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Question Three: Ideas

Primo an sint ideae in Deo.
Secundo an sit ponere plures
ideas.
Are there ideas in God?
Tertio an pertineant ad cognitionem
1. Are there many ideas?
speculativam.
2. Do ideas belong to speculative or only to
Quarto an malum habeat ideam.
3. practical knowledge?
Quinto an materia prima habeat
4. Is there in God an idea of evil?
ideam.
5. Is there in God an idea of first matter?
Sexto an in Deo sit idea eorum
6. Are there ideas in God of those things which do
quae non sunt nec erunt nec
7. not exist, will not exist, and have not existed?
fuerunt.
8. Are there in God ideas of accidents?
Septimo an accidentia habeant
Are there in God ideas of singulars?
ideam in Deo.
Octavo an singularia habeant
ideam in Deo.

ARTICLE I

Ideas are the object of our inquiry,

and in the first article we ask:
Are there ideas in God?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 151 1; 44, 3; I Sent., 36, 2, 1; I Metaph., lect. 15, nn. 232-33.]

Quaestio est de ideis. Difficulties

Et videtur quod non. It seems that there are no ideas in Him, for

Quia scientia Dei est perfectissima. 1. God’s knowledge is most perfect. Now,
Sed perfectior est cognitio quae knowledge had from the essence of a thing
habetur de re per essentiam eius, is more perfect than knowledge had from
quam quae habetur per eius its likeness. Consequently, God knows
similitudinem. Ergo Deus non things, not by means of their likenesses,
cognoscit res per suas similitudines, but by means of their essences. Hence,
sed magis per essentias earum; et those likenesses of things which are called
ita similitudines rerum, quae ideae ideas do not exist in God.
dicuntur, non sunt in Deo.

Sed dicebat, quod Deus scit res 2. But it was said that God knows things
perfectius cognoscens eas per more perfectly by knowing them through
essentiam suam, quae est similitudo His essence, which is a likeness of things,
rerum, quam si cognosceret res per than He would if He knew them through
earum essentias.- Sed contra, their own essences.—On the contrary,
scientia est assimilatio ad scitum. knowledge is an assimilation to the thing
Ergo quanto medium cognoscendi known. Hence, the more the medium of
est magis simile et unitum rei knowing resembles and is united with the
cognitae, tanto perfectius res per id thing known, the more perfectly is the thing
cognoscitur. Sed essentia rerum known by means of that medium. But the
creatarum magis est unita eis quam essence of created things is more united
essentia divina. Ergo perfectius with things than the divine essence is.
cognosceret res si sciret res per Consequently, God would know things
more perfectly if He knew them by means
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essentias earum, quam ex hoc quod of their essences than He does by knowing
scit eas per essentiam suam. them through His own essence.

Sed dicebat, quod perfectio 3. But it was said that the perfection of
scientiae non consistit in unione knowledge consists in the union of the
medii cognoscendi ad rem medium of knowledge with the knower, not
cognitam, sed magis ad with the thing known.—On the contrary, the
cognoscentem.- Sed contra, species species of a thing, which is in the intellect,
rei quae est in intellectu, secundum is rendered individual by the act of
quod habet esse in eo, est existence it has in the intellect; but in
particulata; secundum autem quod relation to the thing known it has the
comparatur ad scitum, habet character of a universal, since it is a
rationem universalis, quia est likeness of the thing according to its
similitudo rei secundum naturam common nature and not according to its
communem, et non secundum particular conditions. Yet the knowledge
conditiones particulares; et tamen which is made possible by means of that
cognitio quae est per illam speciem, species is not singular but universal.
non est singularis, sed universalis. Hence, knowledge follows the relation of
Ergo cognitio magis sequitur the species to the thing known rather than
relationem speciei ad rem scitam its relation to the knower.
quam ad scientem.

Praeterea, propter hoc improbatur a 4. The Philosopher criticizes Plato’s theory

philosopho opinio Platonis quam of ideas because the latter asserted that
habuit de ideis, quia posuit formas the forms of material things existed without
rerum materialium existere sine matter. Now, these forms would exist
materia. Sed multo magis sunt sine without matter to a much greater extent
materia si sunt in intellectu divino, were they in the divine intellect instead of
quam si essent extra ipsum, quia being outside of it, because the divine
intellectus divinus est in summo intellect is the acme of immateriality.
immaterialitatis. Ergo etiam multo Therefore, it is much more inconsistent to
magis inconveniens est ponere say that ideas exist in the divine intellect.
ideas in intellectu divino.

Praeterea, philosophus improbat 5. The Philosopher criticizes Plato’s theory

opinionem Platonis de ideis per hoc of ideas because the ideas he posited can
quod ideae positae a Platone non neither generate nor be generated, and
possunt generare nec generari, et hence are useless. But, if the ideas are
ita sunt inutiles. Sed ideae, si said to be in the divine mind, they also will
ponantur in mente divina, non not be generated—because whatever is
generantur, quia omne generatum generated is composite—nor will they
est compositum; similiter nec generate, for, since whatever is generated
generant, quia, cum generata sint is composite and whatever generates
composita, et generantia sint similia resembles what is generated, that which
generatis, oportet etiam generantia generates must also be composite. Hence,
esse composita. Ergo inconveniens it would be inconsistent to say that there
est ponere ideas etiam in mente are ideas in the divine mind.
divina.

Item, Dionysius dicit, in VII cap. de 6. Dionysius says that God knows existing
divinis nominibus, quod Deus noscit things by means of the non-existing, and
existentia ex non existentibus, et that He does not know them by means of
non cognoscit res secundum ideam. ideas. But the only reason for affirming the
Sed ideae non ponuntur ad aliud in existence of ideas in God is so He can
Deo, nisi ut per eas cognoscantur know things by their means. Hence, ideas
do not exist in God’s mind.
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res. Ergo ideae non sunt in mente

Dei.

Praeterea, omne exemplatum est 7. Whatever has been modeled upon an.
proportionatum suo exemplari. Sed archetype is proportionate to it. But there is
nulla est proportio creaturae ad no proportion of a creature with God, just
Deum, sicut nec finiti ad infinitum. as there is no proportion between what is
Ergo in Deo non potest esse finite and what is infinite. Therefore, in God
creaturarum exemplar; ergo, cum there cannot be any archetypes of
ideae sint formae exemplares, creatures; consequently, since ideas are
videtur quod non sint ideae rerum in exemplary forms, it seems that ideas of
Deo. things do not exist in God.

Praeterea, idea est regula 8. Ideas are the rule of knowledge and
cognoscendi et operandi. Sed illud action. But that which cannot err in its
quod non potest deficere in knowledge or action does not need a rule
cognoscendo vel operando, ad for either; and, since God is this kind of
neutrum regula indiget. Cum igitur being, it seems out of place to say that
Deus sit huiusmodi. Videtur quod there are ideas in him.
non oporteat ponere ideas in eo.

Praeterea, sicut unum in quantitate 9. We read in the Metaphysics that just as

facit aequalitatem, ita unum in being one in quantity causes equality, so
qualitate facit similitudinem, ut being one in quality causes resemblance.
dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed propter Now, because of the difference between
diversitatem quae est inter Deum et God and a creature, a creature can in no
creaturam, creatura nullo modo Deo way be said to be equal to God, nor can
potest esse aequalis, vel e God be said to be equal to a creature.
converso; ergo nec in Deo est Therefore, there is nothing in God that
aliqua similitudo ad creaturam. Cum resembles a creature. Consequently, since
ergo idea nominet similitudinem rei, idea means a likeness of a thing, it seems
videtur quod rerum ideae non sint in that there are no ideas of things in God.
Deo.

Praeterea, si ideae sunt in Deo, hoc 10. If ideas are in God, they are there only
non erit nisi ad producendum for the production of creatures. But Anselm
creaturas. Sed Anselmus dicit in says: “It is sufficiently clear that in the
Monolog.: satis manifestum est in Word, through which all things have been
verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, made, likenesses of things do not exist.
similitudines rerum non esse, sed Only the one simple essence is present.”
veram et simplicem essentiam. Ergo Therefore, it seems that ideas, which are
videtur quod ideae, quae dicuntur called the likenesses of things, do not exist
rerum similitudines, in Deo non sunt. in God.

Praeterea, Deus eodem modo 11. God knows Himself in the same way in
cognoscit se et alia; alias sua which He knows other things; otherwise,
scientia multiplex et divisibilis esset. His knowledge would be multiple and
Sed Deus seipsum non cognoscit divisible. Now, God does not know Himself
per ideam. Ergo nec alia. by means of an idea. Therefore, He does
not know other things by means of ideas.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Augustinus dicit in libro de civitate 1. Augustine says: “Whoever denies that

Dei: qui negat ideas esse, infidelis there are ideas is an infidel, since he
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est, quia negat filium esse. Ergo, et denies the existence of the Son.”
cetera. Therefore.

Praeterea, omne agens per 2. Every intellectual agent possesses

intellectum habet rationem sui within himself a plan of his work; otherwise,
operis apud se, nisi ignoret quid he would not know what he was doing. But
agat. Sed Deus est agens per God acts through His intellect, and He is
intellectum, et non ignorans hoc not ignorant of what He is doing. Therefore,
quod agit. Ergo apud ipsum sunt there exist within Him intelligible characters
rationes rerum quae ideae dicuntur. of things, and these are called ideas.

Praeterea, sicut dicitur in II 3. As is said in the Physics: “The three

physicorum, tres causae incidunt in causes, namely, the efficient, final, and
unam: scilicet efficiens, finalis et formal causes, are ultimately
formalis. Sed Deus est causa identical.”Now, God is the efficient and final
efficiens et finalis rerum. Ergo etiam cause of things. Hence, He is also their
est causa formalis exemplaris; non formal cause —but as an exemplary cause,
enim potest esse forma quae sit since He cannot be a form that is part of a
pars rei, et sic idem quod prius. creature. We conclude as before.

Praeterea, effectus particularis non 4. A particular effect is not produced by a

producitur a causa universali, nisi universal cause unless the universal cause
causa universalis sit propria vel is proper or appropriated. Now, all
appropriata. Sed omnes particulares particular effects are from God, who is the
effectus sunt a Deo, qui est causa universal cause of all things. Hence, they
universalis omnium. Ergo oportet should come from Him in so far as He is
quod sint ab eo secundum quod est the proper or appropriated cause of each
causa propria uniuscuiusque, vel and every one of them. But this would not
appropriata. Sed hoc non potest be possible unless the intelligible
esse nisi per rationes rerum characters of things existed in Him. Hence,
proprias in ipso existentes. Ergo the intelligible characters of things, that is,
oportet in eo rationes rerum, id est ideas, must exist in Him.
ideas, existere.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. 5. Augustine says: “I regret that I said that
de ordine: piget me dixisse, duos there are two worlds, one the object of
esse mundos: scilicet sensibilem, et sense, the other the object of intellect—not
intelligibilem, non quin hoc verum because this is not true, but because I said
sit; sed quia hoc dixi tamquam ex it as though it were an original idea, when
me, cum tamen a philosophis in fact it had been previously pointed out by
dictum fuerit; et quia modus iste philosophers, and because this manner of
loquendi non est consuetus in sacra speaking is not usual in Holy Scripture.
Scriptura. Sed mundus intelligibilis Now, the intelligible world is nothing other
nihil aliud est quam idea mundi. than the idea of the world. Hence, it is true
Ergo verum est ponere ideas. that there are ideas.

Praeterea, Boetius dicit in III de 6. Speaking to God, Boethius says: “You

consolatione loquens ad Deum: tu have drawn all things from the highest
cuncta superno ducis ab exemplo, pattern, having in your mind the glorious
mundum mente gerens pulchrum world—you, the most glorious of all.”
pulcherrimus ipse. Ergo mundi, et Therefore, the pattern of the world, and of
omnium quae in eo sunt, est all that is in the world, is in God; and our
exemplar in Deo; et sic idem quod conclusion is the same as before.
prius.

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Praeterea, Ioann. I, 3, dicitur: quod 7. In the Gospel according to John (1:3-4),

factum est, in ipso vita erat; hoc, we read: “What was made in him was
quia, ut Augustinus dicit, omnes life...” This means, as Augustine says,”,
creaturae sunt in mente divina, sicut that all creatures are in the divine mind as
arca in mente artificis. Sed arca in a piece of furniture is in the mind of a
mente artificis est per suam cabinetmaker. Now, a piece of furniture is
similitudinem et ideam. Ergo in the mind of a cabinetmaker by means of
omnium rerum ideae sunt in Deo. its idea and likeness. Therefore, ideas of all
things are in God.

Praeterea, speculum non ducit in 8. A mirror does not lead us to the

cognitionem aliquorum, nisi eorum knowledge of things unless their likenesses
similitudines in eo resplendeant. are reflected in it. Now, the uncreated Word
Sed verbum increatum est is a mirror that leads to the knowledge of
speculum ducens in cognitionem all creatures, because by the Word the
omnium creatorum, quia eo pater se Father utters Himself and all other things.
et omnia alia dicit. Ergo in eo sunt Therefore, likenesses of all things are in
similitudines rerum omnium. the Word.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VI de 9. Augustine says: “The Son is the Father’s

Trinitate, quod filius est ars patris art, containing the living forms of all things.”
plena omnium rationum viventium. Now, those forms are nothing other than
Sed rationes illae nihil aliud sunt ideas. Therefore, ideas exist in God.
quam ideae. Ergo, ideae sunt in
Deo.

Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, 10. Augustine says that there are two ways
duplex est modus cognoscendi res; of knowing things: through an essence and
scilicet per essentiam, et per through a likeness. Now, God does not
similitudinem. Sed Deus non know things by means of their essence,
cognoscit res per earum essentiam, because only those things which are
quia sic cognoscuntur solum illa present in the knower are known in this
quae sunt in cognoscente per sui manner. Therefore, since He does know
essentiam. Ergo, cum scientiam de things, as is clear from what has been said
rebus habeat, ut ex praedictis, patet, previously, He must know them by means
relinquitur quod sciat res per earum of their likenesses. Hence, our conclusion
similitudines; et sic idem quod prius. is the same as before.

REPLY

Responsio. Dicendum, quod, sicut As Augustine says: “We can literally

dicit Augustinus in Lib. LXXXIII translate ιδεαι as species or forms. Now,
Quaestion., ideas Latine possumus the form of a thing has three meanings.
vel formas, vel species dicere, ut First, it can mean that from which a thing
verbum ex verbo transferre gets its form, as when we say that the
videamur. Forma autem alicuius rei informing of an effect proceeds from the
potest dici tripliciter. Uno modo a form of the agent. Now, an action does not
qua formatur res, sicut a forma necessarily result in effects that attain the
agentis procedit effectus formatio. complete character of the form of the
Sed quia non est de necessitate agent, for effects often fall short of this,
actionis ut effectus pertingant ad especially in the case of equivocal causes.
completam rationem formae Consequently, the form from which
agentis, cum frequenter deficiant, something gets its form is not said to be its
maxime in causis aequivocis; ideo idea or form. Second, the form of a thing
forma a qua formatur aliquid, non can mean that by which a thing is informed,

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dicitur esse idea vel forma. Alio as when we say that the soul is the form of
modo dicitur forma alicuius man, and the shape of a statue is the form
secundum quam aliquid formatur, of the bronze. Now, although form, which is
sicut anima est forma hominis, et part of the composite, is truly said to be the
figura statuae est forma cupri; et form of a thing, we do not usually call it its
quamvis forma, quae est pars idea, because it seems that the word idea
compositi, vere dicatur esse illius signifies a form separate from that whose
forma, non tamen consuevit dici form it is. Third, the form of a thing can
eius idea; quia videtur hoc nomen mean that according to which a thing is
idea significare formam separatam informed. This is the exemplary form in
ab eo cuius est forma. Tertio modo imitation of which a thing is made. It is in
dicitur forma alicuius ad quam this meaning that idea is ordinarily used.
aliquid formatur; et haec est forma Hence, the idea of a thing is the form which
exemplaris, ad cuius imitationem a thing imitates.
aliquid constituitur; et in hac
significatione consuetum est nomen
ideae accipi, ut idem sit idea quod
forma quam aliquid imitatur.

Sed sciendum, quod aliquid potest Note, however, that a thing can imitate a
imitari aliquam formam dupliciter. form in two ways. It can imitate it because
Uno modo ex intentione agentis; of the agent’s intention, as an artist makes
sicut pictura ad hoc fit a pictore ut his painting imitate someone whose portrait
imitetur aliquem cuius figura he is making. It happens at times, however,
depingitur: aliquando vero talis that such an imitation is not intentional, but
praedicta imitatio per accidens happens by chance or by accident. For
praeter intentionem, et a casu fit; example, painters frequently paint
sicut frequenter pictores a casu something resembling someone when they
faciunt imaginem alicuius, de quo have not intended to do so. Now, what
non intendunt. Quod autem aliquam imitates a form by chance is not said to be
formam imitatur a casu, non dicitur formed according to that form, because
ad illam formari, quia ly ad videtur according to seems to imply direction to an
importare ordinem ad finem; unde, end. Hence, since the exemplary form or
cum forma exemplaris, vel idea, sit idea is that according to which a thing is
ad quam formatur aliquid, oportet formed, the exemplary form or idea should
quod formam exemplarem vel imitate something intentionally, not
ideam aliquid imitetur per se, et non accidentally.
per accidens.

Videmus etiam quod aliquid propter We see also that a thing acts because of
finem dupliciter operatur. Uno modo an end in two ways. The agent himself may
ita quod ipsum agens determinat determine his end—and this is true of all
sibi finem, sicut est in omnibus intellectual agents—or the end of the agent
agentibus per intellectum: aliquando may be determined by another principal
autem agenti determinatur finis ab agent. For example, the flight of an arrow is
alio principali agente; sicut patet in toward a definite end, but this end is
motu sagittae, quae movetur ad determined by the archer. Similarly, an
finem determinatum, sed hic finis operation of a nature which is for a definite
determinatur ei a proiiciente; et end presupposes an intellect that has pre-
similiter operatio naturae, quae est established the end of the nature and
ad determinatum finem, ordered it to that end. For this reason,
praesupponit intellectum, every work of nature is said to be a work of
praestituentem finem naturae, et intelligence. Consequently, if a thing
ordinantem ad finem illum naturam, imitating something else comes into
ratione cuius omne opus naturae existence through an agent which has not
dicitur esse opus intelligentiae. Si itself determined the end, the form imitated
ergo aliquid fiat ad imitationem will not have the character of an exemplar
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alterius per agens quod non or idea merely because of what has
determinat sibi finem, non ex hoc happened. For example, we do not say that
forma imitata habebit rationem the form of the man who generates is the
exemplaris vel ideae. Non enim idea or exemplar of the man who is
dicimus quod forma hominis generated; but we use these terms only
generantis sit idea vel exemplar when an agent acting for an end has
hominis generati; sed solum hoc determined the end himself—whether the
dicimus quando agens propter finem form imitated be within him or outside of
determinat sibi finem, sive illa forma him. For we say that the form of art in the
sit in agente, sive extra agentem. artist is the plan or idea of the artistic
Dicimus enim formam artis in artifice product, and we also say that a form
esse exemplar vel ideam artificiati; outside the artist is a plan if he imitates it
et similiter etiam formam quae est when he makes a thing. This, therefore,
extra artificem, ad cuius imitationem seems to constitute the character of an
artifex aliquid facit. Haec ergo idea: It must be a form which something
videtur esse ratio ideae, quod idea imitates because of the intention of an
sit forma quam aliquid imitatur ex agent who antecedently determines the
intentione agentis, qui end himself.
praedeterminat sibi finem.

Secundum hoc ergo patet quod illi Consequently, it is clear that those who say
qui ponebant omnia casu accidere, that all things happen by chance cannot
non poterant ideam ponere. Sed admit the existence of ideas. This opinion,
haec opinio a philosophis however, is criticized by philosophers,
reprobatur; quia quae sunt a casu, because things which happen by chance
non se habent eodem modo nisi ut do not happen uniformly, but happen only
in paucioribus: naturae autem in a few instances. We see, however, that
cursum videmus semper eodem the course of nature always, or at least in
modo progredi, aut ut in pluribus. most cases, proceeds in an uniform
manner.

Similiter etiam secundum eos qui Similarly, those who say that all things
posuerunt quod a Deo procedunt proceed from God by a necessity of nature
omnia per necessitatem naturae, et and not by a decision of will cannot admit
non per arbitrium voluntatis, non ideas, because those who act impelled by
possunt ponere ideas: quia ea quae the necessity of nature do not determine
ex necessitate naturae agunt, non the end for themselves. This cannot be the
praedeterminant sibi finem. Sed hoc case here, however, because, if a thing
esse non potest; quia omne quod acts for an end but does not determine that
agit propter finem si non determinat end itself, it has its end determined for it by
sibi finem, determinatur ei finis ab something else superior to it; and thus
alio superiore; et sic erit aliqua there would be a cause superior to God.
causa eo superior: quod non potest This, of course, is impossible, since all
esse, quia omnes loquentes de Deo those who speak of God understand Him to
intelligunt eum esse causam be the first cause of beings.
primam entium.

Et ideo Plato refugiens Epicuri For these reasons, Plato affirmed the
opinionem, qui ponebat omnia casu existence of ideas, avoiding the opinion of
accidere, et Empedoclis et aliorum the Epicureans, who asserted that
qui ponebant omnia accidere ex everything happens by chance, and that of
necessitate naturae, posuit ideas Empedocles and others who asserted that
esse. Et hanc etiam rationem everything happens because of a natural
ponendi ideas, scilicet propter necessity. This reason for affirming ideas,
praedefinitionem operum namely, on account of the previous
agendorum, innuit Dionysius in V planning of the works that are to be done,

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cap. de divinis nominibus, dicens: is suggested by Dionysius, who says: “We

exemplaria dicimus in Deo say that exemplars in God are the
existentium rationes substantificas, intelligible characters of things that come to
et singulariter praeexistentes: quas be, the individually pre-existing causes of
theologia praedefinitiones vocat, et subsistent beings. These, theology calls
divinas et bonas voluntates ‘predefinitions.’ They predetermine and
existentium praedeterminativas et cause godly and good inclinations in
effectivas: secundum quas creatures. It is according to these that the
supersubstantialis essentia omnia super-substance predefines and produces
praedefinivit et produxit. Sed quia all things. However, because an exemplary
forma exemplaris vel idea habet form or idea has, in some sense, the
quodammodo rationem finis, et ab nature of an end, and because an artist
ea accipit artifex formam qua agit si receives the form by which he acts—if it is
sit extra ipsum; non est autem outside of him—we cannot say that the
conveniens ponere Deum agere divine ideas are outside of God. They can
propter finem alium a se, et accipere be only within the divine mind, for it is
aliunde, unde sit sufficiens ad unreasonable to say that God acts on
agendum; ideo non possumus account of an end other than Himself or
ponere ideas esse extra Deum, sed that He receives that which enables Him to
in mente divina tantum. act from a source other than Himself.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod 1. The perfection of knowledge can be

perfectio cognitionis potest attendi considered either with reference to the
vel ex parte cognoscentis, vel ex knower or with reference to the thing
parte cogniti. Quod ergo dicitur quod known. When it is said, therefore, that
perfectior est cognitio quae est per knowledge by means of an essence is
essentiam, quam per similitudinem, more perfect than that had by means of a
est intelligendum ex parte cogniti. likeness, this is to be understood as
Illud enim quod per seipsum est referring to what is known. For that which is
cognoscibile, est per se magis knowable in itself is, in itself, known more
notum quam illud quod non est than that which, not knowable in itself, is
cognoscibile ex seipso, sed solum known only in so far as it is in a knower by
secundum quod est in cognoscente means of its likeness. In this sense, it is not
per sui similitudinem. Et hoc non est inconsistent to say that created things are
inconveniens ponere quod res less knowable than the divine essence,
creatae sint minus cognoscibiles which is knowable by its very nature.
quam essentia divina, quae per
seipsam cognoscibilis est.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad 2. Two things are required for a species

speciem quae est medium which is a medium of knowledge. First, it
cognoscendi duo requiruntur: must represent the thing known. This
scilicet repraesentatio rei cognitae, belongs to a species in so far as it
quae competit ei secundum approaches the nature of what is known.
propinquitatem ad cognoscibile; et Second, it must have a spiritual or
esse spirituale, vel immateriale, immaterial act of existing. This belongs to a
quod ei competit secundum quod species in so far as it has its act of existing
habet esse in cognoscente. Unde in the knower. For this reason, a thing is
per speciem quae est in intellectu, known better by means of an intellectual
melius cognoscitur aliquid quam per species than by means of the species in
speciem quae est in sensu, quia est sense, since the former is more immaterial.
immaterialior. Et similiter melius Similarly, a thing is known better by means
cognoscitur aliquid per speciem rei of the species in the divine mind than it
quae est in mente divina, quam per could be known by means of its own

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ipsam eius essentiam cognosci essence—even granting that the essence

posset; etiam dato quod essentia rei of a thing could be the medium of
posset esse medium cognoscendi, knowledge despite its materiality.
non obstante materialitate ipsius.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod in 3. Two elements of knowledge must be

cognitione duo est considerare: considered. First, we must consider its
scilicet ipsam naturam cognitionis; nature; and this is determined by the
et haec sequitur speciem secundum relation of the species to the intellect in
comparationem quam habet ad which it exists. Second, we must consider
intellectum in quo est; et the determinate character which the
determinatio cognitionis ad knowledge has with respect to its object;
cognitum, et haec sequitur and this follows the relation that the
relationem speciei ad rem ipsam: species has to the thing itself. Hence, the
unde quanto est similior species rei more similar the species is as a
cognitae per modum representation to the thing known, the
repraesentationis, tanto est cognitio more determinate is the knowledge; and
determinatior; et quanto magis the more it approaches immateriality, which
accedit ad immaterialitatem, quae belongs to the nature of the knower in so
est natura cognoscentis inquantum far as he knows, the more efficacious it is
huiusmodi, tanto efficacius in the production of knowledge.
cognoscere facit.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc est 4. It is contrary to the nature of natural

contra rationem formarum forms that they should be immaterial in
naturalium quod ex seipsis themselves; but it is not inconsistent for
immateriales sint; non est autem them to acquire immateriality from the one
inconveniens quod ex alio in whom they exist. Consequently, in our
immaterialitatem acquirant, in quo intellects, the forms of natural things are
sint; unde in intellectu nostro formae immaterial. Hence, while it would be
rerum naturalium immateriales sunt. incorrect to assert that ideas of natural
Unde inconveniens est ponere ideas things have a separate subsistence, it
rerum naturalium esse per se would be correct to say that they are in the
subsistentes; non est autem divine mind.
inconveniens ponere eas in mente
divina.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod ideae 5. Strictly speaking, the ideas existing in

existentes in mente divina non sunt the divine mind neither generate nor are
generatae, nec sunt generantes, si generated, but rather create or produce
fiat vis in verbo; sed sunt creativae things. Hence, Augustine says: “Although
et productivae rerum; unde dicit they themselves neither begin nor cease to
Augustinus in Lib. LXXXIII be, nevertheless, whatever can begin or
quaestionum: cum ipsae neque cease to be is said to be informed
oriantur neque intereant, secundum according to them.” Nor is it necessary,
eas tamen informari dicitur omne when composite things are made, for the
quod oriri et interire potest. Nec first efficient cause to resemble what is
oportet agens primum in generated: this is true only of the proximate
compositione esse simile generato; efficient cause. Since Plato asserted that
oportet autem hoc de agente the ideas are the proximate principle of
proximo; et sic ponebat Plato ideas generation, the argument mentioned in the
esse generationis principium scilicet difficulty is directed against him.
proximum; et ideo contra ipsum
procedit ratio praedicta.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod intentio 6. Dionysius wished to say merely that God
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Dionysii est dicere quod ipse non does not know by means of an idea
cognoscit per ideam acceptam a received from things or in such a manner
rebus, vel hoc modo quod divisim that He would know a thing differently by
res per ideam cognoscat; unde alia means of an idea. For this reason, another
translatio loco huius dicit: neque per translation of this passage reads: “Nor
visionem singulis se immittit. Unde does He by His vision come into contact
per hoc non excluditur omnino ideas with individual things.” Hence, from this
esse. argument, it is not impossible for ideas to
exist.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod 7. Although there can be no proportion

quamvis non possit esse aliqua between God and a creature, there can be
proportio creaturae ad Deum, tamen a proportionality, as we have previously
potest esse proportionalitas; quod in shown.
praecedenti quaestione frequenter
expositum est.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod sicut 8. Just as God does not need an essence
Deus, quia non potest non esse, other than His act of existence, because
non indiget essentia quae sit aliud He cannot not be, neither does He need a
quam suum esse; ita quia non norm other than Himself, because He
potest deficere in cognoscendo vel cannot know or act in a way that would be
operando, non indiget alia regula a faulty. The reason for this perfection is that
seipso: sed propter hoc deficere non He is His own norm, just as the reason for
potest, quia ipse est sui ipsius the necessity of His existence is that His
regula; sicut propter hoc non potest essence is His act of existence.
non esse, quia sua essentia est
suum esse.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod in Deo 9. In God there is no dimensional quantity

non est quantitas dimensiva, ut on whose basis an equality could be
secundum eam aequalitas attendi established. There is in Him, however,
possit; sed est ibi quantitas per quantity after the manner of intensive
modum intensivae quantitatis; sicut quantity. For example, whiteness is said to
albedo dicitur magna, quia perfecte be great when it attains the perfect fullness
attingit ad naturam suam. Intensio of its nature. The intensity of a form,
autem alicuius formae respicit moreover, refers to the manner in which
modum habendi formam illam. that form is possessed. Now, although that
Quamvis autem aliquo modo illud which is divine may in some way be
quod est Dei ad creaturas derivetur; passed on to creatures, we can never grant
nullo tamen modo potest concedi that a creature possesses it in the same
quod creatura habeat aliquid per way in which God possesses it. Hence,
modum illum quo habet illud Deus: although we grant that there exists a
et ideo quamvis aliquo modo likeness between a creature and God in
concedamus esse similitudinem some way, we do not grant that they are
inter creaturam et Deum, nullo equal in any way whatsoever.
tamen modo concedimus ibi esse
aequalitatem.

Ad decimum dicendum, quod 10. As will be evident to one who carefully

intentio Anselmi est dicere, ut patet considers Anselm’s words, Anselm means
inspicienti verba eius, quod in verbo to say merely that in the Word there exists
non sit similitudo sumpta a rebus no likeness drawn from things themselves,
ipsis, sed omnes rerum formae sunt but, instead, all the forms of things are
sumptae a verbo; et ideo dicit quod taken from the Word. Accordingly, he
verbum non est similitudo rerum, means that the Word is not a likeness of
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sed res sunt imitationes verbi. Unde things, but things are imitations of the
per hoc non removetur idea; cum Word. Consequently, this argument does
idea sit forma quam aliquid imitatur. not dispense with the ideas, since an idea
is a form which something imitates.

Ad undecimum dicendum, quod 11. The statement that God knows Himself
Deus eodem modo cognoscit se et in the same way in which He knows other
alia, si accipiatur modus cognitionis things is true if we are speaking about the
ex parte cognoscentis; non autem si way of knowing with reference to the
accipiatur ex parte rei cognitae, quia knower. It is not true, however, if we are
creatura quae a Deo cognoscitur, speaking about the way of knowing with
non est idem secundum rem cum reference to the thing known, because the
medio quo Deus cognoscit sed ipse creature which is known by God is not the
est idem re cum eo; unde nulla same in the real order as the medium by
multiplicitas in eius essentia which God knows. But He Himself is really
sequitur. the same as it. Consequently, it does not
follow that there is multiplicity in His
essence.

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:

Are there many ideas?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 7; 44, 3; 47, 1, ad 2; I Sent., 36, 2, 2; III Sent., 14, 2, sol. 2;
C.G., I, 54; De pot., 3, 16, ad 12-14; Quodl., IV, 1, 1.]

Secundo quaeritur utrum sit ponere Difficulties

plures ideas.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia ea quae essentialiter dicuntur 1. The things which are predicated

in Deo, non minus sunt vere in eo essentially of God are not less true of Him
quam illa quae dicuntur in ipso than those which are predicated personally
personaliter. Sed pluralitas of Him. Now, a plurality of personal
proprietatum personalium inducit properties involves a plurality of persons,
pluralitatem personarum, and for this reason God is said to be triune.
secundum quas Deus dicitur trinus. Consequently, since ideas are essential
Cum ergo ideae sint essentiales, perfections because common to all three
quia sunt communes tribus Persons, if the number of ideas is
personis, si sint plures in Deo determined by the number of things that
secundum pluralitatem rerum, there are, it follows that there are not only
sequitur quod non solum sint tres three Persons but an infinite number of
personae in ipso, sed infinitae. them.

Sed dicebat, quod ideae non sunt 2. It was said, however, that ideas are not
essentiales, quia sunt ipsa essential properties, since they are the
essentia.- Sed contra, bonitas essence itself.—On the contrary, God’s
sapientia et potentia Dei sunt eius goodness, wisdom, and power are His
essentia, et tamen dicuntur essence, yet they are said to be essential
essentialia attributa. Ergo et ideae, attributes. Therefore, even though they are

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quamvis sint ipsa essentia, possunt His essence, ideas can be called His
essentiales dici. essential properties.

Praeterea, quidquid Deo attribuitur, 3. Whatever is attributed to God should be

debet ei nobilissimo modo attribui. attributed to Him as existing in the most
Sed Deus est principium rerum; noble manner possible. Now, God is the
ergo debet poni in eo omne illud principle of all things; hence, whatever
quod ad nobilitatem principii pertains to the nobility of a principle should
pertinet, in summo. Sed unitas est be said to exist in Him in the highest
huiusmodi, quia omnis virtus unita possible degree. However, unity is a
plus est infinita quam multiplicata, perfection of this sort, because, as is said in
ut dicitur in libro de causis. Ergo in The Causes: “Every power is more infinite
Deo est summa unitas; ergo non when it has unity than when it is multiplied.”
solum est unus re, sed ratione; quia Hence, the highest unity is in God. He is,
magis est unum quod est unum therefore, not only one in reality, but also
utroque modo, quam quod altero one in concept, because that which is one
istorum tantum; et sic non sunt in in both respects is more one than that
eo plures rationes, sive ideae. which is one merely in one respect.
Consequently, many intelligible characters
or ideas do not exist in God.

Praeterea, philosophus dicit in V 4. The Philosopher says: “What is entirely

Metaphys.: quod omnino est unum, one cannot be separated either by intellect,
quod non potest separari neque time, place, or concept—especially with
intellectu, neque tempore, neque regard to its substance.” Consequently, if
loco, neque ratione; et maxime in God is one in the highest degree because
substantia. Si ergo Deus est He is being in the highest degree,
maxime unum, quia est maxime conceptual distinctions are not applicable to
ens, non potest separari ratione; et Him; so, our original position stands.
ita idem quod prius.

Praeterea, si plures ideae, sequitur 5. If there are many ideas, they must be
eas esse inaequales; quia una idea unequal, because one idea will contain only
continebit esse tantum, alia autem the act of existence, another, both
esse et vivere, alia vero insuper existence and life, a third, both of these and
intelligere, secundum quod res intellection besides—according as the
cuius est idea, in pluribus thing, whose idea it is, resembles God in
assimilatur Deo. Cum ergo one or many respects. But, since it is
inconveniens sit in Deo aliquam inconsistent to say that there is any
inaequalitatem ponere, videtur inequality in God, it seems that there
quod non possint esse in eo plures cannot be many ideas in Him.
ideae.

Praeterea, in causis materialibus 6. Material causes can be reduced to one

est status ad unam primam first matter, and efficient and final causes
materiam, et similiter in efficientibus can be reduced in a similar manner.
et finalibus. Ergo et in formalibus Consequently, formal causes can also be
est status ad unam primam reduced to one first form. The end-term of
formam. Sed est status ad ideas, this reduction, however, will be ideas,
quia ut dicit Augustinus in libro because, as Augustine says: “these are the
LXXXIII quaestionum, ideae sunt principal forms or intelligible characters of
principales formae vel rationes things.” Hence, there is only one idea in
rerum. Ergo in Deo non est nisi una God.
tantum idea.

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Sed dicebat, quod quamvis sit una 7. But it was said that, although there is
prima forma, tamen ideae dicuntur only one first form, ideas are nevertheless
plures secundum diversos said to be many because of the different
respectus ipsius.- Sed contra, non relations this form has.—On the contrary, it
potest dici quod ideae multiplicentur cannot be said that ideas are multiplied
secundum respectum ad Deum in because of their relation to God in whom
quo sunt, qui est unus; neque they exist, for He is one; nor can they be
secundum respectum ad ideata, multiplied because of their relation to what
secundum quod sunt in causa is made according to them and as these
prima, quia in ea sunt unum, ut creatures exist in the first cause, since, as
Dionysius dicit; nec per respectum Dionysius says, in the first cause creatures
ad ideata, secundum quod in exist as one. Finally, ideas cannot be
propria natura existunt, quia sic res multiplied because of their relation to what
ideatae sunt temporales, ideae vero is made according to them and as these
aeternae sunt. Ergo nullo modo per things exist in their own natures, because
respectum formae primae possunt creatures are temporal and ideas are
ideae dici plures. eternal. Hence, there is no possible way of
saying that the ideas are many because of
their relation to the first form.

Praeterea, nulla relatio quae est 8. The relation between God and creature
inter Deum et creaturam, est in does not exist in God; it exists only in the
Deo, sed in creatura tantum. Sed creature. But an idea or exemplar implies a
idea vel exemplar importat relation of God to a creature. Therefore,
relationem Dei ad creaturam. Ergo that relation is not in God but only in the
ista relatio non est in Deo, sed in creature. Now, since the idea is in God,
creatura. Cum ergo idea sit in Deo, ideas cannot be multiplied by relations of
per huiusmodi respectus ideae this sort.
multiplicari non possunt.

Praeterea, intellectus qui pluribus 9. An intellect that knows by means of

intelligit, est compositus, et many species is composite and moves from
transiens de uno in aliud. Sed haec one to another. But this way of knowing is
a divino intellectu sunt procul. Cum far from God’s way. Therefore, since ideas
ergo ideae sint rationes rerum, are the intelligible characters of things by
quibus Deus intelligit, videtur quod which God understands, it seems that there
non sint plures ideae in Deo. are not many ideas in Him.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Idem secundum idem non est 1. The same thing under the same aspect
natum facere nisi idem. Sed Deus can, of its very nature, produce only one
facit multa et diversa. Ergo non and the same reality. But God produces
secundum eamdem rationem, sed many and different things. Hence, God
secundum plures, res causat. Sed causes things, not according to one
rationes quibus res producuntur a concept, but according to many concepts.
Deo, sunt ideae. Ergo plures ideae But the concepts by which God produces
sunt in Deo. things are ideas. Therefore, there are many
ideas in God.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. 2. Augustine says: “It remains, therefore,

LXXXIII quaestionum: restat ut that all things are created by plan, but a
omnia ratione sint condita; nec man not by the same plan as a horse. So to
eadem ratione homo qua equus; think would be absurd.” Each thing is
hoc enim absurdum est existimari.

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Singula igitur propriis sunt creata therefore created according to its own plan;
rationibus; ergo sunt plures ideae. hence, there are many ideas.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in 3. Augustine says” that it is just as wrong to

epistola ad Nebridium, quod sicut say that the plan which God has of man in
inconveniens est dicere quod general is the same as that of this man in
eadem sit ratio anguli et quadrati, particular as it is to say that the idea of an
ita inconveniens est dicere quod angle is the same as that of a square. It
eadem sit ratio in Deo hominis et seems, therefore, that there are many plans
huius hominis. Ergo videtur quod in God’s ideas.
sint plures rationes ideales in Deo.

Praeterea, Hebr. XI, 3 dicitur: fide 4. The Epistle to the Hebrews (11:3) states:
credimus aptata esse saecula “By faith we understand that the world was
verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia framed by the word of God; that from
fierent. Invisibilia autem pluraliter invisible things visible things might be
appellat species ideales. Ergo sunt made.” Note that he refers to the ideal
plures. species as invisible things (plural). Hence,
there are many ideas.

Praeterea, ideae a sanctis 5. The saints call ideas art and the world,
significantur nomine artis et mundi, as is clear from the authorities cited. But art
ut patet ex auctoritatibus inductis. implies plurality, for art is a collection of
Sed ars pluralitatem quamdam precepts converging toward one end. World
importat; est enim collectio has a similar connotation, since it implies
praeceptorum ad unum finem the collection of all creatures. Hence, we
tendentium; et similiter etiam should affirm the existence of many ideas in
mundus, cum importet collectionem God.
omnium creaturarum. Ergo oportet
ponere plures ideas in Deo.

REPLY

Responsio. Dicendum, quod While admitting that God acts through His
quidam ponentes Deum per intellect and not under the compulsion of
intellectum agere, et non ex His nature, some have said that He intends
necessitate naturae, posuerunt only one thing, namely, creature in general,
eum habere intentionem unam and the distinction between creatures is
tantum, scilicet creaturae in brought about by secondary causes. They
universali; sed creaturarum declare that God first established one
distinctio facta est per causas intelligence that produced three things: a
secundas. Dicunt enim, quod Deus soul, the world, and another intelligence;
primo condidit unam intelligentiam, and by means of this procession a plurality
quae produxit tria: scilicet animam, of things issued forth from the one first
et orbem, et aliam intelligentiam; et principle. According to this position, there
sic progrediendo, processit would, indeed, be an idea in God, but only
pluralitas rerum ab uno primo one common to all creation. The proper
principio. Et secundum hanc idea of each individual thing would exist
opinionem esset quidem in Deo only in secondary causes. This opinion,
idea, sed una tantum creaturae toti Dionysius says, was held by a certain
communis; sed propriae ideae philosopher named Clement, who
singulorum essent in causis maintained that higher beings were the
secundis, sicut etiam Dionysius archetypes of lower.
narrat in V cap. de divinis
nominibus, quod quidam Clemens

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philosophus posuit principaliora

entia exemplaria inferiorum esse.

Sed hoc stare non potest: quia si This opinion, however, cannot stand,
intentio alicuius agentis feratur ad because if the intention of an agent is
aliquid unum tantum, praeter directed toward one thing only, whatever
intentionem eius erit, et quasi else that follows is apart from his intention
casuale, quidquid sequatur, quod and, as it were, a chance happening, which
accidit ei quod est principaliter happens accidentally in conjunction with
intentum ab eo; sicut si aliquis that which he principally intended. This
intenderet facere aliquod would make the agent like someone who
triangulatum, praeter intentionem wants to produce something that is
eius esset quod esset magnum vel triangular, and whether it is small or large is
parvum. Cuilibet autem communi a matter of indifference to him. Now, to
accidit speciale contentum sub eo; whatever is general something special is
unde si intentio agentis est ad indirectly connected. Hence, if an agent
aliquod commune tantum, praeter intends merely something general, in
intentionem eius esset quod whatever way it is determined by something
qualitercumque determinaretur per special it is entirely apart from his intention.
aliquod speciale; sicut si natura For example, if nature intends to generate
intenderet generare solum animal, only an animal, it is apart from nature’s
praeter intentionem naturae esset intention that what is generated be a man
quod generatum sit homo vel or a horse. Consequently, if God’s intention
equus. Unde si intentio Dei when He acts regards only creatures in
operantis respiciat tantum ad general, then all distinction between
creaturam in communi, tota creatures happens by chance. But it is
distinctio creaturae casualiter hardly correct to say that this difference
accidet. Inconveniens autem est between creatures is related only
dicere quod sit per accidens per accidentally to the first cause and
comparationem ad causam essentially to second causes, since what is
primam; et sit per se per essential is previous to what is accidental,
comparationem ad causas and the relation of a thing to the first cause
secundas: quia quod est per se, is previous to its relation to a second cause,
prius est eo quod est per accidens; as is clear from The Causes. Consequently,
prius autem est comparatio alicuius it is impossible for the distinction between
ad causam primam quam ad creatures to be related only accidentally to
causam secundam, ut patet in libro the first cause and essentially to a second
de causis; unde impossibile est cause. The opposite, however, can happen;
quod sit per accidens respectu for we see that those things that happen by
causae primae, et per se respectu chance as far as we are concerned are
secundae. Potest autem accidere e foreknown by God and ordained by Him.
converso, sicut videmus quod ea Hence, we must say that all the distinction
quae sunt casualiter quoad nos, between things is predefined by God.
sunt Deo praecognita, et ordinata Consequently, we must affirm that
ab ipso. Unde necesse est dicere, intelligible characters proper to individual
quod tota distinctio rerum sit things exist in God and that for this reason
praedefinita ab eo. Et ideo necesse there are in Him many ideas.
est in Deo ponere singulorum
proprias rationes, et propter hoc
necesse est ponere in eo plures
ideas.

Modus autem pluralitatis hinc accipi From this the plurality of ideas can be
potest. Forma enim in intellectu understood. A form can exist in the intellect
dupliciter esse potest. Uno modo ita in two ways. First, it can exist there so as to
quod sit principium actus be a principle of the act of understanding,
intelligendi, sicut forma, quae est as is the form had by a knower in so far as
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intelligentis in quantum est he understands. This is the likeness of what

intelligens; et haec est similitudo is understood, existing in him. Second, the
intellecti in ipso. Alio modo ita quod form can exist in the intellect so as to be the
sit terminus actus intelligendi, sicut end-term of the act of understanding. For
artifex intelligendo excogitat example, by understanding an architect
formam domus; et cum illa forma sit thinks out the form of a house; and since
excogitata per actum intelligendi, et that form has been thought out by means of
quasi per actum effecta, non potest an act of understanding and is, as it were,
esse principium actus intelligendi, effected by that act, it cannot be a principle
ut sit primum quo intelligatur; sed of the act of understanding and thus the
magis se habet ut intellectum, quo first means by which the understanding
intelligens aliquid operatur. takes place. It is, instead, the understood,
Nihilominus tamen est forma by which the knower makes something.
praedicta secundum quo intelligitur: Nevertheless, it is the second means by
quia per formam excogitatam which understanding takes place, because
artifex intelligit quid operandum sit; it is by means of the excogitated form that
sicut etiam in intellectu speculativo the architect understands what he is to
videmus quod species, qua make. Similarly, with respect to the
intellectus informatur ut intelligat speculative intellect, we see that the
actu, est primum quo intelligitur; ex species by which the intellect is informed so
hoc autem quod est effectus in that it can actually understand is the first
actu, per talem formam operari iam means by which understanding takes place;
potest formando quidditates rerum and because the intellect is brought into act
et componendo et dividendo; unde by means of this form, it can now operate
ipsa quidditas formata in intellectu, and form quiddities of things, as well as
vel etiam compositio et divisio, est compose and divide. Consequently, the
quoddam operatum ipsius, per quiddities formed in the intellect, or even
quod tamen intellectus venit in the affirmative and negative propositions,
cognitionem rei exterioris; et sic est are, in a sense, products of the intellect, but
quasi secundum quo intelligitur. Si products of such a kind that through them
autem intellectus artificis aliquod the intellect arrives at the knowledge of an
artificiatum produceret ad exterior thing. Hence, this product is, in a
similitudinem sui ipsius, tunc fashion, a second means by which
quidem ipse intellectus artificis understanding takes place. If, however, the
esset idea, non quidem ut est intellect of an artist were to produce a work
intellectus, sed inquantum that resembled itself, then, indeed, the very
intellectum. intellect of the artist would be an idea, not in
so far as it is an intellect, but in so far as it
is understood.

In his autem quae ad imitationem Now, with respect to those things made in
alterius producuntur, quandoque imitation of something else, we sometimes
quidem id quod alterum imitatur, find that they imitate their archetype
perfecte imitatur ipsum; et tunc perfectly. In such a case, the operative
intellectus operativus intellect when preconceiving the form of
praeconcipiens formam operati, what was made, possesses as an idea the
habet ut ideam ipsam formam rei very form of the thing imitated precisely as
imitatae, prout est illius rei imitatae: the form of the thing imitated. At other
quandoque vero quod est ad times, however, we find that that which is
imitationem alterius, non perfecte made in imitation of another is not a perfect
imitatur illud; et tunc intellectus imitation. In this case, the operative intellect
operativus non acciperet formam would not take as its idea or archetype the
rei imitatae absolute ut ideam vel form of the archetype itself, absolutely and
exemplar rei operandae; sed cum exactly as it is, but it takes it with a definite
proportione determinata, secundum proportion varying according to the degree
quam exemplatum a principali of closeness with which the copy imitates
exemplari deficeret vel imitaretur. the original.
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Dico ergo, quod Deus per I say, therefore, that God, who makes all
intellectum omnia operans, omnia things by means of His intellect, produces
ad similitudinem essentiae suae them all in the likeness of His own essence.
producit; unde essentia sua est Hence, His essence is the idea of things—
idea rerum; non quidem ut est not, indeed, His essence considered as an
essentia, sed ut est intellecta. Res essence, but considered as it is known.
autem creatae non perfecte Created things, however, do not perfectly
imitantur divinam essentiam; unde imitate the divine essence. Consequently,
essentia non accipitur absolute ab His essence as the idea of things is not
intellectu divino ut idea rerum, sed understood by the divine intellect
cum proportione creaturae fiendae unqualifiedly, but with the proportion to the
ad ipsam divinam essentiam, divine essence had by the creature to be
secundum quod deficit ab ea, vel produced, that is, according as the creature
imitatur ipsam. Diversae autem res falls short of, or imitates, the divine
diversimode ipsam imitantur; et essence. Now, different things imitate the
unaquaeque secundum proprium divine essence in different ways, each one
modum suum, cum unicuique sit according to its own proper manner, since
esse distinctum ab altera; et ideo each has its own act of existence, distinct
ipsa divina essentia, cointellectis from that of another. We can say, therefore,
diversis proportionibus rerum ad that the divine essence is the idea of each
eam, est idea uniuscuiusque rei. and every thing, understanding, of course,
Unde, cum sint diversae rerum the different proportions that things have to
proportiones, necesse est plures it. Hence, since there are in things different
esse ideas; et est quidem una proportions to- the divine essence, there
omnium ex parte essentiae; sed must necessarily be many ideas. If we
pluralitas invenitur ex parte consider the essence alone, however, there
diversarum proportionum is but one idea for all things; but if we
creaturarum ad ipsam. consider the different proportions of
creatures to the divine essence, then there
can be said to be a plurality of ideas.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. Personal properties introduce a

proprietates personales ideo distinction of persons in God because they
inducunt distinctionem personarum are opposed to each other by relative
in divinis, quia ad invicem opposition. But properties that are not
opponuntur oppositione relationis; opposed, such as common spiration and
unde proprietates non oppositae paternity, do not distinguish one person
non distinguunt personas, ut from another. Moreover, neither the ideas
communis spiratio, et paternitas. nor other essential attributes are opposed
Ideae autem, nec alia essentialia by relative opposition. Hence, there is no
attributa, non habent ad invicem similarity.
aliquam oppositionem; et ideo non
est simile.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod non 2. The same thing is not true of ideas and
est simile de ideis et essentialibus essential attributes. In their principal
attributis. Attributa enim essentialia meaning, the essential attributes do not
nihil habent de principali intellectu signify anything more than the essence of
suo praeter essentiam creatoris; the Creator. Hence, strictly speaking, they
unde etiam non plurificantur, are not plural, although God is compared to
quamvis secundum ea Deus ad creatures with reference to them. For
creaturas comparetur, prout example, with reference to His goodness,
secundum bonitatem facit bonos, we say that creatures are good; with
secundum sapientiam sapientes. reference to His wisdom, we say that they
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Sed idea de suo principali intellectu are wise. An idea, however, in its principal
habet aliquid aliud praeter meaning signifies something other than
essentiam, scilicet ipsam God’s essence, namely, the proportion a
proportionem creaturae ad creature has to His essence; and this
essentiam, in quo etiam completur completes the formal notion of an idea.
formaliter ratio ideae, ratione cuius Because of this there are said to be many
dicuntur plures ideae: nihilominus ideas. Nevertheless, the ideas may be
tamen secundum quod ad called essential attributes inasmuch as they
essentiam pertinent, nihil prohibet are related to the essence.
ideas essentiales dici.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod 3. A plurality of concepts is sometimes

pluralitas rationis quandoque reduced to a diversity in the thing. For
reducitur ad aliquam diversitatem example, there is a rational distinction
rei, sicut Socrates et Socrates between Socrates and Socrates sitting, and
sedens differunt ratione; et hoc this is reduced to the difference that there is
reducitur ad diversitatem between substance and accident. Similarly,
substantiae et accidentis; et man and animal differ rationally; and this
similiter homo et animal ratione difference is reduced to the difference
differunt; et haec differentia between form and matter, because genus is
reducitur ad diversitatem formae et taken from matter but the specific difference
materiae, quia genus sumitur a from form. Consequently, such a conceptual
materia, differentia vero specifica a difference is repugnant to the highest unity
forma; unde talis differentia or simplicity. On the other hand, a
secundum rationem repugnat conceptual difference sometimes is reduced
maxime unitati vel simplicitati. not to any diversity in the thing, but to its
Quandoque vero differentia truth, which can be understood in different
secundum rationem non reducitur ways. It is in this sense that we say that
ad aliquam rei diversitatem, sed ad there is a plurality of intelligible characters
veritatem rei, quae est diversimode in God. Hence, this plurality is not
intelligibilis; et sic ponimus repugnant to His highest unity or simplicity.
pluralitatem rationum in Deo; unde
hoc non repugnat maximae unitati,
vel simplicitati.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod 4. In this passage, the Philosopher speaks

philosophus appellat ibi rationem of intelligible characters as definitions. But
definitionem; in Deo autem non est we cannot talk of there being many
accipere plures rationes quasi intelligible characters in God as though
definitiones, quia nulla rationum these were definitions, for none of these
illarum essentiam divinam comprehends the divine essence. Hence,
comprehendit; et ideo non est ad this passage is not to the point.
propositum.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod forma 5. The form in the intellect has a double
quae est in intellectu, habet relationship. It is related not only to the
respectum duplicem: unum ad rem thing whose form it is, but also to the
cuius est, alium ad id in quo est. Ex intellect in which it exists. On the basis of its
primo autem respectu non dicitur first relation, the form is not said to be of a
aliqualis, sed alicuius tantum: non certain kind but rather of a certain thing, for
enim materialium est forma the intellectual form of material things is not
materialis, nec sensibilium a material form, nor is the intellectual form
sensibilis. Sed secundum alium of sensible things sensible. It is on the basis
respectum aliqualis dicitur, quia of its second relationship that the
sequitur modum eius in quo est; intellectual form is said to be “of a certain
unde ex hoc quod rerum ideatarum kind,” because its kind is determined by that

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quaedam aliis perfectius essentiam in which it exists. Hence, from the fact that
divinam imitantur, non sequitur some of the things of which ideas are had
quod ideae sint inaequales, sed imitate the divine essence more perfectly
inaequalium. than others, it does not follow that the ideas
are unequal, but that they are ideas of
unequal things.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod una 6. The one first form to which all things are
prima forma, ad quam omnia reduced is the divine essence, considered
reducuntur, est ipsa divina essentia in itself. Reflecting upon this essence, the
secundum se considerata; ex cuius divine intellect devises—if I may use such
consideratione intellectus divinus an expression—different ways in which it
adinvenit, ut ita dicam, diversos can be imitated. The plurality of ideas
modos imitationis ipsius, in quibus comes from these different ways.
pluralitas idearum consistit.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod 7. The ideas are multiplied according to the

ideae plurificantur secundum different relations they have to things
diversos respectus ad res in propria existing in their own natures. It is not
natura existentes; nec tamen necessary that these relations be temporal
oportet quod, si res sunt even if the things are temporal, because the
temporales, quod illi respectus sint action of the intellect—even of the human
temporales, quia actio intellectus, intellect—can extend to something even
etiam humani, se extendit ad when it does not exist, as, for example,
aliquid etiam quando illud non est, when we know the past. Moreover, as is
sicut cum intelligimus praeterita. said in the Metaphysics, a relation follows
Actionem autem relatio consequitur, upon action; hence, even relations to
ut in V Metaphysic. dicitur; unde et temporal things are eternal in the divine
respectus ad res temporales in intellect.
intellectu divino sunt aeterni.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod relatio 8. The relation existing between God and
quae est inter Deum et creaturam, creature is not a real relation in God.
non est in Deo secundum rem; est However, it is in God according to our
tamen in Deo secundum intellectum manner of understanding Him; similarly, it
nostrum; et similiter potest esse in can be in Him according to His own manner
eo secundum intellectum suum, of understanding Himself, that is, in so far
prout scilicet, intelligit respectum as He understands the relation things have
rerum ad essentiam suam; et sic to His essence. Thus, these relations exist
respectus illi sunt in Deo ut intellecti in God as known by Him.
ab ipso.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod idea 9. An idea does not have the character of
non habet rationem eius quo primo that by which a thing is first understood,
aliquid intelligitur, sed habet but, rather, of that which is understood and
rationem intellecti in intellectu is existing in the intellect. Moreover,
existentis. Uniformitas autem whether or not there is to be but one form in
intellectus sequitur unitatem eius the understanding is determined by the
quo primo aliquid intelligitur; sicut unity of that by which a thing is first
unitas actionis sequitur unitatem understood, just as the unity of an action is
formae agentis, quae est principium determined by the unity of the form of the
ipsius; unde, quamvis respectus agent which is its principle. Hence, although
intellecti a Deo sint multi, in quibus the relations understood by God are many
pluralitas idearum consistit; quia (and it is in these relations that the plurality
tamen illos omnes per unam suam of ideas consists), nevertheless, because e
understands all things by means of His
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essentiam intelligit, intellectus eius essence, His understanding is not multiple

non est multiplex, sed unus. but one.

ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:

Do ideas belong to speculative or only to practical knowledge?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 14, 16; 15, 3; I Sent., 36, 2, 3; De div. nom., c. 5, lect. 3 (P.
15:352a seq.); De pot., 1, 5, ad 10-11; 3, 1, ad 13.]

Tertio quaeritur utrum ideae Difficulties

pertineant ad cognitionem
speculativam, vel practicam
tantum.

Et videtur quod tantum ad It seems that they belong only to practical

practicam. knowledge, for

Quia, ut dicit Augustinus in l. 1. According to Augustine: “Ideas are the

LXXXIII quaestionum, ideae sunt principal forms of things, according to which
formae rerum principales, everything is formed that has a beginning or
secundum quas formatur omne an end.” But, since nothing is formed by
quod oritur aut interit. Sed reason of speculative knowledge, ideas do
secundum speculativam not belong to this type of knowledge.
cognitionem nihil formatur. Ergo
speculativa cognitio non habet
ideam.

Sed dicebat, quod ideae non 2. It was said, however, that ideas are related
solum habent respectum ad id not only to those things which have a
quod oritur aut interit, sed ad id beginning or an end, but also to those which
quod oriri vel interire potest, ut can have a beginning or end, as Augustine
ibidem Augustinus dicit; et sic says in the same passage. Consequently,
idea se habet ad ea quae nec ideas are related to those things which do not
sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt, exist, will not exist, and never have existed,
tamen esse possunt, de quibus but nevertheless can exist. Of these, God
Deus speculativam cognitionem has speculative knowledge.—On the
habet.- Sed contra, practica contrary, practical knowledge is said to be
scientia dicitur secundum quam that knowledge according to which one
aliquis scit modum operis, etiam si knows how a thing is done, even if he never
nunquam operari intendat; et sic intends to do it. This is why part of medical
dicitur practica esse pars study is called practical. Now, God knows
medicinae. Sed Deus scit modum how the things which He can make are to be
operandi ea quae potest facere, made, even though He does not intend to
quamvis facere non proponat. make them. Therefore, God has practical
Ergo etiam de eis Deus habet knowledge of them. Hence, in both ways,
practicam cognitionem; et sic ideas pertain to practical knowledge.
utroque modo idea ad practicam
cognitionem pertinet.

Praeterea, idea nihil est aliud 3. An idea is nothing but the exemplary form.
quam exemplaris forma. Sed Now, one can speak of the exemplary form
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forma exemplaris non potest dici only in connection with practical knowledge,
nisi in practica cognitione, quia because an exemplar is that upon which a
exemplar est ad cuius imitationem thing else is modeled. Therefore, ideas
fit aliud. Ergo ideae solum pertain only to practical knowledge.
practicam cognitionem respiciunt.

Praeterea, secundum 4. According to the Philosopher, the practical

philosophum, practicus intellectus intellect pertains to those things whose
est eorum quorum principia sunt principles are within us. But the ideas existing
in nobis. Sed ideae in intellectu in the divine intellect are principles of the
divino existentes sunt ideatorum things that are modeled on the ideas.
principia. Ergo ad practicum Therefore, they belong to the practical
intellectum pertinent. intellect.

Praeterea, omnes formae 5. All the forms in the intellect either are from
intellectus vel sunt a rebus, vel things or have a relation to things. The latter
sunt ad res: quae autem sunt ad type of forms belongs to the practical
res, sunt practici intellectus; quae intellect; the former, to the speculative. But
vero a rebus, speculativi. Sed no forms in the divine intellect are from
nullae formae intellectus divini things, since it receives nothing from things.
sunt a rebus, cum nihil a rebus Therefore, the forms in the divine intellect
accipiat. Ergo sunt ad res; et sic have a relation to things, and thus belong to
sunt practici intellectus. the practical intellect.

Praeterea, si est alia idea 6. If in God an idea of the practical intellect

intellectus practici, et alia were other than an idea of the speculative
speculativi in Deo, diversitas ista intellect, this diversity could not be based on
non potest esse per aliquid something absolute in Him; for everything of
absolutum, quia omne huiusmodi this kind in God is one and one only; nor
est unum tantum in Deo; nec per could it be based on a relation of identity
respectum identitatis, ut cum such as exists when a thing is said to be
dicimus idem eidem idem, quia identical with itself, because such a relation
talis respectus nullam pluralitatem involves no plurality. Finally, it could not be
inducit; nec per respectum based on a relation of diversity, since a cause
diversitatis, quia causa non is not multiplied even when its effects are
plurificatur, quamvis effectus sint multiple. Therefore, there is no possible way
plures. Ergo nullo modo potest of distinguishing an idea of speculative
distingui alia idea speculativae knowledge from an idea of practical
cognitionis ab idea practicae knowledge.
cognitionis.

Sed dicebat, quod in hoc utraque 7. But it was said that these ideas are
idea distinguitur, quod idea distinguished because a practical idea is a
practica est principium essendi, principle of being, while a speculative idea is
sed speculativa cognoscendi.- a principle of knowing.—On the contrary,
Sed contra, eadem sunt principia principles of being and of knowing are the
essendi et cognoscendi. Ergo ex same. Therefore, a speculative idea cannot
hoc idea speculativa a practica be distinguished from a practical idea on the
non distinguitur. basis suggested.

Praeterea, cognitio speculativa 8. God’s speculative knowledge seems to be

nihil aliud videtur esse in Deo the same as His simple knowledge. God’s
quam simplex ipsius notitia. Sed simple knowledge, however, is nothing other
simplex notitia nihil praeter than bare knowledge. Now, since an idea
notitiam aliud habere potest. Ergo, adds a relation to things, it seems that an

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cum idea addat respectum ad res, idea does not belong to His speculative
videtur quod non pertineat ad knowledge but only to His practical
speculativam cognitionem, sed ad knowledge.
practicam tantum.

Praeterea, finis practici est 9. The end of the practical intellect is the
bonum. Sed respectus ideae non good. Now, the reference of an idea can be
potest determinari nisi ad bonum, determined only to a good; for, if evil occurs,
quia mala praeter intentionem that is outside of God’s intention.
accidunt. Ergo idea solum Consequently, an idea pertains only to the
practicum intellectum respicit. practical intellect.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Cognitio practica non extendit se 1. Practical knowledge extends only to those

nisi ad facienda. Sed Deus per things which are to be made. But by His
ideas non solum scit facienda, ideas God knows not only what things are to
sed praesentia et facta. Ergo be made, but also those things that are made
ideae non se extendunt solum ad and have been made. Therefore, ideas are
practicam cognitionem. not restricted merely to practical knowledge.

Praeterea, Deus perfectius 2. God knows creatures more perfectly than

cognoscit creaturas quam artifex an artist knows the products of his
artificiata. Sed artifex creatus, per craftsmanship. But by means of the forms
formas quibus operatur, habet through which he acts, an artist, who is
speculativam cognitionem de merely a creature, has speculative
operatis; ergo multo fortius Deus. knowledge of his handicraft. How much more
must this be true of God!

Praeterea, cognitio speculativa 3. Speculative knowledge is that which

est quae considerat principia et considers the principles and causes of things,
causas rerum, et passiones as well as their properties. But by ideas God
earumdem. Sed Deus per ideas knows all that can be known of things.
cognoscit omnia quae in rebus Therefore, the divine ideas pertain not only to
cognosci possunt. Ergo ideae in practical, but also to speculative knowledge.
Deo pertinent non ad practicam
solum, sed speculativam
cognitionem.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in III As is said in The Soul: “Practical knowledge
de anima, intellectus practicus differs from speculative knowledge in its
differt a speculativo fine; finis end.” For the end of speculative knowledge is
enim speculativi est veritas simply truth, but the end of practical
absolute, sed practici est operatio knowledge, as we read in the Metaphysics, is
ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Aliqua action. Now, some knowledge is called
ergo cognitio, practica dicitur ex practical because it is directed to a work. This
ordine ad opus: quod contingit happens in two ways. In the first way, it is
dupliciter. Quandoque enim ad directed in act—that is, when it is actually
opus actu ordinatur, sicut artifex directed to a certain work, as the form is
praeconcepta forma proponit illam which an artist preconceives and intends to
in materiam inducere; et tunc est introduce into matter. This is called actual
actu practica cognitio, et practical knowledge and is the form by which
cognitionis forma. Quandoque knowledge takes place. At other times,
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vero est quidem ordinabilis however, there is a type of knowledge that is

cognitio ad actum, non tamen capable of being ordered to an act, but this
actu ordinatur; sicut cum artifex ordering is not actual. For example, an artist
excogitat formam artificii, et scit thinks out a form for his work, knows how it
modum operandi, non tamen can be made, yet does not intend to make it.
operari intendit; et tunc est This is practical knowledge, not actual, but
practica habitu vel virtute, non habitual or virtual. At still other times,
actu. Quando vero nullo modo est knowledge is utterly incapable of being
ad actum ordinabilis cognitio, tunc ordered to execution. Such knowledge is
est pure speculativa; quod etiam purely speculative. This also happens in two
dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, ways. First, the knowledge is about those
quando cognitio est de rebus illis things whose natures are such that they
quae non sunt natae produci per cannot be produced by the knowledge of the
scientiam cognoscentis, sicut cum knower, as is true for example, when we think
nos cognoscimus naturalia; about natural things. Second, it may happen
quandoque vero res cognita est that the thing known is something that is
quidem operabilis per scientiam, producible through knowledge but is not
tamen non consideratur ut est considered as producible; for a thing is given
operabilis; res enim per existence through a productive operation,
operationem in esse producitur. and there are certain realities that can be
Sunt autem quaedam quae separated in understanding although they
possunt separari secundum cannot exist separately. Therefore, when we
intellectum, quae non sunt consider a thing which is capable of
separabilia secundum esse. production through the intellect and
Quando ergo consideratur res per distinguish from each other realities that
intellectum operabilis cannot exist separately, this knowledge is not
distinguendo ab invicem ea quae practical knowledge, either actual or habitual,
secundum esse distingui non but only speculative. This is the kind of
possunt, non est practica cognitio knowledge a craftsman has when he thinks
nec actu nec habitu, sed about a house by reflecting only on its genus,
speculativa tantum; sicut si artifex differences, properties, and other things of
consideret domum investigando this sort which have no separate existence in
passiones eius, et genus et the thing itself. But a thing is considered as
differentias, et alia huiusmodi, something capable of execution when there
quae secundum esse indistincte are considered in its regard all the things that
inveniuntur in re ipsa. Sed tunc are simultaneously required for its existence.
consideratur res ut est operabilis,
quando considerantur in ipsa
omnia quae ad eius esse
requiruntur simul.

Et secundum hos quatuor modos God’s knowledge is related to things in these

cognitio divina se habet ad res. four ways. Since His knowledge causes
Scientia enim eius est causativa things, He knows some things by ordaining
rerum. Quaedam ergo cognoscit by a decree of His will that they come into
ordinando ea proposito suae existence at a certain time. Of these things
voluntatis ad hoc quod sint He has actual practical knowledge. Moreover,
secundum quodcumque tempus, He knows other things which He never
et horum habet practicam intends to make, for He knows those things
cognitionem in actu. Quaedam which do not exist, have not existed, and
vero cognoscit quae nullo never will exist, as we said in the preceding
tempore facere intendit, scit enim question. Of these things He has actual
ea quae nec fuerunt, nec sunt, knowledge, not actually practical knowledge,
nec erunt, ut in praecedenti however, but merely virtually practical. Again,
quaestione, dictum est; et de his since He knows the things which He makes
habet quidem scientiam in actu, or is able to make, not only as they exist in
non autem actu practicam, sed their own act of existence, but also according
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virtute tantum. Et quia res quas to all the notes which the human intellect can
facit vel facere potest, non solum find in them by analysis, He knows things
considerat secundum quod sunt in that He can make even under an aspect in
proprio esse, sed secundum which they are incapable of execution.
omnes etiam intentiones quas Finally, He knows certain things of which His
intellectus humanus resolvendo in knowledge cannot be the cause—evils, for
eis apprehendere potest; ideo example. Therefore, it is very true to say that
habet cognitionem de rebus there is both practical and speculative
operabilibus a se etiam eo modo knowledge in God.
quo non sunt operabiles. Scit
etiam et quaedam quorum sua
scientia causa esse non potest,
sicut mala. Unde verissime in Deo
et practicam et speculativam
cognitionem ponimus.

Nunc ergo videndum, secundum Now we must see which of the preceding
quem modum praedictorum, idea ways is proper to the ideas which must be
in divina cognitione possit poni. attributed to God’s knowledge. As Augustine
Idea ergo, ut Augustinus dicit, says if we consider the proper meaning of the
secundum proprietatem vocabuli word itself, an idea is a form; but if we
forma dicitur; sed si rem consider what the thing itself is, then an idea
attendamus, idea est rei ratio, vel is an intelligible character or likeness of a
similitudo. Invenimus autem in thing. We find, moreover, in certain forms, a
quibusdam formis duplicem double relation: one relation to that which is
respectum: unum ad id quod informed by these forms, and this is the kind
secundum eas formatur, sicut of relation that knowledge has to the knower;
scientia respicit scientem; alium another to that which is outside, and this is
ad id quod est extra, sicut scientia the kind of a relation that knowledge has to
respicit scibile; hic tamen what is known. This latter relationship,
respectus non est omni formae however, is not common to all forms, as the
communis, sicut primus. Hoc igitur first is. Therefore, the word form implies only
nomen forma importat solum the first relation. This is why a form always
primum respectum; et inde est has the nature of a cause, for a form is, in a
quod forma semper notat sense, the cause of that which it informs—
habitudinem causae. Est enim whether this informing takes place by
forma quodammodo causa eius inherence, as it does in the case of intrinsic
quod secundum ipsam formatur; forms, or by imitation, as it does in the case
sive talis formatio fiat per modum of exemplary forms. But an intelligible
inhaerentiae, ut in formis character and a likeness also have the
intrinsecis, sive per modum second relationship, which does not give
imitationis, ut in formis them the nature of a cause. If we speak,
exemplaribus. Sed similitudo et therefore, of an idea, considering only the
ratio respectum etiam secundum notion that is properly conveyed by that word,
habent, ex quo non competit eis then an idea includes only that kind of
habitudo causae. Si ergo knowledge according to which a thing can be
loquamur de idea secundum made. This is knowledge that is actually
propriam nominis rationem, sic practical, or merely virtually practical, which,
non se extendit nisi ad illam in some way, is speculative. On the other
scientiam secundum quam aliquid hand, if we call an idea an intelligible
formari potest; et haec est character or likeness in a wide sense, then
cognitio actu practica, vel virtute an idea can also pertain to purely speculative
tantum, quae etiam quodammodo knowledge. Or, if we wish to speak more
speculativa est. Sed tamen si formally, we should say that an idea belongs
ideam communiter appellemus to knowledge that is practical, either actually
similitudinem vel rationem, sic or virtually; but an intelligible character or
idea etiam ad speculativam
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cognitionem pure pertinere potest. likeness belongs to both practical and

Vel magis proprie dicamus, quod speculative knowledge.
idea respicit cognitionem
practicam actu vel virtute;
similitudo autem et ratio tam
practicam quam speculativam.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod 1. Augustine is referring the formative action

Augustinus formationem ideae of ideas not only to those things which are
refert non tantum ad ea quae made but also to those which can be made.
fiunt, sed etiam ad ea quae fieri For, even if these latter never exist, they are,
possunt; de quibus, si nunquam in a certain sense, known, speculatively, as is
fiant, est cognitio aliquo modo clear from what has been said.
speculativa, ut ex dictis, patet.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod 2. This argument refers only to knowledge

ratio illa procedit de cognitione illa which is practical virtually, not actually.
quae est practica virtute, non Nothing prevents us from calling this
actu; quam nihil prohibet aliquo speculative in some sense in so far as it falls
modo speculativam dici, short of actual execution.
secundum quod recedit ab
operatione secundum actum.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod 3. Although an exemplar implies a relation to

exemplar, quamvis importet something outside, it is related as a cause to
respectum ad id quod est extra, that extrinsic thing. Therefore, properly
tamen ad illud extrinsecum speaking, it belongs to knowledge that is
importat habitudinem causae; et practical, either habitually or virtually. But an
ideo, proprie loquendo, ad exemplar is not necessarily restricted to that
cognitionem pertinet quae est which is actually practical, because a thing
practica habitu vel virtute; non can be called an exemplar merely if
autem solum ad illam quae est something else can be made in imitation of it
actu practica: quia aliquid potest —even though this other thing is never made.
dici exemplar ex hoc quod ad eius The same is true of ideas.
imitationem potest aliquid fieri,
etsi nunquam fiat; et similiter est
de ideis.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod 4. The practical intellect pertains to those

practicus intellectus est de his things whose principles are within us not in
quorum principia sunt in nobis non any manner whatsoever, but as being
quocumque modo, sed in capable of being executed by us, Hence, as
quantum sunt per nos operabilia. is evident from what we have said, we can
Unde et de eis quorum causae also have speculative knowledge of those
sunt in nobis, habere possumus things whose causes are within us.
speculativam scientiam, ut ex
dictis, patet.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod 5. The speculative intellect is not

intellectus speculativus et differentiated from the practical because one
practicus non distinguuntur per has its forms from things, and the other,
hoc quod est habere formas a forms related to things, because our practical
rebus aut ad res; quia etiam in intellect, at times, also receives its forms from
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nobis intellectus practicus things, as happens, for example, when an

quandoque habet formas a rebus artist, having seen some work of art,
sumptas; ut cum aliquis artifex ex conceives a form according to which he
artificio aliquo viso concipit intends to make something. Therefore, it is
formam secundum quam operari not necessary, either, that all the forms which
intendit. Unde non etiam oportet pertain to the speculative intellect be
ut omnes formae quae sunt received from things.
intellectus speculativi, sint
acceptae a rebus.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod idea 6. God’s practical and speculative ideas

practica et speculativa in Deo non should not be distinguished as though they
distinguuntur quasi duae ideae; were two kinds of ideas. They are
sed quia secundum rationem distinguished because, according to our way
intelligendi, practica addit super of understanding, to the speculative idea the
speculativam ordinem ad actum; practical adds a relation to an operation. It is
sicut homo addit super animal just as we say that man adds rational to
rationale; nec homo tamen et animal, even though man and animal are not
animal sunt duae res. two things.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod pro 7. Principles of being and principles of

tanto dicuntur eadem esse knowing are said to be the same, because
principia essendi et cognoscendi, whatever is a principle of being is also a
quia quaecumque sunt principia principle of knowing. The opposite, however,
essendi, sunt etiam principia is not true, since effects are not infrequently
cognoscendi; non autem e principles of knowing causes. Consequently,
converso, cum effectus interdum there is no reason why the forms of the
sint principia cognoscendi causas. speculative intellect should not be merely
Unde nihil prohibet formas principles of knowing, while the forms of the
intellectus speculativi esse tantum practical intellect are principles both of
principia cognoscendi; formas knowing and of being.
autem intellectus practici esse
principia essendi et cognoscendi
simul.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod 8. We speak of God’s simple knowledge, not

simplex notitia dicitur non ad to exclude the relation which His knowledge
excludendum respectum scientiae has to what He knows, for such a relation is
ad scitum, qui inseparabiliter inseparably joined to all knowledge, but to
omnem scientiam comitatur, sed exclude from it things that are outside the
ad excludendum admixtionem genus of knowledge. Such things are the
eius quod est extra genus notitiae; existence of things (which is added by His
sicut est existentia rerum, quam knowledge of vision) and the relation of His
addit scientia visionis; vel ordo will to the things that He knows and will
voluntatis ad res scitas produce (which is added by His knowledge of
producendas, quem addit scientia approval). It is just as we call fire a simple
approbationis; sicut etiam ignis body, not to deny that it has essential parts,
dicitur corpus simplex, non ad but rather to exclude foreign elements from
excludendum partes essentiales its definition.
eius, sed commixtionem extranei.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod verum 9. The true and the good include each other,
et bonum se invicem since the true is a good and every good is
circumincedunt, quia et verum est true. Therefore, the good can be considered
quoddam bonum, et bonum omne speculatively when only its truth is
est verum; unde et bonum potest considered. For example, we can define the
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considerari cognitione good and show what its nature is. But the
speculativa, prout consideratur good can also be considered practically if it is
veritas eius tantum: sicut cum considered as a good, that is, as an end of a
definimus bonum et naturam eius motion or operation. Consequently, it clearly
ostendimus; potest etiam does not follow that the ideas or likenesses
considerari practice, si or intelligible characters in the divine intellect
consideretur ut bonum; hoc autem belong only to practical knowledge simply
est, si consideretur in quantum est because they have a relation terminating in a
finis motus vel operationis. Et sic good.
patet quod non sequitur ideas vel
similitudines aut rationes divini
intellectus ad practicam tantum
notitiam pertinere, ex hoc quod
respectus terminatur ad bonum.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

Ad primum vero quod contra 1. Time has no ebb or flow in God, because
obiicitur, dicendum quod apud His eternity, which is entirely simultaneous,
Deum non currunt tempora neque includes all time. Hence, He knows the past,
decurrunt, quia ipse sua present, and future in the same way. This is
aeternitate, quae totum est simul, precisely what Sirach (2 3:2 9) says: “For all
totum tempus includit; et sic things were known to the Lord God, before
eodem modo cognoscit they were created: so also after they were
praesentia, praeterita et futura; et perfected he beholds all things.” Hence, it is
hoc est quod dicitur Eccli., XXIII, not necessary that an idea properly so called
29: domino Deo nostro antequam should exceed the limits of practical
crearentur nota sunt omnia; sic et knowledge merely because the past is known
post perfectum cognoscit omnia. by means of it.
Et sic non oportet quod idea
proprie accepta limites practicae
cognitionis excedat, ex hoc quod
per eam etiam praeterita
cognoscuntur.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa 2. If the knowledge of his handicraft which an

cognitio quam artifex creatus artist, who is a creature, has by means of
habet per formas operativas de forms referred to action is a knowledge of his
suo artificio, si cognoscit ipsum ut work as it can be produced, although he does
est producibile in esse, quamvis not intend to produce it, then that knowledge
operari non intendat, non est is not speculative in all respects but is
usquequaque speculativa habitually practical. But that knowledge by
cognitio, sed habitualiter practica; which the artist knows, works, not, however,
cognitio autem artificis qua as he can produce them, is purely
cognoscit artificiata non ut sunt speculative. It does not contain ideas
productibilia ab ipso, quae est corresponding to the work, although it might
pure speculativa, non habet ideas possibly contain likenesses or intelligible
respondentes sibi, sed forte characters of it.
rationes vel similitudines.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod est 3. Both speculative and practical knowledge

commune practicae et are had by means of principles and causes.
speculativae scientiae quod sit Consequently, this argument cannot prove
per principia et causas; unde ex that a science is speculative or that it is
hac ratione non potest probari de practical.
aliqua scientia neque quod sit
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speculativa, neque quod sit

practica.

ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:

Is there in god an idea of evil?

[ARTICLE De ver., 2, 15; S.T., I, 14, 10; 15, 3, ad 1; I Sent., 36, 1, 2; C.G., I, 7 1;
Quodl., XI, 2, 2.]

Quarto quaeritur utrum malum habeat Difficulties

ideam in Deo.

Et videtur quod sic. It seems that there is, for

Deus enim habet scientiam simplicis 1. God knows evil things in His science
notitiae de malis. Sed idea aliquo of simple knowledge. But the ideas
modo respondet scientiae simplicis belong to His science of simple
notitiae, secundum quod large sumitur knowledge in some way if idea is taken
pro similitudine vel ratione. Ergo in its broader meaning of a likeness or
malum habet ideam in Deo. intelligible character. Therefore, there is
an idea of evil in God.

Praeterea, malum nihil prohibet esse in 2. There is no reason why evil cannot be
bono quod non est ei oppositum. Sed in a good not opposed to it. Now, the
similitudo mali non opponitur bono, likeness of evil is not opposed to the
sicut nec similitudo nigri albo, quia good, just as the likeness of black is not
species contrariorum in anima non opposed to white, because the species
sunt contrariae. Ergo nihil prohibet, in of contraries in the soul are not contrary.
Deo, quamvis sit summum bonum, Therefore, there is no reason why there
ponere ideam vel similitudinem mali. cannot be an idea or likeness of evil in
God, even though He is the highest
good.

Praeterea, ubicumque est aliqua 3. Wherever there is any community,

communitas, ibi est aliqua similitudo. there is likeness. Now, from the fact that
Sed ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est a thing is a privation of being, being can
privatio entis, suscipit entis be predicated of it; hence it is said in the
praedicationem; unde dicitur in IV Metaphysics that negations and
metaphysicorum, quod negationes et privations are called beings. Therefore,
privationes dicuntur entia. Ergo ex hoc from the fact that evil is the privation of
ipso quod malum est privatio boni, good, some likeness of it exists in God,
habet aliquam similitudinem in Deo, qui who is the highest good.
est summum bonum.

Praeterea, omne illud quod per 4. Whatever is known in itself has its
seipsum cognoscitur, habet ideam in idea in God. But the false, like the true,
Deo. Sed falsum per seipsum is known in itself; for, just as first
cognoscitur, sicut et verum; sicut enim principles are known in themselves in
prima principia sunt per se nota in sua their truth, so also are the opposites of
veritate, ita eorum opposita sunt per se these principles known in themselves in
nota in sua falsitate. Ergo falsum habet their falsity. Hence, the false has its idea

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ideam in Deo. Falsum autem est in God. Now, the false is a kind of evil,
quoddam malum, sicut et verum est just as the true is the good of the
intellectus bonum, ut dicitur in VI intellect, as we read in the Ethics.
Ethicorum. Ergo malum habet ideam in Therefore, evil has an idea in God.
Deo.

Praeterea, quidquid habet naturam 5. Whatever has a nature has an idea in

aliquam, habet ideam in Deo. Sed God. Now, since vice is the contrary of
vitium, cum sit virtuti contrarium, ponit virtue, it has a nature which belongs to
aliquam naturam in genere qualitatis. the genus of quality. Therefore, it has an
Ergo habet ideam in Deo. Sed ex hoc idea in God. But because it is vice, it is
ipso quod est vitium, est malum. Ergo evil. Therefore, evil has an idea in God.
malum habet ideam in Deo.

Praeterea, si malum non habet ideam, 6. If evil has no idea, the only reason for
non est hoc nisi quia malum non est this is that evil is non-being. But the
ens. Sed formae cognitivae possunt forms by which one knows can have
esse de non entibus; nihil enim non-beings as their objects. There is
prohibet imaginari montes aureos, aut nothing to prevent us, for example, from
Chimaeram. Ergo nihil etiam prohibet imagining golden mountains or
mali ideam esse in Deo. chimeras. Therefore, there is no reason
why evil cannot have an idea in God.

Praeterea, inter res signatas non 7. If a thing has no mark upon it and
habere signum est esse signatum, ut exists among other things that are
patet in ovibus quae signantur. Sed marked, the very lack of a mark
idea est quoddam signum ideati. Ergo becomes its mark, as is clear in sheep
ex hoc ipso quod, rebus bonis which are marked. Now, an idea is, in a
habentibus ideam in Deo, malum non way, a sign of that of which it is an idea.
habet, debet dici ipsum esse ideatum Therefore, since all good things have an
vel formatum. idea in God, and evil does not, evil itself
should be said to be modeled upon or
formed in the likeness of an idea.

Praeterea, quidquid est a Deo, habet 8. Whatever comes from God has its
ideam in eo. Sed malum est a Deo, idea in Him. But evil, that is, the evil of
poenae scilicet. Ergo habet ideam in punishment, comes from God.
ipso. Therefore, it has an idea in God.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Omne ideatum habet esse terminatum 1. All effects of an idea have an act of
per ideam. Sed malum non habet esse existence determined by that idea. But
terminatum, cum non habeat esse, sed evil does not have a determined act of
privatio sit entis. Ergo malum non existence, since it does not have any
habet ideam in Deo. existence, and is, instead, a privation of
being. Therefore, evil does not have an
idea in God.

Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, idea 2. According to Dionysius, the divine

vel exemplar est praedefinitio divinae exemplar or idea is a pre-definition of
voluntatis. Sed voluntas Dei non habet the divine will. But the divine will is
se nisi ad bona. Ergo malum non habet related only to what is good. Therefore,
ideam in Deo. evil has no exemplar in God.

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Praeterea, malum est privatio speciei, 3. “Evil,” according to Augustine, “is the
modi et ordinis, secundum privation of form, measure, and order.”
Augustinum. Sed ipsas ideas Plato Now, Plato says that ideas themselves
species appellavit. Ergo malum non are beautiful. Consequently, evil can
potest habere ideam. have no idea.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod idea secundum As pointed out previously, an idea,

propriam sui rationem, ut patet ex according to its proper nature, implies a
dictis, importat formam, quae est form that is the principle of informing a
principium formationis alicuius rei. thing. Consequently, since there is
Unde, cum nihil quod est in Deo, possit nothing in God that can be a principle of
esse mali principium, non potest evil, evil cannot have an idea in God if
malum ideam habere in Deo, si proprie idea is taken in its proper sense. This is
accipiatur idea. Sed nec etiam si likewise true if it is taken in its broad
accipiatur communiter pro ratione vel sense as meaning a likeness or
similitudine; quia, secundum intelligible character, because, as
Augustinum, malum dicitur ex hoc ipso Augustine says, evil gets its name from
quod non habet formam. Unde, cum the fact that it lacks form. Hence, since
similitudo attendatur secundum a likeness is considered as a form that
formam aliquo modo participatam, non is in some way shared by others, evil
potest esse quod malum similitudinem can have no likeness in God, because a
aliquam in Deo habeat, cum aliquid thing is called evil for the very reason
dicatur malum ex hoc ipso quod a that it falls short of any participation in
participatione divinitatis recedit. divinity.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod 1. God’s science of simple knowledge

scientia simplicis notitiae non solum has as its object, not only evil, but also
est de malis, sed etiam de quibusdam certain good things that do not exist, will
bonis, quae nec sunt, nec erunt, nec not exist, and never did exist. It is with
fuerunt: et respectu horum ponitur idea respect to these non-existing things that
in scientia simplicis notitiae, non autem there is an idea in God’s simple
respectu malorum. knowledge, but there is no idea in it of
evil things.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod non 2.We deny that evil has an exemplar in
negatur malum habere ideam in Deo God, not just because of its opposition,
ratione oppositionis tantum; sed quia but because evil has no nature through
non habet aliquam naturam per quam which it could in some way participate in
aliquo modo participet aliquid quod sit something that is in God and which
in Deo, ut sic similitudo eius accipi could, therefore, be called a likeness of
possit. it.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa 3. That community by which something

communitas qua aliquid communiter is predicated both of being and of non-
praedicatur de ente et non ente, est being is a community merely of reason,
rationis tantum, quia negationes et because negations and privations are
privationes non sunt nisi entia rationis: merely beings of reason. Such a
talis autem communitas non sufficit ad community is not enough for the
similitudinem de qua nunc loquimur. likeness of which we are now speaking.

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Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc 4. That this principle, “No whole is

principium: nullum totum est maius sua greater than its part,” is false is a truth.
parte, esse falsum, quoddam verum Therefore, to know that it is false is to
est; unde cognoscere hoc esse falsum, know something true. However, the
est cognoscere quoddam verum. falsity of this principle is known only by
Falsitas tamen eius principii non its privation of truth, just as blindness is
cognoscitur nisi per privationem known by its being a privation of sight.
veritatis, sicut caecitas per privationem
visus.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut 5. Just as evil actions are good in so far
actiones malae quantum ad id quod as they have existence and come from
habent de entitate, bonae sunt, et a God, so also in this sense are the habits
Deo sunt, ita est etiam et de habitibus good which are the principles or effects
qui sunt earum principia vel effectus; of these actions. Therefore, the fact that
unde ex hoc quod sunt mala, non they are bad does not posit any nature
ponunt aliquam naturam, sed solum but only a privation.
privationem.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod aliquid 6. A thing is called a non-being for two

dicitur non ens dupliciter. Uno modo, reasons. First, because nonexistence is
quia non esse cadit in definitione eius, included in its definition; and this is why
sicut caecitas dicitur non ens; et talis blindness is called a non-being. It is
non entis non potest concipi aliqua impossible to conceive, either in our
forma neque in intellectu neque in imagination or in our intellect, any form
imaginatione; et huiusmodi non ens est for such non-beings; and evil is a non-
malum. Alio modo, quia non invenitur being of this type. Second, because the
in rerum natura, quamvis ipsa privatio non-being is not found in the realm of
entitatis non claudatur in eius nature, even though the privation of
definitione; et sic nihil prohibet existence is not included in its definition.
imaginari non entia, et eorum formas Here, however, there is no reason why
concipere. we cannot imagine such non-beings and
conceive their forms.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod ex hoc 7. Because evil has no idea in God, God
ipso, quod malum non habet ideam in knows it by means of the idea of the
Deo, a Deo cognoscitur per ideam boni good opposed to it. In this way, evil is
oppositi; et per hunc modum se habet related to His knowledge as though it
ad cognitionem ac si haberet ideam; had an idea-not that the privation of an
non autem ita quod privatio ideae idea stands in the place of an idea,
respondeat ei pro idea, quia in Deo however, because there can be no
privatio esse non potest. privation in God.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod poenae 8. The evil of punishment proceeds from

malum exit a Deo sub ratione ordinis God as part of His order of justice.
iustitiae; et sic bonum est, et ideam Hence, it is good and has an idea in
habet in Deo. Him.

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:

Is there in God an idea of first matter?

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[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 3, ad 3; I Sent., 36, 1, 1.]

Quinto quaeritur utrum materia Difficulties

prima habeat ideam in Deo.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Idea enim, secundum Augustinum, 1. According to Augustine: “An idea is a

forma est. Sed materia prima form.”’ But matter has no form. Therefore, in
nullam habet formam. Ergo idea in God there is no idea corresponding to
Deo nulla ei respondet. matter.

Praeterea, materia non est ens 2. Matter is merely a being in potency. Now,
nisi in potentia. Si ergo idea debet if an idea has to correspond to its effect, if
ideato respondere si habet ideam, matter has an idea, the idea of matter will be
oportet quod eius idea sit in merely in potency. There is, however, no
potentia tantum. Sed in Deum potentiality in God. Therefore, first matter
potentialitas non cadit. Ergo has no idea in Him.
materia prima non habet ideam in
ipso.

Praeterea, ideae sunt in Deo 3. As they exist in God, the ideas are of
eorum quae sunt vel esse those things which are or can be. But first
possunt. Sed materia prima nec matter does not exist separately, that is, by
est per se separata existens, itself, nor can it so exist. Therefore, it has no
neque esse potest. Ergo non idea in God.
habet ideam in Deo.

Praeterea, idea est ut secundum 4. An idea is that according to which a thing

ipsam aliquid formatur. Sed is informed. But first matter can never be
materia prima nunquam potest informed so that a form would belong to its
formari, ita ut forma sit de essentia essence. Therefore, if it did have an idea,
eius. Ergo si haberet ideam, that idea would be useless in God. This,
frustra esset idea illa in Deo; quod however, is absurd.
est absurdum.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Omne quod procedit in esse a 1. Whatever derives its act of existence from
Deo, habet ideam in ipso. Materia God has an idea in God. Matter belongs to
est huiusmodi. Ergo habet ideam this class of beings. Therefore, it has an idea
in Deo. in God.

Praeterea, omnis essentia 2. Every essence is derived from the divine

derivatur ab essentia divina. Ergo essence. Therefore whatever has an
quidquid habet aliquam essence has an exemplar in God. Matter
essentiam, habet ideam in Deo. belongs to this class of beings. Therefore.
Sed materia prima est huiusmodi.
Ergo, et cetera.

Responsio. REPLY

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Dicendum, quod Plato, qui Plato, who was the first to speak about
invenitur primo locutus fuisse de ideas, did not posit any idea for first matter,
ideis, non posuit materiae primae because he asserted that the ideas were the
aliquam ideam, quia ipse ponebat causes of the things modeled upon them,
ideas ut causas ideatorum; and first matter is not caused by an idea but,
materia autem prima non erat instead, is its co-cause. For he said that
causatum ideae, sed erat ei there are two principles to be found in
concausa. Posuit enim duo matter, “the great” and “the small,” but only
principia ex parte materiae, scilicet on principle to be found in form, namely, the
magnum et parvum; sed unum ex idea. We, however, assert that matter is
parte formae, scilicet ideam. Nos caused by God. Hence, it is necessary to
autem ponimus materiam esse affirm that it exemplar in some way exists in
causatam a Deo; unde necesse God, since He possesses a likeness o
est ponere quod aliquo modo sit whatever He causes.
eius idea in Deo, cum quidquid ab
ipso causatur, similitudinem ipsius
utcumque retineat. \

Sed tamen, si proprie de idea On the other hand, if we take idea in its strict
loquamur, non potest poni quod sense, we cannot say that first matter of
materia prima habeat per se itself has an idea in God that is distinct from
ideam in Deo distinctam ab idea the idea of the form or of the composite. For
formae vel compositi: quia idea an idea, properly speaking is related to a
proprie dicta respicit rem thing in so far as it can be brought into
secundum quod est producibilis in existence; an matter cannot come into
esse; materia autem non potest existence without a form, nor can a form
exire in esse sine forma, nec e come into existence without matter. Hence,
converso. Unde proprie idea non properly speaking, there is no idea
respondet materiae tantum, neque corresponding merely to matter or merely to
formae tantum; sed toti composito form; but one idea corresponds to the entire
respondet una idea, quae est composite—an idea that causes the whole,
factiva totius et quantum ad both its form and its matter. On the other
formam et quantum ad materiam. hand, if we take idea in its broader sense as
Si autem large accipiamus ideam meaning an intelligible character or likeness,
pro similitudine vel ratione, tunc then both matter and form of themselves can
illa possunt per se distinctam be said to have an idea by which they can be
habere ideam quae possunt known distinctly, even though they cannot
distincte considerari, quamvis exist separately. In this sense, there is no
separatim esse non possint; et sic reason why there cannot be an idea of first
nihil prohibet materiae primae matter, even taken in itself.
etiam secundum se ideam esse.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod 1. Although first matter has no form, there is
quamvis materia prima sit in it an imitation of the first form; for, even
informis, tamen inest ei imitatio though its act of existence may be very
primae formae: quantumcumque feeble, it is an imitation of the first being. For
enim debile esse habeat, illud this reason, its likeness can be in God.
tamen est imitatio primi entis; et
secundum hoc potest habere
similitudinem in Deo.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod 2. The idea and its copy need not be similar
ideam et ideatum non oportet esse according to a conformity in nature. It is
similia secundum conformitatem enough that one represent the other. For this
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naturae, sed secundum reason, the idea of even composite things is

repraesentationem tantum; unde simple, and, similarly, the idea of a potential
et rerum compositarum est being is actual.
simplex idea; et similiter existentis
in potentia est idealis similitudo
actu.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod 3, Even though matter cannot exist by itself,

quamvis materia secundum se it can be considered in itself. Thus, it can, in
esse non possit, tamen potest itself, have a likeness.
secundum se considerari; et sic
potest habere per se
similitudinem.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio 4. That argument refers to the idea inasmuch
illa procedit de idea practica actu as it is actually or virtually practical, and is
vel virtute, quae est rei prout est in related to a thing in so far as it can be
esse producibilis; et talis idea brought into being. First matter does not
materiae primae non convenit. have an idea of this kind.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

Ad primum quod in contrarium 1. Matter derives its act of existence from

obiicitur, dicendum, quod materia God only in so far as it is part of a
non procedit in esse a Deo nisi in composite. In this sense, it does not,
composito; et sic ei idea, proprie properly speaking, have an idea in God.
loquendo, respondet.

Et similiter dicendum ad 2. Similarly, matter does not properly have

secundum, quod materia, proprie an essence. It is, rather, part of the essence
loquendo, non habet essentiam, of the whole.
sed est pars essentiae totius.

ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:

Are there ideas in god of those things which do not exist, will not exist, and
have not existed?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 3, ad 2. See also readings given for q. 2, a. 8.]

Sexto quaeritur utrum in Deo sit idea Difficulties

eorum quae nec sunt, nec erunt, nec
fuerunt.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia nihil habet ideam nisi quod 1. Nothing has an idea in God unless it
habet esse determinatum. Sed illud has a determined act of existence. But
quod nec fuit, nec est, nec erit, nullo that which does not exist, never has
modo habet esse terminatum. Ergo existed, and never will exist has no
nec ideam. determinate act of existence at all.

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Therefore, neither does it have an idea in

God.

Sed dicebat, quod quamvis non 2. But it was said that, even though it does
habeat esse terminatum in se, habet not have a determinate act of existence in
tamen esse terminatum in Deo. Sed itself, it has, nevertheless, such a
contra, ex hoc est aliquid terminatum determinate act in God.—On the contrary,
quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Sed a thing is determinate in so far as it is
omnia, prout sunt in Deo, sunt unum, distinguished from another. But all things
et ab invicem indistincta. Ergo nec as they exist in God are one and are not
etiam in Deo habet esse terminatum. distinct from each other. Therefore, even
in God it does not have a determinate act
of existence.

Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, quod 3. According to Dionysius, exemplars are

exemplaria sunt divinae et bonae those good acts of the divine will which
voluntates, quae sunt cause and predetermine things. But the
praedeterminativae et effectivae things which are not, have not been, nor
rerum. Sed illud quod nec fuit, nec will be were never predetermined by the
est, nec erit, nunquam fuit divine will. Therefore, they do not have an
praedeterminatum a divina voluntate. idea or exemplar in God.
Ergo non habet ideam vel exemplar
in Deo.

Praeterea, idea ordinatur ad rei 4. An idea is ordained to the production of

productionem. Si ergo sit idea eius a thing. If there is, therefore, an idea of
quod nunquam in esse producitur, something which will never be given
videtur quod sit frustra; quod est existence, it seems that such an idea is
absurdum; ergo et cetera. useless. But this would be absurd.
Therefore.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Deus habet cognitionem de rebus 1. God knows things by means of ideas.

per ideas. Sed ipse cognoscit ea But as we said above. He knows those
quae nec sunt, nec erunt, nec things which are not, have not been, nor
fuerunt, ut dictum est supra in will be. Therefore, there is an idea in God
quaestione de scientia Dei. Ergo est of all that does not exist, has not existed
in eo idea etiam eorum quae nec and never will exist.
sunt, nec fuerunt, nec erunt.

Praeterea, causa non dependet ab 2. A cause does not depend on its effect.
effectu. Sed idea est causa essendi Now, an idea is a cause o the existence of
rem. Ergo non dependet ab esse rei things. Therefore, it does not depend in
aliquo modo: potest igitur esse etiam any way on their existence. Consequently,
de his quae nec sunt, nec erunt, nec there can be ideas of those things which
fuerunt. do not exist, have not existed, and never
will exist.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod idea proprie dicta Properly speaking, an idea belongs to

respicit practicam cognitionem non practical knowledge that is not only
solum in actu, sed in habitu. Unde, actually but also habitually practical.
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cum Deus de his quae facere potest, Therefore, since God has virtually
quamvis nunquam sint facta nec practical knowledge of those things which
futura, habeat cognitionem virtualiter He could make, even though He never
practicam, relinquitur quod idea makes them or never will make them,
possit esse eius quod nec est, nec there must be ideas of those things which
fuit, nec erit; non tamen eodem modo are not, have not been, nor will be. But
sicut est eorum quae sunt, vel erunt, these ideas will not be the same as those
vel fuerunt; quia ad ea quae sunt, vel of the things which are, have been, or will
erunt, vel fuerunt, producenda, be, because the divine will determines to
determinatur ex proposito divinae pro duce the things that are, have been,
voluntatis, non autem ad ea quae and will be, but not to produce those
nec sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt; et which neither are, have been, nor will be.
sic huiusmodi habent quodammodo The latter, therefore have, in a certain
indeterminatas ideas. sense, indeterminate ideas.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod 1. Even though that which never existed,
quamvis quod nec est, nec fuit, nec does not exist, and will no exist lacks a
erit, non habeat esse determinatum determined act of existence in itself, it
in se, est tamen determinate in Dei exists determinately in God’s knowledge.
cognitione.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliud 2. It is One thing to be in God, another to

est esse in Deo, et aliud in cognitione be in His knowledge. Evil is not in God; it
Dei: malum enim non est in Deo, sed is, however, contained in His knowledge.
est in scientia Dei. Secundum hoc Now, a,, thing is said to be in God’s
enim aliquid esse dicitur in Dei knowledge if God knows it; and because
scientia quod a Deo cognoscitur; et God knows all things distinctly, as we said
quia Deus cognoscit omnia distincte, in the previous question, things are
ut in praecedenti quaestione dictum distinct in His knowledge even though in
est, ideo in eius scientia res Him they are one,
distinctae sunt, quamvis in ipso sint
unum.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis 3. Even though God may never will to
Deus nunquam voluerit producere bring into existence things of this class,
huiusmodi res in esse quarum ideas whose ideas He possesses, He wills that
habet, tamen vult se posse eas He be able to produce them and that He
producere, et se habere scientiam possess the knowledge necessary for
eas producendi; unde et Dionysius producing them. Consequently, Dionysius
non dicit quod ad rationem is saying that the nature of an exemplar
exemplaris exigeretur voluntas demands, not a will that is predefining and
praedefiniens et efficiens, sed effecting, but merely a will that can define
definitiva et effectiva. and effect.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod ideae 4. Those ideas are not directed by God’s
illae non sunt ordinatae a divina knowledge to the production of something
cognitione ad hoc ut secundum eas in their likeness, but rather to this, that
aliquid fiat, sed ad hoc quod something can be produced in their
secundum eas aliquid fieri possit. likeness.

ARTICLE VII
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In the seventh article we ask:

Are there in God ideas of accidents?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 3, ad 4; I Sent., 36, 1, 1.]

Septimo quaeritur utrum accidentia Difficulties

habeant ideam in Deo.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia idea non est nisi ad 1. An idea is for knowing and causing
cognoscendum et ad causandum res. things. But an accident is known by
Sed accidens cognoscitur per means of its substance, and is caused by
substantiam, et ex eius principiis the principles of the substance. Hence, it
causatur. Ergo non oportet quod in need not have an idea in God.
Deo ideam habeat.

Sed dicebat, quod accidens 2. But it was stated that the existence, not
cognoscitur per substantiam the essence, of an accident is known by
cognitione quia est, non autem means of its subject.—On the contrary,
cognitione quid est.- Sed contra, quod the definition of a thing signifies what it is,
quid est significat definitio rei, et especially by giving its genus. But, in the
maxime ratione generis. Sed in definitions of accidents, as is said in the
definitionibus accidentium ponitur Metaphysics, are placed substance and
substantia, ut dicitur VII the subject, in the sense in which subject
Metaphysicor., et subiectum, ita quod is used instead of the genus, as the
subiectum ponitur loco generis, ut Commentator notes. For example, we
Commentator ibidem dicit, ut cum say: “Snub means a curved nose.”
dicitur: simum est nasus curvus. Ergo Consequently, we know the essence of
etiam quantum ad cognitionem quid an accident by knowing the substance.
est accidens per substantiam
cognoscitur.

Praeterea, omne quod habet ideam, 3. Whatever has an idea participates in it.
est participativum ipsius. Sed But accidents do not participate in
accidentia nihil participant; cum anything, because participation is proper
participare sit tantum substantiarum, only to substances since they alone can
quae aliquid recipere possunt; ergo receive something. Accidents, therefore,
non habent ideam. do not have ideas.

Praeterea, in illis quae dicuntur per 4. In regard to those things that are
prius et posterius, non est accipere predicated as prior and subsequent, in
ideam communem, sicut in numeris et Plato’s opinion an idea should not be
figuris, secundum opinionem Platonis, taken as common, e.g., as applied to
ut patet in III Metaphys. et in I Ethic.; numbers and geometrical figures. This is
et hoc ideo quia primum est quasi clear from the Metaphysics and Ethics.
idea secundi. Sed ens dicitur de The reason for this is that the first is, as it
substantia et accidente per prius et were, the exemplar of the second. Now,
posterius. Ergo accidens non habet being is predicated of substance and
ideam sed substantia est ei loco accident as prior and subsequent.
ideae. Therefore, an accident does not have an
idea, but has substance in the place of an
idea.

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Sed contra. To the Contrary

Omne quod est causatum a Deo, 1. Whatever is caused by God has its
habet ideam in ipso. Sed Deus causa idea in God. Now, God causes not only
est non solum substantiarum, sed substances but accidents as well.
etiam accidentium. Ergo accidentia Therefore, accidents have an idea in
habent ideam in Deo. God.

Praeterea, omne quod est in aliquo 2. Every inferior of a genus should be

genere, oportet reduci in primum illius reduced to the first of that genus, just as
generis, sicut omne calidum ad everything that is hot is reduced to the
calidum ignis. Sed ideae sunt heat of fire. Now, as Augustine says:
principales formae, ut Augustinus dicit “Ideas are principal forms.” Consequently,
in libro LXXXIII quaestionum. Ergo, since accidents are forms, it seems that
cum accidentia sint formae quaedam, they have ideas in God.
videtur quod habeant ideas in Deo.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod Plato, qui primus As the Philosopher says, Plato, who first
introduxit ideas, non posuit ideas introduced the notion of ideas, posited
accidentium, sed solum ideas, not for accidents, but only for
substantiarum, ut patet per substances. The reason for this was that
philosophum in I Metaphys. Cuius Plato thought that the ideas were the
ratio fuit, quia Plato posuit ideas esse proximate causes of things. Hence, when
proximas causas rerum; unde illud cui he found a proximate cause other than an
inveniebat proximam causam praeter idea for a thing, he held that the thing did
ideam, non ponebat habere ideam; et not have an idea. This also is the reason
inde est quod ponebat, in his quae why he said that there is no common idea
dicuntur per prius et posterius, non for those things that are predicated as
esse communem ideam, sed primum being prior and subsequent, but that the
esse ideam secundi. Et hanc etiam first is the idea of the second. Dionysius
opinionem tangit Dionysius, in V cap. also mentions this opinion, attributing it to
de divinis nominibus, imponens eam a certain Clement the Philosopher, who
cuidam Clementi philosopho, qui said that superior beings were the
dicebat, superiora in entibus esse exemplars for inferior. Using this
inferiorum exemplaria; et hac ratione, argument, namely, that accidents are
cum accidens immediate a substantia caused directly by substances, Plato did
causetur, accidentium ideas Plato non not posit ideas of accidents.
posuit.

Sed quia nos ponimus Deum On the other hand, since we affirm that
immediatam causam uniuscuiusque God is the direct cause of each and every
rei secundum quod in omnibus causis thing because He works in all secondary
secundis operatur, et quod omnes causes and since all secondary effects
effectus secundi ex eius are results of His pre-definition, we posit
praedefinitione proveniant: ideo non ideas in Him not only of first beings but
solum primorum entium, sed etiam also of second beings, and, consequently,
secundorum in eo ideas ponimus et both of substances and of accidents, but
sic substantiarum et accidentium; sed of different accidents in different ways.
diversorum accidentium diversimode.

Quaedam enim sunt accidentia First, there are proper accidents, which
propria ex principiis subiecti causata, are caused by the principles of their
quae secundum esse nunquam a suis subjects and never have existence apart
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subiectis separantur. Et huiusmodi from their subjects. These accidents are

una operatione in esse producuntur brought into existence together with their
cum suo subiecto. Unde, cum idea, subject by one operation. Consequently,
proprie loquendo, sit forma rei since an idea, properly speaking, is a
operabilis inquantum huiusmodi, non form of something that can be made,
erit talium accidentium idea distincta, considered precisely under this aspect,
sed subiecti cum omnibus there will not be distinct ideas of such
accidentibus eius erit una idea; sicut accidents. There will be only one idea,
aedificator unam formam habet de that of the subject with all its accidents—
domo et omnibus quae domui just as an architect has one form of a
accidunt inquantum huiusmodi, per house and of all the accidents that pertain
quam, domum cum omnibus talibus to a house as such, and by means of this
suis accidentibus simul in esse one form brings into being the house and
producit, cuiusmodi accidens est all its accidents, such as its square shape
quadratura ipsius, et alia huiusmodi. and the like.

Quaedam vero sunt accidentia, quae There are other accidents, however, that
non sequuntur inseparabiliter suum are not inseparable from their subject and
subiectum, nec ex eius principiis do not depend on its principles. These
dependent. Et talia producuntur in are brought into existence by an
esse alia operatione praeter operation other than that by which the
operationem qua producitur subject is produced. For example, it does
subiectum; sicut non ex hoc ipso not follow from the fact that a man is
quod homo fit homo sequitur quod sit made a man that he is a grammarian; this
grammaticus, sed per aliquam aliam is the result of another operation. Now,
operationem. Et talium accidentium the ideas in God of such accidents are
est idea in Deo distincta ab idea distinct from the idea of the subject, just
subiecti, sicut etiam artifex concipit as the form of a picture of a house, which
formam picturae domus praeter an artist conceives, is distinct from the
formam domus. form he conceives of the house itself.

Sed si large accipiamus ideam pro If we take idea in its broader sense,
similitudine vel ratione, sic utraque however, as meaning a likeness, then we
accidentia habent ideam distinctam in can say that both types of accidents have
Deo, quia per se distincte considerari distinct ideas in God, because He can
possunt; unde et philosophus dicit in I know each one in itself distinctly. This is
Metaphysic., quod quantum ad why the Philosopher says that, with
rationem sciendi, accidentia debent respect to their manner of being known,
habere ideam sicut et substantiae; accidents should, like substances, have
sed quantum ad alia, propter quae ideas; but with respect to the other
Plato ponebat ideas, ut scilicet essent reasons why Plato posited exemplars,
causae generationis et essendi, ideae namely, to be the causes of generation
videntur esse substantiarum tantum. and of being, it seems that only
substances have ideas.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod, 1. As we said above, there is in God an

sicut dictum est, in Deo non est idea idea not only of first effects but also of
solum primorum effectuum, sed etiam second effects. Hence, even though
secundorum; unde, quamvis accidents have their act of existence by
accidentia habeant esse per means of substances, this does not
substantiam, non excluditur quin prevent their having ideas.
habeant ideas.

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Ad secundum dicendum, quod 2. An accident can be taken in two ways.

accidens dupliciter potest accipi. Uno First, it can be taken in the abstract. In
modo in abstracto; et sic consideratur this way, it is considered according to its
secundum propriam rationem; sic proper nature, a genus and species are
enim assignamus in accidentibus given it, and its subject is not placed in its
genus et speciem; et hoc modo definition as a genus but rather as a
subiectum non ponitur in definitione specific difference. In this sense we say:
accidentis ut genus, sed ut differentia, “Snubness is a curvature of the nose.” On
ut cum dicitur: simitas est curvitas the other hand, an accident can be taken
nasi. Alio modo possunt accipi in in the concrete. In this way, it is
concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum considered according as it has an
quod sunt unum per accidens cum accidental unity with its subject. Hence,
subiecto; unde sic non assignantur neither a genus nor a species is assigned
eis nec genus nec species, et ita to it. Here it is true that the subject is put
verum est quod subiectum ponitur ut in the place of the genus in the definition
genus in definitione accidentis. of an accident.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod, quamvis 3. Although an accident is not that which

accidens non sit participans, est participates, it is, however, a participation.
tamen ipsa participatio; et sic patet Hence, it is clear that in God there is an
quod ei etiam respondet idea in Deo, idea or likeness corresponding to it.
vel similitudo.

Ad quartum patet responsio ex dictis. 4. The response to this difficulty is clear

from what has been said.

ARTICLE VIII

In the eighth article we ask:

Are there in God ideas of singulars?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 15, 3, ad 4; De ver., 2, aa. 4-5.]

Octavo quaeritur utrum singularia Difficulties

habeant ideam in Deo.

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia singularia sunt infinita in 1. Singulars are potentially infinite in

potentia. Sed in Deo est idea non number. Now, in God there is an idea, not
solum eius quod est, sed etiam eius merely of what exists, but also of what
quod esse potest. Si ergo singularium can exist. If, therefore, there were ideas
esset idea in Deo, essent in ipso of singulars in God, there would be an
ideae infinitae; quod videtur infinite number of ideas in Him. This
absurdum, cum non possint esse actu seems absurd, since they could not be
infinita. actually infinite.

Praeterea, si singularia habent ideam 2. If singulars have ideas in God, either

in Deo; aut est eadem idea singularis there is one idea for the individual and
et speciei, aut alia et alia. Si alia et the species, or there are distinct ideas for
alia: tunc unius rei sunt multae ideae them. If there were distinct ideas, then
in Deo, quia idea speciei est etiam there would be many ideas in God for
idea singularis. Si autem est una et one thing, because the idea of the
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eadem; cum in idea speciei omnia species is also that of the individual. On
singularia quae sunt eadem specie, the other hand, if there is but one and the
conveniant, tunc omnium singularium same idea for the individual and the
non erit nisi una idea tantum; et sic species, then, since all the individuals of
singularia non habebunt ideam the same species have the same idea,
distinctam in Deo. there would be only one idea for all, and,
consequently, singulars would not have
distinct ideas in God.

Praeterea, multa singularium casu 3. Many singulars happen by chance.

accidunt. Sed talia non sunt Now, such beings are not predefined.
praedefinita. Cum ergo idea requirat Since, as is evident from what has been
praedefinitionem, ut ex praedictis, said previously, namely, that an idea
patet, videtur quod non omnia postulates pre-definition, it seems that not
singularia habeant ideam in Deo. all singulars have an idea in God.

Praeterea, quaedam singularia sunt 4. Certain singulars are combinations of

ex duabus speciebus commixta, sicut two species. For example, a mule is a
mulus ex asino et equo. Si ergo talia combination of a horse and an ass. Now,
habent ideam, videtur quod unicuique if such things had ideas in God, it would
eorum respondeat duplex idea; et hoc seem that there would be two ideas for
videtur absurdum, cum inconveniens each one. This seems absurd, since it is
sit ponere multitudinem in causa, et unreasonable to affirm multiplicity in the
unitatem in effectu. cause and unity in the effect.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Ideae sunt in Deo ad cognoscendum 1. Ideas are in God for the purpose of
et operandum. Sed Deus est cognitor knowing and making. But God is one who
et operator singularium. Ergo in ipso knows and makes singulars. Therefore,
sunt eorum ideae. there are in God ideas of singulars.

Praeterea, ideae ordinantur ad esse 2. Ideas are directed to the existence of

rerum. Sed singularia habent verius things. But singulars have acts of
esse quam universalia, cum existence more truly than universals do,
universalia non subsistant, nisi in because the latter subsist only in
singularibus. Ergo singularia magis singulars. Therefore, it is more necessary
debent habere ideas quam for singulars to have exemplars than it is
universalia. for universals.

REPLY

Responsio. Dicendum, quod Plato, Plato did not posit ideas of singulars but
non posuit ideas singularium, sed only of species. There were two reasons
specierum tantum; cuius duplex fuit for this. First, according to him, ideas did
ratio. Una, quia, secundum ipsum, not cause the matter but only the forms of
ideae non erant factivae materiae, things here below. Now, the principle of
sed formae tantum in his inferioribus. individuation is matter, and it is because
Singularitatis autem principium est of the form that each singular is placed
materia; secundum formam vero under a species. Consequently, his ideas
unumquodque singulare collocatur in did not correspond to a singular in so far
specie; et ideo idea non respondet as it is singular but only by reason of its
singulari inquantum singulare est, sed species. His second reason may have
ratione speciei tantum. Alia ratio esse been this: An idea is related only to those
potuit, quia idea non est nisi eorum things that are intended directly, as is
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quae per se sunt intenta, ut ex dictis, clear from what was said. But the
patet. Intentio autem naturae est intention of nature is principally to
principaliter ad speciem preserve the species. Consequently, even
conservandam; unde, quamvis though generation terminates in this or in
generatio terminetur ad hunc that man, the intention of nature is simply
hominem, tamen intentio naturae est to generate man. For this reason, the
quod generet hominem. Et propter Philosopher also says that final causes
hoc etiam philosophus dicit in XIX de should be assigned for the accidents
animalibus, quod in accidentibus common to a species, but not for the
specierum sunt assignandae causae accidents found in singulars. For the
finales, non autem in accidentibus latter, only efficient and material causes
singularium, sed efficientes et can be assigned; consequently, an idea
materiales tantum; et ideo idea non does not correspond to a singular but to a
respondet singulari, sed speciei. Et species. Using the same argument,
eadem ratione Plato non ponebat moreover, Plato did not posit-‘ ideas for
ideas generum, quia intentio naturae genera, alleging that nature does not
non terminatur ad productionem intend to produce the form of a genus but
formae generis, sed solum formae only that of a species. We, however,
speciei. Nos autem ponimus Deum assert that God is the cause of singulars,
causam esse singularis et quantum both of their form and of their matter. We
ad formam et quantum ad materiam. also assert that all individual things are
Ponimus etiam, quod per divinam determined by His divine providence.
providentiam definiuntur omnia Hence, we must also posit ideas for all
singularia; et ideo oportet nos etiam singulars.
singularium ponere ideas.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod 1. Ideas are multiplied only in so far as

ideae non plurificantur nisi secundum they have different relations to things. As
diversos respectus ad res: non est Avicenna says, however, it is not
autem inconveniens relationes contradictory to multiply conceptual
rationis in infinitum multiplicari, ut relations infinitely.
Avicenna dicit.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod si 2. If we speak of idea in the proper

loquamur de idea proprie, secundum sense, namely, inasmuch as it is the idea
quod est rei, eo modo quo est in esse of a thing in so far as that thing is capable
producibilis; sic una idea respondet of being produced, then there is but one
singulari, speciei, et generi, idea for the singular, the species, the
individuatis in ipso singulari, eo quod genus, and for whatever is individuated in
Socrates, homo et animal non that singular, because Socrates the man
distinguuntur secundum esse. Si and Socrates the animal do not have
autem accipiamus ideam communiter separate acts of existence. If, however,
pro similitudine vel ratione, sic, cum we are speaking of idea in its broader
diversa sit consideratio Socratis ut sense of a likeness or intelligible
Socrates est, et ut homo est, et ut est character, then, since the considerations
animal, respondebunt ei secundum of Socrates as Socrates, as a man, and
hoc plures ideae vel similitudines. as an animal all differ, a number of ideas
or likenesses will correspond to him in
this respect.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis 3. Although some things may happen by

aliquid sit a casu respectu proximi chance with respect to their proximate
agentis, nihil tamen est a casu agent, nothing happens by chance with

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respectu agentis qui omnia respect to the agent who knows all things
praecognoscit. beforehand.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod mulus 4. The mule has a separate species,

habet speciem mediam inter asinum halfway between that of a horse and that
et equum; unde non est in duabus of an ass. Therefore, the mule is not in
speciebus, sed in una tantum, quae two species but in one. This fact is due to
est effecta per commixtionem the mixture of seeds, because the
seminum, inquantum virtus activa generative powers of the male cannot
maris non potuit perducere materiam bring the material provided by the female
feminae ad terminos propriae speciei to the perfection of his own species, since
perfectae, propter materiae the material is outside his own species;
extraneitatem, sed perduxit ad aliquid so, instead, the male brings it to a term
propinquum suae speciei; et ideo that is close to his species. For this
eadem ratione assignatur idea mulo reason, a separate idea is assigned to
et equo. the mule and to the horse.

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