|| ei, AND BOER ZULU CONFLICT». SA byINTRODUCTION The Zulu var has alvays been a popular period with fiqure and dicrans modellers, a6 the many dioramas of the heroic defence of Rorke's Drift prove. But in the wargaming sense the period is very much the ‘poor relation’, despite the fact that most 2am figure ranges include this period. This is because most people vargeme vith a friend or in Societies vhere each person furnishes the opposing armies for a certsin period. Such an arrangement vorks perfectly vel vhere the opposing armies are fairly well balanced, but in the Zulu war, the major battles vere usually foucht with the Zulus out-nunbering the British at odds of between 15 and 20 to one. It is thus painfully obvious that if the usual arrangement is applied to an average British-Zulu battle, the person providing the British force needs between 1500 and 201") figures, vhilst the person providing the Zulu force needs between 1500 and 2UU0 figures, in order to maintain @ reelistic retio, Automatically the question is raised, "Who will provide the Zulus?!" A resourceful wargamer (and most are), will soon find a solution to this problem, belov are listed a feu of the more obvious methods: (4) Buy both armies yourself (this is @ costly method). (4i) If you wargame, (a) vith a friend - each of you buy half of the British and Zulu force, or (b) with a Society - everyone contribute equally to the provision of the required forces. (iii) Buy 0 fixed fraction of on average Zulu ermy force (20,000 men), and (a) bring on destroyed or routed units as nev units for the required nunber of times to equal a full Zulu force, or (b) double, treble or quadruple the ratio of ‘real’ men that a British figure represents and opply this to a Zulu figure, remembering to base the Zulu on a suitably increased base. The rules in the folloving passages are largely designed to fight the more static battles of the Zulu var, here the British stood firm and let the Zulus attack then, but they can be used to Simulate Boer-Zulu cattle raids of the fore-running ‘Great Trek" day I hope that these rules vill fill the gop left by the board and semi-board game rules covering this period, and help to promote this period for wargames purposes.Wargames Rules for ‘1879 Zulu War and Boer-Zulu Conflicts Index PAGE No SECTION 1 Historical backqround i Tactics Zulu Tactics 5 Boer Tactics 7 British Tactics 8 Pre 1879: Boer/Zulu Conflicts 9 SECTION 2 The Rules 10 Base Sizes 10 Setting up the Gane n Visibility 42 Sound 12 ind b Sentries irs Troop Formations v1 Orders 4 Signaling 15 Hovenent 15 Conbat 1 Firing 16 Hand to Hand Conbet 7 jeapon, Tactical & Randon Factors Tactical Factor Table 8 Notes on Fire-Pover 9 Casualties Risk to Army Commander Reaction of Units Arny Commander's Reaction Test Pout & Pursuit Winners & Losers CAMPAIGNS APPENDIX, 31 Smoke and the effect of vind. 33 Bibliography 34 Examples of Armies 34 Ground Scale Conversions. 34 © covyrignt Richard Tory & Tabletop ones Harch 1982 Cover illustration by Ian Cook. SECTION 1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (i)_THE cause In 1877 Sir Henry Bartle Edvard Frere, the newly appointed Covenor of the Cape Colony, arrived in Cape Town to carry out the policy of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, vhich was to achieve a federation of the South African states. There vere four major South African states, two under direct British rule (the Cape Colony and Natal), and two ruled by Boers (the Orange Free State and the Transvaal). The state of the economy in the Colonies combined vith the unstable native situation (both from internal native unrest and the fear in Natal of invasion from the neighbouring Zulu nation) convinced Frere that federation of the Colonies must happen quickly. In fact Frere became obsessed vith the belief that it was only the threat posed by the Zulu nation, with its standing army of approximately 50,000 varriors, that stood between him and his goal of federation. Frere therefore decided that the only feasible solution to his problem was the destruction of the Zulu var machine. The British Government did not want to be involved in any vers to acquire new territories because of the unstable world situation, therefore Frere used exaggerated reports and ninor border incidents to justify his proposed invasion of Zululand. By November 1878, the British preparations for invasion vere well advanced, all that vas nov needed vas an acceptable excuse to cross the borders of Zululand. The excuse vas to be created on the 1ith December vhen a Zulu delegation gathered to witness an ultimatum in tvo parts:~ The first part consisted of three demands to be met within 20 days, end involved handing over four Zulus for trial in Natal and a total fine of 600 head of cattle for their, and other border offences. The second part consisted of ten further demands to be met within 30 days, these vere: (3) Several more Zulus to be handed over for trial in the Transvaal. (44) No Zulu to be executed vithout an open trial, along British lines. (4ii) The disbandment of the Zulu army. (iv) The abandonnent of the present military systen. (v) Every Zulu vas to be free to marry on reaching maturity. (vi) ALL missionaries and converts vho had fled Zululand in 1877 vere to be permitted to return to their mission stations. (vii) AlL missionaries vere to be free to teach as they pleased. (viii) A British diplonatic resident vas to reside in Zululand to enforce these provisions. (ix) Any dispute involving a Euopean wes to be heard in public in the presence of the King and of the British resident. (x) No sentence of expulsion from Zululand to be carried out without the approval of the British resident. Failure to comply with all of the conditions would result in @ state of var existing between Britain and Zululand. The conditions of the ultimatum vere intended by Frere to be such that the Zulus vould find it impossible to comply, even if they had wished to do 80. Consequently, on the morning. of the 11th January 1879, three separate British ‘army columns crossed the Tugela river, vhich formed the Natal-Zululand border. The Zulu var had begun. iTRANSVAAL, THE SITUATAT IN Int Seurd AREA 187A, (41) _ BRITISH SE MACKS, Fron the outset things looked promising from the British point of view, as Colonel Evelyn Wood's left flank colunn had been successfully engaged in raiding Zululand since the 2nd January 1879 and had already captured sone 2,000 head of cattle. As the main invasion got under way the British central column launched a minor attack in which the Kreal of @ local Induna (chieftain) vas put to the torch, some twenty Zulus vere killed, and 500 head of cattle were siezed. Little then happened until the 22nd January uhen the Zulus retaliated in ernest as two columns, the right flank and the central, were attacked on the same day. The right flank column, conmanded by Colonel Charles Pearson, vas attacked by 6 Zulu force of approximately 6,000 warriors. The attack occurred uhen the column vas still someuhat dispersed after crossing the Inyezane river. Luckily thie force vas relatively Snall.and its attack vas beaten vith the loss of only eleven British dead and sixteen ‘wounded. The central column, commanded by Colonel Glyn and accompanied by Leiutenant Generel Lord Chelmsford (the over-all conmander of the British invesion forces), vas camped at the base of @ large hill, vhich formed the southern end of @ broad spur running from the Nqutu plateau to the north. Isandhivana, the Zulu name (meaning "the place like the stonach of an ox') for the hill that dominated the camp site, had a shape that reminded ‘any of @ crouching beast, rather like the sphinx on the badge of the 24th Reginent. On the morning of the 22nd, Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn led off half the central column, sone six conpenies of infantry and four artillery pieces, out from the camp to engage vhet wae believed to be the advance guard of the ‘main Impi' that vas knovn to be in the area. The remainder of the colunn (consisting of six companies of infantry, two field guns, ‘and ‘some 800 natives) was left under the command of Colonel Pulleine, vith orders to defend the camp. The Zulus did not intend ettacking the British on that dey, but a party of mounted scouts inadvertently stumbled on the main Zulu force, thus causing the Zulus to attack the Isandhlvana camp. The Inpi vas between 20,000 and 25,000 verriors strong. 2 The battle lasted until about 2.00 p.m. vhen the Zulus totally over-ran the Aritish camp. In this battle, still considered as one of the British Army's greatest defeats, the British lost 1,329 dead (858 Europeans and 471 natives) as against approximately 2,000 Zulu dead. On the Tugela river, sone ten miles avay from Isandhivana, there stood the mission station of Rorke's Drift. This vas the starting point for the central colum and was also being used as a supply depot. A force of 4,000 Zulus, acting as reserve troops at Isandhlvana, vas led to attack the garrison of Rorke's Drift by Cetshvayo's brother, Dabulamanzi (Cetshwayo was the Zulu King). The defenders numbered 139, of vhon 104 vere fit for action (conmanded by Lieutenant John Merriott Chard of the Royal Engineers, vhose only qualification was his technical seniority over Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead vho conmanded the infantry company stationed at Rorke's Drift). After tvelve hours of fighting, the Zulus retired, leaving 400 dead and the defences virtually intact. British casualties vere fifteen dead and ten wounded, a total of eleven V.C.'s vere received by defenders of Rorke's Drift. Although all major British offensive activity came to a halt with the Isandhivana disaster, one more military disaster vas to occur before fortune turned in their favour. On 12th March, @ company of the 80th Regiment, conmanded by Captain David Moriarty, vas guarding @ convoy of supply wagons waiting to cross the Intonbi river at Myer's Drift. In the early hours of that morning, about 1,000 Zulus over-ran their camp, killing 79 British for less than 50 of their own number. By this date, massive reinforcements vere arriving from Britain, which meant that the defeat of Zululand vas only a matter of time. (ii) THE FALL_OF ZULULAND Folloving the early military disaster of Isandhlvana, and later on the Intonbi river, an outery in Britain resulted in a massive influx of reinforcements to Natal. The final total of troops and ordinance available to Lord Chelmsford was to reach about 23,000 men (16,000 Europeans and 7,000 natives) and about thirty field and Gatling guns, consisting of some fifteen infantry battalions, tvo regular cavalry regiments, approx- imately 800 menbers of the naval brigade, ebout five artillery batteries, as vell as the colonial volunteers and natives. In addition to these reinforcements, Lord Chelmsford also received four Major-Generals in ansver to his request for one Major-General to assist in his administration duties. As the first of the reinforcements beqan to arrive, Lord Chelmsford began organising a relief column at the lover drfit, on the Tugela river, in order to extricate Colonel Pearson's right flank column, which was trapped in 4 defensive position at the Eshoue Mission Station (about 25 miles inside Zululand). At this time, Lord Chelmsford vas not prepared to fight @ major battle, therefore he requested Colonel Wood to use his left flank column as a diversionary force to attract the Zulus avay from his relief column. The diversion planned by Colonel Wood, was to attack a Zulu stronghold an a thousand feet high, five miles long and one mile vide, table-top mountain, called Hlobane. This natural fortress vas defended by approximately 4,000 Zulu verriors, whilst Wood intended attacking vith about 1,700 mounted Europeens and natives. The assault was launched before dan on 28th March. At first all vent well as Colonel Buller's force of 1,075 men reached the plateau (the 640 men under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Russell attacked from the opposite side and met vith less success). By 10.30 a.m. the assault had degenerated into a disorderly retreat, as a Zulu force in the region of 20,000 varriors strong had errived en route for the main camp of the left flank column. The raid on Hlobane cost the lives of at least 94 mounted volunteers and achieved nothing, as the Zulus had already sent troops to attack Colorel Wood's column at Kambula. A Zulu force of approximately 22,000 men attacked the camp at Kanbula at noon on the 29th March. This attack was easily repulsed for British losses of 28 dead and 65 wounded compared with 3 knoun total of 785 Zulu dead.At 6.00 a.m. on the 29th March, the Eshove relief column, under the personal command of Lord Chelmsford, began its journey to extricate Colonel Pearson's garrison. Lord Chelmsford vas anticipating an attack upon his relief colunn, and so on the morning of the 2nd April, he decided to keep his vagons laagered (there vere in fact tvo reasons for doing this, the first ves to allow the ground to dry after torrential rain, and the second vas'to give the Zulus a chance to attack vhilst he vas best prepared to meet them) It vas shortly after 6.00 a.m. on that morning vhen some 10,000 Zulus, vith another 2,000 in reserve, launched themselves at the British positions. The British fire vas devastating, killing about 900 Zulus before they retreated one snd a half hours later. British losses vere eight dead, forty-one vounded. Eshove vas relieval the following day. There vas now a period of relative inactivity as the reinforcements completely arrived, acclimatized, and vere organised, ready for the second and final invasion. Among the reinforcements vas Louis Napoleon, the Prince Imperial of France. The Prince Inperial's officiel status whilst out in Zululand vas that of ‘spectator’, despite this the Prince was so determined to actively participate in some vay that he was finally offered, and accepted, the post of Assistant to the Quarternaster-General. One of the duties of this assignment vas the scouting of possible lines of advance for the invasion. In fact it vas on one such scouting mission (on the very day that the second invasion was launched, Ist June) that the Prince and his eight escort were anbushed by some forty Zulus, the Prince and tuo troopers vere killed. The political repercussions vere equal to those experienced after the Isandhlvana disaster. Despite the tragedy of the Prince Inperial's death, the invasion continued. By the 3rd July the invading forces were within a day's march of the Zulu capital of Ulundi. On the aorning of the 4thJuly Lord Chelmsford left his well defended and laagered camp and marehed vith a force of 4,000 Europeans, 1,100 natives, plus 12 field and 2 Gatling guns to do battle with the Zulu ary, The British formed a large square, vith an outer cavalry screen, on the Mahlabatini Plain, about one and a half miles from Ulundi. When it cane the Zulu attack lasted about three quarters of en hour, the result ves a foregone conclusion as the Zulus were decimated by the veight of the British fire. The casualties as aluays, vere heavily imbalanced as the Zulus lost some 1,500 dead against the paltry British loss of twelve dead, eighty-eight wounded. The King's Kraal at Ulundi was burned dovn, but Cetshwayo vas not tsken prisoner until late July (by which time most of the invasion forces vere recalled to Natal, and Lord Chelmsford had been replaced by Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley). The Zulu var could now be said to be over, but it had béen very costly for Britain in veral ways: (4) The British ermy ouffered its worst defeat at the hands of a non-European arny. (4i) Total var casualties vere 1,933 dead and 1,624 wounded, or disabled (due to either conbat or illness). (iii) This unwanted var had cost the Treasury £5,230,323. Although the var vas brought to a successful military conclusion, it was a political failure as Sir Bartle Frere was still no closer to achieving a Federation of the South African States (his sole reason for starting the var). /Major Redvers Henry Buller, V.C. SiCetshwayoRtan 4 TACTICS ATEST OF TRADITIONAL METHODS In 1879, as the British began their invasion of Zululand, the tuo armies that vere about to meet in battle vere in no doubt at all as to the course of the forthcoming var. Roth armies had their ovn methods of vaging war, vhich on reflection seemed to conpiiment one another. For the British normally waged var against large native forces by fighting defensive battles (depending upon their fire-pover to ‘beat off’ the attacks of the natives), vhilst the Zulus tried to surround their enemies (to prevent any escaping) and ther. depended upon speed and weight of numbers to close with and annihilate them, Neither army vas accustomed to its tactics failing, therefore the forthcoming hatt les could be assimilated to the irresistable force (the Zulus) meeting the immovable object (the British). Given individually below are the tactics used by the Zulus (rightful inhabitents of the region), the Boers (uho first tried to dispossess the Zulus of their land) and the British (who were launching the nineteenth century equivalent of @ 'pre-enprive strike"). ZULU TACTICS ~ Nation forming methods (4) CONCEPTS LEADING TO_THE TACTICS DEVELOPMENT As Napoleon Boneparte's military career ves coming to on end in Furope, a young man, by the name of Shaka, vas ascending to the throne of an insignificant South African tribe knovn as Zulu.’ Having served several years in the army of the dominant native kinadom in his region (rising rapidly through the ranks), Shaka had disagreed vith the political and military methods of his chosen leader. Warfare as the Basuto people knev it, consisted of battles which were fought by prior arrangement, which because of the weapons (light throwing spears), and unimaginative tactics (both opponent forces stand in parallel lines throving spears at one-another), proved relatively bloodless in relation to the nunbers involved. But Shaka, unable to see any logic in throwing ones veapon avay, developed a hand-to-hand conbat ‘technique ‘and a new spear to go vith it. This nev spear, known as the 'ixua'thad a head approximately ten inches long and two inches vide (at its widest point) mounted on a thick, vell balanced three foot shaft end ves vealded in the manner of a Roman short sword. Shaka also introduced a nev concept to Basuto warfare vhereby, instead of just defeating the opponent's army and extracting a fine of cattle, the opponent's army's ability to vage var vas removed; the ruling family vere put to death and the defeated tribe integrated into the Zulu nation. (ii) The Tactics The hand-to-hand conbat technique introduced by Shaka comprised of hooking ones shield behind that of your opponent; folloved by a poverful back-hended sveep to throw him off balance; whilst simultaneously preventing him from using his veapon and exposing his left arm pit to @ thrust of the ixva assegai. sc named because the Zulu pronunciation of ixva imitates the ‘sucking’ sound created by vithdraving the Assegai (Zulu vord for spear) from en opponent's body. 5The offensive use of the Zulu shield in combat The shield is forced forvard and across the surface of the opponent's shield The Zulu method of attack KNOWN AS THE "BULLS HEAD’ FORMATION os [s|=> LOINS HORN | ean || HORN | Loins 2) The horns of the Zulu ition rush ahead of the centre, vhich continues to advance. The enemy, surprised and confused for’ halts. 6 Loins The left edge of the shield is taken beyond and hooked around the left edge of the opponent 's shield. 1) The battle begins HEAD A powerful back-hand sweep throws the opponent off balance, vhilst his left armpit is exposed to a thrust of the Zulu 'ixwa! Assegai. This method leaves the Zulu's left covered, whilst hampering his opponent's efforts by pushing his shield across his front. 3) The horns envelope the enemy whilst the head expands it's frontage to engage the enemy, the loins act as a toctical reserve. Once Shake hed taught hig men this new combat method he made them discard their sandles (similar to modern flip-flops) hich fccvtitated speedier movenent. The Zuiu army vas then formed into Impis (regiments vhich in turn were brigaded together to form the different sections of the ‘Bull's head’ tactical formation. A Zulu army always adopted this formation; hich vas divided into four sections: the two Flanking sections vere known es the horns, vhilst the central section vas known as the head, and the Fourth section vas knoun as the loins. The function of these different sections vere: (a) The Horns = to encircle the enemy and prevent his escape. (b) The Head - to engage the enemy frontally and allov the horns to carry out their task. (c) The Loins - to act as a tactical reserve and reinforce any part of the Zulu ring that looked like it might be veakening. BOER TACTICS In the four years of conflict (1838-1842) between Boer and Zulu, the battles fought vere of two basic types. The most conmon type of Boer-Zulu battle was in the form of large-scale ‘hit and runt Boer cattle raids. In these battles the Boer Conmandos vere usually about 300 strong, whilst the Zulu strength depended largely on their state of preparedness and consequently it varied between one and fivet Impis (approximetely 800 - 6,000 men). To Fight such battles the Boers depended upon surprise and accurate rifle fire for the initial ‘shock’ effect, to make the Zulus fall back, and their horses to provide the necessary mobility for survival when trying to out-run the re-organised Zulus. Obviously the Boers, at all tines, tried to prevent close contact vith the Zulus; as this usually resulted in death. Consequently such battles vere very fluid, in terms of tactical movement, as the Zulus attempted to surround the Boers and the Boers endeavoured to prevent them. The least conmon type of Boer-Zulu battle (though more conmon the the ‘high-veldt' against the Matabele) was in a form familiar to all vho have seen Hollywood's portrayal of ‘How the West vas von', namely forming vagon circles (Leagers - to the Boers). In such battles the Boers vould have between 400 and 600 men (vho actually fought, meanuhile the women and children loaded spare rifles) whilst the Zulus attacked with about ten is (approximately 10,000 - 15,000 men). Unlike Hollywood wagon-trains, the Boers rarely formed one single laager, instead they vould form tuo lagers to qive mutual fire support. In very large Boer 'treking’ parties, © third laager, to act as a cattle pen, vas often formed between the two defended leagers. The Boers fighting the Zulus only ever had one field-gun at their disposal, but in sone of the later large treks into the Transvaal, several field-guns (and on one occasion even a Gatling-gun) were taken along. ‘This is an assumption as little is known of the Zulu contingents in such ‘spontaneous! battles. The experience gained by the Boers vhen fighting the Matabele led to the development of the highly successful defensive tactics shoun. This involved forming three Laagers, the smallest and central Laager acted as a cattle pen vhilst the two larger ones provided supporting fire for each other. Note:- Field and Gatling guns vere not always available, and sometimes the snaller Laager vas done avayBRITISH TACTICS The way in-which the British government, and people, expected vars of coloniel expansion to be von (quickly, decisively. and cheaply) ves to greatly influence the nethads enployed by the Generals in’'local' command of the war zone. The emphasis was therefore on deploying the mininun of Imperial (regular, or ‘professional’ British) troops and bringing the enemy's army to battle at the eerliest possible opportunity. To achieve their aim, the British Commanders adapted @ besic infantry drill movement, the Battalion Square, into @ formation that encompassed their entire army force. Instead of each infantry battalion forming its ovn square, all Imperial infantry formed one massive square, vith field-guns (and, vhen introduced, Gatling-quns) posted at the corners. Cavalry, locel volunteer units, non-conbatants and all supplies vere kept within the confines of the infantry and artillery square, the cavalry vere alloved to venture out only for scouting purposes; or to pursue a beaten foe. The entire British column would march in this manner vherever the terrain permitted, to facilitate @ speedy response to surprise attacks. In order to bring the enemy's army to battle quickly, the British rarely attempted to make their movenents a secret. More often than not, battles vere fought on ground — chosen by the British Commander, as vhen @ favourable spot was reached (usually @ vide ‘open plain) he vould make canp and avait the eneny's onslaught. sn Fighting the Zulus, the British vould form their wagons into lager. But unlike yw Geities lecges vas intenced purely to orotect Ue Semight cumn ofa slaughter animals, the infantry being expected to stand in the open and hold off the Zulu attacks with veight of fire pover. y though British field orders for the Zulu var stated that vhenever a colunn halted overnight, @ loaner should be constructed (and surrounded, if practicable, by a trench) not every Conmander sav the need for such ‘extravagant’ procedures. Similarly not every column marched in the rigid square formation, the Conmanders settling for a ragged line of infantry companies on each side of the vagon column. Apart from the dictates of terrain, or circumstance, such laxity in folloving the field orders reflected incompetence in certain Conmanders and the prevailing sense of over-confidence felt by all Inperial Officers (especially before the Isandhlvana disaster). BRITISH INFANTRY BATTALION BRITISH TNVASTON cOLUIa\ OF 8 COMPANTES. IN’ SQUARE ca ran tlc PORATION 2.0 yds 7oyds MOUNTED Trot 130 yds 140 yds 120 yds 110yds_ INFANTRY Canter 175 yds 185 yds 165 yds 155yds Gallop/charge} 265 yds 275 yds 255 yds | 245yds (4) AL types of gun (Field and Gatling) move 1s, or half infantry valk speed if being nan-handled. Pa Pes ee ane a eae (i) Two wheeled wagons move 70yds, and four vheeled vagons move S0yds. (411) Pack animals (eg. mules) move’at the speed of the foot troops they are vith, or reduce all cavalry to 1l0yds per move. (iv) All troops move 20yds vhen cravling (incuring no penalties for poor terrain). MOVEMENT PENALTIES 1. Any infantry unit passing through the ranks of stationary (eq. lying, crouching)” friendly, infantry unit(s), must reduce its speed by 5 (if the stationary unit(s) present an obstacle of more than 3 figures in depth) until it has completely passed through the stationary unit(s). 2. (a) To turn through 90° eg. changing formation from line to column, takes \ of a nove. (b) To lie down or get up takes % of a move. 3. To turn through 180, mount/dismount, or start fron concealed positions takes 4 of a move. 4. To traverse rough, soft or hilly ground: (a) Cavalry -40 yds from move (b) Tefantry, vagons, etc. -20 yds from nove (Should a conbination of these ground conditions be ecountered then the above penalties are to be miltiplied by 14). 5. Fighting Retreats: Carried out vhen wishing to vithdray in the face of the enemy, €g. vhen anbushed If carried out by: (a) Infantry, or cavelry firing from the saddle, -\ of their move (valk or trot for the respective troops) and count ss firing on the move. (b) Cavalry vishing to fire dismounted -% of their move (trot) and count their firing as normal for dismounted troops. 6. To cross dongas (vater courses). Pa| TyPe OF DONGA Infantry and cavalry units may change AND PENALTY INCURRED |formation from column to line in order (IN MOVES) PER FIGURE |to reduce crossing tines. | Sul [If the banks of the donga have been Jmade less steep by engineers/pioneero, ———— reduce the movement penalty for Infentry Jwagons by %. Cavalry | 2 Wheeled Wagons, | Field/Gatling Guns, ete. \ TYPE OF TROOPS OR EQUIPMENT 4 Wheeled Wagons 7. To Cross Rivers (@) By Ford - (i) Infantry cross at % run speed. | (ii) Cavalry cross at % trot speed. (iii) AL] wheeled equipment and vagons cross at % respective speeds. (b) By Pontoon Ferry ~ (i) Ferry crosses river at 20 yds per move. (i) Infantry/Cavalry take 2 moves to enbark/disenbark and tine for ferry to cross. (4ii) All vheeled equipment and small vages take 4 moves to enbark/disembark and time for ferry to cross. | (iv) 4 wheeled wagons take 6 moves to enbark/disenbark and tine for ferry to cross. (c) A mass of infantry in colunn (vith arms linked) can cross a river as in (a)(i), but the column must beat least 2 figures wide and long enough to equal the vidth of the river. (4) Individual infentry figures can cross a river as in (8)(i) vith a loss of 2/15th of a figure per nove take to cross the river. (e) Any nunber of cavalry figures can cross a river at x trot speed. 8. To Change Fornetion (within a single unit) fron Column to Line and Vice-versa. T) Infantry expand/contract their frontage by two figures per move. (ii) Cavalry and Zulus expand/contract their frontage by four figures per move. All formation changes must take place vhilst the body of troops involved are at the halt. 9. When altering the dispositions of a major force, all movenent is to be carried out at either the valk/run, for infantry, or the trot/gallop for cavalry. COMBAT FIRING TIMING: Firing is normally carried out after 011 movement has been completed. AMMUNITION ) SUPPLY: This is not taken into consideration as assuming each man has 70 rounds of ammunition, and fires no more than three rounds per move, it vill take him at least 23 moves to exhaust his personal ammunition supply. This number of moves has proved, in test gemes, usually to be more than adequate to complete even large ganes. ARCS OF FIR The calculation of arcs of fire is explained at the rear of the conbat section, vhere the ‘Arc of Fire Card’ is illustrated. By placing this card in front of a figure(s) it is possible to determine vhat eneny units can be Fired upon without moving the Firing figure(s). 16 FIRING OVERHEAD: Figures standing in the backs of wagons or cavalry firing from the saddle cen fire over the heads of friendly infantry figures providing: (i) They are within 200 yds of the infantry over uhom.they are firing. (ii) The eneny are no closer than 150 yds in front of the friendly infantry (except vhen the friendly infantry are closer than 50 yds, when they can fire until the enemy are vithin 50 yds of the friendly infantry). Any troope cen fire over the heads of friendly units, until the eneny are within 100 yds of the friendly units, providing: (i) They are on ground’ higher then that on vhich the friendly unit is standing. (4i) The friendly unit is crouching or lying doun. FIRING ON THE MOVE: All troops, except artillery or Gatling guns, can fire on the nove. Natives can throv assengais on the move without incurring any penalty. FIRING INTO A MELEE: ALL Figures actively engaged in hand-to-hand conbat are not eligible as targets. CREW SERVED WEAPONS: For ease of casualty calculation, crew served vespons are classified in terms of British infantry figures. The classifications are: (4) Gatling guns equal six infantry figures. (ii) Field guns equal four infantry figures. (iii) Rocket tubes equal tuo infantry figures. NOTE: Before Firing Gatling guns, throv a single die, a score of one results in the gun jamming for that move, any other score results in the gun firing normally. HAND to HAND COMBAT TIMING: Hand-to-hand combat is normally carried out after all movenent and firing has been completed. However, if troops are in contact vith a retreating enemy vho vill pass out of reach during the movenent period, it is sone~ times convenient to assess casualties before movenent is carried out. FIGURES ELIGIBLE 10 Figures or models are able to take part in hand-to-hand combat ift FIGHT: (i) They are in full or partial base to base contact vith en eneny to their front. (ii) They are extending a line of contact to overlap the enemy force by up to four figures on the eneny's unshielded side or rear, or up to two figures on the enemy's shielded side (Europeans obviously have no shielded side). (iii) They are crew figures of artillery or Gatling gun models, they count as one figure in melee (irrespective of the runber of figures actually on the base). WEAPON, TACTICAL and RANDOM FACTORS WEAPON FACTORS: These are used in conjunction with tactical and randon factors as vell as the number of figures firing to calculete casualties. The factors for different weapons at certain ranges are given in the table overleaf. 7TACTICAL These are factors which may affect the accuracy and effect of rifle fire, or WEAPON FACTORS (cont inued) FACTORS the fighting ability of troops in melee. Such factors are given belov: —— WEAPON FACTORS COMBATANT 'S, faneco: ORTTISH. |. Paste NATAL] snug T ESTO STANCE IMPERIALS| vohavterag| KAFFIRS COMBATANT 'S BRITISH NATAL STANCE EMO Ronee, INPERIALS |vottwrters | KAFFIRS | 7ULUS Infantry, | Hunting knife, Knobker-| say t= Z| Dismounted} ries, Bayonet, Sword, 0 0 1 Short : c les 2] cavairy + | Assegoi 0-200yds Q| Artittery [Light throving aa | Wedium 2 3 D ry is j Asseget 201-500yds | 2 Lance z Rifle or Carbine | Lo = ane = 501-700yd 2 2 | - rs Infantry | S¥°Fé L [Sor8Sotoyd6 | 8 a2) vi le TACTICAL FACTORS | [Store z 3 Icuropean infantry charaing @ ‘steody' Eneny taken by surprise, or in | | _0-50vds laulu force. flank/rear_(for melee). Hediun 1 2 jounted troops fidhting to cross | Defending doors/vindovs of |__51-100yds ldefended obstacle. ~? 1 European buildings. Revolver Tong 0 I lsentry figure Firing blind et enemy Cavalry cherging/pursving vith 101-200yds zal jin _darkness/mist. [Extreme ‘oot troops attacking baracedes oF If range markers set outs 201-300yde, ff uropean Buildings. | Short 3 3 ‘ring vhilst_on the move. 0-200yds [Target moving ectoss field of Tire. Defending Taager, or earth warks7 Gatling Guns |” Hediun 2 2 arget moves % or less of max. -1|_palisedes. (2 Gun = 6 Figs) _|-201-200y¢8 Jdistance, then lies doun. Tf enemy charge about to make (On casualty teble)|) tO" 1 ey llarget behind hard cover/crouching imminent contact. Y 501-700yds } lor_lying down. Mounted troops charging/pursuing Extrene | Heligy fire ate daneeas/aiats —] with sword. 701-1000yds |_0 oe “pesboyd 3 FACTOR: This is added to the totel veapon and tacticel fectors. To celeulete the Field Guns Tiediun random factor, thro one green or red ‘average’ die (numbered 2,3.3,444,5) 301-600yde 2 1 counting minus and one blue or black die counting plus. The rendon factor (1 Gun = 4 Figs ae is the difference betueen the die scores, i.e. a plus score of 5 end a (On cosualty table)! 661 i2o0yde| 5 minus score of 3 gives a random fector of +2. extrane r NOTE: Stationary European troops Firing rifles or revolvers cannot qo belov: (a) =I on the Casualty Table uhen on foot, snd (b) =2 on the Casualty Table uhen mounted. Rocket Troughs |_0-300yde & Tubes Tediun 7 301=600yds 1 trough = 2 figs) ° (Tobe = 3 Fige)] bo oaa | 2 Notes on Fire-Power dn casualty table. |-E pape apotets00yde | 72 THE BOERS: Being born marksmen they have @ high Fire-pover factor, to illustrate this hor ability and also to compensate for then generally Fighting in groups no 0-200yde 2 * 0 2 bigger than about 200-300 men (approximately 13-20 figures). Tlediun ; 2B Sor ches THe 201-500yds BRITISH: Have @ feirly high fire-power because it vas mainly their ability to keep us Rifle or Carbine |[~ Long a : 7 up an accurate volley-Fire that stopped the Zulus. a po fone we mae ze 701-1000,ds | _~} 0 oe KAFFIRS: Have @ poor Fire-pover factor to reflect their lack of training vith rifles, BS eee SH due to a shortage of rifles for their use. Therefore no more than one 32 0-S0yde 1 2 Figure in ten should be represented as possessing a rifle, as this vas the éz Hedium T teal life ratio. 0 1 2 51-100yde THE ZULUS: Have the vorst fire-pover Factor as many of then disliked the recoil, or Revolver tong 0 ‘kick’ and so they tended to fire rifles as arms’ length, thus reducing 101-200 yds accuracy dramatically. The factor is not even altered in a post Isandhlvana Extrene 7 3 ’ battle, because even though more rifles and anqunition vere available to __ || 201-300 yes. 19 18allow greater practice, the Zulus invariable fired high. A reasonable number of riflemen in a Zulu impi is: (2) one figure in fifteen, in a pre-Isandhlvana force, and (b) one figure in eight or nine in a post- Isandhivana force. Volley-fire was usually opened at ranges between 600 and 800 yds (i.e. 700yde or long range). Any firing outside volley-fire renge must be carried out by no more than three figures per British conpany, or by any number of Boers, natives, Gatling/field guns, or rocket tubes. For every two Zulu rifle carrying Figures lost in one move, one figure is by an ordinary figure (this can only happen uhen the riflemen are integrated with an impi). The arc of fire is derived by drawing diagonal lines from the front corners to the rear corners of the figures base. The point where the tvo lines being fired actually i (see example of a field gun base below) Position of field ‘gm in real life : TO ie eect tesa « cavalry and Zulus. = Mounted cavalry Gatling guns/Rocket tubes 4 = 7/9Pdr field guns CASUALTIES CASUALTY CALCULATION Onee you have calculated the appropriate veapon factor (by combining the original veapon factor vith any applicable tactical factors, as vell es the random factor) read don the column on the extrene left of the table overleaf until you reach the corresponding number. Now read across until you reach the colunn headed by a nunber equal to the hunber of your own troops firing or fighting. The nunber in the box vhere row and column intersect gives the number of ‘real’ enemy troops vho become casualties. Divide this figure by 15, remove that nunber of figures, and carry any remainder forvard, Figures removed as casualties should be taken from the edge of the formation vhich Facet the source of the highest casualties inflicted (be it front, rear, or flank). If the body of men is in @ one deep formation (eg. European’ infantry), the above applies. Except vhere the source of casualties is from along the longest side of the formation as multiple figure casualties should be taken from several points in the line - thus creating several small gaps, rather than one large one. Several units fighting in one combined force should have casualties recorded separately. 20 OF OWN FIGURES 13 14/15/16 17 Th 2023 24 @[1O]13 15 17 192125 25 28 29131133 37 40 44 [49152 5862] €7 | 10 |12[15 16 19 22]24[29 32 35 59/4245 50 54 59/63/68 73 77] Bh 12]15/17 20 25 25/29/31 34 38 41/44/49 53 58 61/65/70 74 79] 85 9 11 15/17/20 23 25 29|31|34 38 41 44|49/53 58 61 65/70/74 79 85] 91 I 13 17/20]23 25 29 3134/38 41 44 49/53/58 61 65 70/74]79 65 91] 98 13 15 20|23|25 29 31 34|38|41 44 49 53/58/61 65 70 74|79|85 91 98/105 15-17 23]25]29 31 34 38]41]4a 49 53 58]61/65 70 74 79|85|91 98 105 ]120 5 17 23 25|29]31 34 38 41|44]49 53 58 61/65|70 74 79 85|91/98 105 120/131 NOTE: (1) Any factor going below -5 has a zero effect. (i) Any Factor going above 7 is to be counted as for 7. EXAMPLES One company of imperial infantry (eight Figures), protecting @ supply colum, open volley fire on @ small Zulu force following the column. At @ range of 650 yards the British have @ veapon factor of 1. In this case no tactical factors apply. The green dice scores 4, the blue dice 3, so that the random factor 15-1. Factors total 0, 80 eight figures cause 17 casualties. One Zulu figure is removed, and tuo ‘surplus cesualties are cerried forvard. If the Zulu figure removed is rifle armed, it still counts as firing that period, as firing is assumed to be simultaneous. One field gun fires on a Zulu impi that moves across its front. The veapon factor, at a range of 500 yarde is 2. Tactical factors ere -1, because the Zulus are moving across the gun's field of fire. The green dice scores 3, the blue dice 5, so that the rendon factor is +2. Factors total 3, so one gun (equal'to four figures) causes 15 casualties. One Zulu figure is removed, and there are no surplus casualties to carry forward. A 2ulu impi (ten figures in width) in base contact with an imperial infantry company in the open. In hand-to-hand combat, the Zulus have a weapon factor of 2. No tactical factors apply. The green dice scores 2, the blue dice 4, so that the random factor is +2. Factors total 4, so ten figures cause 34 casualties. Tvo British figures are venoved, and four surplus casualties are carried forward. One British Figure is Defending a Barricade against Two Zulu Figures. (4) The British figure has a veapon factor of 0. Tectical factors are +1 for being behind a berricade. The green dice scores 3, the blue dice 4, so the rendom factor is +1. Factors total 2, so one figure causes 5 casualties. (4i) The Zulu figures get 9 veapon factor of 2. Tactical factors are —1 as the Zulus are foot troops attacking @ barricade. The green dice scores 5, the blue dice 2, s0 the random factor is -3. Factors total -2, so tvo figures cause one casualty, So in the first round of melee the British cone out on top. RISK TO THE ARMY COMMANDERS The nature of most battles to be fought will not involve erny commanders in hand-to-hand conbat, neither should he be exposed to rifle or any other kind of fire. However, should unexpected circumstances involve the army commander's figure in suffering casualties, consult the table overleaf. 21SCORE REQUIRED Ti KILL arty | WOUND ARiY COMMANDER | COMMANDER CASUALTIES ON | NO, OF ‘AVERAGE FIGURE (IN%) DIE TO BE THROWN 15. 10. 3 Automatic a REACTION OF UNITS On the battlefield many factors affect the way men act. These factors acting upon the morale of @ unit may cause that unit to react in ouch a manner that a battle may be von, or lost, as a result of that unit's reaction. The factors affecting 3 unit's morale are simulated on the wargames table by a reaction test. Certain types of troops in the Zulu var had fairly predictable reations to different circumstances, and so are not required to test their reaction. These troops cre: 1. British Imperial troops. Boers and other European volunteers. Natal native pioneers, and, mounted Basutos. The above troops, as they io not test for reaction, follow standard procedures vhen faced vith differing cir-unstances:~ 1. BRITISH IMPERIAL TROOPS (FOOT) = vill always stand Firm unless the situat!on deteriorates to such an that the battle as a hole is obviously lost. In such circumstances individual figures, or, units may try to "fight their vay out’ (back ong the route of adva 2, BRITISH IMPERIAL | PS (CAVALRY) PLUS BOERS AND EUROPEAN VOLUNTEERS - will fight delaying actions, as they are intended for scouting and pursuing a beaten foe, and vill attempt to ‘drov-off! Zulus fron infantry units that have been surprised whilst on the march, or, are engaged in fighting retreats. 3. NATAL NATIVE PIONEERS, AND MOUNTED GASUTOS - vill follow the lead of the European troops to which they are either attached or which they most closely resemble in regard to their troop type (foot or cavalry), Troop types to be tested for reaction:~ 1, NATAL NATIVE CONTINGENT - COMPANIES (10 FIGURES) TEST WHE Ti) Zulus approach vithin 200 yds vith only open ground between them and the company to be tested, (i) Zulus approach within 100yde with no Europeane between then and the company to be tested. (iii) A routing N.N.C. figure passes vithin 100yds of the company to be tested. (iv) Zulus enter into melee vith Europeans, within 200yds of the company to be tested. To test the N.N.C. reaction, throw tuo ordinery die and check the score vith the table belov for effect. vie score 2 [3,4 [5,6 [78,9 [201112 | wate: cach iGiepehy’ tu taaend No. of Figures BE only once during @ Ser ia Heel a Lec e batt 2, ZULU IMPIS ~ TEST:~ i) Every time fired upon by a force not smaller than 1/s of the impi to be tested (if no part of the impi is engaged in melee). (41) Every time fired upon, by a force not smaller than + of the menbers of an inpi not actively engaged in melee (vhen part of that impi eg. the Front rank, 18 engaged in neles). 2 The Zulu reaction test is split into two phases (i) The Reaction Phase - this inmediately follove the receipt of enemy fire. (ii) The Recovery Phase - this occurs immediately after the movement phase of the gane move following that in uhich the reaction phase vas assessed. To test Zulu reaction, throw one ordinary dice and check the score vith the table below FACTORS AFFECTING REACTION TEST for effect. DICE SCORE REACTION OF UNIT Continue atteck unchecked If at least 50% of unit engaged in melee Reduce speed by one grade If Zulus vithin 100yds of British ie. from ‘charge'to 'run'+#] [TF at least 25% of unit engaged in melee | _) ‘Adopt_a crouching posture* Tf British or large numbers of ‘Adopt_e lying posture® N,NC. Fall back Rout™ If first time unit has been under fire 5 Zy-a0g | * [+* Only effective for one move. + These results require to be If Unit's casualties equal: folloved by a recovery pl NOTE: (4) In @ campaign the first time under fire reaction factor should only be applied during a Zulu impis first battle. (44) If a second reaction test is required before the unit has recovered from its first test, then the most dire result vill take predominance. (iii) If @ unit, vhich is partially in melee, is forced to take a reaction test, it will: (a) continue to fight -'if the resulting score is 3 or below, (b) rout ~ if the resulting score is 4 or above. To assess en impi's recovery from the previous move's reaction test, throu one ordinary dice and consult the table belov: evel of recov=" ry from Inpid\ previous mrcentne positiohReact ior! — after ost Reaction Test 1 2 3 4 5 6 i Advance at Advance at ‘Advance at Seokshi __the valk the run the charge Tei aed jenain Advence at Adopt @ ‘Advance at 78, __Btationary the cravl crouching posture | the run Rout ing Continue routing Rally (NOTE: A routing impi cannot attempt to rally if pursued by an enemy unit, that maintains base-to-base contact.) If an impi that is lying doun should attain the result of : (i) "Remain stationary" or "Advance at the cravl", then it should attempt (during the folloving recovery phase) to recover as for lying down. (4i) "Adopt @ crouching posture" then it should attempt (during the Folloving recovery phase) to recover as for crouching. Whilst, if @ unit that is routing should attain a result of: (i) "Continue routing", then on the following move it should once again attempt to rally. (4i) "Rolly" then it should attempt to decide (during the folloving recovery phase) hat it is Likely to do once it has rallied. A 9) 23Once rallied, another ordinary dice should be throun, and the table belov consulted: A significant number of casualties is to be considered DIE SCORE IMPI'S REACTION AFTER RALLYING 8% of the total ‘on-table' force commanded by the man being tested, = IQ_TEST THE COMMANDER'S REACTION Bel manner. i ii 1% | Withdray, completely from battle area, in an orderly er (i) Throv two ordinary die, numbered 1-6 and add to or subtrect from the resulting ey | Withdraw, out of volley-fire range, in an orderly manner - then test score anything from the ‘tactical situation factors’ teble (below). as for crouch on move after reaching safety. 3 Tie down, for one move, then test as for lying dovn on folloving TACTICAL SITUATION FACTORS THFFECT ‘Fecovery phase. bis SITUATION 3,2 | Crouch down, for one move, then test aa for crouching on following ON DIE pa oie | eecouenyy, pees. Sa —— Enemy defences breached 42 " Crouch down, for one move, then advance at the run on following At least 4 figures have reached the enemy defences and are in melee | movement. phase. Enemy defences intact and manned 6 | [touch down, ‘one move, it the charge on following All attacks have bean repulsed | novenent phase. At not Ist test and 10%, or more, casualties T+] Advance at run on folloving novenent phase. If not _Ist_test_end 14%, or more, casualties =a Ti) Now check the resulting score with the left-hand column of the table belov, The army commander's reaction is given in the corresponding section of the right-hand FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION OF RALLIED UNITS column. If enemy defences reached by: ree To Tai ansy iocmmandan’ pressot with Unit - Trout of volley-fire range (when routing) Call off the action completely If army commander has been killed a Disengage for 2 moves to re-assess before resuming the action for : 4 moves, vhen snother test should be taken Rf 4 a1 60% = Continue present course of action for 2 moves, then test again If Unit's casualties equal: 61 ~ 80% — =3 Continue present course of action for 4 moves, then test ayain Bike 4 Continue present course of action until: (4) victorious If the Zulus are engaged in crossing e river, or vater filled donga, and a reaction (ii) "extra casualties suffered, then test again test results in the Zulus adopting a crouching/lying posture, then a further dice (whichever occurs first) should be thrown: A score of 1, 2 or 3 - resulting in the Zulus crossing the river before crouching/lying down 4, 5 or 6 ~ resulting in the Zulus falling back before crouching/lying down ROUT and PURSUIT Should the reaction test result in the Zulus felling back, when the front rank is further than half-way across, then yet another dice should be thrown: © ‘ROUTING NATIVES Ascore of lor’2 - resulting in the first three ranks of Zulus Thabaj ili ‘Sabine WEEH. Uietvbgtite Ga thevenea i © the eneny, in @ line directly avay from the enem crossing the river before crouching/lying doun, threatening them, and will not defend themselves. em if whilst the renainder fell back before crouching/ Only routing Zulus may attempt to relly vhilst in the vicinity of the eneny (i.e. on lying doun (joining those vho have not yet begun eee to cross). For rallying, or refi » ref ecov' ase of eaction tes 3,.4, 5 or 6 - resulting in the whole Zulu force falling back nice ying, or refusal to rally, refer to the recovery ph fF the reaction test before crouching/lying down. If the Zulus are engaged in crossing a dry donga, and a reaction test results in the PURSUING ROUTING TROOPS Zulus adopting a crouching/lying posture, then a further dice should be throvn: Only units detailed by army commanders can follov-up routs. That is unless the routing A score of 1,2,3or 4 - resulting in the Zulus crouching/lying dovn in the unit vas put to flight in hand-to-hand conbat, vhereupon the conmander of the victorious donga f unit can pursue at his oun discretion. 5 or 6 = resulting in the Zulus falling back (out of the If a unit maintains base-to-base contact, vith a routing unit that it is pursuing, for donga) before crouching/lying down. three consecutive moves, the routing unit will ‘break-up’ (i.e. be removed from the battle erea) and take no further part in the battle. ARMY COMMANDER'S REACTION TEST WINNERS and LOSERS Apart from the normal reaction test (taken by the troops actively participating in a melee or fire-fight), the overall commander of the forces involved in the 'on-table’ action must test to see hov he vill act when his command has suffered a significant Unless an obvious result has been achieved by the time to end the gane arrives, the general rule should be applied that if the Zulus have not yet reached the British defences, then it is a British victory. But should an impi or impis of a total strength nunber of casualties. Sai iaiaiiy’es a tive Warten StPabiding! force s(ehSohvwith equaling at least 70 figures be in base to base contact vith the main Aritish defences, esi oes Pins. mua ty: pty ta He, Pomnetetes gor the atten Saeean aT then it is a Zulu victory as their eventual success is only @ matter of time. exceptions vas Ms 24 25CAMPAIGNS Should you vish to Fight © Zulu var campaign a fev basic guidlines are given here. Thes: guidlines are intended only to give an idea of how to organise such @ campaign and are in no vay considered to be comprehensive. MAPS Firstly, when setting up @ campaign, you require a mop of the var zone. In real life the Zulu war vas fought, by the British, using very crude maps of Zululand, the fine detail being added by scouting parties who may sketches of the terrain ahead of the invasion columns. Therefore it is suggested that at least two maps are prepared, one map having # reasonable anount of terrain detail (held by the Zulu commander ~ vho should obvious} knoy his ovn country!) and the second map having only the major terrain features (held by the British commander - vho does not know the country). The Zulu commander can then give the British commander the fine terrain details as his scouts search ahead, thus making @ more realistic campaign. A map containing the amount of detail availeble to the British (although only major terrain details are labelled) is given at the end of this section on campaigns (Appendix A). MOVENENT ALI movement is to be carried out, initially, on a weekly besis - with daily movement being used for the appropriate units, vhen a Zulu army closes to within a veek's march of a British column, (A) Weekly Movement For the Zulus is relatively simple: (4) Maximum "normal" veekly movement is 21 miles per week (this being the result of an order by Cetshvayo that the impis should march ‘at their ease’ to attack the British). ii) Forced marching - see Daily Novenent below. For the British,movenent is a little more complicated as it is decided by throving two average die (numbered 2)3,3,4,4,5) and adding the scores together in order to obtain the y movenent. This should be done for each British inv co aed ich British invasion colum. For the Zulus, daily movenent is: (4) Maximum "normal" daily movement - achieved by dividing the “normal” weekly move by 7. (ii) Maximum "special" daily movement - used only under the following circunstances: (a) Zulu army vithin 4 "normal" days march of @ British column, (b) Zulu army retreating after a battle. (c) When Cetshuayo's orders require an arny to be at a special place on a specific day. The maximum "special" daily movement is 30 miles per day. (iii) Forced marching - carried out only in an emergency, or on the express orders of Cetshwayo. Forced march movenent is 45 miles per day. For the British, daily movement is not alvays possible on every day in a veek. This is because all daily movenent is to be carried out (if at all) in units of whole miles, The distance a British colunn moves on any particular day is decided by two factors. (i) The total number of miles available to that colunn for that veek. (4) The portion of the total that the column commander, or umpire, allots to the column for that day. NOTE: On any day that a British column spends in laager (i.e. does not move) Field gngineering tasks nay be engaged in, if ite commander so desires. in lent British cavalry/infantry units raiding Zulus kraals, ca! wo days! rations, are capsble of travelling: 9 ve Mrales carrying two dave (4) Infantry - 10 miles per day (ii) Cavalry - 20 miles per dey 26 ‘SCOUTING Once you have calculated the British movement it is necessary to establish the area covered by the scout parties of each column, vhich must be at least three figures in strength. The scouting party vill elvays search a rectangular area, ten miles vide by fifteen miles long, in a systematic manner. In this vay it vill be possible to decide if @ Zulu force stands a chance of attacking @ British column undetected by its scout party, To do this on a map, you should drav a rectangle, corresponding to the scale Size of fifteen miles by ten miles, and divided into six equal squares, on a piece of tracing paper (or perspex) and then use it in the manner described belov. First place point 'A' (see diagram 1) on the point where the column ended its veekly or daily movenent, then turn the rectangle until the arrow is pointing in the direction in which the colunn is heading. The search pattern then follows the shape of an 'S', starting with the rear (or bottom) left square. Scout parties are assumed to search only during the hours of daylight, fron 6.30 a.m, to 5.30 p.m. The times vhen the scouts vill be in any particular square are indicated in the respective squares on diagram 2. DIAGRAM 1 5 miles Pattern of square search in real-life Point A Should the Zulus enter a square occupied by the scout party of a column the normal rules of visibility etc. apply. ORDERS AND COMMUNICATIONS Al] independent commanders oust be given written orders at the outset of a campaign, so that their tasks are clearly defined. The orders for Zulu conmanders only need to be in relatively general terms, vhereas the orders for British conmenders should be in terns to suit their personalities (to decide their personalities - see later). These orders are considered to be the initial written or verbal orders received by @ commander and will be carried out until nev orders, superceding then,are received. New orders, or ordinary military communications, can be transmitted in three different vays: (4) Verbally - either from superior to subordinate, or via a messenger, (ii) In uritten form 0 vie a messenger, or (iii) By Heliograph, as long as the receiver is in line of sight vith the sender - and the veather is clear. Confirmation of receipt can be by the same methods. The length of time taken to transmit orders vill depend upon the method used to convey them: (4) Verbal orders (from superior, direct to subordinate) and orders transmitted by heliograph are received virtually instantaneously. vhereas (ii) orders (verbal or uritten) corried by @ messenger are received only after the messenger physically arrives at the recipient's camp. Mounted messengers can travel 50 miles per day, vhilst Zulu messengers on foot move at forced march speed. 27SUPPLY Zulu inpis did not have to vorry about supplies, as kraals in their area of operations provided for all of their material needs. The British, on the other hand, operating in enemy territory, had to transport everything they needed. The only evailoble transport vas ox dravn vagons, vhich vere required in prodigious nunbers if the British vere to move the vast amounts of food, ammunition, and equipment required to keep @ ‘modern’ army in the field. In his efforts to obtain enough transport, Lord Chelmsford bought, or hired, almost nine tenths of all of the vagons in Natal, but even this vas barely sufficient. The nunber of vagons available to the British, in terns of vagon models, is given below: (i) For the first invasion, January 1879, 250. (4i) For the second invasion, April 1879, 417. It is suggested thet the nunber of vagons available: (4) In January be divided into 150 large, four vheeled, vagons and 100 small, tuo vheeled vagons. (4i) In April be divided into 260 large, four vheeled wagons end 157 omall, tuo vheeled wagons. NOTE: Should you vish to Fight @ campaign that begins in January, if it is still in progress uhen April arrives (or in the event of a major disaster - such as Isandhlvana) then instead of automatically increasing the nunber of wagons available to 417, the difference betveen the above January and April figures (167 vagons) should be added to vhatever is left of the original 250 vagons. This figure should be divided into 110 large and 57 small vagons. One large, or tuo small, wagon model(s) can carry everything to supply either: (i) Eight infantry figures. (4i) Six cavalry figures. (4ii) Six field gun, Gatling gun, rocket rube, or heliograph models (or any combination of these) for a period of ten days. It should therefore prove necessary to construct and garrison supply dumps, as it is inpossible to reach Ulundi and return to Natal vith the amount of wagons available. record of the amount of supplies in each dump should be kept. For ease of calculation, you should use units of 'vagan loads’ and ‘half wagon loads', a large vagon model carries one "wagon load' and a small vagon model carries ‘half a vagon load’. ORGANISING THE ARMIES Tn January 1879 the Zulu nation had a standing army of approximately 40,000 verriors, with a reservist force of about 10,000 married men (considered to be too old for regular military service). The majority of the regiments vere at Ulundi celebrating the ‘first fruits’ when the British invaded. In viev of this fact, it is suggested that for a campaign starting: (i) In January - the Zulu commander should have @ total of 45,000 men in his army (comprising sone 60 regiments). Of these, betueen 30,000 and 35,000 should be at Ulundi (ready to march) vhilst the renainder will take four days to be sunmoned and arrive (being ready to march on day five of the campaign). (4i) In April - the Zulu commander should have a total of 38,000 men (still comprising 60 regiments) in his arny - this allovs for dead and vounded fron the earlier battles. Of these between 20,000 and 25,000 should be at Ulundi (ready to march) vhilst the remainder vill take six days to be summoned and arrive (being ready to march on day seven of the campaign). NOTE: The longer delay in the sunmoning and arrival time for April reflects the fact that Zulus vent to their hone kreels after a battle, or campaign, and it would therefore take longer to re-assenble the impis for battle. The Britich should fight with the nunber of troops available to then at the out-set of either the January or April campaign (a list of the troops available to the British commander is given at the end of this section on Campaigns (Appendix 8)). It is suggested that the British begin the Jenuary, or April, campaign vith the same number of invasion columns as vere really used, but their composition is left to the discretion of the Gritish commander. 28 FIELD ENGINEERING Prior to the invasion the British constructed two earth valled forts, to quard the lover drift on the Tugela river, and several large punts at each drift,to ferry wagons or troops to the Zulu bank of the river. But the engineering tasks undertaken during the invasion (eg. fort building) are the important factors in a wargames campaign. All field engineering tasks vill take a set number of ‘man hours’ (the length of time- in hours - that it would take one figure) to complete. The actual anount of time taken to complete any task vill depend upon hov many men are involved on the project, but no matter how many men are involved, each task vill alvays have 2 minimum length’ of time in which it can be completed. See table below for the major tasks likely to be undertaken, and the time required to complete them: TIME NEEDED TO COMPLETE MINIMUM TIME WITH ONE THE TASK FIGURE WITH ANY NUMBER OF FIGURES SOyds of shelter trench (24ft vide, aft deep) cree Aioue ‘Soyds of earth rampart Ce 2 Hours 4 Hour SOyds of wooden pallieade wore of: @ hours 1 Hour [a cut tinbar Tar s0yas or Pellisade 3 Hours 4 Hour To make the banks of one Saat 1 Hour 4 Hour a drift less steep for fous. ei ‘On a large easier passage of wagons | "8 12 2 Hours 4 Hour ee DECIDING THE PERSONALITY OF SRITISH SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS IN CAMPAIGNS In ‘one-off games the vargamer acts as the overall commander of the forces on the playing surface, therefore his personelity vill dictate how he fights the battle. This also applies vhen fighting. A Boer v Zulu/Matabele wargane as the Boer commando and trek leaders usually led their people without subordinate commanders. ut in an 1879 v Zulu campaign it is necessary to have a chain of comand in which subordinate ers lead independent troop formations, and to make the actions of these 'sub- commanders! more realistic they are given @ personality of their own. The main British commanders (listed later) have been given a personality rating, but if a sub-conmander of 9 rank belov that of major should be required, his personality is to be decided by throving a die, numbered 1-6, and consulting the table below: CLASS OF COMMANDER PERSONALITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLASSIFICATION] Will teke @ calculated risk with his command, 6 A ~ Good (decisive- is prepared to act independently, and responsible) accept responsibility - requires only general written orders. Lisble to make hasty decisions and risk his 5 B - Above Average command being 'cut-off', is prepared to | (decisive-slightly rash) | accept responsibility - requires fairly specific uritten orders, Will only take action that involves a 3,4 C ~ Average (cautious) | reasonable risk to his command, unless given specific uritten orders. Will not take action liable to put his command at risk, he vill alvays leager his wagons at the expense of mobility. He vill {isregard orders that vill in any forn put 2 D = Belov Average (very cautious) | _| his command ‘out ons linb'. 1 Will not act unless the situation is covered 1 — - Poor in his written orders (which must be | (indecisive) specific as to the purpose and duties of his i command. 29The main Officers involved in the first invasion of Zululand vere (the letters in brackets are their personality classes): The Second Baron Chelmsford, Lt. Gen. Frederic Augustus Thesiger, C-in-€ Troops in Natal 2) Colonel Richord Thomas Glyn - Commander of the Central Column (c) Brevet Lt. Col. Henry Burmester Pulleine - Second in Command to Col. Glyn (0) Brevet Colonel Anthony William Durnford (B) Colonel Charles Pearson - Commander of the Right Flank Column (Cc) Colonel Evelyn Wood - Commander of the Left Flank, renaned "Flying' Column in the 2nd invasion (ay Major Redvers Henry Buller (8) The four Generel Officers thet arrived in 1879 vere: Yajor General Henry Hope Crealock - Comender 1 Division Gin the 2nd invasion) (c) Najor Geteral Edvard Nevdigate - Conrander II Division Gn the 2nd invasion) (e) Major General Frederick Marshal! (e) Major General, the Honourable Henry Hugh Clifford, V.C., C.B., - T-in-£ Non invasion troops in Natel cH) * The varganer controlling the British invasion forces vill assume this role, therefore no classification has been allotted. ** This officer did not have an active command, therefore no classification has been allotted. yA iE ay APPENDIX TROOPS AVAILABLE TO THE BRITISH COMMANDER For the first invasion, the British Forces vere divided into five columns: - ne STRENGTH START POIN cones TEN aNO FIGURES SUREER | CONPURNDER |, “oR TASS ii EQUIPHENT NODELS ‘One | cor. Lover Drift] 99th Regiment of foot @ coys 64 Pearson 2nd BN 3rd Reqinent of foot | 8 coys ry Naval Brigade 200 men } 18 2nd Regiment N.N.C.(28N's) | 2,256 men 150 Natal Hussars | Durban, Alexandra, Stanger, Victoria, fio. 51, \ and Isipongo mountedf' 2!" | 512 men 2 rifles. Mounted ie | infantry of the 24th) | Regiment of foot | Artillery 4-7 pounders 4 1 Gat ling ba 2 rocket tubes | 2 1 rocket troush | 1 Royal Engineers 1 coy 8 Natal Native Pioneer Corps | 1 coy 6 Two | Lt. Col. | To guard [lot Regiment N.N.C.(3NB's) | 5,088 nen | 233 Durnford | the middle |ounted Natives 315 men } 2 drift and artillery 3 rocket trouahs | 3 support | No. 3 | coluan Three | Col. Rorke's [lst GN 24th Regiment of foot | 6 cova oa Glyn | orift 2nd BN 24th Regiment of foot} 8 coys 64 3rd Regiment N.N.C.(2BN's) | 2,566 wen jam | Natal Carbineers | Natal mounted police | | Buffalo border quardft*v0" | 320 men 2 Neveastle mounted rifles | | Artillery 6-7 pounders | | 2 rocket troughs | 2 | Natel Native Pioneer Corps_| 1 coy é Four | Brevet | Balte 90th Reginent of Foot 8 coys Tea Col. Spruit [ist BN 13th Regiment of foot | 8 coys | 6 Evelyn | (around the|Dissaffected Zulus 500 men | 36 Wood head vaters|Frontier Light horse). 1p, | of the |Weatherleys Border f02¥815¥| 208 men 4 | | Blood river horse. uys's Burgers, | Artillery 6-7 pounders | 6 | 2 rocket troughs | 2 Five | Col. Luneburg [80th Regiment of Foot 8 coys | 6 | Roviends | (fo guard Native Contingent. 338 men 23 | against 2 [Volunteer Cavalry troops | 553 nen 37 | | Zulu out {Artillery 1 Krupp gun 1 | break north] (This colunn vas kept out of | 2-6 pdr Armitrong| 2 | of the |the invasion by political | Pangola | trouble in the Transvaal) river) 31