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One (Partially) Non-Privative Account of Natural Evil Is Hedonism. Hedonism Says Pleasure Is Good, and Pain and The Absence of Pleasure Are Both Evil

1. Philo believes that the creator of the world is indifferent to good and evil based on the observation that both good and evil exist in the world in a mixed form. 2. Calder objects to the idea that evil is merely the absence of good, known as the privation theory of evil, because it cannot account for certain evils like pain and cruelty and is not better justified than a privation theory of good. 3. Augustine defends the privation theory by arguing that all of God's creation is good and evil is just the absence of good, like how disease is an absence of health, though not every lack of goodness constitutes evil.

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34 views

One (Partially) Non-Privative Account of Natural Evil Is Hedonism. Hedonism Says Pleasure Is Good, and Pain and The Absence of Pleasure Are Both Evil

1. Philo believes that the creator of the world is indifferent to good and evil based on the observation that both good and evil exist in the world in a mixed form. 2. Calder objects to the idea that evil is merely the absence of good, known as the privation theory of evil, because it cannot account for certain evils like pain and cruelty and is not better justified than a privation theory of good. 3. Augustine defends the privation theory by arguing that all of God's creation is good and evil is just the absence of good, like how disease is an absence of health, though not every lack of goodness constitutes evil.

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cotten
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Study Guide #1

1. Philo thinks the best reason for why we have a mix of good and evil in the world is that
there our creator is indifferent to us. He believes the first two options of a completely
benevolent creator and a completely malevolent creator do not explain the mixed
phenomena that occurs since these two are unmixed principles. The third option of
having two warring gods/creators, one completely good and the other completely evil,
does not fit our reality either because of the steadiness and uniformity of general laws.
Therefore, the fourth option of having an indifferent creator is more probable because to
Philo the first causes of the universe are neutral with regard to good and evil.
2. The privation theory of evil is that evil has no positive existence but is actually the
absence of something, like good. Calder objects the privation theory of evil because it
doesn’t really help solve the problem of evil. One reason is that it cannot account for
certain evils, like pain and cruelty. The second is that the privation theory of evil is no
better justified than a privation theory of good is.
3. St. Augustine defends the privation theory of evil by believing all of God’s creation is
good, and evil is just the absence of that good. Then gives examples like how disease is
an absence of health and injustice is an absence of justice. Although, he thought not
every lack of goodness is evil, it must be a lack of an appropriate goodness. Humans
ought to act virtuously, so a lack of virtue (vice) is an evil.
4. Calder supposes moral evils like cruelty. Some argue that they are privations in that
they are nonfulfillment of duties. We normally regard the intentional and wrongful taking
of life (murder) to be morally worse than simply not helping people who are starving in
distant countries. So murder must be a greater nonfulfillment of duties. One (partially)
non-privative account of natural evil is hedonism. Hedonism says pleasure is good, and
pain and the absence of pleasure are both evil.
5. Leibniz’s believed the proposition (P), that if a perfectly good moral agent created any
world at all, it would have to be the very best world it could create. Adams does not think
that the ethical views predominant in the Judeo-Christian tradition need to accept (P).
Adams will assume for the sake of argument that there is a best of all possible worlds,
but he says there is little reason to believe that there is such a thing. But, assuming there
is a greatest possible world, would God have to choose that one to be morally perfect?

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