Macapagal, Gladys, D.

Evidence – 3S

Star Two ISPV-AMCI vs. Howard Ko, et al., GR. No. 185454. March 23. 2011

Doctrine: As a general rule, courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered. As an
exception, such pieces of evidence may be considered if identified by testimony duly recorded and
incorporated in the records of the case.

Facts: Jianshe Motorcycle obtained loan accommodations from RCBC to finance its importation of
motorcycles, parts, accessories and other related goods. RCBC required Jianshe to execute trust receipts
over the goods as security. Also, to secure payment of all existing and future obligations, respondents
executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement with a limited liability of 50 M.
Jianshe failed to pay its obligations. Thus, RCBC filed a complaint for specific performance with
a writ of preliminary attachment against Jianshe and respondents as sureties. A writ of preliminiary
attachement was then issued. Respondents filed a motion to discharge preliminary attachment and a
motion to dismiss on the ground that RCBC’s claim had already been paid, waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished. The trial court ordered the immediate discharge of the attachment but denied the
motion to dismiss. Petitioner and respondents both file motions for reconsideration. Howard Ko likewise
filed a motion to set case for hearing for reception of evidence. RTC granted the motion and accordingly
dismissed the case, stating that there was sufficient evidence to prove that respondents paid an amount
more than the limit provided under the Comprehensive Surety Agreement. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, which was denied.

Issue: WON the trial court arbitrarily considered and relied on documents which were not duly identified
by testimony or offered in evidence.

Ruling: No. Indeed, courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered because parties
are required to inform the courts of the purpose of introducing their respective exhibits to assist the latter
in ruling on their admissibility in case an objection thereto is made. Without a formal offer of evidence,
courts are constrained to take no notice of the evidence even if it has been marked and identified.
This rule, however, admits of an exception, provided that the evidence has been identified by
testimony duly recorded and that it has been incorporated in the records of the case.
In this case, the subject pieces of evidence were presented in support of respondents’ motion for
reconsideration of the denial of their motion to dismiss. A hearing was set for the reception of their
evidence, but petitioner failed to attend the same. The pieces of evidence were thus identified, marked in
evidence, and incorporated in the records of the case. Clearly, the trial court correctly admitted and
considered the evidence of respondents warranting the dismissal of their case.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

Ramos vs. Spouses Dizon. G.R. No. 137247, August 7, 2006

Doctrine: Evidence to be considered must be formally offered. The mere fact that a particular document
to identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. As an exception, court may consider pieces of evidence not formally offered if the
same have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and it must have been incorporated in the
records of the case.
Facts: Petitioner filed an action against respondents alleging that respondents were the owners of an
undivided one-half portion of a parcel of land. Respondents executed a SPA authorizing Elpidio to sell
such share and that Elpidio sold it to petitioner with a right to repurchase. Respondents spouses failed to
redeem the property thus, ownership was consolidated in favor of petitioner.
In their Answer, respondent spouses averred that the SPA was executed to enable Elpidio to
secure a loan for the construction of a house. However, Elpidio exceeded his authority by acquiring a loan
greater than the amount agreed upon. Thus, the spoused revoked the SPA. The spouses maintained that
the sale was simulated, and if ever, shall be treated as equitable mortgage.
During the trial, Ramos took the witness stand and testified. Petitioner presented Elpidio as
second witness and the latter was subjected to cross-examination wherein he stated that he owns a
residential apartment built on the land in question and sold the same to respondent spouses; that he
acquired a loan from Ramos to finish the construction of the lot; and that the money he received from
Ramos was the same as the one in the pacto de retro sale. It was also revealed that Sps. Dizon filed a civil
case against Elpidio, which Sps. Dizon won, and had the contract be declared as an equitable mortgage.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent spouses, stating that the sale was an equitable
mortgage. Ramos filed an appeal but it was denied.
Issue: WON petitioner was denied the opportunity to file her objection to or comment on respondents’
exhibits and to cross-examine the witness regarding their exhibits.

Ruling: No. Evidence to be considered must be formally offered. The mere fact that a particular
document to identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of
the evidence of a party. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it
will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not
authorized by the Rules to consider the same.

However, in People v. Napat-a, we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered
to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first,
the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have
been incorporated in the records of the case.

In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits in question were
presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been incorporated into the records.
Elpidio himself explained the contents of these exhibits and in the presence of petitioner’s counsel.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

De La Paz vs. lAC. GR. No. 71537, September 17, 1987

Doctrine: The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is a personal one which may
be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.

Facts: Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against the petitioners for a judicial declaration of ownership of
a parcel of land in the name of Ponciano de la Paz with damages. The parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement during pre-trial. Hence, trial on the merits followed. 
During the trial, after Loreto finished her direct testimony, the petitioners' counsel began his
cross-examination of Loreto but it was not completed. Hence, the petitioners' counsel moved in open
court for the continuance of the cross-examination since he still had to conduct a lengthy cross-
examination. Thereafter, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction of transcript" due to some errors
in the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of Loreto. Petitioner’s counsel
then manifested that he would not be able to undertake the cross-examination of the witness as scheduled
and asked for postponement. The trial was postponed twice and on the date of the scheduled trial, neither
the petitioners, nor their counsel appeared despite due notice. Thus, Loreto's counsel was allowed to
present evidence ex parte before a commissioner. During this time, petitioners were still allowed to cross-
examine Loreto. For the next schedule of the trial, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear, and the cross-
examination of Loreto was deferred for the fourth time. Loreto, however, died. The petitioners moved to
strike off the record the entire testimony of Loreto. However, this was denied.

Issue: WON petitioner waived their right to cross-examine Loreto.

Ruling: Yes. The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is a personal one which
may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto was through no fault of the
respondents. Loreto was available for cross-examination from the time she finished her direct testimony.
The petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-examination but at times failed to appear during
scheduled hearings. Therefore, petitioners had waived their right to cross-examine Loreto. Through their
own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her testimony stands.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

Chua Gaw vs. Gaw, G.R. No. 160855, April 16. 2008

Doctrine: Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse witness in all respects as
if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character.
Facts: Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill
Corporation, and Columbia Wood Industries. They have seven children including herein petitioner
Concepcion Chua and respondent Suy Ben Chua. On On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife
Chan Chi and his seven children as his only surviving heirs. His surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir. Their interests in
Hagonoy Lumber were settled in which ½ shall go to the mother, while another half supposedly for the
children was renounced in favor of Chua Sioc Huan.

Thereafter, petitioner and her husband Antonio Gaw asked respondent to lend them P200k which
they will use for the construction of their house in Bulacan. Spouses Gaw failed to pay, thus, respondent
filed a complaint for sum of money. Spouses Gaw contended that that the P 200,000.00 was not a loan but
petitioner’s share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one of her family’s businesses. During the trial, the
petitioners called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section 10, Rule 132. He testified that
he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill to pay for the purchase price of Hagonoy Lumber.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, upholding the validity and the due execution
of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale, evidencing the transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber.
CA affirmed, holding that petitioner failed to show that the inclusion of respondent's testimony in the
statement of facts in the assailed decision unduly prejudiced her defense and counterclaims.

Issue: WON petitioners are bound by the testimony of the witness, the latter being an adverse party.

Ruling: Yes. The witness as is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not
be bound by the former's testimony. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach an
adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does
not vouch for the witness' veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or
remains unrebutted.

A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latter's testimony only
in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be
bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely
that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him. This,
the petitioner failed to do. Petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondent's testimony
on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

People vs. Relucio, G.R. No. L-38790, November 9, 1978

Doctrine: Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of
the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and
if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before
any question is put to him concerning them. (Sec. 14, Rule 132)

Facts: Appellant was charged with murder in the court, together with Federico Relucio, Edri Pineda,
Dante Ariola, Miguel Espejo Padrones, Peter Doe and Richard Doe for allegedly killing Gonzalo
Talastas. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of all the witnesses consist of over
930 pages. Of the four witnesses presented by the prosecution only two, Crispen Angeles and Miguel
Padrones, can be said to have given incriminatory evidence against appellant. 

It was, however, concluded that the statement of Angeles on account of the participation of appellant in
the shooting of Talastas was vague and inconclusive. Nothing points definitely and specifically to
appellant as having fired any shot at all; importantly the one clearly and categorically referred to as
having shot Talastas is Egi or Padrones.

Issue: Whether or not the two prosecution witnesses should be impeached. 

Ruling: Yes. The testimonies of Crispin Angeles during the direct examination, cross examination and
his sworn statement have discrepancies which cannot be reconciled by the Court. The material
discrepancies between the contents of the sworn statement and the testimony of Angeles in open court are
so irreconcilable that even if the proper predicate had been laid upon proper objection of the fiscal it is
doubtful, if any believable reconciliation could have been given by him. 

In Exhibit 17, it appears that he and Talastas agreed to follow and look for their lady companions
and that he went ahead and Talastas stopped by the ticket booth. Whereas in court, he testified that he was
already in the middle or across Burgos Street near the Avenue Theater when he heard shots inside the
Capital Theater where Talastas had  returned, as they met Federico Relucio with a companion, unknown
to him, who were going inside, hence, he did not see who fired the shots, in the above sworn statement, he
categorically stated that upon seeing Relucio, who had separated from his two armed companions and
gone inside, he (Angeles) went back inside the theater and actually saw Relucio firing at Gonzalo and the
latter retaliating with his own gun. In court, he said that when Talastas came out of the theater already
wounded and running towards the east, the two companions of Relucio, referring to Velasco and
Padrones, chased Talastas, with Relucio riding in a jeep and Padrones going on foot. 

It is a basic postulate in the law on evidence that every witness is presumed to be truthful and
perjury is not to be readily inferred just because apparent inconsistencies are evinced in parts of his
testimony. Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first be exerted before any adverse
conclusion can be made therefrom.

Section 16 of Rule 132 provides that before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has
made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to
him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

Tan Shuy vs. Maulawin, G.R. No. 190375. February 8. 2012 J. Sereno

Doctrine: Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Facts: Tan Shuy extended a loan to Guillermo Maulawin. Eventually, Maulawin failed to pay, arguing
that the loan had already been paid in full and that the net proceeds of such deliveries had been applied as
installment payments for the loan. Elena, daughter of Shuy, served as the cashier and prepares the pesada.
In Elena’s absence, Vicente, Shuy’s son, would issue the pesada. According to Vicente, whenever they
would buy copra or corn from crop sellers, they would prepare and issue a pesada in their favor. A pesada
is a document containing details of the transaction. The annotation "pd" on the total amount of the
purchase price, meant that the crop delivered had already been paid for by Shuy. An annotation of
“sulong” on pesada means partial payment for the loan was made. Shuy alleged that Guillermo remitted
only Php 28k and had an outstanding balance of Php 391k but failed to pay despite repeated demands.

Guillermo alleged that they had oral arrangement that the net proceeds of his copra delivery and
sale to Shuy shall be applied as installments for the loan, which amounted to Php 420k worth of copra.
The Pesadas did not contain “Pd.” which meant that he was not paid because it was applied as loan
payment. 

The RTC ruled that pesada which did not bear the notation of “pd” should be applied as
installment payments for the loan. The Pesada’s due execution and authenticity was established by Elena
and Vicente, children of petitioner. 
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC. Shuy could have easily belied the existence of the pesadas and
the purpose for which they were offered in evidence by presenting his daughter Elena as witness;
however, he failed to do so. Thus, it gave credence to the testimony of Guillermo. The CA denied Shuy’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Shuy asserts that
the pesadas should not have been admitted in evidence, since they were private documents that were not
duly authenticated.

Issue: Whether the pesadas were authenticated

Ruling: Yes. According to Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, there are two ways of proving the
due execution and authenticity of a private document, to wit: SEC. 20. Proof of private document. —
Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document
need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The due execution and authenticity of the pesadas were "established by the Shuy’s daughter Elena and
sometimes by Shuy’s Son Vicente. On cross-examination,, he also confirmed the penmanship and
handwriting of his sister Ate Elena who acted as a cashier in the pesada being shown to him. He was even
made to compare the xerox copies of the pesadas with the original copies presented to him and affirmed
that they are faithful reproduction of the originals.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

Suerte — Felipe vs. People, G.R. No. 170974, March 3, 2008

Doctrine: Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of homicide for the death of Godofredo Ariate. Rodolfo
Alumbres testified that he was 4-arms length away from petitioner with two more others and Ariate
wherein the two were arguing when suddenly, accused fired four shots Godofredo. Alumbres rushed to
Ariate’s aid but the accused shot him twice and hit him on his leg. Fearing he might be shot again, he
pretended to be dead. Godofredo's son, William Ariate, and Barangay Chairman Pio Arce witnessed the
incident. Godofredo was declared dead on arrival at the Pasay City General Hospital. Dr. Ludovino J.
Lagat, Jr. conducted the autopsy, which showed that Godofredo sustained three gunshot wounds which
caused his death.

For his defense, accused testified that it was the deceased and his six to seven companions who were the
unlawful aggressors that night. Godofredo and his companions attacked and repeatedly stabbed petitioner.
Accused drew his firearm in self-defense. Danilo Villa, as street vendor, testified and backed up
accused’s testimony. The defense also presented as witness Dr. Roger Archangel, the doctor who
performed surgeries on petitioner, but his testimony was dispensed with.

The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed.

Issue: WON there is clear evidence to support that it was Godofredo’s body that was autopsied.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner claims that Dr. Lagat was uncertain and incompetent to prove that the body he
autopsied was that of Godofredo Ariate. He allegedly admitted that he had no personal knowledge of who
signed the Request for Autopsy and the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body.

According to the Court of Appeals, the records clearly show that the body autopsied and referred to in the
autopsy report of Dr. Ludovino Lagat of the NBI was no other than that of Godofredo Ariate. Moreover,
the entries found in the assailed Autopsy Report should be deemed prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein, as there had been no proof of any intent on the part of Dr. Lagat to falsely testify on the
identity of the victim's body.

The presentation in evidence of the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body,16 the latter being a public
record made in the performance of a duty of officers in the Medico-Legal Office of the National Bureau
of Investigation, is governed by Rule 132, Sections 19 and 23 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

All other writings are private.

xxx

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter.

Thus, entries in the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body are deemed prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein, i.e., that a body has been properly identified as that of Godofredo Ariate. This prima
facie evidence of identification cannot be rebutted by an extremely meticulous fault-finding inquiry into
the chain of custody of the body of the victim, as such body cannot be easily replaced or substituted by
ill-minded persons.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

Patula vs. People, G.R. No. 1644S7, April 11, 2012

Doctrine: The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,
specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the
document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.

Facts: Anna Lerima Patula, a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc. in Dumaguete City, was
charged with estafa, for having collected and received the total sum of P 131,286.97 from several
customers of said company but has failed to remit the said amount to the company despite the repeated
demands.

During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses. The first one was Lamberto
GO, the branch manager of Footlucker’s in Dumaguete. He testified that when the usual high
volume of sales of Patula dropped, her confronted her and decided to subject her to an audit. It
was then that he learned there were discrepancies between the confirmations from the customers
and Footlucker’s records. The second witness is Karen Guivencan, Footlucker’s auditor. It was in
the course of her audit that she discovered differences between the original receipts held by the
customers and the duplicate copies of the receipts submitted by Patula to the office. She then
presented a list of the discrepancies between the customers’ confirmations and the office records
as per audit.

However, during Guivencan’s direct-examination, petitioner’s counsel continuously objected and

question the evidences and testimony of Guivencan on the ground that they were hearsay because the
persons who actually made the entries were not themselves presented in court. They also regarded
Guinvencan’s testimonies to be irrelevant because they did were not proof of estafa but of falsification, an
offense not alleged in the information.

The RTC rendered a decision finding Patula guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not the ledgers and receipts were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafas
charged despite their not being duly authenticated.

Ruling: Yes. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or
because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public
official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a
private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner
allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:
(a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied
under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been
admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because private
individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of
the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence
against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided
in Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

Bartolome vs. lAC, GR. No. 76792. March 12, 1990

Doctrine: The due execution and authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by anyone who
saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a
subscribing witness.

Facts: Epitacio Batara owned a parcel of land. He entrusted the same to his cousin, Doroteo Bartolome,
who owned the lot bounding Epitacio's property on the south. Thereafter, Epitacio and Doroteo died. The
the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the said land. Ursula Cid, the widow of the son
of Doroteo Bartolome, Bernabe, claimed ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660 square
meters, on the ground that it was acquired by Ursula through inheritance from Doroteo. Resurreccion
Bartolome, the grandchild of Epitacio Batara, also filed an answer in the same cadastral case claiming
ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 alleging that he acquired it by inheritance from his
grandfather and grandmother.

After 34 years of no progress in the cadastal proceedings, Maria J. Bartolome filed a motion
motion to admit answer in intervention, alleging that she is one of the children of Doroteo Bartolome and
that she and her co-heirs had been excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the petition. She therefore prayed
that the answer of Ursula Cid be amended so as to include the rightful heirs of Doroteo Bartolome. Ursula
Cid filed a motion to amend her answer, stating that she was the absolute owner of the land and that she
was the possessor for over 50 years. She claimed that her husband, Bernabe Bartolome, who together with
her, purchased the said lot and that it had been declared in the name of her husband Bernabe for tax
purposes.
Ursula Cid presented three deeds of sale: one showing that that Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula
Cid bought a 374-square meter lot for fifteen pesos from the spouses Domingo Agustin and Josefa
Manrique; another executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of Bernabe Bartolome evidencing the sale of
another lot also for fifteen pesos; and one executed by Maria Gonzales, wife of Epitacio Bitara, in in
favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid. Said piece of land is the one being claimed by Resurreccion
Bartolome.
The RTC rendered a decision that the deed of sale executed executed by Maria Gonzales has no
probative value as the same is incomplete and unsigned. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s
decision, holding that the deed of sale are ancient documents under Section 22 (now Section 21), Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. It also ruled that Ursula Cid's continuous possession of the lot from its
acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership over it vested her with the legal presumption that she
possessed it under a just title.
Issue: WON the deeds of sale are ancient documents.
Ruling: No. The SC ruled that the first two requirements are met by Exhibit 4, to which it was more than
30 years old when it was offered in evidence; and it was presented in court by the proper custodian
thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. However, the requirement that no
alterations or circumstances of suspicion shall be present, was not conformed with.
According to Dominador Bartolome, son of Ursula, he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession of his
mother when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the document had a fourth page containing the
signature of Maria Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn together. However, when the document
was entrusted to him by his mother in 1947 as he was then representing the family in litigation concerning
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

the land, the document's fourth page was already missing. He stated that his mother told him that the
fourth page was lost during the Japanese occupation while they were evacuating from Davao City.
The missing page affected its authenticity. It is important because it allegedly bears the signature
of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the
voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. Necessarily, since Exhibit 4 is not an ancient
document, proofs of its due execution and authenticity are vital. The due execution and authenticity of a
private writing must be proved either by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the
genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness. The testimony of Ursula Cid's
and her son Dominador on the authenticity of Exhibit 4 do not fall within the purview of Section 21 (now
Section 20).
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

St. Mary’s Farm, Inc. vs. Prime Real Properties, Inc., GR. No. 158144, July 31, 2008

Doctrine: Notarial acknowledgment in a public document is prima facie evidence of the fact of
its due execution.
Facts: St. Mary’s was the registered owner of an originally 25,598 sqm of land in Las Pinas . In
compliance with a final court decision in another civil case, St. Mary’s passed and approved in 1988 a
board resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision 4,000 sqm of the
abovementioned land. Agana did not return to plaintiff the said title. Instead, allegedly forged a board
resolution of St. Mary’s authorizing Agana to sell the remaining 21,598 sqm of land. Agana also sold the
property, by virtue of a SPA, to Prime Real Properties.
St. Mary’s filed an action for rescission of the sale and the reconveyance of the property, on the
ground that the sale between Agana and Prime is null and void for lack of authority on the part of Agana
to sell the property. Prime, on the other hand, contends that it acted in good faith when it relied solely on
the face of the authorization of Agana and paid in full the purchase price.
Issue: WON respondent is a buyer in good faith and for value.
Ruling: Yes. The Special Power of Attorney was duly notarized. It is a public document where the
notarial acknowledgement is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with
such a document would have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath
the signature on it. The notarial acknowledgment has removed that choice from him replacing it with a
presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that
he executed the document, understood its import and signed it.
Macapagal, Gladys, D.
Evidence – 3S

Biak Na Bato vs. Tanco, G.R. No. 34267-68, January 25. 1991

Doctrine: The fact that a document does not appear in the notarial register will not make it spurious, fake
or non-existent. The notarial register is not always the memorial of all the daily transactions of a notary
public.
Facts: During the mining boom in 1933, a group of hopeful and enthusiastic individuals from the North,
among them Jose Moldero, Saturnino Moldero, Miguel Moldero and Manuel Dirige, located 170 mining
claims in Cordillera. The said 170 mining claims were divided into four (4) groups, viz: NAGASAT
Group consisting of 42 claims; MUGAO Group consisting of 40claims; LUCKY STRIKE Group
consisting of 40 claims; and BUMABAG Group consisting of 48 claims.
On September 3, 1936, Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines Association entered into an Operating
Agreement with Jose Moldero as Attorney-in-fact of the claim owners of the Nagasat and Mugao Groups
of claims. After the war in 1949-50, private respondents Balatoc-Lubugan and Mountain Mines filed
reconstitution proceedings before the Bureau of Mines to reconstitute the records of the 170 lode claims.
The Bureau of Mines conducted hearings and heard the testimonies of witnesses who confirmed the sale
to Mountain Mines, Inc. of the 88 lode claims and to Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. of the 82 lode claims.
Thereafter, the Bureau of Mines issued corresponding orders of reconstitution.
Biak na Bato filed its protest against Balatoc Lubuagan and another against Mountain Mines
contesting 11 and 9 claims respectively, contending that the deeds of sale over the 88 lodes claims in
favor of Mountain Mines were fake and fictitious. The Bureau of Mines ruled that Balatoc and Mountain
have a better right to the 170 mining claims.
Issue: WON the pieces of evidence presented for reconstitution are fraudulent.
Ruling: No. The facts that the original locators were not notified, which is the only irregularity, was
settled by the order of the reconstitution. The fact that the questioned documents did not appear in the
notarial register did not make the documents spurious, fake and non-existent because the notarial register
is not always the memorial of all the daily transactions of a notary public. The notary being only human,
lapses by way of omission may happen.