
personality —in order to mask resentful anger that is even more painful to them.
The point that emerges is that all internal structures are in constant dynamic
interaction with each other. This dynamic is more fluid and changeable in health
than in pathology, where it tends to become fixed or frozen in one or another
pattern.
In ‘Endopsychic structure’ (1944) and later in his paper ‘On the nature of
hysterical states’ (1954), Fairbairn also discussed the Oedipus situation in
revolutionary terms, writing that it was not dependent upon a castration complex
or on the possession or lack of a penis, or even on active and passive sexual
characteristics. The beginning of the oedipal problem, he noted, was based upon
the original deprivation of the abandoned baby on the hillside (1954, pp. 27-9),
associated with the capacity of the parents to thwart, frustrate and reject the child.
The development of sexuality depends not on ideas phantasised by the child, but
upon the living reality of the dependence relationship as understood by the child to
involve sexual relatedness, and exciting and rejecting objects projected into sexual
parts of the body. Gender and sexual orientation are dependent upon a blend of
identification and object-seeking. Maturity for Fairbairn is no longer a matter of a
genitality which sexually infuses the personality, but of a mature individual with a
capacity to relate to a whole other person when both of them are understood to
have genitals. In consequence, it is the parent's own mature responsiveness to the
child's needs which predisposes that child to future mental health and well-being,
rather than a relatively isolated aspect of sexual development.
Fairbairn did not overlook the way psychic development depended upon and
interacted with inherent genetic and constitutional capacities as embodied in
Freud's concept of drives. His own view of drives requires some clarification. The
view of ‘instincts’ (1930), which orchestrates his work, involved two main types
of tendencies. Those that could be properly defined as drives are concerned with
the preservation of the body. These respond to internal states such as hunger,
object need and sexual desire. The second group of tendencies are ‘reactive’ and
respond to experience in the external world. Frustration and consequent anger and
aggression come into this category, and he clearly believed that aggression, while
of fundamental importance, was a secondary, reactive tendency (1952, 1963).
However, object relationships can incorporate any affect that has arisen as a
response to either internal or external tendencies. In such situations, reactive
tendencies operate in a manner analogous to ‘drives’. An example of this would be
violent behaviour that had originated as anger due to infantile frustration
incorporated affectively within an internalised relationship.
Fairbairn thought that potential in each individual is dependent upon genetic
predisposition. The internal structures and genetic capacities of the individual
confer a flexibility for development in the same way that the structure of the
carbon atom defines its capacities for molecular relationships. This much derives
from Freud's discussion of the drives and inherited basis of personality. But for
Fairbairn, such development is always in concert with actual experience, and the
drives achieve meaning only within the structure of relational experience (1956).
Inner reality, and therefore personality, are the outcome of continuous series of a
dialectic of encounters between endowment and external reality.
Fairbairn took as his beginning point an integral ego that intrinsically seeks
relationships with important sustaining figures. This picture of the ego we might
now call an unformed inherent potential to become a self (Sutherland, 1994).
Within the sustenance of these relationships, the infant and growing child takes
into its psyche both experiences that are painfully frustrating and those that
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are satisfying. As the child does this, its psyche is organised by this introjection of
objects and by a splitting of the ego (or self) into units of relational structures. In
the process the child constructs an internal reality that is derived from experience
with external reality. The mind is thus made up of structures that contain prior
relational experience, although these structures are heavily modified by the
intrinsic process of the structuring itself—by the limitations of the child's capacity
to understand at the time experience is taken in, and by the distortions and
modifications introduced by developmental issues and the biases of the child's
prior experience. Once inner reality is thus established, it monitors and influences
external reality and relationships in a never-ending cycle, in which it also
continues to be modified by these external relationships.
Although Fairbairn's model was built largely out of the study of pathological
development, he always intended that it should explain normal development and
thus form the framework for a general psychology. We can amend Fairbairn's
theory in order to bridge the gap to a general psychology in the following ways
which we believe to be consistent with his actual use of his concepts. In the
normal personality, the Central Self contains tendencies of need for objects, and of
need for separation from objects within the context of relationships. Both desire
for objects (the libidinal tendency that includes sexual longing), and need for
separation from objects (the anti-libidinal tendency that includes limit setting) are
normal ways of relating. It is only when these are excessive that they become
pathological. Internal objects are embedded in the self structures of which they are
a part, but we can also see that the need exciting object and the rejecting object are
in part associated with central self and the object of the central self as objects of
libidinal attachment and limit-setting objects respectively. All the elements of
internal object relations are in constant dynamic relation to each other. The
situation can be summarised in the following diagram.
Figure 2:
Figure 2:Revision of Object-Relations Theory. Neediness and separateness
are aspects of the Central Self. Exciting and Rejecting Objects partly
communicate with the Ideal object and are partly repressed. All aspects of
self and object are in dynamic relation. (From D. E. Scharff 1992. By
permission, Jason Aronson.)

The fixity that occurs when patients attempt to maintain patterns as defensive
closed systems, attempting to bar continual interaction with, and feedback from,
others tends to make the inner world resemble a closed system. This is the
situation of resistance, which in Fairbairn's view emanated not solely from internal
conflict between mental structures, nor from reluctance to making the unconscious
conscious. He thought that patients’ resistance in psychotherapy stemmed from a
reluctance to exposing parts of the patients’ internal reality to therapists, to an
unwillingness to give up parts of their internally organised self:
I have now come to regard … the greatest of all sources of
resistance [to be] the maintenance of the patient's internal
world as a closed system … [I]t becomes still another aim of
psychoanalytical treatment to effect breaches of the closed
system which constitutes the patient's inner world, and thus to
make this world accessible to the influence of outer reality
(1958, p. 84).
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Under these circumstances, the patient feels that psychoanalysis is an assault
on the inner world as a closed system, and trains his resistance on the person of the
analyst, who he comes to feel is responsible for the assault.
A fundamental contribution of object-relations theory comes from the
principle inherent in the formulation of the complex relationship between the
infant and the mother. It is the notion that one must understand the subjective
experience of the child to understand the meaning of the object relationships
involved. Nevertheless, while the child-centred view that Fairbairn maintained in
developing his notions of endopsychic structure gave him a new and powerful
perspective, it also limited his ultimate reach. We can now see how the mother-
child paradigm can be enriched by the newer analogies of current scientific
understanding, by a view derived from field theory of the inextricability of objects
from their context, a view that was adumbrated when Fairbairn wrote, ‘the object
in which the individual is incorporated is incorporated in the individual’ (1941, p.
43). His description of ‘exciting’ and ‘rejecting’ objects also contains within it the
potential for a more subtle appreciation than the original formulation. In a broader
perspective, acceptance and rejection are experienced by the mother as well as the
child. In order to experience a satisfying relationship, both mother and child have
to be able to give and to receive: the experience must by definition be inter-
dependent and interactive, what has now been called ‘intersubjective’ (Stern,
1985).
When Fairbairn modified psychoanalytic theory, he replaced Freud's model
based on a differentiation between conscious and unconscious structure with a
focus on the differentiation between inner and outer realities. Freud's structural
model was concerned with the progressive taming of the drives. Fairbairn replaces
this with an open systems, information-processing model able to take advantage of
the cybernetic principles of the newer models made available through modern
physics, chemistry and mathematics. This shift made it possible for analytic theory
to move beyond a two-dimensional theory in which the individual only moves in a
linear direction, growing by moving forward and retreating through regression to
fixation at prior positions as a result of trauma or overwhelming stress. In
Fairbairn's model, the individual structures internal reality out of accumulated
experience, but does so in order to understand current external reality at each
successive phase. The storage of prior history allows the individual to make sense
of current experience, and the internal reality that conserves structure while, at the
same time, it continues to be susceptible to modification throughout life. In
psychoanalysis, current experience with the analyst gives information about
internal object relations because these are what the patient is using, as he or she
does in every interpersonal encounter, to make sense of the therapeutic experience.
As he described his object-relations theory of the personality, Fairbairn came
to realise that it is the relationship between patient and therapist that is the crucial
factor for growth and change, not, as others had considered, the single factors of
exact interpretation, genetic reconstruction, transference interpretation, or any
particular technical recommendations isolated from the personal factor. Rather, it
is the use of technique within the growth-promoting relationship that is the
fundamental agent of change:
In my own opinion, the really decisive factor is the relationship of
the patient to the analyst, and it is upon this relationship that the
other factors … depend not only for their effectiveness, but for
their very existence, since in the absence of a therapeutic
relationship with the analyst they simply do not occur … [W]hat I
understand by ‘the relationship between the individual and his
analyst’ is not just the relationship involved in the transference, but
the total relationship existing between the patient and analyst as
persons (1958, p. 82-3).
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This shift of emphasis stemmed directly from his proposal for a new
theoretical basis for psychoanalysis. It is a shift that has been sustained in
contemporary analysis, which has now moved even further to emphasise the
person of the analyst and the use of the analyst's subjective experience as a
fundamental therapeutic tool (Jacobs, 1991; Joseph, 1989; Gill, 1984; Hoffman,
1991, 1996). In this practical way, object-relations theory also laid the ground for
further developments of analytic theory itself, and for its application to many other
fields in new and interesting ways: to research in the mother-infant relationship
and in infant development, to group and institutional applications, to the use of
psychoanalytic theory and technique with families and couples, and to new
developments in social theory, theology and group relations.
Fairbairn began to apply object-relations theory to social policy, social issues,
philosophy of science, child development, education and the psychology of art.
His first steps in these directions went far enough for us to see the potential range
and usefulness of his ideas (Fairbairn, 1952, 1994a, b). Later writers have
enlarged on the many implications of Fairbairn's work. The first to do so were
Guntrip and Sutherland, both of whom were analysand, student and colleague to
Fairbairn. Guntrip began by summarising Fairbairn's work (Guntrip, 1961). He
suggested to Fairbairn that the term ‘self’ more accurately described the issues
Fairbairn had been discussing while using the term ‘ego’ (1969). Fairbairn
expressed agreement with him (Sutherland, 1989). Guntrip followed the theme of
the self's search for an elusive sustaining object, which he summarised in his work
on the ‘regressed libidinal ego’ —that part of the ego which becomes deeply
repressed in consequence of the failure to find a sustaining relationship with an
object (Guntrip, 1969). Some have felt that Guntrip's specific theoretical
elaboration distorted the symmetry of Fairbairn's theory, but it is clear that Guntrip
extended the reach of Fairbairn's contribution towards a theory of the self. The
concept of the regressed libidinal ego is an extrapolation from Fairbairn's theory,
which describes a mental state rather than a structure, depicting the unconscious
but subjective experience of the failure of the mother to perceive and communicate
to the infant her acceptance of the infant's selfhood. The failure of experience of
self-development seems to represent a combination of the effect of aggression
redirected, turned from the object to the libidinal self, and of subjective experience
of the failure of the self in the face of experience with a mother who is unavailable
because of preoccupation or depression. The result is that the child incorporates a
non-responding and non-affirming aspect of the object as central to its primary
relationship.
Sutherland began by spreading the word. In a landmark paper given at the
Menninger Clinic (Sutherland, 1963), he outlined the scientific basis for
Fairbairn's work and made it available to a wider audience in America, which
included Kernberg, who discussed Sutherland's paper (Kernberg, 1963), and
made a great deal of use of Fairbairn's contribution in his own subsequent work
(1976, 1980). Sutherland's encyclopaedic grasp facilitated the growth of
psychoanalytic theory and application partly through his own writing, but
principally through his editorship of the central international vehicles of
psychoanalysis —the British Journal of Medical Psychology, the International
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, and the International Psychoanalytical Library, and
through his stewardship of the Tavistock Clinic as its Medical Director for twenty-
one years. In these ways he kept Fairbairn's ideas alive and well as a quiet but
strong undercurrent in the development of psychoanalysis.
It was not until the publication of Sutherland's biography of Fairbairn in 1989,
and the gathering of Sutherland's own papers, published as The Autonomous Self
(1994), that
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we could see how his own interest in the evolution of the self moved the
theoretical work forward, especially in the realm of investigation of the self as an
overarching entity throughout life which bridges from the individual's internal
object relations to relations with other individuals and with the wider society.
Of the other writers who applied Fairbairn's work in important ways, perhaps
the best known is John Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980). Bowlby specifically
acknowledged his Fairbairnian orientation in the development of attachment
theory and the ethological approach to infant development (personal
communication), which have spurred the enormous increase in our understanding
of the mother-infant relationship during the last twenty-five years while also
leading to other research which has enhanced our understanding of the biology of
mind (Schore, 1994). Henry Dicks (1967) blended Fairbairn's contribution with
Klein's work on projective identification in applying object-relations theory to
marital work and to a psychology of interaction. This in turn allowed Shapiro and
Zinner (collected in J. Scharff, 1989) and Scharff & Scharff (1987, 1992) in the
USA to continue the application to families as well. Kernberg, (1963, 1976, 1980)
made Fairbairn's work known in the USA and gave object relations new impetus
worldwide. This was consolidated by Grotstein's work, Splitting and Projective
Identification (1981), which furthered the idea of the centrality of splitting in
development and psychopathology. Sutherland (1989) has made the point that
there is more than an echo of Fairbairn's writing about the self in the language of
Kohut's contributions (1971, 1977), giving confirmation about the way Fairbairn's
new orientation for analytic theory had become so much a common property that
others thought they had discovered the paths he had pioneered. More recently,
Rayner (1991), Padel (1972, 1991), Ogden (1986) and Grotstein & Rinsley (1994)
explored the ramifications of Fairbairn's work further. Mitchell (1988) has placed
it at the centre of his relational theory, and Scharff and Scharff have continued to
foster application of Fairbairn's concepts to family and marital therapy, trauma,
and to an integrated view of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis based on self and
object relations (J. Scharff, 1992; D. Scharff, 1992, 1996; J. & D. Scharff,
1994).
Fairbairn's ideas are now so central to the vision of psychoanalysis that they
often pass for truisms, making it hard to remember a time when the need for
relationships was not seen as the central fact of development and of therapy, when
splitting and its vicissitudes were not understood to be important from the
beginning of life. Before Fairbairn, the analyst was held to be an impersonal
projection screen, striving to be technically correct and uninvolved. The focus on
relatedness that originated with his vision has fundamentally re-ordered
psychoanalysis. It has also shaped the contributions of analysis to philosophy,
science, the humanities and social understanding. Fairbairn taught us that
relationships are at the centre of psychoanalytic theory and practice. But, more
importantly, he led us to see that personal relationships form the essence of our
human experience.
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