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The controversy around the concept of archetypes

Article  in  Journal of Analytical Psychology · November 2019

DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12541

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Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2019, 64, 5, 682–700

The controversy around the concept of

archetypes

George B. Hogenson, Chicago, USA

Abstract: The paper reviews the course of the controversy surrounding Jung’s theory of
archetypes beginning in the mid 1990s and continuing to the present. Much of this
controversy was concerned with the debate between the essentialism of the
evolutionary position of Anthony Stevens as found in his 1983 book Archetypes: A
Natural History of the Self, and the emergence model of the archetypes proposed in
various publications by Hogenson, Knox and Merchant, among others. The paper
then moves on to a consideration of more recent developments in theory, particularly
as derived from an examination of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who introduces
Bergson’s somnambulistic unconscious into the discussion of Jung’s theories. It is
suggested that this largely unexamined influence on Jung may provide answers to
some of the unanswered questions surrounding his theorizing. The paper concludes by
suggesting that the notion of the somnambulistic unconscious may resemble
Atmanspacher’s argument for a dual-aspect monism interpretation of Jung.

Keywords: archetypes, Bergson, complex systems theory, Deleuze, dual-aspect monism,

emergence, somnambulistic unconscious

As the announcement for this conference notes, even after more than 20 years of
discussion in journals and books regarding the theory of archetypes, ‘no fully
satisfying theoretical conceptualization is at hand’. The fact that this is the
case makes the question of archetypes among the most pressing issues facing
analytical psychology. Indeed, in the absence of a satisfying theoretical
conception of archetypes, analytical psychology runs the risk of losing other
critical elements of the system as a whole (Hogenson, 2009).
The contemporary debate regarding archetypes arguably began with an
exchange between Hogenson, Stevens, Hester Solomon, and the Finnish
historian of science Petteri Pietikainen in 1998 (Hogenson, 1998; Mogenson,
1999; Pietikainen, 1998a; Pietikainen, 1998b; Stevens, 1998). Pietikainen
proposed a reading of the theory of archetypes that drew on Ernst Cassirer’s
philosophy of symbolic forms, which he proposed in his book, C. G. Jung
and the Psychology of Symbolic Forms (Pietikäinen 1999). In what stands as

0021-8774/2019/6405/1 © 2019, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Wiley Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12541
The archetype debate 683

an anticipation of later critiques of the received theory of archetypes, such as

Warren Colman’s Act and Image: The Emergence of Symbolic Imagination
(2016), this approach to archetypes rejects the evolutionary model of Stevens
and much of the previous tradition of interpreting Jung and places the theory
of archetypes in an largely cultural framework. Stevens replied in favour of
the evolutionary reading based on a number of texts in Jung’s discussion of
archetypes, while Hogenson was equally critical of both Peitikainen, on
grounds of aspects of Cassirer’s philosophy that Peitikainen did not take up,
and Stevens, due to questions about the foundations of the sociobiological
argument Stevens advanced. This debate had been preceded by two important
papers, one by John van Eenwyk (1991; see also van Eenwyk 1997), which
proposed a theory of archetypes as strange attractors, linked to the then
developing science of complex systems or ‘chaos theory’ and the other by
David Tresan (1996), which first introduced the notion of emergence in
relation to archetypes. These developments were critical for arguments that
would dominate the debate, particularly the notion of emergence, but
Anthony Stevens’ 1983 book, Archetypes: A Natural History of the Self, is in
many ways the critical text in the controversies surrounding archetypes. What
Stevens did in his work on archetypes was to take a number of comments in
Jung’s early work on the theory that, to many observers, appeared to point in
the direction of neo-Darwinian biologically encoded, innate factors that
shaped the archetypal patterns, and combine those comments with materials
from evolutionary psychology and references to Noam Chomsky’s linguistics
to argue that the genetic code or DNA constituted the archetypes-in-
themselves. Stevens was also concerned to absolve Jung of charges that he
was a Lamarckian, advocating for the inheritance of acquired characteristics.
Stevens was by no means alone in viewing the archetypes through a neo-
Darwinian lens. One could find it in the work of Michael Fordham, and the
frequency with which numerous commentaries, even by Jung’s closest
associates, repeated phrases like ‘innate, inherited factors’ or some similar
formulation is easily documented. Most of these other commentaries,
however, used these formulas as placeholders in the discussion without much
examination of their actual scientific viability. What Stevens did was bring a
far more sophisticated understanding of evolutionary biology and the
thinking around the possible socio-cultural implications of evolutionary
processes to his discussion of Jung. Stevens certainly felt, as did many in the
Jungian community, that he had gone a considerable way to nailing down a
scientifically sound basis for the theory of archetypes. But to the degree that
other investigators might challenge his position, his argument clearly put the
status of the archetype-in-itself at the centre of the debate. However, focusing
on the archetype-in-itself left two other elements of the theory largely
unexamined: the nature of the collective unconscious and the nature of the
archetypal image. Stevens however, made a number of perfectly
understandable, but ultimately incorrect assumptions about Jung’s
684 George B. Hogenson

relationship to evolutionary theory and biology. We will return to this issue

below.
Objections to Stevens’s position first became public at the 2001 IAAP
Congress where Stevens and Hogenson debated the role of biology in the
theory of archetypes (Hogenson, Stevens & Ramos 2003). The argument
Hogenson presented in Cambridge was that, notwithstanding his significantly
better grasp of evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and linguistics than his
predecessors, fundamental changes in evolutionary theory taking place in the
1990s as well as the introduction of other disciplines, particularly theoretical
robotics and complex dynamic systems theory, were radically altering our
understanding of the foundations of cognitive and behavioural phenomena,
and by extension our understanding of archetypes. In particular, Stevens did
not understand how dynamic processes of emergence could minimize the need
for prebuilt or innate structures for an account of complex patterns of
behaviour, a point illustrated at the beginning of the debate with a brief video
of simple robots displaying seemingly complex behavior. This video
apparently had a profound effect on some in the audience, but the point of
the demonstration was to illustrate the significance of one of the curiosities of
Jung’s writings on archetypes: his use of peculiar but simple animal examples
in the midst of his discussions. The introduction of this material to the
discussion of archetypes also resulted in Hogenson beginning a review of
Jung’s background in relation to biology and the emergence of natural
phenomena. Other important sources of influence in this part of the debate
were, among others, the developmental psychologists, Ester Thelen and Linda
Smith (Thelen & Smith, 1996), the philosopher of science, Susan Oyama
(Oyama, 1986, 1989 and 2000), the anthropologist, Terrence Deacon
(Deacon, 1992, 1997 and 2000), and the cognitive scientist and theoretical
roboticist, Horst Hendriks-Jansen (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996 and 1997).
With the introduction of these alternative views of the nature of evolutionary
processes and their relationship to behaviour, including certain symbolic
processes unique to humans, it became possible to re-examine some of the
examples Jung used to illustrate the idea of archetypal patterns. His preferred
examples in many cases were from the behaviour of insects, particularly the
yucca moth and the leaf-cutting ant and its environment. Jung is perfectly
straightforward regarding the sources of these examples; they largely derive
from the work of the British comparative psychologist, Conway Lloyd
Morgan, whose work Jung cites. He also has some brief references to the
American psychologist, James Mark Baldwin. These references had a
particular resonance in the context of the idea of emergence and complex
adaptive systems, originally proposed by Tresan because Baldwin and Lloyd
Morgan had developed a variant interpretation of Darwinian evolutionary
theory around the turn of the century that came to be called the Baldwin
effect. The details of the Baldwin effect are outlined in ‘The Baldwin effect: A
neglected influence on C. G. Jung’s evolutionary thinking’ (Hogenson, 2001).
The archetype debate 685

Importantly, the Baldwin effect, which had more or less disappeared from the
literature for several decades was at this point making a reappearance at the
Santa Fe Institute, among other research centres, due to the ability of high-
speed computers to simulate the effects predicted by the theory. Once again,
the Baldwin effect appeared to loosen the tight bonds between some form of
pre-specification assumed in more traditional views of archetypes, particularly
in the evolutionary psychology model of Stevens.
It was still the case, however, that the argument focused on the nature of the
archetype-in-itself. This focus became even clearer with the publication, also in
2001, of the developmental emergent model of archetypes, in a paper by Jean
Knox, based on research in cognitive science, particularly the work of Annette
Karmiloff-Smith, Mark Johnson and George Lakoff (Knox 2001). This paper
was followed in 2003 by her book-length treatment of the subject, with
explicit reference to attachment theory, Archetype, Attachment, Analysis:
Jungian Psychology and the Emergent Mind (Knox 2003). Knox’s argument
was distinctly developmental and rejected any preexisting form for the
archetype-in-itself, opting instead for the emergence of ‘image schemas’ as
developmental achievements that would then give rise to the organization of
phenomenal experiences in the form of archetypal images. Thus, the image
schema ‘containment’ would become the basis for the emergence of the
mother archetype as the paradigmatic moment of containment.
The emergence model, either in its more biological or its developmental form
nevertheless posed a problem for archetype theory, it was no longer clear that
one needed a strong sense of the archetype-in-itself to make the theory work.
In the Baldwin effect paper, Hogenson rather starkly declared that ‘the
archetypes do not exist in some particular place, be it the genome or some
transcendent realm of Platonic ideas. Rather, the archetypes are the emergent
properties of the dynamic developmental system of brain, environment, and
narrative’ (Hogenson 2001, p. 607). Jean Knox, on the other hand, directed
her attention increasingly to attachment theory, and by about 2010, she had
concluded that further pursuit of a theory of archetypes was not likely to be
productive and rather devoted all her attention to attachment theory and
other aspects of clinical practice and theory (personal communication).
It is possible to go into much more detail on this period in working on the
theory of archetypes, and deal with the researchers involved in the process:
Peter Saunders and Patricia Skar (Saunders & Skar, 2001), John Merchant
(Merchant, 2006), Joe Cambray (Cambray, 2002) et al., but the point to be
made is that by about 2010 the proposals for a theory of archetypes, which
really meant a theory of the archetype-in-itself, had both fragmented to a
considerable degree, although some form of emergence theory had come to
dominate at a more global level, and become quite abstracted from the
phenomena associated with archetypes. For example, at this point there was
almost no adequate theory of what distinguishes an archetypal image from
other phenomena, and beyond a rather general sense that either a loose form
686 George B. Hogenson

of biological reductionism, or the most rudimentary forms of infant

development and attachment there was really no account of the nature of the
collective unconscious. The group of investigators working on archetypal
theory at this point had become, it seems, absorbed in the intricacies of
theory, and in the process lost sight of Jung. It is also the case, however, that
the group, beginning with Stevens, who published an updated version of his
original book in 2015 (Stevens 2015), had in fact misread much of Jung and
failed in essential ways to dig into the real origins of his thinking about
archetypes.

The French Connection

Students of Jung are well aware of his connections to the French or French-
speaking psychologists. In 1902 he spent an academic term in Paris, studying
with Pierre Janet, whose dissociative model of the psyche had an important
influence on Jung’s theory of the complex. Theodore Flournoy, in Geneva,
was not only the source of materials Jung used in Wandlungen und Symbole
der Libido, his From India to the Planet Mars (Flournoy, 1994) was an
inspiration for Jung’s dissertation on ‘so-called occult phenomena’. The
influence of Janet’s theories on Jung has been explored by John Haule in two
important papers (Haule, 1983 and 1984) and Sonu Shamdasani has
commented on the relationship to Flournoy (Shamdasani 1998). The person
who is missing from Haule’s account is the philosopher, Henri Bergson.
Bergson was the foremost philosopher in France at the turn of the century,
some would say in the world, and he was a close friend of both Janet and
Flournoy. Also close to Janet and Flournoy was James Mark Baldwin, of
Baldwin effect fame. Baldwin had been forced out of his position at Johns
Hopkins due to a sex scandal but was welcomed in France by his friends
Janet and Flournoy. Through them, he came into contact with Bergson (Scarfe
2009). Jaan Valsiner (Valsiner 1998 and 2017) has gone farther and argues
that Baldwin was an important influence on Bergson’s Creative Evolution
(Bergson 1998). Valsiner writes, ‘Undoubtedly there is a clear intellectual
closeness between Bergson’s ideas and James Mark Baldwin’s "postulates of
genetic science”’. Indeed, Bergson relied on Baldwin’s developmental ideas
directly (pp. 180-181). In an extension of these relationships, Bergson’s
Creative Evolution influenced Conway Lloyd Morgan’s thinking, culminating
in Lloyd Morgan’s 1923 Gifford Lectures, Emergent Evolution (Lloyd
Morgan 1923).
Marilyn Nagy mentions Bergson in her Philosophical Issues in the
Psychology of C. G. Jung (1991) and Shamdasani provides more detail
regarding the timing of Jung’s actual reading of Bergson, roughly beginning in
1913, and the importance of Bergson for Jung’s revision of the libido theory
(2003). The most sustained discussion of Jung and Bergson, however, comes
The archetype debate 687

from the philosopher Pete A. Y. Gunter at the University of North Texas

(Gunter 1982). Gunter also emphasizes the correspondences between Jung’s
libido theory and Bergson’s élan vital, as well as the importance of time and
creativity in both thinkers. Most recently Ann Addison returned to a
discussion of Bergson’s influence on Jung in her study of the concept of the
psychoid (Addison 2009 and 2016). Addison’s review of the development of
the psychoid is an important contribution to understanding Jung, but in the
course of laying out the origins of the concept she too quickly conflates the
vitalism of Hans Driesch with that of Bergson, and by extension, Jung. This is
an area in the history of ideas that has been seriously distorted, largely by the
logical positivists in the early part of the 20th century, precisely due to their
opposition to Driesch’s notion of the entelechy, a shaping force in the
organism. As the historian of science, Charles Wolfe, argues the history of
vitalism falls into two quite different forms, the substantive and the
functional, with the highly metaphysical, or spiritualistic substantive form
only appearing in the mid to late 19th century (Normandin & Wolfe 2013;
Wolfe 2011). The functionalist view of vitalism, which originated in the
Faculty of Medicine at the University of Montpellier in the second half of the
18th century focused on the unique modes of organization in living
organisms. Wolfe writes, ‘that the Newtonian-influenced, organizational,
functional models of life developed by the Montpellier vitalists open onto an
“attitudinal” vitalism which can survive the various counter-arguments
mounted over the course of the twentieth century, from the Vienna Circle
onwards. But this attitudinal vitalism may still require (or ‘be’) a metaphysics’
(Wolfe 2011, p. 3).
Wolfe’s characterization of the original Montpellier vitalism concerns us
directly because it bears a striking resemblance to the organizing principles of
what are now called complex adaptive systems. Wolfe quotes Théophile de
Bordeu’s paradigmatic commentary on the group behavior of bees:

I compare the living body, in order to properly assess the particular action of each
part, to a swarm of bees which cluster together [se ramassent en pelotons] and hang
from a tree like a bunch of grapes; I find the image suggested by an ancient author,
that one of the lower organs was an animal in animali, to be quite helpful. Each
part is, so to speak, not quite an animal, but a kind of independent machine
[machine à part] which contributes [concourt] in its way to the general life of the
body. Hence, following the comparison to a bee swarm, it is a whole stuck to a tree
branch, by means of the action of many bees which must act in concert to hold on;
some others become attached to the initial ones, and so on; all concur [concourent]
in forming a fairly solid body, yet each one has a particular action, apart from the
others; if one of them gives way or acts too vigorously, the entire mass will be
disturbed: when they all conspire to stick close, to mutually embrace, in the order of
required proportions, they will comprise a whole which shall endure until they
disturb one another.

(Wolfe 2011, p. 6)
688 George B. Hogenson

Joe Cambray has highlighted examples from contemporary research that are
almost identical to this example from the 18th century:

[A] striking example of organization from below upwards among insects was reported
in Scientific American by Diane Martindale: The tiny blister beetle larvae in the
Mojave Desert are taking bees for a ride. Hundreds of the parasitic Meloe
franciscanus beetles clump together to mimic the shape and color of a female bee.
When an amorous male bee attempts to mate, the beetles grab his chest hair and are
carried off. When the duped male mates with a real female bee, the beetles transfer
to her back and ride off to the nest, where they help themselves to pollen. The
cooperative behavior of the beetle larvae . . . is virtually unknown in the insect
world except among social species such as bees and ants. The report also notes that
beetle larvae clumps must also smell like female bees, because the male bee is not
fooled by painted models.

(Cambray 2002, p. 414f)

Hogenson has argued on a number of occasions that Jung’s discussion of the

‘image of the leaf-cutting ant’ in his 1946 essay, ‘On the Nature of the
Psyche’, is a similarly emergent model of behaviour based on the entire
context within which several organisms connect to form a greater whole, and
that this example is critically informative for our understanding of the
archetypal image:

In view of the structure of the body, it would be astonishing if the psyche were the only
biological phenomenon not to show clear traces of its evolutionary history, and it is
altogether probable that these marks are closely connected with the instinctual base.
. . . The instinct of the leaf-cutting ant fulfills the image of ant, tree, leaf, cutting,
transport, and little ant-garden of fungi. If any one of these conditions is lacking, the
instinct does not function, because it cannot exist without its total pattern, without
its image. Such an image is an a priori type. It is inborn in the ant prior to any
activity, for there can be no activity at all unless an instinct of corresponding pattern
initiates and makes it possible. If any one of these conditions is lacking, the instinct
does not function, because it cannot exist without its total pattern, without its
image. Such an image is an a priori type. It is inborn in the ant prior to any activity,
for there can be no activity at all unless an instinct of corresponding pattern initiates
and makes it possible. This schema holds true of all instincts and is found in
identical form in all individuals of the same species.

(Jung 1970, para.398)

The most probing commentaries that engage the relationship between Jung and
Bergson, however, are from the philosopher and Deleuze scholar, Christian
Kerslake. Kerslake’s examination of the influence of both Bergson and Jung
on Deleuze provides a closer look at the underlying features of what
increasingly appear to form the foundations of Jung’s theory of archetypes
and the nature of the collective unconscious. In his discussion of Jung’s theory
of archetypes, Kerslake highlights one of the issues that should concern us,
The archetype debate 689

going back to the earliest interpretations of Jung’s theory, and made central in
Anthony Stevens’s work:

The fact that in the late 1920s Jung introduces his notion of archetype within the
specific context of a synthesis of the Bergsonian and Kantian notions of intuition
has been strangely overlooked by Jungians, who have tended to focus on the
relation of the theory of archetypes to the opposition between Darwinism and
Lamarckism. The problem of how exactly ’archetypes’ might be inherited has
dominated the literature.

(Kerslake 2007, p. 88 emphasis added citing Jung CW 7:69-70)

The notion that the archetypes relate directly to intuition, and that the form of
intuition in question derives from Bergson and Kant, has significant
consequences for our understanding of the concept. As Nathalie Pilard
argues, in her important study of Jung’s understanding of intuition (Pilard
2015), Jung’s 1919 discussion of archetypes in ‘Instinct and the Unconscious’
(Jung, 1948) explicitly refers to the archetypes as categories of intuition and
also refers directly to Bergson.
Kerslake adds another essential element to our understanding in his
examination of the meaning of somnambulism in Bergson, and its significance
for understanding Jung. Haule correctly associates somnambulism with the
mediumistic phenomena Jung studied in his dissertation (Jung 1970a), but he
fails to see somnambulism as a more encompassing concept that defines the
kinds of behaviour in animals, particularly insects, that Jung uses to illustrate
his concept of the archetypes. This involves what Kerslake refers to as the
‘somnambulistic unconscious’. To understand the somnambulistic model of
the unconscious we begin with the observations by the French naturalist
Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), and the entomologist, Jean- Henri Fabre (1823-
1915). Fabre, in particular, interests us due to his observations of the
behaviour of the Ammophila Hirsuta wasp, which Bergson cites (1907). The
Ammophila Hirsuta is a solitary ground-nesting wasp that attacks the cutter
worm, a caterpillar, and stings the caterpillar in its nerve ganglions and
squeezes its head, thereby paralyzing, but not killing it. The wasp then drags
the caterpillar to its nest and lays its egg on the caterpillar, providing living
food for its larva once it hatches. The behaviour of the wasp and a number of
other strange animal behaviors were of great interest at the end of the 19th
and early 20th centuries. Within the context of the somnambulist model of
instinct these behaviours took on more significance, given that the behaviours
were manifestly not learned, as the insects, in particular, were solitary, or as
in the case of the Yucca moth, which would become a touchstone for Jung,
their particular behaviour was limited to one night in their otherwise very
short life cycle.
Bergson’s explanation for the behaviour of the wasp was based on what
Kerslake refers to as ‘divinatory sympathy’ (Kerslake, 2007, p. 54) between
690 George B. Hogenson

the wasp and the caterpillar. Bergson’s formulation in Creative Evolution is

important for understanding the process:

But the whole difficulty comes from our desire to express the knowledge of the
Hymenoptera in terms of intelligence. It is this that compels us to compare the
Ammophila with the entomologist, who knows the caterpillar as he knows
everything else—from the outside, and without having on his part a special or vital
interest. The Ammophila, we imagine, must learn, one by one, like the entomologist,
the positions of the nerve- centers of the caterpillar—must acquire at least the
practical knowledge of these positions by trying the effects of its sting. But there is
no need for such a view if we suppose a sympathy (in the etymological sense of the
word) between the Ammophila and its victim, which teaches it from within, so to
say, concerning the vulnerability of the caterpillar. This feeling of vulnerability
might owe nothing to outward perception, but result from the mere presence
together of the Ammophila and the caterpillar, considered no longer as two
organisms, but as two activities. It would express, in a concrete form, the relation of
the one to the other. Certainly, a scientific theory cannot appeal to considerations of
this kind. It must not put action before organization, sympathy before perception
and knowledge. But, once more, either philosophy has nothing to see here, or its
rôle begins where that of science ends.

(Bergson 1998, pp. 173-4, emphasis added)

Implicit in this discussion is the sense that underlying the duality of wasp and
caterpillar is a more profound unity, almost a single organism that manifests
itself in two forms. This was, in fact, a position that Bergson had taken in
Matter and Memory of 1896 where he writes:

Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images’. And by ‘image’ we mean a certain

existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less
than that which the realist calls a thing—an existence placed halfway between the
‘thing’ and the ‘representation’.

(Bergson 1990, p. 9)

With this more elaborated understanding of somnambulism in hand, we can return to

Jung. Roughly 20 years after writing ‘Instinct and the Unconscious’, in Jung’s seminar
on Dream Interpretation: Ancient and Modern (Jung 2014) conducted between 1936
and 1941, Carol Baumann presented a paper based on Eugène Marais’ book, The Soul
of the White Ant, published in Afrikaans in 1925 and translated into English in 1937.
Marais was a South African naturalist and ethologist, and the ‘white ant’ referred to
the termites that were common in the African bush. Baumann’s paper no longer exists,
but Jung’s comments engage the question of termite behaviour by way of an implicit
reference to Bergson:

We would be mistaken to assume, however, that collective images, because they are
independent of environmental influences, remain enclosed in the soul to no effect. . .
. These are processes that can only be explained by sympathy (Greek sympathein: to
suffer together). There a transmission without words and visible signs takes place;
The archetype debate 691

the contents go directly from one unconscious to the other. Such a living out of
‘sympathy’ is extremely pronounced in termites. One could integrate the multiplicity
of individual termites and imagine them as a single being.

(Jung 2014, p. 97, emphasis added)

The behaviour of termites, as well as other social insects, is now conceptualized

under the theory of swarm behaviour (Bonabeau, Theraulaz, & Dorigo 1999)
which relies on the aggregation of simple interactions among organisms to
create what appear to be complex behaviours, essentially like the behaviour
of the robots used to illustrate emergence in the debate with Anthony Stevens
in 2001. The same processes account for the intricate patterns of flocking
birds and schools of fish. The behaviour of swarming systems is, however,
once again a form of emergence, but now based on a deeper collective
dynamic.

Conclusion: From somnambulism to dual aspect monism

In 2002, Joe Cambray for the first time broached the question of emergence and
synchronicity in his paper ‘Synchronicity and emergence’. This was followed by
a more clinical paper, ‘Towards the feeling of emergence’ in 2006 (2006), but
Cambray took a decisive step with his Fay lectures at the Texas A & M
University, published in 2009. In these lectures Cambray moved the
discussion of synchronicity into a central position linking synchronistic
phenomena, which are closely related to archetypes in Jung’s later works, to
developing theories of psyche and matter taking place in quantum mechanics,
particularly at the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental
Health at Freiburg.
The Freiburg group is engaged in the study of extraordinary experiences such
as out of body events, near-death experiences, and other forms of altered
perception. The theoretical focus of this work is based on a dual aspect
metaphysics that views physical and psychological phenomena as epistemic
points of view on an underlying non-dual substrate. Harald Atmanspacher’s
research into this field, and its implications for analytical psychology is
extensive (Atmanspacher 2003; Atmanspacher & Primas 2006; Atmanspacher
2012 and 2014; Atmanspacher & Fuchs 2014). In 2013 in collaboration with
his Freiburg colleague, Wolfgang Fach, he published an overview of the dual
aspect model in the Journal of Analytical Psychology with a commentary by
David Tresan (Atmanspacher & Fach 2013a and 2013b; Tresan 2013).
During this same period Hogenson shifted attention to the underlying
structural characteristics of symbolic patterns culminating in an argument for
the importance of fractal geometry for understanding the significance of
Jung’s attention to mandala symbols as fundamental symbolic archetypal
692 George B. Hogenson

representations of individuation (Hogenson 2004, 2005, 2014 and 2018),

working from research into the mathematics of symbols systems first
developed by the Harvard linguist, George Kingsly Zipf (Zipf 1949) but more
recently developed by research at the Santa Fe Institute and elsewhere (Ferrer
i Cancho & Solé 2003; Ferrer i Cancho, Riordan, & Bollobás 2005; Serrano,
Flammini, & Menczer 2009; Vogt 2004 and 2012). Cambray has similarly
extended his investigations into universal structures, also including the fractal
patterns of Jung’s illustrations in the Red Book, the symbolic importance of
cosmological structures and the metaphysics of Wha Yen, or Kegon Buddhism
(Cambray 2014, 2016 and 2017).
How can we assess this state of affairs, and what is the path forward in the
theory of archetypes? Several questions suggest themselves as critical to
answering this question. They include:

Are we, in our research and theorizing, trying to understand Jung’s theory?
Are we trying to fix Jung’s theory?
Do we not care about Jung’s theory and simply want to build our own?

It seems that much of the early expository literature on Jung’s theory of

archetypes was intended to explain the theory without actually understanding
all the elements of the theory as Jung conceived of it. The result was the
simplistic subsumption of archetypes to neo-Darwinian evolutionary forces
leading to inherited innate genetic structures in the spirit of evolutionary
psychology. Jung himself unquestionably contributed to this problem, not
least because he was inside the problem itself, trying to understand his own
experiences, and not paying a great deal of attention to articulating in a more
or less third person manner what instruments and sources he was using for
some of his theory building. When we get to the late 1970s and the 1980s,
and particularly the work of Anthony Stevens, it would be perfectly
reasonable to assume that the earlier commitment to Jung as neo-Darwinian
socio-biologist was valid. The problem, as we have seen, is that Jung’s
engagement with the French psychologists, and through them with Bergson,
must be taken into account when trying to unpack his theorizing. The irony
in this is that much of what was dismissed in Bergson’s thinking in the early
years of the 20th century may actually have come back in the form of
complex adaptive systems theory or a working out of the Pauli/Jung
conjecture at the end of the century. The major problem for the theorizing
that has been based on complexity theory is that it did not fully recognize this
connection.
The real turning point for a more comprehensive understanding of Jung’s
theorizing is Kerslake’s Deleuze and the Unconscious. Kerslake’s book, which
deals with the very early Deleuze, outlines in detail Deleuze’s interest in Jung,
which is almost totally ignored in other treatments of Deleuze’s philosophy.
More startling was Kerslake’s own meticulous reading of Jung, and his
The archetype debate 693

detailed overview of Bergson and the somnambulistic understanding of the

unconscious. Combined with several other authors, such as Natalie Pilard
(2015) and Liz Green (2018), whose historical reconstruction of Jung’s
interest in astrology also introduces a version of Bergson’s sympathy,
Kerslake’s work can fit into much of what has gone on in the last few years,
certainly as guides to understanding Jung in a manner that allows us to
explain him, fix him, or propose something altogether new, but in a more
conscious manner.
The other line of inquiry that needs to be taken seriously by everyone
working on archetypal theory, again regardless of the precise purpose, is the
work done by Harald Atmanspacher and his colleagues that begins with the
collaboration of Jung and Pauli and extends into the investigation of just
those phenomena that Jung would have found particularly interesting, often
referred to as paranormal phenomena. Atmanspacher certainly does not
need an endorsement for his work, but as with the detailed historical work
done by Kerslake on the early influences on Jung, Atmanspacher’s
investigation of the Pauli/Jung conjecture, and the development of the notion
of dual aspect monism sheds a very different light on all of Jung’s work.
Indeed, one aspect of Jung’s theorizing that is clarified by the conjunction of
these two approaches to Jung’s works is the underlying consistency of his
thinking. Bergson has his own version of dual aspect monism, in his theory
of matter and memory. This leads to the suspicion that Jung was familiar
with some of this material, not least through his relationship with Flournoy,
and that it had a more profound impact on his thinking about symbols and
images than is realized. Ann Addison has made a solid case for Jung
thinking in terms of the psychoid as early as the Zofingia lectures, which
would again prime him not only for what would come by way of Pauli, but
also from Bergson. With all of this in hand it should be evident that the way
forward in understanding the theory of archetypes will have to take into
account a much more careful and fully developed understanding of Jung’s
own theorizing.
Finally, a brief word on the collective unconscious, and a hint about
archetypal images. Sonu Shamdasani has argued that it is important to read
Jung without Freud, a point of view he admirably follows through in his
Jung and the Making of a Modern Psychology (2003). This is a beneficial
and indeed important project, but the opposite may also be true; you can’t
read Jung without the interaction with Freud. This is where the collective
unconscious comes into the picture. Looking carefully at the debate Jung
had with Freud regarding the nature and analysis of dementia praecox,
particularly around the case of Daniel Paul Schreber, and the influence that
Schreber’s Memories of My Nervous Illness may have had on Jung’s
‘encounter with the unconscious’ and the composition of the Red Book, is
probably critical to understanding Jung’s notion of the collective
unconscious, and hence, the theory of archetypes (Freud 1958; Schreber
694 George B. Hogenson

2). In an essay on masochism Gilles Deleuze captures the essence of the issue:

That there are very different levels of the unconscious, of unequal origin and value,
arousing regressions which differ in nature, which have relations of opposition,
compensation and reorganization going on between them: this principle dear to
Jung was never recognized by Freud because the latter reduced the unconscious to
the simple fact of desiring.

(Deleuze 2004, p. 128)

Examining Jung’s position on the unconscious, and the importance of his

early work on psychosis will inform our understanding of Jung’s thinking
not only about the unconscious, but also about archetypes and the nature
of the archetypal image. Those topics, however, will have to await further
research.

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TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT

L’article passe en revue le cours suivi par la controverse autour de la théorie de Jung sur
les archétypes, commençant au milieu des années 1990 et jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Une partie
importante de la controverse s’attachait au débat entre l’essentialisme de la position
évolutionniste d’Anthony Stevens, telle qu’on la trouve dans son livre de 1984
698 George B. Hogenson

Archétype : Une histoire naturelle du Soi, et le modèle de l’émergence des archétypes

proposé sous des formes diverses par Hogenson, Knox et Merchant, entre autres. Cet
article s’intéresse ensuite à des avancées plus récentes dans la théorie, particulièrement
ce qui provient de l’examen du philosophe Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze introduit
l’inconscient somnambulique de Bergson dans le débat sur les théories de Jung. Il est
suggéré que cette influence sur Jung - à ce jour quasiment pas étudiée - pourrait
fournir des réponses à certaines des questions ouvertes entourant ses théories. L’article
conclut en suggérant que la notion d’inconscient somnambulique peut s’apparenter à
l’argumentation d’Atmanspacher soutenant une interprétation de Jung selon le modèle
d’un monisme à double aspect.

Mots clés: Archétypes, Emergence, Théorie des Systèmes Complexes, Deleuze,

Bergsoninconscient somnambuliquemonisme à double aspect

Der Artikel gibt einen Überblick über den Verlauf der Kontroverse um Jungs
Archetypentheorie, die Mitte der 1990er Jahre begann und bis heute andauert. Ein
Großteil dieser Kontroverse befaßte sich mit der Debatte zwischen dem Essentialismus
der evolutionären Position von Anthony Stevens, wie er in seinem 1984 erschienenen
Buch Archetype: A natural history of the self zu finden ist, und dem Emergenzmodell
der Archetypen, welches in Variationen von Hogenson, Knox und Merchant sowie
anderen vorgeschlagen wurde. Der Text wendet sich sodann einer Betrachtung von
neueren Entwicklungen in der Theorie zu, insbesondere solchen, die sich aus einer
Untersuchung des Philosophen Gilles Deleuze herleiten, der Bergsons
somnambulistisches Unbewußte in die Diskussion über Jungs Theorien einführt. Es
wird vermutet, daß dieser weitgehend unbeleuchtet gebliebene Einfluß auf Jung
Antworten auf einige der offenen Fragen im Zusammenhang mit seiner Theorie liefert.
Der Beitrag schließt mit dem Hinweis, daß der Begriff des somnambulistischen
Unbewußten Atmanspachers Argument für eine doppelaspektliche
Monismusinterpretation von Jung ähneln könnte.

Schlüsselwörter: SchlüsselwörterArchetypen, Emergenz, Theorie komplexer Systeme,

Deleuze, Bergson, somnambulistisches Unbewußtes, doppelaspektlicher Monismus

L’articolo riesamina l’evoluzione della controversia sulla teoria junghiana degli

archetipi a partire dalla metà degli anni ’90 e continuando fino ad oggi. Gran parte di
questa controversia riguardava il dibattito tra l’essenzialismo della posizione evolutiva
di Anthony Stevens, come riportato nel suo libro del 1984 Archetype: A natural
history of the self, e il modello degli archetipi come emergenti proposto in vari scritti
da Hogenson, Knox e Merchant, tra gli altri. L’articolo passa poi a considerare gli
sviluppi più recenti nella teoria, in particolare derivati da un esame del filoso Gilles
Deleuze, il quale introduce l’inconscio sonnambolico di Bergson nella discussione delle
teorie di Jung. Si suggerisce che questa influenza, perlopiù non considerata, su Jung
possa fornire risposte ad alcune delle domande ancora senza risposta che si riferiscono
alle sue teorizzazioni. L’articolo conclude affermando che la nozione di inconscio
sonnambolico potrebbe assomigliare all’argomentazione di Atmanspacher di
The archetype debate 699

un’interpretazione monistica a doppio aspetto di Jung.

Parole chiave: Parole chiaveArchetipi, emergenza, teoria dei sistemi complessi, Deleuze,
Bergson, inconscio sonnambolico, monistica a doppio aspetto

В статье представлен обзор дискуссии о теории архетипов Юнга, которая началась в

середине 90-х годов и продолжается по сей день. Большая часть дебатов была
посвящена обсуждению эссенциализма эволюционной позиции Энтони Стивенса,
описанного в его книге «Архетип: естественная история сэлф», и эмерджентной
модели, представленной взглядами Хогенсон, Нокс, Мерчант и другими. Далее в
статье рассмотрены более современные теоретические взгляды, в частности те,
которые проистекают из наблюдений философа Жиля Делезе, который сопоставляет
сомнамбулистическое бессознательное Бергсона и с теорией Юнга. Предполагается,
что это по бОльшей части неизученное влияние, оказанное идеями Бергсона на Юнга,
может дать ответы на не проясненные ответы, связанные с его теорией. В заключении
статьи предполагается, что сомнамбулистическое бессознательное может иметь
сходство с аргументом Атманшпахера в пользу дуального аспекта монизма в
интерпретации Юнга.

Ключевые слова: Ключевые словаархетипы, проявление (Emergence), теория

комплексов, Делез, Бергсон, сомнамбулистическое бессознательное, дуальный аспект
монизма

El trabajo presenta una revisión del curso de la controversia alrededor de la teoría de

arquetipos de Jung que comenzó a mediados de 1990 y continúa hasta el presente.
Mucho de dicha controversia consideraba el debate entre el esencialismo de la posición
evolutiva de Anthony Stevens tal como es encontrada en su libro de 1984 Arquetipo:
Una historia natural del self, y el modelo de emergencia propuesto por Hogenson,
Knox y Merchant, entre otros. El trabajo luego considera un desarrollo más reciente
en la teoría, que deriva particularmente de la examinación del filósofo Gilles Deleuze,
quien introduce el inconsciente sonambulístico de Bergson en la discusión de las
teorías de Jung. Se sugiere que esta influencia en Jung, largamente ignorada, puede
ofrecer respuestas a algunas de las preguntas no respondidas de su teoría. El trabajo
concluye sugiriendo que la noción de inconsciente sonambulístico puede parecerse al
argumento de Atmanspacher sobre una interpretación de Jung, monista de aspecto dual.

Palabras clave: Palabras claveArquetipos, Emergencia, Teoría de Sistemas Complejos,

Deleuze, Bergson, inconsciente sonambulístico, monismo de aspecto dual

文章回顾了始于二十世纪九十年代中期, 一致持续至今的, 围绕荣格原型理论所展开

的辩论。大多数的辩论都围绕着两个理论, 一个是Anthony Stevens在其1984年出版的专
著《原型:自我的自然历史》所论述的进化地位中的本质主义, 另一个是原型的涌现模
型, 这一理论由多位提及, 包括Hogenson, Knox 和Merchant等等。文章继续关注另一些
在理论上的近期发展, 特别是来自哲学家吉尔·德勒兹的检验, 他把伯格森梦游的无意识
700 George B. Hogenson

概念与荣格的理论结合起来进行讨论。文章认为, 这部分对荣格所产生的影响很大程
度上尚未被检验, 而它们可能会帮助我们解答荣格理论中那些尚未被解答的问题。文
章最后提出, 与梦游无意识的观点一致的是Atmanspacher所讨论的观点, 即用双面一元
论来解释荣格。

关键词: a 原型, 涌现, 情结系统理论, 德勒兹, 伯格森, 梦游无意识, 双面一元论

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