Fisher V Bell Case Note
Fisher V Bell Case Note
In this case, Chief Inspector of Police, George Fisher (appellant) alleged that shop owner,
James Charles Bell (respondent) had unlawfully offered a flick knife for sale, in breach of
On October 26th, 1959, at 3.15pm, police constable, John Kingston, noticed the knife in
question displayed in the respondent’s shop window with a ticket which read “Ejector
knife4s.”3 With reason to believe that the article was an illegal “flick knife”, he entered the
shop and asked to examine the knife. The respondent remarked that other policemen had
previously asked about the knives.4 After examining the knife, the police constable took it
away for further examination by a superintendent of police. Later that same day, he
returned and informed the respondent that the knife was a flick knife. The respondent said,
“Why do manufacturers still bring them around for us to sell?” 5 The constable informed the
respondent that he would be reported for illegally offering the knife for sale under the
The case was initially tried in the Magistrates’ Court in Bristol on February 3 rd, 1960. The
appellant argued that the respondent had offered the knife for sale within the meaning of
the 1959 Act by displaying the knife in the shop window with an accompanying tag in the
intention of attracting the attention of a buyer and selling it to them. The respondent
argued that he had “at no time offered the knife for sale” within the meaning of the 1959
1
Fisher v Bell (1961) P.394
2
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 Section 1(1)
3
Fisher v Bell (1961) P. 395
4
Ibid
5
Ibid
Act. The justices found that since the Act lacked a definition of the phrase “offer for sale” 6, it
must be interpreted in the way it is meant in the ordinary law of contract. Having the knife
on display in the shop window is merely an invitation to treat, and the court accordingly
dismissed the case. The appellant then appealed to the Queen’s Bench Division of the High
In his judgement, Lord Parker highlights the importance of the application of the literal rule
Weapons Acts. The Act reads “offer for sale”, and since it did not provide a definition of
what this entailed, the court is obliged to interpret this in the meaning outlined in the
ordinary principles of the law of contract. Accordingly, the display of the knife was not an
Lord Parker acknowledged that the application of this rule does not always result in a fair
outcome and can lead to an absurd decision that at first glance may seem ridiculous. He
explains in his judgement that “[I]n ordinary language, [the knife] is there inviting people to
buy it, and it is for sale; but any statute must of course be looked at in the light of the
general law of the country”.8 In legal terms, the knife being displayed for sale is simply
inviting customers to offer to buy it. It is not in itself an offer for sale, and the 1959 Act must
6
Fisher v Bell (1961) P. 396
7
Fisher v Bell (1961) P. 399
8
Fisher v Bell (1961) P. 399
be construed in accordance with this legal meaning. If the Act intended to prohibit a
situation that involved the display of an item for sale, it must include the words “exposing
for sale” or an alternative definition that enlarges the ordinary meaning of the term “offer
for sale.” Lord Parker exemplified this being employed in practice when he referred to the
Prices of Goods Act 19399 and the Goods and Services (Price Control) Act 194110.
Moreover, in his judgement, Lord Parker distinguished the present case from two of the
cases cited, Keating v Horwood (1926) and Wiles v Maddison (1943), both in which the
relevant Acts included the term “expose for sale”. In the latter, the Lord Chief Justice
explains that the display of an article in a shop window is an exposure of that article for
sale.11
I find it hard to disagree with Lord Parker’s judgement in this case of apparent casus
omissus, since parliament is assumed to know the laws of the country and since they have
previously worded legislation in a way that covers such situations, the court could have
extended the meaning of the term “offer for sale”. In the case of interpreting the supposed
intention of parliament, it is not the duty of the courts to write what legislature has not
Even if it were parliaments true intentions to prevent possession of such knives in this case,
one would argue that surely, they could have foreseen the potential consequence of
wording the act in a way that seems to overlook the situation of the exposure of these
9
Fisher v Bell (1961) P. 399
10
Ibid
11
Fisher v Bell (1961) P. 401
12
Fisher v Bell (1961) P. 400
13
St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation (1952) P. 189, 191
knives in a shop window. Nonetheless, it is not the responsibility of the court to interpret
this and therefore Lord Parker employed literal rule of interpretation and reluctantly
Conclusion
This case stands out as one of significance, exemplifying the importance of the fundamental
principles of the ordinary law. I find Lord Parker’s judgement to be thorough and perceptive,
demonstrating admirable recognition and consideration for how the ordinary language of a
layman would interpret the facts of the case and come to a rational conclusion that an
offense was committed. His judgment ultimately highlights the loopholes that can exist
within the laws that Parliament writes and that it is the duty of the courts to interpret the
actual legal meaning through employing the literal rule of statutory interpretation.
Although, it is to be noted that this can sometimes result in seemingly absurd rulings, which
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
Elliott C, and Quinn F, Elliott & Quinn's Contract Law (12th edn, Pearson 2019)